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OF

1857-8.

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KAYE'S AND MALLESON'S HISTORY
OF THE
INDIAN MUTINY
OF
1857-8

EDITED BY COLONEL MALLESON C.S.I.

IN SIX VOLUMES

VOL. III.

By COLONEL MALLESON, C.S.I.



NEW IMPRESSION

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Wm. H. Storer

TO
MAJOR-GENERAL
SIR VINCENT EYRE, K.C.S.I., C.B.

A FRIENDSHIP OF THIRTY YEARS'
DURATION, THE VALUE OF WHICH I NEED NOT
HERE ESTIMATE, IS MY SOLE, BUT SUFFICIENT, REASON
FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE MOST GRACEFUL
PRIVILEGE OF AN AUTHOR, IN DEDICATING TO YOU THESE
PAGES, WHEREIN YOUR NAME OCCUPIES
A CONSPICUOUS PLACE IN CONNECTION WITH THE
MEMORABLE EVENTS WHICH I HAVE
ENDEAVOURED, FAITHFULLY AND IMPARTIALLY,
TO RECORD.

PREFACE TO THE CABINET EDITION.

IN offering this volume to the public I take the opportunity of stating that I have re-read and re-examined all the documents and authorities on which the first edition was based; and that, while I have found it impossible to change the opinions then recorded with respect to any one phase of the history or any one individual therein mentioned I have re-written many passages which seemed obscure, and have added notes on all points, the meaning of which might be misinterpreted. If I may judge from the criticisms which appeared on the previous editions, there were but two matters on which any difference of opinion really existed. The first of these differences related to the case of Mr. William Tayler of Patná; the other to Lieutenant-General Lionel Showers. The second of these I have treated alike in the text and in the Appendix. The first needs some further remark here.

The treatment in this edition of the occurrences of 1857 in the Bihár division of which Patná was the capital and Mr. William Tayler the Commissioner, stands precisely as it did in the first edition. When I first wrote on this subject in the year of the Mutiny, in a work which obtained honourable mention as "The Red Pamphlet," not only did I not know Mr. Tayler, but I had felt a strong prejudice against him, based upon his reputation as a caricaturist. In the presence, however, of facts which I witnessed on the spot, all my prejudices disappeared, and when I wrote of him, still not knowing him, I strove to render him the justice which his splendid conduct under most trying circumstances seemed to me to deserve.

Called upon, twenty years later, to complete the work which

Sir John Kaye had left unfinished, I again approached the subject with a mind absolutely unbiased. I had never looked forward to the prospect of writing a History of the Mutiny, and I had not concerned myself with Mr. Tayler's case since the days of the "Red Pamphlet." I determined then to study the subject *de novo*, and to record only such facts as would stand the test of the most minute inquiry. Had I been capable of being biased by my interests, I should not have inclined towards Mr. Tayler, for while he, comparatively poor, and possessing few influential friends, sat in the cold shade of the displeasure of the ruling powers, his opponent, Sir Frederick Halliday, basked in the warm sunshine of a seat in the Indian Council. But I thought only of finding out the truth, and of submitting the results of my investigations to my fellow-countrymen. The end of it was that my investigations confirmed the impressions which had been made upon me and upon all the independent minds of Calcutta and Bihâr in 1857. I had the satisfaction also of knowing that the same process had led minds such as those of Sir Herbert Edwardes, Sir John Low, Sir Vincent Eyre, Sir Henry Havelock, and most of the chief actors in the Mutiny, to the same conclusion; that Sir John Kaye, with all the resources of the India Office at his disposal, had recorded a similar verdict. Subsequently other gentlemen who approached the subject from a different standpoint—Mr. T. R. E. Holmes on the one side, and Captain Lionel Trotter on the other—equally resolved to search out the truth and to record it, were impelled to the same conviction. The evidence, in fact, is overwhelming; it has never been met; it is incontrovertible.

Ten years have elapsed since the volume containing my deliberate conclusions on the Tayler-Halliday question was published. Those conclusions were not questioned by a single critic. It soon appeared, in fact, that the minds of the thinking portion of the people of England had previously arrived at the conclusion that a great miscarriage of justice had occurred. My book was the spark which kindled that feeling into action; for, shortly afterwards, several members of the House of Commons, representing a very much larger body of men outside, petitioned the Government for an inquiry into the circumstances connected with the removal of Mr. Tayler from the office which he had held with such enormous advantages to the country. Amongst those who signed that petition was the present Under Secretary to the India Office, Sir John Gorst.

But, although, as I have said, ten years have elapsed, no inquiry has been allowed. The Government of the day, whichever side was in power, has always shirked the question. When, in the course of last year, Sir Roper Lethbridge and Sir Henry Havelock did ask for an inquiry, their demand was at once met by putting forward a side-issue, and by successfully persuading the House of Commons that this side-issue was the main issue. The arguments for the main issue, ably put by the gentlemen whose names I have mentioned, were left absolutely unanswered. They were not even referred to. The action of Sir John Gorst on this occasion reminded me of the action of a certain Counsel for the Crown, who, desiring to move the court against the pardon of a man who had been wrongfully transported for life, remarked, that whatever might be the merits of the case on which the man had been transported, it could not be denied that when he was a boy he had stolen an apple!

There can be no stronger testimony to the soundness of Mr. Tayler's case than the persistency with which Officialdom has always declined and still declines to meet it fairly.

Apart from this case and from the solitary objection of General Showers to the "merciful silence" with which I treated him in previous editions, there is no criticism which calls for remark. In many places the additions I have made are tantamount to a re-writing; I have endeavoured, in fact, as far as possible, to make the work complete. Conscious of the spirit in which it has been written, and the long labour freely given, I would fain hope that this volume, its predecessors, and its successors may find a permanent place on the shelves of those who are desirous of possessing a true record of the events of the great Indian Mutiny.

G. B. MALLESON.

27, West Cromwell Road,

February 14, 1889.

LIST AND SHORT DESCRIPTION OF PLACES MENTIONED IN THIS, AND NOT DESCRIBED IN THE PRECEDING VOLUME.



- ÁBÚ**, Mount, a sanitarium in the Sirohí principality of Rájputáná. The highest peak is 5,700 feet above the sea. It is forty miles from Díśá.
- AJMÍR**, the division of, is separated from the bulk of the north-western provinces by Jaipúr, Tonk, and other allied states. Its area is 2,672 square miles, and its population, in 1857, was 415,000 souls. The south-western part of it is called Mairwára. The chief town, also called Ajmír, lies at the foot of a fortified hill, on which is the mausoleum of the first Muhammadan saint of India, Muínuddín Chishtí, of Sijistán, to whose tomb Akbar and his successors frequently made pilgrimages.
- ALÍGARH**, a district containing 1,860 square miles. The chief town, also called Alígarh, is defended by a fort, which was stormed by Lord Lake in 1803. It is on the high road between Kánhpúr and Míráth.
- ALWAR**, a native state in Rájputáná, north of Jaipúr, and west of Mathurá. Area, 3,573 square miles; population, 700,000. The chief town, Alwar, has a fort.
- AURANGÁBÁD**, a city in the dominions of the Nizam, on the Dúdhná; is famous for its manufacture of silks, brocades, and tissues, and for its gardens. It lies 250 miles north-east of Bombay.
- ÁRAH**, chief town of the district of Sháhábád, in the division of Patná.
- BUDÁUN**, a district in the Rohilkhand division. The chief town is also called Budáun.
- BHARATPÚR**, the district of, in Rájputáná, is bounded to the west by Alwar; to the south by Jaipúr, Karaulí, Dholpúr, and Ágra district; to the east by Mathurá and Ágra; and to the north by the Panjáb. The inhabitants are principally Játs. The chief town, also called Bharatpúr, is famous for the sieges it sustained against Lord Lake and Lord Combermere.
- BHOPÁL**, a native state in Málwá, ruled over by a Muhammadan lady. The Narbadá forms its southern boundary. The chief town, near the Betwá, is also called Bhopál.
- CHAMBAL**, the river, rises near Máu, flows by the towns of Kotá and Dholpúr, and falls into the Jamnah forty miles below Itáwah.

- DHOLPÚR**, a native state in Rájputáná. The capital, of the same name, possesses several fine mosques and mansoleums, built by Sádik Khán, an officer of Akbar. The stato is bounded on the north and north-east by the Ágra distriet; on the south-east by the Chambal; and on the west, by the Karaulí and Bharatpúr states.
- FATHPÚR SÍKRI**, south-west of Ágra; the residencee of the Emperor Akbar, who gave it its prefix to commemorate his conquest of Gújrát, the original name having been SÍKAÍ.
- GAYÁ**, chief town of the distriet of the same name in the division of Patná; famous for its places of pilgrimage and its Buddhistic remains.
- GHÁGRÁ**, the, a river in Oudh, which, rising in Nípál, runs through the districts of Kehrí, Bahráieh, Gondah, Bárah Bankí, and Faizábád, and falls into the Ganges at Chaprá.
- GORÁKHPÚR**, a town in the division of the same name, on the Ráptí. The division is bounded on the north by Nípál; on the east by the Ghandak; on the south by the Ghághrá; and on the west by Oudh.
- GUMTÍ**, the, a river in the Sháhjahánpúr distriet; runs a course of 500 miles through the Oudh districts of Kherí, Lakhnao, and Sultánpúr, and falls into the Ganges not far from Banáras.
- GWÁLIÁR**, chief town of Sindhiá's dominions, on the Súbanrekhá, between Dholpúr and Jhánsí. The fortress is one of the most famous in India.
- HAMÍRPUÁ**, chief town of a distriet in the Allahábád division, at the confluence of the Jamnah and Betwá.
- INDÚR**, capital of the possessions of Máharájah Holkar, situate on a plain on the left bank of the Khán river. It is distant, from Ágra, 402 miles; from Dehli, 494; from Nímach, 142; from Ságar, 224; from Alláhábád, 557; from Calcutta, 1,030; from Bombay, 377.
- ITÁWAH**, chief town of a distriet of the same name in the Ágra division, on the river Jamnah.
- JALPÁIGURÍ**, on the Tístá, chief town of distriet of the same name in Koch Bibár.
- JAMNAH**, the, rises at the south-western base of the Jamuotri peaks, in Gahrwál, at an elevation of 10,849 feet, traverses the districts of Dehrá Dún, Saháranpur, Muzaffarnagar, Ambála, Karnál, Gurgáon, Míráth, Balandshahr, Aligarh, Mathurá, Ágra, Itáwah, Káulpúr, Jaláun, Hamírú, Fathpúr, Bandah, and Allahábád. After a course of 860 miles it mingles with the Ganges at the last-named place.
- JHÁNSÍ**, chief town of the division of the same name in Bundelkhand, south of Ágra.
- JODHPÚR** (also called Márwár), a native stato in Rájputáná. The capital is also called Jodhpúr.
- KOTÁ**, capital of a native stato of the same name in Rájputáná. It lies on the Chambal, and is strongly fortified.
- LALATPÚR**, chief town of a distriet of the same name in the Jhánsí division.
- MATHURÁ**, a town in the Ágra division, renowned in Hindu mythological history. It is on the Jamnah, thirty miles from Ágra.

MĀU (incorrectly written Mhow, in spite of the fact that the original name is innocent of the letter "h"), a town and cantonment in the Indúr state (Holkar's); thirteen miles south-west of the town of Indúr.

MEWĀR: *vide* UDAÍPÚR.

MÍRZÁPÚR, a town on the Ganges, fifty-six miles from Alláhábád.

MURÁDÁBÁD, chief town of the district of the same name in Rohilkhand, on the right bank of the Rámangá river.

MOTÍHÁRÍ, capital of the Champáran district, Patná division; is also called Champáran. The largest town in the district is Bhetíá.

MUZAFFARGARH, chief town of the district of the same name in the Multán division, Panjáb. The district is bounded on the north by the Derá Ismáíl Khán and Jhang districts; on the west by the Indus; on the east and south-east by the Chanáb. It forms the inmost triangle of the Sind Ságar Duáb, and is watered by the Chanáb and the Indus.

MUZAFFARNAGAR, chief town of the district so named in the Míráth division, on the road from Míráth to Landáur.

MUZAFFARPÚR, chief town of the Tirhut district of the Patná division. It is bounded to the north by Nipál. The town lies on the right bank of the Little Ghandak river.

NÁGPÚR, chief town of the district and division in the central provinces of the same name; formerly the capital of the dominions of the Bhonslá. The town is on the river Nág; hence its name. The civil station is Sítábalí, famous in the military history of British India.

NARBADÁ, the, rises in the Biláspúr district, central provinces, and runs a course nearly due east to the Gulf of Cambay, thirty miles beyond Bharóch. From Talakwára to the sea, a distance of eighty-five miles, it is navigable for boats of considerable burthen. At Bharóch it is two miles wide, even when the tide is out. It is considered to be the boundary between the Dakhan and Hindustan, and, as a sacred stream, ranks second only to the Ganges.

NASÍRÁBÁD, a cantonment in the Ajmír-Mairwára district of Rájputáná.

NÍMACH, a cantonment in the Gwáliár state, situated near the frontier of the native state of Udaipúr. It lies 155 miles north-west of Mán, 371 south-west of Dehli, 312 south-west of Ágra, 306 west of Ságar, and 1,114 west of Calcutta.

NIPÁL, an independent state in the mountain range north of Bihár and Oudh. It is 500 miles long from east to west, and about 160 miles broad. It abounds in long, narrow, fertile valleys, 4,000 feet above the level of the sea, well watered and cultivated. The inhabitants are the Newárs, a Mongolian tribe, and their conquerors, the Gurkhás.

RÁJPÚTÁNÁ, a portion of Western India, comprising eighteen principalities, with an area of 120,000 square miles, and nine millions of inhabitants. It is under the protection of the British.

RÁJSUÁNÍ, a division in Bengal, comprising the districts of Murshidábád, Dínájpur, Máldá, Rájsháhí, Rangpur, Bagúrá, and Pabná.

SÁGAR, chief town of district of same name in the Central Provinces. It lies ninety miles north-west of Jabalpúr, 185 north of Nágpúr, and 223 south-west of Alláhábád. A large fort, built by the Maráthás, commands the town.

SAHÁRANPÚR, chief town of district of same name in Miráth division. It is on the Jammah canal, and forms the head-quarters of its superintendent.

SHÁHÁBÁD, district in the Patná division, having Árah as its chief town.

SHÁHJAHÁNPÚR, chief town of district of same name in Rohilkhand.

SÍTÁPÚR, capital of district of same name in Oudh; lies on the banks of the Sarázan river, midway between Lakhnáo and Sháhjahánpúr.

SULTÁNPUÚR, chief town of district of same name in the Rai-Barelí division, Oudh; lies on the right bank of the Gúmtí, fifty-nine miles north of Alláhábád, and ninety-two south-east of Lakhnáo.

UDAIPIÚR or MEWÁR, chief town of the native state of the premier ruler, here called Ráná, of Rájputáná. It lies seventy miles to the west of Nímach

UNÁO, chief village of district of same name in Oudh; it lies nine miles north-east of Kánhpúr, and forty-three miles south-west of Lakhnáo.

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HISTORY OF THE INDIAN MUTINY.

BOOK VII.—FEEBLENESS IN BENGAL AND STRENGTH IN BIHÁR.

[1857.]

CHAPTER I.

PANIC AND PANIC-MONGERS IN CALCUTTA.

It is time now to return to Calcutta. The measures taken and the views entertained by the Government on receiving intelligence of the Mirath outbreak have been Calcutta. already recorded. (It is evident that up to the end of the month of May they had not fully apprehended the gravity of the situation.) "Everything," wrote the Secretary in the Home Department, Mr. Cecil Beadon, on the 25th of May, May 25. to the French Consul and the other French residents at Calcutta, who, with rare self-sacrifice, had placed their services at the disposal of the Government, "everything is quiet within six hundred miles of the capital. The mischief caused by a passing and groundless panic, has already been arrested; and there is every reason to hope that in the course of a few days tranquillity and confidence will be restored throughout the Presidency." Certainly the disinclination of the Government to accept, to the extent to which they were proffered, the loyal and disinterested offers of the members of the 'Trades' Association, of the Masonic Fraternity, of the Armenians, and of the French residents, seemed to argue on their part a conviction that the resources at their disposal were equal to any emergency, and a belief that the measures already taken would suffice to put down the revolt. But, however that may have been,

nothing could justify or even palliate the tone of the reply of the Home Secretary to the French residents. It seemed at the time difficult to affirm to whom Mr. Beadon, the mouth-piece of the Government, intended to impute "a passing and groundless panic." It could not apply to the citizens of Calcutta, for not only had they evinced no fear, but they had not caused the mischief. That mischief had been caused by the Sipáhis; but it was scarcely the result of panic. Nor, had it been so, was the panic, it would seem, altogether groundless, and certainly it was not passing.

It is clear, at any rate, that, on the 25th of May, the Government reckoned upon order being maintained throughout the country between Calcutta and Alláhábád, and upon the prompt repression of the rebellion.

They had, on the 20th of May, commenced, and they subsequently continued, the despatch by detachments of the 84th Regiment to the North-West Provinces. They had been cheered, on the 23rd of May, by the arrival from Madras of the 1st Madras Fusiliers, and with commendable promptitude they had, at once, sent off that regiment in the same direction. They were expecting regiments and batteries from Persia, from Ceylon, and from Rangún.

The Government, then, felt tolerably secure regarding Bengal Views of the Government. proper and the country south of Alláhábád. The news, however, from the districts north of the last-named city was calculated to alarm. Between the 25th and 30th of May, the native troops at Fírúzpúr, at Áli-garh, at Mainpúrí, at Itáwah, and at Balandshahr, had mutinied. Great fears were entertained regarding Lakhnao, Kánhpúr, Ágra, and the surrounding districts. On the other hand they were confident that the fall of Dehli was imminent, and that the troops engaged in the capture of that place would be almost immediately available to secure the threatened districts north of Alláhábád. It is only fair to them to admit that this view was shared by the public, and, very generally, by soldiers. It was justified, moreover, by the records of the past. Neither to the invaders from the north, to the Maráthás, nor to the English under Lord Lake had the capital of the Mughuls ever offered more than an ephemeral resistance. It was hardly, then, to be supposed that, garrisoned by native soldiers without a chief, it could successfully resist the trained and disciplined warriors of England.

Secure, then, of his base, of the ground lying six hundred miles in advance of it, confident that the troops in the North-West would very soon be available for the repression of rebellion in the central districts, and fearful only regarding the rising there of the native army before the Commander-in-Chief should detach a force to keep it under, the Governor-General, on the 31st of May, despatched the following telegram to General Anson:—"I have heard to-day that you do not expect to be before Dehli until the 9th. In the meantime Kánhpúr and Lakhnao are severely pressed, and the country between Dehli and Kánhpúr is passing into the hands of the rebels. It is of the utmost importance to prevent this, and to relieve Kánhpúr, but nothing but rapid action will do it. Your force of artillery will enable you to dispose of Dehli with certainty; I, therefore, beg that you will detach one European Infantry Regiment, and a small force of European Cavalry, to the south of Dehli, without keeping them for operations there, so that Áligarh may be recovered, and Kánhpúr relieved immediately. It is impossible to overrate the importance of showing European troops between Dehli and Kánhpúr. Lakhnao and Alláhábád depend upon it."

Lord Canning's anxiety about the weak point of his position.

May 31.

The instincts which dictated this telegram were undoubtedly sound. The country between Dehli and Alláhábád was the weakest and the most threatened part of the British position. The only error committed by the Governor-General was the error of believing that the force of artillery on the spot could dispose of the Mughul capital with certainty. But Lord Canning shared that belief with almost every other European, civilian and soldier, in British India.

His view justified.

On the 1st of June, then, all looked hopeful to the Government of India. (Its members were so sanguine, that, having only two European regiments to guard Calcutta and the country between that city and Dánápúr, they dispensed with the aid which would have been afforded them by fifteen hundred armed European citizens; they allowed the three and a half native regiments at Barrackpúr and the regiments at Dánápúr, Banáras, and the intermediate stations, to remain armed; knowing that the districts lying between Dehli and Alláhábád were in imminent peril, they yet hoped—even confidently hoped—that the disaster there might be delayed until either General Anson should despatch a regiment from the

June 1.

north-west, or until they should be strong enough to send up troops from Calcutta.

If the Government of India had had no other resources at their disposal, the course they actually pursued would have been amply justified. But writing, not, so to speak, after the event, but in the spirit of those who were present in Calcutta at the time, I am bound to affirm that they had other resources, and that they neglected them. When the lives of thousands, when the *prestige* of one's country, when the very safety of the national position are in danger, it is a crime to depend solely upon possibilities. If the Government of India did not know, every other man in India knew, that the mutiny of the 19th Native Infantry had been no isolated act. (Conscious of this, as I must suppose they were, the Government of India most certainly knew that in the long direct line between Dánápúr and Miráth there was but one European regiment.) Yet, even in the first half of the first week of May, when fully aware that the condition of the native army was, to say the least, excited, and that the European soldiers were to the natives in the proportion of one to twenty-four, the Government of Lord Canning had, even then, actually ordered the return of the 84th Regiment to Rangún, and had only been deterred from this step by the opportune outbreak of mutiny at Lakhnao on the 3rd of that month.

The 84th Regiment remained then at Barraekpúr to watch over, on the 6th of May, the disbandment of a mutinous portion of the 34th Native Infantry. That act accomplished, nothing further remained for it to do. Yet the first detachment of the 84th started for the north-west only fourteen days later (20th May). This delay not only remains unexplained, but it is inexplicable. So far as Bengal was concerned, the Government of India had been content to dispense with the 84th Regiment on the 3rd of May, and to send it out of India. Yet, though the occurrences at Lakhnao on that day disclosed the latent weakness in the centre of our line, the 84th was detained motionless near Calcutta! It is true it was used on the 6th, but subsequently to that date it wasted fourteen precious days—days which, if profitably employed, might almost certainly have secured Kánhpúr!

I cannot but think that a mistake, but little less important, was committed when the first offer of the Calcutta citizens, made on the 20th of May, was refused. The acceptance of that offer

Blindness of the Government with regard to the true character of the crisis.

would have disengaged for immediate action the wing of a regiment. As events happened, the first batch of the 84th Regiment, leaving Calcutta the 20th of May, succeeded in reaching Kánhpúr early in June. Now it cannot be questioned but that the entire 84th Regiment, if despatched on the 6th of May, might have reached Kánhpúr during that month. Its presence would probably have prevented the outbreak which occurred there; and, in that case, it might certainly have been strengthened by a wing of the 53rd, leaving Calcutta the 21st, and by the Madras Fusiliers, which actually left on the 23rd.

Consequences
of the blind-
ness.

The reason why the Government did not act in the manner in which it might have acted is explained by Mr. Secretary Beadon in his letter, already quoted, to the French residents at Calcutta:—"Everything is quiet within six hundred miles of the capital. The mischief caused by a passing and groundless panic has fortunately been arrested, and there is every reason to hope that, in the course of a few days, tranquillity and confidence will be restored throughout the Presidency." This "reason to hope" had, I have shown, no solid foundation. The hope which existed was, in fact, without reason. It had sufficient vitality, however, to induce the Government to risk the weakest and most threatened point of their line in order that they might appear strong to the world.

The week that followed the 1st of June disclosed to the Government their error, to the world the short-sightedness of the Government.

During that week intelligence reached Calcutta of the mutiny at Lakhnau, of the defection of all the regiments occupying Oudh, of revolts at Ázamgarh, at Bináras, and at Alláhábád, of the massacre of the Europeans at Jhán-sí. This news increased the anxiety of the Government regarding the safety of their weak centre line; for Oudh was separated from Kánhpúr but by the river, and even before the defection of that province, the position of Kánhpúr, garrisoned by native troops and in close proximity to the stronghold of the discontented heir of a prince whom we had dispossessed, had inspired alarm. As counterbalancing, in a measure, the effect of this evil news the Government saw with satisfaction the arrival, during that week, in Calcutta, of the 64th Foot and 78th Highlanders from Persia, of a wing of the 35th Foot from Moulinein, of a wing of the 37th Regiment, and of a company of

June 1-7.

Their first
awakening.

Royal Artillery from Ceylon. Awake now to the danger before them they pushed on these regiments to the north with praiseworthy activity. The uncompleted state of the railway rendered the progress of the detachments slow. In default of this means of transit, single-horsed post-carriages—the quickest mode of travelling then available—bullock carriages, and steamers, were employed to the fullest possible extent. The Government, in fact, did then all that was possible to save the threatened line.

I have said that the Government were awake to the danger before them in the north. It is strange, however, that their eyes were not yet opened to the full magnitude of the crisis; that they neglected the danger at their very door. At the time that they were despatching every available European soldier to protect a station in their centre line from the possible mutiny of the armed Sipáhis who garrisoned it, they allowed the Sipáhis close to Calcutta to remain armed; the native garrison of Dánápúr to remain armed. What is more, in spite of so many examples of disaffection, they believed, or professed to believe, in the loyalty of these men. Their policy at this period was to trust, or to seem to trust, every native regiment until it should revolt. Such a policy naturally greatly hampered the movements of the European troops, for it was often necessary to keep these inactive at a station to guard against a possible outbreak.

Thus, with the news of the revolt of many regiments stationed within the limits of the six hundred miles indicated by Mr. Beadon in his famous letter of the 25th May ringing in their ears, the Government reported to the Court of Directors their belief that a public profession of loyalty made by the 70th Regiment of Native Infantry, then stationed at Barrackpúr, would “have the happiest influence on the minds of all well-disposed men in the Native Army.” They, therefore, allowed three and a half native regiments at that station to retain their arms. To the 6th Native Infantry at Alláhábád, on the eve of a revolt accompanied by marked barbarity, the Government sent, at the same time, their acknowledgment of a similar profession. They would not believe the fact which was patent to all around them,—the fact that the entire native army was animated by but one feeling, and that the mutiny of a regiment was merely a question of time and of opportunity.

Their views regarding the possibility of an advance from

Dehli in the direction of their weak central line were encouraged by the receipt, at this period, of information of a victory gained by the Mirath garrison over the rebels issuing from Dehli at the rivulet Hindan, near the town of Ghází-ud-dín Nagar. This victory, in which the rebels lost five guns, was gained on the 31st of May. It encouraged the hope that almost any post might bring the intelligence of the fall of the great fortress.

Another most important item of intelligence conveyed to the Government during this absorbing week was that of the death by cholera of the Commander-in-Chief, General Anson, at Karnál, on the 27th of May. This Death of General Anson. much to be lamented event did not occur until General Anson had prepared and set in action the measures which were to the end persistently carried out for the capture of Dehli. His death was a great—time proved it to be a most sensible His character. loss. A man of very remarkable natural talents, General Anson had, during a residence in India of more than five years, used those talents to master completely the necessities of Indian warfare. He was a perfect judge of character. No man ever more quickly detected the veneer of superficiality. He could not conceal his contempt for a man whom he discovered to be playing a part. Hence, probably, there swarmed up after his death enemies and detractors. They have not succeeded, however, in sullyng his fair fame. For to him, as truly now as when death snatched him from the triumph which he had prepared, may be applied the immortal epitaph which the great historian of the Peninsular War composed for one of the most illustrious of English Generals:—"The honest loved, the dishonest feared him. For, while he lived he did not shun, but scorned and spurned the base, and, with characteristic propriety, they spurned at him when he was dead."

It has already been shown, in the volume immediately preceding this, how, consequent upon the death of General Anson, the command of the force destined to besiege Dehli devolved upon Major-General Sir Henry Barnard, commanding the Sindhi Division.

I have now given a picture—a severe but accurate picture—of the information possessed by the Government of India up to the end of the first week of June, of the deductions they drew from that information, of their hopes, their fears, and beliefs. It will have been Summary of the mental range of the Government.

observed that whilst, in the main, their view of the position was correct, they had not sounded the full depths of the disaster; and that as in May, so still, early in June, they preferred the ascension of a belief in the loyalty of the Sipáhis who had not revolted, to the taking of measures which, whilst rendering them harmless for mischief, should place at their disposal, for active employment, the British soldiers who were watching them; and the upholding of their infallibility as a Government to acting in generous concert with the only classes they could absolutely trust,—the Europeans and Eurasians living and settled in India.

The fortnight which followed was full of startling incidents, but incidents marked by the same general correctness of view regarding strategy, the same weakness of political vision, and the same distrust of their own countrymen.

We have seen how, on the night of the 6th of June, the native regiment at Alláhábád which, the previous day, had been thanked by the Government for its professions of unswerving loyalty, mutinied and murdered nearly all its officers, including some young boys just arrived from England: how the fortress of Alláhábád, occupying a most commanding position on the Jamnah, and considered the gateway to the North-West, escaped by a miracle. Simultaneously the telegraphic lines were cut or destroyed, and communication with the army before Dehli became impossible except by way of Láhor or Bombay. The troops in Rájputáná and in Central India were likewise reported to have risen. There had been a mutiny at Banáras, but thanks to the wise and statesmanlike conduct of Mr. Frederic Gubbins of the Civil Service, and the bold measures adopted by Colonel Neill and his Madras Fusiliers, the mutiny had been suppressed, and the disaffected of the great Hindú city had been overawed.

From the 7th of June, indeed, it may be truly affirmed that the outlook to the Government of India had become darkness intensified. Mr. Beadon's intact line of six hundred miles had been attempted in many places. Beyond it all was impenetrable.

In this extremity the Government still clung to the army before Dehli. On the 10th of June, Lord Canning drafted to the Major-General commanding that army a letter in which he urged him to send southwards, with the least possible delay, an Euro-

Lord Canning's
anxiety re-
garding his weak
central line.

pean force as large as he could spare.* He kept the letter by him for eleven days, and only despatched it when the chances of relieving the central line from Calcutta seemed almost desperate.

Two days after that letter had been penned Lord Canning, yielding to the solicitations of the ablest of his coun-
cillors, Mr. J. P. Grant, resolved to avail himself
of the aid which had been proffered him, three weeks
earlier, by the citizens of Calcutta. But in order to induce the

June 10.
Mr. Grant's
practical
advice.

Governor-General to agree to this tardy concession, it was necessary for Mr. Grant to lay aside all gloss, to sacrifice the false confidence on which Mr. Beadon had laid so much stress three weeks previously, and to describe facts as they really were. "In reality," wrote Mr. Grant early in June, "in reality
as well as in appearance we are very weak here

June 12.

where we ought to be—and if we can't be should at least appear to be—as strong as possible. We have as enemies three Native Infantry regiments and a half, of which one and a half are the very worst type we know; one, two, three (for no one knows) thousand armed men at Garden Reach, or available there at a moment; some hundred armed men of the Sindhi Amirs at Dandamah; half the Muhammadan population; and all the blackguards of all sorts of a town of six hundred thousand people. Against these we have one and a half weak regiments, most of whom dare not leave the Fort. There is no reason to expect real help in real danger from the Native Police. The

* The letter, in a more complete form, runs as follows:—"Banáras has been made safe. So has Alláhábád, I hope, but only just in time. Henceforward, the reinforcements will be pushed up still further—to Kánhpúr; but the disorganised state of the country between Alláhábád and Kánhpúr may interpose delay; and both telegraph and dawk from any place north of Alláhábád is now cut off from Calcutta. I cannot, therefore, speak so confidently of the time when help will reach Sir Hugh Wheeler. It may not be for four or five days, or even more. This makes it all the more urgently necessary that you should push down an European force immediately. When it reaches the Kánhpúr division, it will, according to the instructions which have been sent to you, pass under Sir Hugh Wheeler's command. And with him will rest the responsibility of relieving Lucknow, and pacifying the country from Kánhpúr downwards. It will be for you to judge what your own movements should be. All that I require is, that an European force, as large an one as you can spare, should be sent southwards with the least possible delay, and that it should not be detained an hour for the purpose of finishing off affairs at Delhi after once the great blow has been struck."

insurrection is regularly spreading down to us. Is this an emergency or not? My conviction is that even a street row at the capital would give us an awful shake—not only in Bengal, but in Bombay and Madras—at this moment.”

This remonstrance, vivid, true, and out-spoken, expressed in nervous, even in passionate language, the thoughts of the much maligned citizens of Calcutta. The daily newspapers had for a fortnight been pressing the same arguments on the Governor-General. These had failed to shake the reluctance of Lord Canning, to take his own countrymen into his confidence, to admit that he had some small occasion for their aid. But now one of his colleagues, and incomparably the ablest of his colleagues, pressed upon him, in language more clear and more forcible than any used by the Press, the dangers of persistence in the same policy of distrust. That even the weighty utterances of Mr. Grant would, in any case, have met the fate of the expressed opinions of the European community is scarcely probable. But he did not stand quite alone in his view. It happened that an examination of the records of the Home Office showed that the question of raising volunteers in India had been thoroughly discussed in the time of Lord Dalhousie; that a decision in favour of the measure had been recorded; and that that decision had received the endorsement of the Court of Directors. This discovery added force to Mr. Grant's argument. He elenched it further by recording his opinion that it was probable that, if a Volunteer Corps were not raised in the crisis then before them, the Home Government would ask the reason why. These arguments proved successful. Lord Canning, still retaining his opinion as to the practical uselessness of the measure, sanctioned, on the 12th of June, the enrolment of the citizens of Calcutta as volunteers.

Lord Canning
sanctions the
enrolment of
volunteers.

The Calcutta citizens nobly responded to the call of the Government. In a very few days the three arms—Horse, Foot, and Artillery—sprang into vigorous life. Men of all classes and of all positions pressed forward to enrol themselves, and in less than three weeks a brigade was formed sufficiently strong to guard Calcutta, and to enable the Government, had they deemed it necessary, to send all the regular troops into the field.

The day following that on which the Government had thus announced their intention to solicit the aid which three weeks

previously they had rejected, they introduced and passed through the Legislative Council a measure calculated, above all others, to rouse the indignation of the community and to deaden the loyalty to which they had but just at the moment appealed.

It can well be imagined that the events occurring all over the country had not been unnoticed by the public press. In India the fourth estate was represented by two distinct bodies of men. There was the English press advocating English interests, generally owned and entirely contributed to by Englishmen. Running parallel with this was the native press, the organ of native interests, and owned and contributed to by natives. The two divisions were subject to the same laws and amenable to the same jurisdiction. So blended had become the interests of the native and the European, that, as a rule, the two sections referred to advocated identical measures. It did happen indeed occasionally, though rarely, that they espoused opposite sides. Such had been the case when the legislature brought in a measure to introduce a native magistracy with power to try Europeans. Against this measure the European press had protested, whilst it was eagerly supported by the organs of native public opinion. But such occasions were not common. As traders, the interests of the European and of the native merchants were identical. The land question, which was to assume so great a prominence in later years, had then been but incidentally referred to. The two sections acted alike as critics of the conduct of the Government, and, as a rule, they performed this delicate duty with judgment, with temper, and with moderation.

It is true that, when dealing with individual officials, the press of India—native as well as European, was often extremely uncompromising. It certainly called a spade a spade. And as the Indian officials had experienced none of the rough training to which the statesmen of Europe are subjected, and were often men who owed their high positions to favour rather than to merit, this habit of plain speaking had been apt to engender, and often did engender, feelings of rancorous dislike in the breasts of the criticised.

When the early incidents of the mutiny occurred—that is, when the 19th Regiment of Native Infantry misbehaved at Barhampur—the English press had spoken out very plainly. It had urged the Government to adopt at once decided measures. More than one writer had pointed out that the Barhampur

The European
and Native
press.

incident was a spark which, if not immediately crushed, would be speedily fanned into a flame. The native press was more deliberate and more reticent, but it offered no great opposition to vigorous action. The warnings of the press were disregarded. The Government did not act with promptitude, nor, when it acted, did it act with vigour. When, a little later, the spark had been fanned into a flame—when, that is to say, the outbreak at Míráth had disclosed to all who were not wilfully blind the gigantic extent of the insurrection, again did the European press clamour vehemently for prompt action, and urge upon the Government the necessity of taking into their confidence the European community. But on this occasion the tone of the native press, as if by command, almost immediately changed. Possibly the supineness which its conductors witnessed made them believe that the fatal day for the English had arrived, just as their fathers had seen that day overtake the Mughuls, the Maráthás, and the Sikhs. Possibly the Bengálí portion of the native press, representing a highly educated people, unversed in arms, but alone capable of administering the country should it fall under native domination, believed that their prospects would be greatly improved by the overthrow of the British power. Certainly many of them not only doubted our ultimate success, but openly expressed their doubts. But, whatever may have been the reason, it is undeniable that from the time of the arrival in Calcutta of the news of the Míráth outbreak the tone of the native press changed. It began to speak out against the Government, and to show very plainly that it sympathised with the movement which the revolvers had originated.

This alteration in the tone of the native press was brought to the notice of Lord Canning early in June, and he was urged then to interfere, by legislative action, with its freedom. Unlike his colleagues, however, Lord Canning had been brought up in a free country. He had been accustomed all his life to the freedom of the press. He had seen in England that the law of the land was sufficient to put down license. He knew that an honest Government had no better friend than a free and outspoken public critic. To the solicitations of his councillors then he replied that “the remedy was worse than the disease.”

But a few days later the opinions of Lord Canning in this respect underwent a change. On the 13th of June he, for the first and only time during his tenure of office, went down

to the Legislative Council, and, declaring there that the incendiary tone of the native press had driven him to the conclusion at which he had reluctantly arrived, brought forward and carried a measure to place the native press under restrictions so galling that, compared to them, the restrictions on the press of France during the darkest days of the reign of Napoleon III. were light and easy.

Had Lord Canning stopped there, he would have carried with him the voice of the public. The times were critical, the native press had encouraged sedition and rebellion, and it was necessary that authority should assert itself. But when Lord Canning proceeded to include in the same measure of stern repression the European press, in spite of "the loyalty and intelligence which marked their labours," on the ground, mainly, that he could not draw a line of demarcation between European and native publications,* he evoked an outburst of opposition such as has been seldom witnessed in Calcutta. It was not only that the English community of that place resented the restriction of their liberties. Had such a restriction been proposed by a Government in which they had confidence they would have borne it patiently. But on this occasion they distrusted alike the sincerity and the capacity of the Government. They had seen them slow to be convinced, slow to move, slow to avail themselves of the advantages forced upon them, confident where they should have been distrustful, and distrustful where they should have been confident. They had seen them arrogant whilst blundering, supercilious whilst courting disaster. They knew now that a great disaster had occurred, that Mr. Beadon's

The Gagging
Act.

Indignation of
the European
community.

* The following are the exact words used by Lord Canning with respect to the European press.—"The remarks I have taken occasion to make with reference to the Native Press, I do not direct to the European Press. But I see no solid standing ground upon which a line can be drawn marking off one from the other, when the question is to prevent matter calculated to work mischief at a crisis like this. For whilst I am glad to give credit to the conductors of the European Press for the loyalty and intelligence which mark their labours, I am bound by sincerity to say that I have seen passages in some of the papers under their management which, though perfectly innocuous as far as European readers are concerned, may, in times like the present, be turned to the most mischievous purposes in the hands of persons capable of dressing them up for the Native ear. I am glad to admit that the bill is not specially levelled at the European Press, but I do not see any reason, nor do I consider it possible in justice, to draw any line of demarcation between European and Native publications."

line of six hundred miles had been broken, and that the central line beyond it was terribly endangered. And, yet, no sooner had they become aware of this than the Government forcibly shut their mouths. There was but one conclusion for them to draw. They believed then, and many believe still, that the action of the Government was prompted by a determination to prevent, if possible, the transmission to England of any printed record of their mistakes.

That the Government was actuated by any such motive I am now far from thinking. But their action in muzzling the European press was undoubtedly a mistake. It severed the confidence which ought to exist in a great crisis between the rulers and the ruled, and increased the distrust which the tardiness of their repressive measures had till then inspired.

This distrust was greatly augmented by an incident which occurred the day following. True to the opinion expressed by Mr. Secretary Beadon to the members of the Trades' Association, on the 21st of May, to the effect that it was most unfair to the Native Army of Bengal to assume that all its regiments were disaffected:—notwithstanding that Mr. J. P. Grant, a member of the Supreme Council, had, early in June, recorded his opinion that at Barrackpúr, fifteen miles from Calcutta, the Government had “as enemies three Native Infantry regiments and a half, of which one and a half are the very worst type we know”:—in spite of the examples supplied by some stations in the upper provinces of the danger of allowing native regiments to retain their arms, and of the beneficial results which in others had followed their being disarmed:—Lord Canning had been resolute in allowing the regiments at Barrackpúr, so graphically painted by Mr. Grant, to continue, armed, in the exercise of their duties. Before the Government had, on the 12th of June, accepted the offers of the volunteers, Lord Canning was aware of the mutiny of the native troops at Banáras, at Alláhábád, at Lakhnao, in Rohilkhand, at the stations north of Kánhpúr; he knew that disarming at Láhor, at other stations in the Panjáb, and at Ágra, had been attended with beneficial results,—and yet he continued to permit the regiments quartered within fifteen miles of Calcutta to retain their arms!

What was the state of Calcutta at the time when the Governor-General persisted in this resolution? It cannot better be described than in the words, already quoted, of the ablest

of Lord Canning's councillors, Mr. J. P. Grant. After recording in the language noted in the preceding paragraph his opinion of the native regiments quartered at Barrackpúr. Mr. Grant added that the Government had, in addition to those "enemies," "one, two, or three (for no one knows) thousand of armed men at Garden Reach" (a suburb of Calcutta), "or available there at a moment; some hundred armed men of the Sindh Amir's at Damdamah" (four and a half miles from Calcutta), "half the Muhammadan population; and all the blackguards of all sorts of a town of six hundred thousand people." To encounter these enemies the Government had at their disposal, in Calcutta itself, a weak wing of an English regiment! A wing of another regiment, the 35th, was at Barrackpúr, and a complete regiment, the 78th Highlanders, some miles beyond, at Chinsurah. Those regiments were, in fact, detained near the seat of Government to guard the armed Sipáhis. For disarmed Sipáhis one-fourth of their number would have sufficed.

State of
Calcutta at
the time.

The fruits of this policy very soon showed themselves. Intended as a policy of conciliation, to display confidence in quarters in which no confidence was felt, it had the result of imparting boldness to those who had long been mutineers in heart, and who were watching only their opportunity. Lord Canning had accepted the offers to volunteer of the citizens of Calcutta on the 12th of June; he had passed the Act, known thenceforth as the Gagging Act, on the 13th. The 14th was a bright, clear day, as bright as days are in India

The natural result of the "feigning confidence" policy.

June 13.

after the first rainy season has set in, and when no rain falls. It was a Sunday. That morning the church-goers attended service at the various churches at the ordinary hour of 11 A.M. In most of the churches nothing remarkable occurred. But those present at the garrison church in Fort William had their attention disturbed by the rolling sound of heavy *matériel* moving out of the fort. One individual, who occupied a house in Chauringhi, the Park Lane of Calcutta, somewhat impressed by this unusual occurrence, thought he would endeavour to ascertain if anything had taken place to justify the movement. Accordingly, after the service was over, he, in accordance with the Sunday custom in Calcutta, went to make some calls. He called upon one of the Secretaries to Government. But nothing appeared out of

Calcutta on
the 14th of
June.

its usual course, and he returned to his house with his curiosity unsatisfied. About two hours later, however, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, he received a note from a gentleman who was living in the same house with the Secretary on whom he had called. In this note he was informed that the native regiments at Barrackpúr had mutinied, and were in full march on Calcutta; that the lives of the European inhabitants were in the greatest danger; that he (the writer) begged him and his wife to proceed at once to his (the writer's) house, where they "had a stone staircase and five good rifles;" further, that no time was to be lost.

The gentleman addressed declined to leave his own house. He even went outside to endeavour to ascertain the correctness of the information he had received. What he saw on that eventful afternoon he recorded on the spot. The impression the sight made upon him has never left him. The roof of his house commanded a view of the plain between Chauringhí and the fort. Of the details which accompanied and which followed the seamer across the plain he had accurate knowledge; and, when he published his account of what occurred, he was prepared, as he is now prepared, to name, had he been called upon, the individuals to whom he referred. To the statement as he wrote it there is not a comma to add, nor from it is there a comma to be withdrawn. As an accurate picture of the events of that afternoon it is irrefutable.

The gentleman referred to thus painted the scene*:—"It has been said by a great writer that 'there is scarcely a less dignified entity than a patriotic in a panic.' The veriest sceptic as to the truth of this aphorism could have doubted no longer had he witnessed the living panorama of Calcutta on the 14th of June. All was panic, disorder, and dismay. The wildest reports were in circulation. It was all but universally credited that the Barrackpúr brigade was in full march on Calcutta, that the people in the suburbs had already risen, that the King of Oudh, with his followers, was plundering Garden Reach. Those highest in office were the first to give the alarm. There were Secretaries to Government running over to Members of Council, loading their pistols, barricading the doors, sleeping on sofas; Members of Council abandoning their houses with their families, and taking refuge on board

* Red Pamphlet, page 105.

ship; crowds of lesser celebrities, impelled by these examples, having hastily collected their valuables, were rushing to the fort, only too happy to be permitted to sleep under the fort guns. Horses, carriages, palanquins, vehicles of every sort and kind, were put into requisition to convey panic-stricken fugitives out of the reach of imaginary cut-throats. In the suburbs almost every house belonging to the Christian population was abandoned. Half-a-dozen determined fanatics could have burned down three parts of the town. A score of London thieves would have made their fortunes by plundering the houses in the neighbourhood of Chauringhi which had been abandoned by their inmates.*

There was some reason for the alarm. There is not a shadow of doubt that the native regiments quartered at Barrackpúr had long been watching their opportunity, and that, noting the successive arrival of European regiments from Persia, from Pegu, and from Ceylon, they had, on the night of the 13th of June, resolved to mutiny the following day. Fortunately, some of the well-disposed among them betrayed the secret that night. An express was at once despatched by the Major-General commanding the division to order down the 78th Highlanders from Chinsurah, whilst permission to disarm the mutinous regiments without delay was urgently requested from Calcutta.

Effects of the
"leigning con-
fidence" policy
at Barrackpúr.

* Sir John Kaye quotes the following description, given by Dr. Mouat, residing at the time at Calcutta, of the events here referred to. He says that the flight was "what might have been seen if a modern Herculaneum had been evacuated in broad daylight on the approach of a visible eruption from a neighbouring volcano." Dr. Mouat adds, "The whole line of the ghauts was crowded with fugitives, and those who could find no shelter on the ships, took refuge within the Fort, of which the squares, the corridors, all the available space everywhere, indeed, were thronged by many, who passed the night in their carriages." Since writing the text I have seen Dr. Mouat. He tells me that his remarks apply to the Christian population of the suburbs, who were mostly Eurasians. In this I am in perfect agreement with Dr. Mouat. Nothing could exceed the courage and steadfastness of the members of the mercantile and trading community. In his journal, written at the time, and quoted by Sir John Kaye, Colonel Cavenagh, then the highest official in the Fort, recorded as follows:—"On my return home, I found my house besieged by all sorts of people wishing to obtain shelter in the Fort, and all full of rumours of the worst description from Dandamah and Barrackpúr." Colonel Cavenagh, however, did not observe any unusual number of vehicles inside the Fort. They were probably refused admittance, for the author saw them "dashing across the plain towards the Fort with reckless speed."

The Highlanders set off that night from Chinsurah. Misled—whether purposely or otherwise may possibly be doubtful—by their guide, they wandered four miles out of their direct road, but a strong detachment of them, recovering the track, arrived by daybreak in the station, weary and footsore, yet ready for any emergency. This prompt action entirely disconcerted the Sipáhis. They determined to defer the outbreak to a more convenient season. But the chance was not allowed them. The remainder of the 78th arrived during the day; and, the necessary permission having been received from the Government, the native regiments were at 4 P.M. paraded and disarmed in the presence of the wing of Her Majesty's 35th and of the 78th Regiment with loaded muskets, each on either flank, and of six 12-pounders in their front loaded with grape. They offered no resistance, but piled their arms in silence.

In Calcutta the night passed off tranquilly. But the following morning there was a new excitement. The list given by Mr. J. P. Grant in his famous minute of the enemies to public order in Calcutta will not have been forgotten. If prominently in this list figured the three and a half native regiments at Barrackpúr, next in importance were enumerated the “one, two, three (for no one knows) thousand armed men at Garden Reach, or available there at any moment.” Garden Reach was one of the suburbs of Calcutta, and the men alluded to were the followers of the deposed King of Oudh. Having, on the 14th, acted, so to speak, on Mr. Grant's first hint regarding the Sipáhis, the Government followed up that vigorous action by taking up his second recommendation

on the 15th. And it is due to them to state that they performed a distasteful, though necessary, task with great prudence and delicacy. They rightly deemed that the best mode of rendering powerless the followers of the King of Oudh would be to deprive those followers of their natural leader. On the morning of the 15th of June, therefore, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Edmonstone, accompanied by a detachment of English soldiers, waited upon the King of Oudh and informed him that political necessities, and the fact that emissaries had made a mischievous use of his name, required that he should remove from Garden Reach and take up his residence in the Governor-General's house within Fort William. The King of Oudh behaved on the occasion with dignity and propriety. Having in the most solemn manner protested that,

Arrest of the
King of Oudh.

June 15.

neither by word nor deed had he encouraged the mutineers, he declared himself ready to go wherever the Governor-General might think fit. He was then conducted to the Government House within the fort. His late Prime Minister, Ali Naki Khán, and a few other nobles, were selected to bear him company. This action on the part of the Government excited no disturbance, and in its results it fully justified the ideas which prompted it. The unknown number of armed men at Garden Reach were by it rendered powerless for mischief.

Two days later the officer selected by Lord Canning to assume temporarily the command of the Bengal Army, vacated by the death of General Anson, arrived in Calcutta. This was Lieutenant-General Sir Patrick Grant, K.C.B., Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army. Sir Patrick Grant was an officer of the Company's service who had made his way through the regimental grades to the command of a regiment, and from the command of a regiment to the General Army Staff, rising eventually to be Adjutant-General of the Bengal Army. He had served on the staff during the first and second Sikh campaigns. Circumstances, to which it is unnecessary to refer, had made him unpopular with the majority of the officers of the Bengal Army, but his many and varied services seemed to justify Lord Canning in regarding him as the man for the situation, and certainly to few soldiers was a greater opportunity ever offered of vindicating the judgment of the Governor-General. The weak centre line I have so often referred to was known to be in imminent danger. It was believed that there was yet time to avert that danger. According to the latest reports received by the Government the Madras Fusiliers had reached Alláhábád; the 84th Regiment and a portion of the 64th had passed Banáras; a considerable number of the 78th had already left Calcutta, and the remainder, and a wing of the 37th, were to start on the 20th. These united would constitute a force sufficient, with the artillery available, to strengthen the weak central line. Could that line be strengthened before it were actually rent, it seemed possible that direct communication with Dehli might be re-opened. And the Government had no information that the line had been rent.

To endeavour to execute this project, to reach Kánhpúr before our troops there had been overwhelmed, was a task sufficient to

June 17.
Arrival of
Sir Patrick
Grant.

His previous
career.

stimulate the energies and to satisfy the ambition of any man. And this task was open to Sir Patrick Grant to select.

Sir Patrick Grant did not select it. The reasons which he gave for his decision proved that, up to the date on which it was made, the 22nd of June, neither he, nor the Members of the Government who approved it, had comprehended the full extent of the calamity which had fallen on the country; that they still regarded the outbreak as partial in its effects and temporary in its nature. Those reasons were that "the Commander-in-Chief can most efficiently, and assuredly most expeditiously, control and direct all military movements now, *and the reorganization and regeneration of the Army hereafter,** if he has the advantage of being in personal communication with the head of the Government, if he learns the views of Government with respect to the innumerable questions which must constantly arise, and, which is highly important, if he is made acquainted with the mass of intelligence which may be expected to reach the Government from every quarter of the empire."

It will be seen that, in the presence of actual and pressing danger, danger to be overcome at once if the empire was to be saved, the mind of Sir Patrick Grant was dreaming of "reorganization and regeneration." Surely the shortest way of accomplishing that dream was to act vigorously against the rebels who had rendered necessary the revision of the old system. The fact that the Commander-in-Chief himself was in the field would have increased the moral power of the army operating against the rebels, whilst in such a position the head of the Army would have exercised an authority such as could not be delegated even to the most trusted of his lieutenants.

As for the control and command of the army there was the fact that of the two armies, the Native and the European, the one had mutinied, the other was in the field. The presence of the Commander-in-Chief was naturally required with the latter. The routine work of ordering forward troops from Calcutta, of furnishing supplies and ambulances for the field force, could well be entrusted to the Deputy Adjutant-General of the Army and his subordinates, who were on the spot. There, too, remained the Indian War Office, represented by the Military Secretary to Government and his assistants.

* The italics are my own.

The reason given by the Commander-in-Chief for not placing himself at the head of the army in the field was, then, based upon premisses which were incorrect, and upon a general view of the situation which was erroneous. But another reason which Sir Patrick Grant recorded in the same State memorandum goes far to show that he did well in coming to the conclusion which he adopted.

Unsoundness
of those
reasons.

"I may also observe," wrote Sir Patrick, "that it is quite impossible to conduct the multifarious duties of this large army without a numerous staff and extensive office establishment, requiring, when moving about the country, a complete regiment as an escort, and a large amount of carriage for their transport, neither one nor the other of which can be supplied under present circumstances."

His further
reasons.

This reason is decisive. Sir Patrick Grant was in command of the army employed to crush the mutiny. If he thought that he could not leave details to the tried officers on the general staff at Calcutta, whilst he should be marching against the rebels; if he considered that he must attend personally to petty matters of promotion and appointments at the same time that he should be directing all his energies against the enemy, and that, at so grave a crisis, when every European soldier was an object of importance, he would need a complete regiment to escort his papers, he was certainly quite right to stay where he was, and to detach another officer to command the army in the field.

Justify the
decision to
remain in
Calcutta.

The officer whom he selected for the post was Major-General Havelock.

The achievements of this officer belong to another section of this history. I purpose to continue here the account of the state of Calcutta up to the date of his departure from Alláhábád to reconquer the weak central line.

On the 17th of June,—the day of the arrival in Calcutta of Sir Patrick Grant,—the Government received intelligence that General Barnard had, on the 8th, beaten the rebels at Delhi. For a short time there was a hope that Delhi itself had fallen—a hope so vivid that it induced Lord Canning, four days later, to despatch to Delhi the requisition he had penned to the general on the 10th, to send down southward as large an European force as he

The false
report of the
capture of
Delhi.

could spare with the least possible delay. But it transpired in a few days that not the fortified city of Dehli, but the cantonments on the ridge only, had fallen into British hands. The siege was to follow; and to conduct that siege with any prospect of success, General Barnard, far from being in a position to spare troops, urgently needed reinforcements.

From other parts of India the news was on the whole unfavourable. At the end of the third week of June the Government were without information from Káhnepúr and Lakhnao beyond the 4th. At Naogang, at Nímach, at Jhánsí, and at Jaunpúr, they knew that mutinies had occurred; but they were without details. Dánápúr was safe; Banáras and Alláhábád had been made so in the manner already described. From Ágra they had good news up to the 10th. At Ázamgarh there had been an outbreak; and there were bad rumours from Rohilkhand.

The fourth week of the month, and the week succeeding, up to the 4th of July, added considerably to their knowledge. On the 3rd of July, Government received information that the native troops at Káhnepúr had mutinied on the 4th of June; that they had been joined by Náná Dúndú Pant, the adopted son of the last of the Peshwás, with all his armed following; that Sir Henry Lawrence, and the Europeans at Lakhnao, had been gradually hemmed in by the rebels until they retained only the Residency, the Machhí Bhawan fort, and the cantonments, but that all was well there up to the 30th of June; that the troops of the Gwáliár Contingent had mutinied on the 15th of June; that an uneasy feeling prevailed at Haidarábád; that up to the 15th Ágra was safe, but that Bandah and other small stations had been occupied by the rebels. Such was the state

of the intelligence up to the 3rd. The following day brought a letter from Sir Henry Lawrence, dated 10 P.M., the 28th of June. In that letter Sir Henry stated that "he had every reason to believe that the Káhnepúr force had been entirely destroyed by treachery." Details, which in the end turned out in the main to be true, were added. But it was further stated that the intelligence was not believed either at Alláhábád or Banáras.

Such was the information possessed in Calcutta when General Havelock set out from Alláhábád to re-secure the broken central line. I must add a few words as to the circumstances which attended his appointment.

Major-General Havelock was Adjutant-General of the Queen's Troops in India. He had commanded a division during the Persian war, but on its conclusion, General
Havelock. ignorant of the death of General Anson and of his replacement as Commander-in-Chief by General Somerset, he had come round by steamer to Calcutta, and had been a fellow-passenger from Madras with Sir Patrick Grant. General Havelock had seen a great deal of service in India. In Burmah, in Afghanistan, in Gwáliár, on the Satlaj, he had established the character of being a thorough soldier. Quiet and retiring in his manners, he was not calculated to make an impression on those who judge only by outward show, but he had read and thought much, and his acquirements were solid and profound. Thin and spare of frame, he was yet gifted with a vitality which was proof against fatigue. He was not a talker, and many, perhaps, before the campaign then about to ensue, might have doubted his ability to command. But in this respect he bore a strong resemblance to the most capable of the Marshals of the first Empire, the illustrious Masséna, of whom Napoléon thus wrote:—"His conversation gave few indications of genius: but at the first cannon-shot his mental energy redoubled, and when surrounded by dangers his thoughts were clear and forcible."

Such was the officer to whom Sir Patrick Grant delegated the duty of commanding in the field the forces which the Government had been able to collect. To take command of those forces General Havelock left Calcutta on the 24th of June. What he accomplished with his army, and how he accomplished it, has been already related. It remains for me here only to say that his position at Kánhpúr, even after his victories, was, in the presence of the rebels in Oudh on his right, and the revolted Gwáliár Contingent on his left rear, in a military sense unsound and dangerous. It was not the smallest proof of his skill and daring that, notwithstanding this, deeming it in a political sense essential, he maintained it; and this, too, at a time when Mr. Beadon's line of six hundred miles—the line which maintained his communications with Calcutta—had been rudely snapped in twain.

CHAPTER II.

PATNÁ AND ÁRAH.

WHILST the events recorded in the preceding chapter had been enacted in Calcutta itself, the state of affairs in Bengal and in Bihár had scarcely been of a nature to justify the jaunty confidence expressed by Mr. Beadon on the 25th of May. The first information that the line of six hundred miles was actually in danger of being broken was conveyed to Government on the 12th of June from Rohní, a station in the Santhál district, about three hundred miles from Calcutta. This station was the head-quarters of the 5th Irregular Cavalry, commanded by Major Maedonald, one of the best officers of the Bengal Army. This officer was taking tea in front of his bungalow on the evening of the 12th of June, in company with his Adjutant, Sir Norman Leslie, and the Assistant Surgeon of the regiment, Dr. Grant. During a pause in their conversation, Dr. Grant rose with the intention of entering the bungalow. In the act of rising, he noticed the stealthy approach of three men, apparently strangers. As he turned to point them out to his companions, the intruders rushed upon them with drawn swords. Unarmed and taken by surprise, the Englishmen could defend themselves only with their chairs. But before Sir Norman Leslie could do even this he was cut down. Major Maedonald was scalped and received two other wounds on the head. Dr. Grant also was wounded. It would have gone hard with both had the assassins persevered; but suddenly and most unaccountably they turned and fled.

As no symptom of mutinous disposition had appeared in the 5th Cavalry, and as Major Maedonald believed in the loyalty of his men, it was at first conjectured that the assassins were discharged Sipáhis. A few days later, however, a sawár confessed that they belonged to the regiment. They were at once seized, tried, and sentenced to be hanged. This sentence. Major

Macdonald, with a courage which was great, though not rare, carried out in the presence of the entire regiment. A moment's weakness on his part would have been the signal for a general rising. Subsequent events proved that there was at the time an organized conspiracy in the regiment; that many had been aware of the plot to assassinate the three officers, that they "waited its success to rise." They were deterred at this critical time solely by the courage and determination of Major Macdonald.*

A comparatively trifling incident at Barhampúr—caused by the action of a sawár of the 11th Irregular Cavalry, who not only released some deserters from the 43rd Native Infantry, apprehended by the police, but likewise incited the men of his regiment and of the 63rd Native Infantry to mutiny—influenced the Government to retain some European Infantry at that station. This measure would, I need scarcely point out, have been wholly unnecessary had the Government taken the precaution to disarm the native regiments.

Mutinous
incident at
Barhampúr.

But it was at the great station of Patná, the capital of the country east of Banáras, that the strain was most severely felt. This city, containing 158,000 inhabitants, of whom 38,000 were Muhammadans, is situated on the right bank of the river Ganges, three hundred and seventy-seven miles north-west from Calcutta, and ten miles east from the military station of Dánápúr.

Patná.

* Major Macdonald thus related the circumstances at the time: "To tell the truth, I never for a moment expected to leave the hanging scene alive; but I determined to do my duty, and well knew the effect that pluck and decision had on natives. The regiment was drawn out. Wounded cruelly as I was, I had to see everything done myself, even to the adjusting of the ropes, and saw them hooped to run easy. Two of the culprits were paralysed with fear and astonishment, never dreaming that I should dare to hang them without an order from the Government. The third said he would not be hanged, and called on the Prophet, and on his comrades to rescue him. This was an awful moment: an instant's hesitation on my part, and probably I should have had a dozen bullets through me; so I seized a pistol, clapped it to the man's ear, and said, with a look there was no mistake about, 'Another word out of your mouth, and your brains shall be scattered on the ground.' He trembled, and held his tongue. The elephant came up, he was put on his back, the rope adjusted, the elephant moved, and he was left dangling. I then had the others up and off in the same way. And after some time, when I dismissed the men of the regiment to their lines, and still found my head upon my shoulders, I really could scarcely believe it."

Patná owed its importance partly to its traditions; partly to the fact that it was the capital of one of the richest provinces in the country; partly likewise to its being the head-quarters of the Wáhábís—the extreme Muhammadan party in India. It was ruled by a Commissioner, corresponding directly with the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. Subordinate to it and to its Commissioner were the districts of Gayá, to the south, with a chief town of the same name, sixty miles distant; of Sháhábád, comprising the country between the Ganges, the Karamnása, and the Són, and having as its capital Árah, about thirty-five miles to the west of Patná; of Sárán, with Chaprá, forty miles to the north, as its capital; of Champáran, with Motihárá, as its chief station; and Tirhut, between Nipál and the Ganges, represented by the civil station of Muzaffarpúr. In these stations the magistrate represented the executive power.

The station of Dánápúr was garrisoned by three Native Infantry Regiments, the 7th, 8th, and 40th, by one company of European and one of Native Artillery, and by Her Majesty's 10th Foot. Dánápúr was the head-quarters of a division, and its divisional commander was Major-General Lloyd, an officer who had rendered excellent service in his day, and who, but four years before, had been selected by Lord Dalhousie to suppress the Santal insurrection—a task which he had accomplished with judgment and discretion. His command at Dánápúr was extensive in its range. To the north it included all the country to the foot of the Nipál hills; to the east it reached Barhámpúr; to the south Hazáribágh and Rámpúr. (The troops protecting this vast extent of country were, with one exception, massed at Dánápúr. That exception was the 12th Regiment of Irregular Cavalry, commanded by a most distinguished officer, Major Holmes. This corps was stationed at Sigaulí, fifteen miles to the north-west of Motihárá, on the Nipál road, and about a hundred to the north of Dánápúr.

The province of which Patná was the capital, was, I have said, one of the richest in the possession of the English. It owed its importance partly to the fact that for several years it had been the chosen ground for the development of native industry by English landholders working with English capital; partly, and to a far greater extent, to the circumstance that the native landowners were, as a rule, men of ancient lineage and of large estates.

Garrison of
Dánápúr.

Peculiarities
of the Patná
division.

Before the arrival of reinforcements from Persia, Ceylon, and Burmah, the European regiment at Dánápúr was the only English regiment in the long line between Calcutta and Lakhnao. Having in view the extent of country it had to guard—the area of Western Bihár alone comprehending 2101 square miles, with a population of upwards of a million and a half, its proximity to the influential city of Patná, to the fact that many of the native landowners of Bihár were men commanding a large following, it still seems strange that the expedient so successfully adopted at Láhor and other places—the expedient of disarming the native troops—was not at once resorted to here. (The postponement of such a measure necessarily chained the European troops to the station of Dánápúr, leaving all the other districts in the Patná division to shift for themselves.)

It was from no lack of knowledge of the danger of leaving arms in the hands of the Sipáhis, that the Government of India hesitated to give the order to disarm them. The Commissioner of Patná, Mr. William Tayler, had been unremitting alike in impressing his courageous spirit on the disaffected, and in keeping the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal well informed of the general aspect of affairs. As this gentleman's name will figure somewhat conspicuously in the following pages, it is fit that I should introduce him here.

Mr. William Tayler was a member of the Bengal Civil Service. He was a gentleman and a scholar, possessing great natural abilities which he had lost no opportunity of cultivating, an elegant mind, and a large fund of common sense. To these should be added the greater gifts, during a crisis such as that of which I am writing, of a nerve not to be shaken, a clear view, and a power to decide rapidly and correctly in difficult circumstances. In the prime of life, courteous in manner, loyal to his Government, ready to hear the opinions of all, yet resolved to act on those which best commended themselves to his understanding, he was just the man whom a Wellesley or a Napier would have detached as his lieutenant to command a difficult position.

Mr. William
Tayler.

The mutinous spirit displayed early in the year by the Sipáhis at Barhámpúr, and later by those at Barrackpúr, had not been unnoticed by Mr. Tayler. As the consul of a province which had as its capital the city of Patná, the head-quarters of the chiefs of the Wáhábís, it

Early detects
the sore spot.

had devolved upon him to watch every vibration in the political system, so strangely agitated since the beginning of the year. Mr. Tayler, with a forecast surer than that of Mr. Secretary Beadon, had detected in the action of the 19th Regiment of Native Infantry and in the scarce-concealed sympathy with that action of the regiments stationed at Barrackpúr, the germs of a very contagious political disease, and he had deemed it not at all improbable that, if not wholly eradicated by the measures of Government, the disease might gradually spread upwards. (Never for a moment did he believe in the "passing and groundless panic" theory of Mr. Beadon. But not even Mr. Tayler, astute and far-seeing as he was, had imagined that the contagion would be communicated, as if by magic, to the upper provinces, passing over the intermediate divisions, to attack the body politic, suddenly, in its very heart.

When, therefore, the catastrophe of the 10th of May occurred at Mirath, it took not less by surprise the Commissioner of Patná than every other official in India. But Mr. Tayler was equal to the occasion. He summoned the European inhabitants of the place to deliberate on the means to be adopted to avert the crisis from Patná. Rejecting the timid counsel offered him shortly before by the judge,—who then, or a little later, took refuge in the opium godown,—to despatch the Government treasure to Dánápúr and to be prepared on the first alarm to follow it thither, Mr. Tayler briefly stated to those present his information, his apprehensions, and his hopes, and then added that if they had confidence in him, he was

Is supported
by the Euro-
pean com-
munity.

prepared to assume the entire responsibility, and to act as he might consider necessary. In reply the Europeans present voted by acclamation confidence in their Commissioner. Thus armed, Mr. Tayler

prepared for the inevitable emergency.

On the 7th June the crisis seemed to arrive. Intimation was received that evening from Dánápúr to the effect that the native regiments were in a state of excitement, and that a rise was apprehended that

June 7.
The first
crisis.

very night.

Mr. Tayler determined at once to make of his own house a fortress for the whole station. He drove to the nearest residents, and sent messengers to those further off, begging them to accept his hospitality during the crisis. In less than an hour his house was crowded

Mr. Tayler
meets it.

by men, women, and children, from all parts of Patná. The house, however, was garrisoned by the Station Guards, who were all natives. Could they be trusted? Suddenly the discovery of a letter passing between them and the Sipáhis at Dánápúr showed Mr. Tayler that his guards were in league with the disaffected regiments.

Fortunately, a body of Sikhs newly raised by Captain Rattray, were then within forty miles of Patná. Mr. Tayler had sent expresses a day or two before to summon these men. They arrived at the early dawn. For the moment, then, Patná was safe. The several residents returned to their homes.

The immediate superior of Mr. Tayler was the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. The gentleman who filled that office in 1837 was Mr. Frederick Halliday, a member of the Bengal Civil Service. Mr. Halliday had spent the greater part of his career in the Secretarial offices of Calcutta, and had, as a practical man, suffered from a training which, whilst it makes a man an excellent clerk, affords him no opportunity for that capacity to deal with men which can only be acquired in independent executive command. Of the clerkly ability which makes a man a good Secretary in unruffled times Mr. Halliday had abundance. He was, however, utterly and hopelessly unfitted to deal with a great crisis. Other reasons combined with his want of practical knowledge to unfit him for the post which he unfortunately occupied. The "service" did not trust him. He was believed to favour unduly those who were bound to him by personal ties of blood and friendship. On one memorable occasion, the Private Secretary of Lord Dalhousie, Mr. Courtney, had not only charged him with falsehood, but had published the correspondence containing the charge in the leading newspaper of Calcutta, the *Englishman*, without eliciting any denial or explanation. His immediate subordinates, the Commissioners of Divisions, felt themselves terribly handicapped by serving a chief, who, having had no personal experience of the duties of their position, could not sympathise with their difficulties: whom they felt they could not trust: who would not judge them by their actions, but by the manner in which those actions would reflect personally upon himself, and whose fussy interference, nurtured hundreds of miles from the scenes of action in complete ignorance of the circumstances of the moment, was

calculated to disarrange plans, matured with the most profound knowledge and after careful consideration, on the spot.

It can easily be conceived, then, that a full report of the threatened outbreak at Patná, made to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, had not the effect of inducing the Government of India to order the disarming of the men from whom the outbreak had been apprehended.

Major-General Lloyd.

Major-General Lloyd, then commanding at Dánápúr, had passed all his service in a Sipáhi regiment. He had witnessed the fidelity of the native soldier under trying and difficult circumstances, and, fortified by the opinion of the several commandants of regiments, he clung to his belief in their loyalty. He shut his eyes too closely to the fact that of the three native regiments under his command two had already shown a mutinous disposition. Like so many officers, good honest men, who had spent their lives amid the Sipáhis, he could not bring himself absolutely to mistrust them,—to recommend their disarming, equivalent, in his opinion, to their dishonour. His confidence in his own judgment was increased by the fact that on the 7th of June—about the period when so many other regiments had risen; when he had been positively informed that his regiments would certainly rise; and when an

Trusts the Sipáhis.

opportunity had been offered them of seizing some £200,000 of money belonging to the Government, as they believed, but slightly guarded—those regiments had remained passive. (On the 2nd of June he had reported to the Government his belief that the regiments would remain quiet, “unless some great temptation or excitement should assail them,” and five days later he reiterated the same opinion.)

The Government trust Major-General Lloyd.

The Government, then, had before them the report of the Commissioner of the danger incurred at Patná on the 7th of June, and the opinion of the Major-General commanding the division that the native troops would remain quiet, “unless some great temptation or excitement should assail them.” (Having in view the composition of the native society at Patná, the isolation of the stations dependent upon it, the vast wealth of the province, the Government must, I think, be held guilty of fatuity in trusting, at such a crisis, to the chance that no great temptation or excitement would assail the Sipáhis.) Neither at that time nor later would there have been any difficulty in disarming the Sipáhis at Dánápúr. The 10th Regiment was on the spot, and

detachments of European troops were constantly conveyed past the station in steamers.

The only defence of the inaction of the Government with which I am acquainted, relating to this particular period, the first week in June, is to the effect that Lord Canning had "not merely to consider what was locally or individually best, but what was most generally conducive to the interests of those under his charge." It has been urged that the result of disarming might have been "dangerous in the extreme to our people in other parts of the country where Sipáhis abounded, and not a detachment of Europeans was to be seen": that the Governor-General "was looking anxiously for the arrival of fresh reinforcements when the game would be more in his own hands; but in the then destitute state of the Lower Provinces, it seemed to him and to the members of his Council to be sounder policy to temporise. ^{Defence of the action of the Government.} But these and similar arguments will not bear examination. (Nothing that might have been done in the way of disarming could have produced results so disastrous as those which actually followed the inactive policy of the Government of India, and which I am now about to record.) It may likewise be added that when Lord Canning had fresh reinforcements at his disposal, he still refused, in the manner hereafter to be described, to order the disarming of the Sipáhis. ^{Its weakness.}

To return to Patná. The report brought by Captain Rattray of the reception accorded to his Sikh soldiers by the inhabitants of the city and the districts in its vicinity, was not of a nature to allay the apprehensions which his profound acquaintance with the province had excited in the mind of Mr. Tayler. Those soldiers, he was informed, had been constantly reviled on their march towards Patná, taunted with the part they were taking, accused of being renegades from their faith, and asked whether they intended to fight for the infidel or for their religion. When they entered Patná the high priest of the Sikh temple in the city refused to admit them to the sacred shrine, and wherever they were seen they met the most palpable evidences of the hatred and contempt of the population. ^{Excitement of the people of Patná.}

Private inquiries which Mr. Tayler instituted at this time soon brought to his mind the conviction that secret mischief

was brewing. He learnt, too, that conferences of disaffected men were held at night, though in a manner so secret and so well guarded, that proof of meeting was rendered difficult, the capture of the plotters impossible.

The alarm meanwhile was increasing. The judge of Patná, the opium agent, and some others, left their houses with their families and took refuge in the opium godown. It spread likewise to the districts. Mr. Wake, the magistrate of Árah, afterwards so distinguished for his gallantry in the defence of that place, wrote to Mr. Tayler on the 11th, informing him that many of the railway *employés* and other Europeans had run away from his district in a panic, and had taken refuge in Dánápúr.

Under these trying circumstances Mr. Tayler acted with Alarm in the districts. Splendid conduct of Mr. Tayler. vigour, with judgment, and with decision. He stood out prominently amongst his compeers. He hid nothing from his superiors. The details of the crisis through which his division was passing, were, therefore, well known in Calcutta. And when post after post brought to the capital accounts of the risings at Banáras, at Ázamgarh, in Central India and in the North-Western Provinces, the question rose naturally and involuntarily to the lips:—"How is it that Patná is quiescent?" Patná was quiescent simply because one man, Mr. William Tayler, the Commissioner of the Division, was a brave and determined man, ready to strike when necessary, and incapable, even under the darkest circumstances, of showing hesitation or fear.

The metal of which his character was formed was soon to be further tested. The disaffection among the Dánápúr troops, and in the districts, being daily on the increase, Mr. Tayler directed the removal of the moneys in the treasuries of Chaprá and Árah into Patná, thus bringing the coin under his own eye. He controlled with a firm hand the movements in his six districts of the officials, some of whom had actually left their stations under the conviction of an impending attack. Every day the post and messengers brought him intelligence of disaffection on the one side, of apprehension on the other; of plots to murder, of plots to burn, of plots to rise in revolt. (He was informed, moreover, that Kúnwar Singh, a powerful landowner, whose estates in the vicinity of Árah were peopled by a martial tenantry devoted to their chief, was making secret preparations to seize the first opportunity to revolt. }

Mr. Tayler did not, at the moment, credit the reports about Kínwar Singh individually. He was well aware that to all the disaffected nobles and landowners of the districts only two opportunities, or one of two opportunities, would prove sufficiently tempting. These were, the mutiny of the native regiments at Dánápúr, and the rising of the population of Patná. It was clear that a successful mutiny at Dánápúr would be instantaneously followed by the rising of Patná; equally clear that a successful rising at Patná would precipitate the mutiny of the native troops. (Mr. Tayler was, however, confident that if allowed by the Government unfettered action, he could maintain order in Patná so long as the native troops at Dánápúr should remain quiescent. Thus, in his view, all, for the moment, depended on the quiet attitude of the Sipáhis.)

So many symptoms, amongst others intercepted correspondence, seeming to show that the native troops were only watching their opportunity, it appeared to Mr. Tayler imperatively necessary that they should be disarmed with as little delay as possible. He endeavoured to impress his views in this respect on Major-General Lloyd. But in this he was unsuccessful. Major-General Lloyd held to the views I have already quoted, and declared repeatedly to Mr. Tayler that he was in direct communication with Lord Canning on the subject, and that he would carry the province through the crisis without resorting to the supreme measure of disarming.

Fails to impress his views on Major-General Lloyd.

Mr. Tayler's position was rendered a thousand times more difficult by the fact that in addition to a disaffected city under his very eyes, to disaffected districts within ranges varying from thirty to upwards of a hundred miles, to disaffected landowners controlling large portions of those districts, he had within a few miles of his own door three native regiments, pledged, as their correspondence showed, to mutiny, and only watching their opportunity. It is difficult to realise the enormous responsibility thus thrown upon the shoulders of one man. Other positions in India were dangerous, but this was unique in the opportunities of danger which threatened it, in the number of the lives, in the amount of treasure, in the extent of country, devolving upon one man, almost unaided, to guard. Without a single European soldier, and with only a few Sikhs, at his disposal, Mr. Tayler was responsible for the lives of some hundreds of Europeans

The enormous difficulties of his position.

scattered over the province, for a treasury in his own city containing more than £300,000, and in the districts of still more, for opium of the value of millions, for his own good name, for the credit and honour of his country. And now all around was surging. Any moment might bring revolt and mutiny to his door.

I have said in my description of Mr. Tayler that he possessed great natural talents which he had cultivated. In the course of his reading he had not been slow to observe that in great crises, when two armies, or two political parties are sitting armed opposite to each other, each watching its opportunity, success almost invariably inclines to the leader who shall strike the first blow. The time had now arrived for him to consider whether he was not himself placed in a position in which he

Resolves to
strike the
first blow.

would be justified in dealing at the disaffected chiefs a blow which would paralyse their movements—a blow not accompanied by bloodshed, but one strictly of self-defence. The measure he contemplated may, in one sense, be termed a measure of disarming. He was not strong enough, indeed, to disarm at the moment the inhabitants of Patná by depriving them of their weapons, but he could disarm their counsels of wisdom by apprehending and confining their trusted leaders. It was a bold and daring idea requiring strength of nerve and resolution to carry through; but the necessities were pressing, the dangers were threatening, a general rising in Patná might be fatal. Mr. Tayler resolved to anticipate those dangers, to render impossible or fruitless that rising, by acting in the manner I have indicated.

Accordingly he struck. Private information had satisfied

The principal
conspirators.

Mr. Tayler that the chiefs of the disaffected natives were the Wáhábí Maulavís. These men were the leaders of the most bigoted Muhammadan party in the world, and as such commanded implicit obedience from the mass of Patná Muhammadans, holding in their hands the strings of the contemplated movement. Prominent amongst these Maulavís were three men, Sháh Muhammad Husén, Ahmad Ulah, and Waiz-úl-Hakk. To seize these men openly would have provoked the outbreak which Mr. Tayler was careful to avoid. But it was necessary for the public peace that they should be secured. Mr. Tayler, therefore, requested their presence, and the presence of others, to consult on the state of affairs. When the conference was over he allowed the others

to depart, but detained the three men I have named, informing them that in the then existing state of affairs it was necessary that they should remain under supervision. They politely acquiesced, and were conducted to a comfortable house near the Sikh encampment where suitable accommodation had been provided for them.

Mr. Tayler
arrests them.

This act occurred on the 19th of June. It was followed up by the arrest of Maulavi Mehdi, the patrolling magistrate of the city, strongly suspected of connivance with the disaffected. The next day, the 20th, the rank and file having been overawed by the seizure of their chiefs, Mr. Tayler issued a proclamation calling upon all citizens to deliver up their arms, within twenty-four hours, on pain of being proceeded against; and another, forbidding all citizens, those excepted who might be specially exempted, from leaving their homes after 9 o'clock at night.

June 20.
Follows up
the blow.

These several measures were to a great extent successful. The disaffected were deprived of their most trusted leaders; several thousand stands of arms were peaceably delivered up; nightly meetings of the conspirators ceased. As a first practical result, the judge, Mr. Farquharson, the opium agent, Mr. Garrett, and others, left their refuge at the opium godown, and returned to their houses. The second was the sudden diminution of the symptoms of disaffection throughout the districts under Mr. Tayler's orders.

Success of his
bold action.

But the crisis was not over. Three days later a corporal of the native police, Wáris Áli by name, was arrested at his own station, in Tirhut, under most suspicious circumstances. Upon his person was found a bundle of letters implicating in the rebellious movement one Áli Karim, an influential Muhammadan gentleman, residing nine miles from Patná.

June 23.
Fresh discoveries of
treason.

Mr. Tayler at once despatched the magistrate of Patná, Mr. Lewis, to arrest this gentleman, placing at his disposal a party of Sikh cavalry. But Mr. Lewis, listening to the voice of the native official who was to accompany him, resolved to act without the cavalry. The same friendly voice which had proffered this advice warned Áli Karim of the magistrate's approach. When Mr. Lewis came in sight of his intended victim, the latter was mounted on an elephant. Mr. Lewis had at his disposal a small pony gig—

The chief
criminal escapes—how?

and his legs. As Áli Karím turned at once into the fields, he was enabled easily to baffle his pursuer, and to escape.

The order which Mr. Tayler's bold measures had thus restored was maintained without interruption till the 3rd of July 3. July. The disaffected had been thoroughly cowed. In the interval, however, reports of the mas-acre at Sháhjá-hánpúr, of the fall of Kánhpúr, of Fathpúr, and of Farrukhábád, came to re-animate their hopes. The attitude of the Sípáhi regiments continued doubtful.

But on the evening of the 3rd of July the long threatened Patná rising occurred. (Thanks, however, to the energetic measures already taken by Mr. Tayler, it occurred in a form so diluted that a continuation of the same daring and resolute policy sufficed to repress it.) It happened in this wise. At the period on the 3rd already indicated, some two hundred Muhammadan fanatics, led by one Pír Áli, a bookseller, noted for his enthusiasm for his religion and his hatred of the English, unfurled the green flag, and summoning by beat of drum others to join them rushed, calling upon Alláh, towards the Roman Catholic Church, situate in the very heart of the city. On the news of this movement reaching Mr. Tayler, that gentleman directed Captain Rattray, attended by the magistrate, to march down with 150 Sikhs, whilst for the protection of the residents he put into operation the same precautions which had been adopted on the 7th of June, he himself going in person to the houses nearest to his own.

Meanwhile, and before the Sikhs had reached the spot, Dr. Lyall, the assistant to the opium agent, hearing the uproar, and thinking that his presence might overawe the rioters, had galloped to the scene of action. As he approached the crowd several shots were fired at him. By one of these he was killed.*

The sight of a fallen European stimulated the fanaticism of the crowd, and produced on them the effect which the taste of blood arouses in a hungry tiger. They pushed onwards with renewed enthusiasm, their numbers being augmented at every step. In a very few minutes, however, they found themselves face to face with Rattray's 150 Sikhs. Between the opposing parties, far from sympathy, there was the hatred of race, the

* His face was at once so mutilated that it could not afterwards be recognised

hatred of religion : on the one side the newly aroused fanaticism, on the other the longed for opportunity to repay many a covert insult. It can well be imagined what followed.

There was not a moment of parley. The rival parties instantaneously clashed, and in a few seconds, the discipline and bayonets of the Sikhs suppressed the long threatened Patná rising.

The rising
suppressed.

The next day, and the day following, the city was searched for the ringleaders of the outbreak. (Thirty-one were apprehended. Amongst these were Pír Áli, the actual leader, and Shekh Ghasíta, the confidential servant of Lútf Áli Khán, the richest banker in the city.)

July 4-5.
Capture and
trial of the
ringleaders.

Of the thirty-one men who were apprehended, fourteen were tried and executed without delay. With them likewise was hanged the Wáris Áli referred to in a previous page.* Two—the two above named—were remanded for further examination.

Facts seemed to speak strongly against them. It was clearly proved that Pír Áli was a main agent for promoting a crusade against the English; that for months he and the Shekh Ghasíta, above mentioned, had engaged and kept in pay numerous men who should be ready, when called upon, to fight for their religion and the Emperor of Dehli. But these operations had required a large outlay. Pír Áli was poor. His associate, Ghasíta, was the hand of the great banker. But though it might have been fairly presumed that the great banker was implicated, no proceedings were, for the moment, taken against him.

The two men, Pír Áli and Ghasíta, were tried and hanged. Lútf Áli, arraigned subsequently on the charge of harbouring a mutinous Sipáhi, and acquitted by the judge on the ground of insufficient evidence, was promptly released, and shortly afterwards was welcomed and honoured as a martyr by the successor of Mr. Tayler!

Lútf Áli.

But the outbreak was suppressed. It had been premature. As Pír Áli admitted, Mr. Tayler's strong measures had forced his hand and compelled him to strike before he was ready. But for those strong measures the conspiracy would have been

* When taken to the gallows, this man called out in a loud voice, "If there is any one here who professes to be a friend of the King of Dehli, let him come and help me."

silently hatched until the outbreak at Dánápúr should have given it the signal for explosion.

Whilst Mr. Tayler, thus, in spite of the all but superhuman difficulties in his path, maintained order in the most disaffected city still under British rule in India, and in the districts immediately contiguous, Major Holmes, commanding the 12th Irregular Cavalry, acting in concert with him and pursuing the same system, prevented an outbreak in the frontier district of Sigaulí. It is true, indeed, that Major Holmes still believed in his native soldiers, and equally true that up to the moment of their actual outbreak—almost simultaneous with that at Dánápúr—they had shown no symptom of disaffection. But this belief on the part of Major Holmes was so generally shared by the officers of the Bengal army, that it should attract no surprise. It was natural that the officers should believe in men with whom they had been associated twenty, thirty, and forty years; who had followed them unhesitatingly through the snows of Kábul; whose forefathers had served with goodwill in the expeditions against Egypt, and the isles of France and Bourbon; and who had protested against the indignity of being suspected. That was natural enough. But it was not natural that the Government, raised above the passions and prejudices of regimental officers, should more than share their sympathies. With the far wider scope open to their view the Government possessed means, not available to the officers, of testing the truth of the lip-service so freely proffered by the men. It is impossible to say how much loss of life, how much misery, how much evil would have been avoided had the Government of India not refused to take from the native troops of the Dánápúr division the arms, which their own Sipáhi-trained Major-General had assured them, would be loyally used only if no great temptation or excitement should assail them!)

Still, order was maintained. The means employed to assure that order, whilst they gained for Mr. Tayler the confidence of the English planters and traders throughout the province, were not at all to the taste of the Government of Bengal. Of Mr. Halliday I have already spoken. It is scarcely to be doubted that if that gentleman and Mr. Tayler could have changed places; if the latter had been Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and the former Commissioner of the Patná division, whilst the affairs of Bengal would not certainly have suffered, the nature of the rule at

Contrast between Mr. Tayler and Mr. Halliday.

Patná would have been widely different. There is abundant evidence to prove that whilst the policy of Mr. Tayler, condemned, as we shall see, by Mr. Halliday, saved Patná; the policy of concealing from the public view facts which it was of vital importance that the public should know,—of equipping, so to speak, with armed rebels,—advocated by that gentleman, and employed so uselessly in Calcutta and its vicinity, would, if followed in a city such as Patná and in a province such as Bihár, have played the game of, and given victory to, the disaffected. The Patná rising, so easily suppressed by Mr. Tayler, would most certainly have been a black day in the calendar of Mr. Halliday.

I repeat, under Mr. Tayler, order was maintained, under most difficult circumstances, in Patná. About Patná, then, so long as he should remain there, no apprehension was felt. But the case was not so with respect to Dánápúr. There, the Sipáhís remained armed and trusted. In spite of intercepted letters, of men occasionally caught in mutinous acts, the Government continued to trust to the chance that “no great temptation or excitement” would induce them to rise.

Far different was the feeling of the European community of Calcutta. These had important interests in Bihár, European
interests in
Bihár. large districts of which were watered and fertilised by their capital. These interests seemed to depend entirely on the good behaviour of the Sipáhís. To many of them it was a question of wealth or poverty, to those on the spot of death or of existence. In Mr. Tayler they had absolute confidence. His measures had warded off one danger. But the other still remained, clear, vivid, threatening; ready to burst forth at any moment; safe to encounter no opposition capable of restraining it for an hour.

That the possibility of such an outbreak had escaped the attention of the Government of India there is evidence to disprove. It may have been, as his latest apologist has asserted, that Lord Canning refrained at an earlier date from issuing a disarming order because he was waiting for “fresh reinforcements, when the game would be more in his own hands.” But in the early part of July those fresh reinforcements arrived. Not only so, but those very reinforcements, consisting of a wing of the 37th Foot and of the 5th Fusiliers, had received orders to proceed towards the north-west in steamers, touching at Dánápúr on the way.

Here then was the opportunity—the opportunity which would take from the Government the last excuse not to disarm the native regiments, unless they were prepared to avow that they would trust rather to the chance of the Sipáhis remaining quiescent.

The Government considered the question carefully and with attention. They arrived at a decision fatal alike to their prescience as statesmen, and to the true conception of the responsibilities of men placed, fortuitously perhaps, but very really, in a position of absolute power. (They cast from their shoulders the entire responsibility.) They would not order that the regiments should retain their arms; neither would they direct that they should be disarmed. They left the decision to Major-General Lloyd, commanding the Dánápúr division—the officer who had already reported his belief that the Sipáhis “would remain quiet, unless some great temptation or excitement should assail them, in which case, I fear, they could not be relied upon.” The Government thus constituted Major-General Lloyd the sole judge as to whether such temptation or such excitement was likely to arise.*

This decision of the Government was not published, but the purport of it was privately conveyed to the mercantile community of Calcutta. It failed to satisfy the members of that community. They saw that the responsibility had been only

* The order of the acting Commander-in-Chief, Sir Patrick Grant, speaking the voice of the Government, runs thus: “The first detachment of H.M.’s 5th Fusiliers left Chinsurah this morning, on flats towed by steamers, in progress towards Banáras, and the remaining portion of the regiment will follow by the same means of transit to-morrow and Friday. If, when the regiment reaches Dánápúr, you see reason to distrust the native troops, and you entertain an opinion that it is desirable to disarm them, you are at liberty to disembark the 5th Fusiliers to assist you in this object; but, it is imperatively necessary that the detention of the regiment should be limited to the shortest possible period. If you decide on disarming, it should extend to all three regiments, and it should be carefully explained that it is merely a measure of precaution to save the well-disposed to be led to commit themselves by the machinations of designing scoundrels, some few of whom are always to be found, even in the best regiments. If resistance to authority is exhibited, the most prompt and decided measures for its instant repression should be adopted.” The reader will observe that this letter contains no order, but simply throws the responsibility of ordering the disarming on the Major-General.

moved. It had been shifted from the shoulders of the Government to the shoulders of Major-General Lloyd. That officer was known to be opposed to disarming; to entertain a belief that he could carry those under his command through the crisis without having resort to so extreme a measure. In the opinion of the mercantile community, then, the decision arrived at by the Government seemed equivalent to a refusal to order disarming.

Impressed with the conviction of the certain evil which must follow a conclusion so adverse to their interests, to the interests of the province, of the Empire, and to public order, the merchants of Calcutta determined, as a last resource, to make, in the most temperate language, a personal appeal to Lord Canning. On the 17th of July, then, two days after they had been informed of the resolution at which the Government had arrived, the merchants solicited the Governor-General to receive from their body a deputation, charged with their ideas on the state of affairs in Tirhut and Bihár.

July 17.

The merchants
of Calcutta re-
monstrate with
Lord Canning.

Lord Canning agreed to receive, and did on the 20th receive, the deputation. Its spokesman, Mr. Daniel Mackinlay, a gentleman who carried with him the confidence of all Calcutta, began by pointing out how the mercantile interests were involved in the maintenance of peace and order; how both were threatened by the attitude of the native regiments at Dánápúr; how the disarming of those regiments would quiet the public mind and restore confidence; how that a most favourable opportunity for carrying out that measure then presented itself, inasmuch as the 5th Fusiliers, who had left Calcutta by steamer on the 12th, would reach Dánápúr on or about the 22nd; that they, disembarking, could very easily, in conjunction with the 10th Regiment on the spot, disarm the native regiments, and then, re-embarking, proceed on their upward journey. Such were the points submitted in respectful language by the spokesman of the deputation. Lord Canning, in a curt and ceremonious speech, refused to accede to the request preferred.

July 20.

Lord Canning
is obstinate.

The events that followed can only be regarded as the consequence of the decisions of the Government of India. These decisions may be thus briefly stated:—1st, a refusal to order the disarming of the Dánápúr brigade at the period when the troops south of Dánápúr were being disarmed, when those north of it were mutinying, and

Summary of
the action of
the Govern-
ment.

when the greatest disaffection in the city and in the districts close to Dánápúr were daily being brought to light; 2ndly, the rejection of the request of the merchants of Calcutta to order the disarming when the strength in Europeans had been greatly increased; 3rdly, the transfer of responsibility to an officer who was known to be opposed to the disarming of the native troops under his command.

I now proceed to relate the consequences of these decisions.

Major-General Lloyd was armed, we have seen, with the power, should he think fit, to detain the 5th Fusiliers at Dánápúr, and, acting with them and the 10th Regiment, to disarm the three native regiments of his command. Major-General Lloyd winced under this responsibility. He did not like it at all. He could not resolve to make use of the powers with which he was entrusted. (When, therefore, on the 22nd of July, the main body of the 5th Fusiliers arrived off Dánápúr, he did not order them to disembark, he did not even detain them. They proceeded without delay on their way.)

But no sooner had they left than Major-General Lloyd began to doubt whether he had acted rightly. He could not call them back. But it happened two days later, whilst the Major-General was half regretting, half doubting, that two companies of the 37th Regiment arrived off the station. Major-General Lloyd at once directed the disembarkation of these men.

But he had not even then brought himself to the point of ordering disarming. Nor could he, even with these new troops at his disposal, persuade himself to direct the necessary measure. The responsibility thrust upon him by the Government pressed him down. Like all weak men, weighted with a burden to which their intellect and their nerve are alike unequal, Major-General Lloyd hesitated. In the midst of his hesitation he bethought him of a half-measure—a measure which, he believed, would render the Sipáhis powerless and yet save their honour. (He decided to leave them their percussion-muskets, but to deprive them of their percussion-caps!)

That the reader may clearly understand the danger with which such a measure was fraught, it is necessary that I should give a short description of the station of Dánápúr, and of its military plan.

Dánápúr lies ten miles from the city of Patná, six from the civil station of Báukípúr, in which reside the European officials. The native town occupies the easternmost point of the station, that nearest to Patná. Close to the town is a large square, tenanted mainly by European troops. Adjoining this on its western side is a smaller square in which are the better quarters of the European officers. Beyond this a few detached houses, and beyond these again, the lines or huts occupied by the Sipáhis. Further on still, at the westernmost point of the station, was the magazine, in which were stored, amongst other items, the percussion-caps for the use of the regiments. To remove these caps from this magazine into the square occupied by the Europeans, the whole length of the native lines would thus have to be traversed. It would not be possible to conceal from the Sipáhis the nature of the measure which should thus be carried out. They would most certainly divine its reason. Surely, then, in deciding to deprive the Sipáhis of their percussion-caps, Major-General Lloyd was placing in their way that very temptation, and arousing in their minds that very excitement, which, he had reported to Government, would almost certainly incite them to mutiny!

The station
of Dánápúr.

Having received only the permission, not the order, to disarm, and not being able to nerve himself to a measure of a character so pointed, Major-General Lloyd directed the carrying out of a scheme far less decisive and infinitely more dangerous. A parade of the European troops was ordered for the morning of the 25th; and it was directed that whilst the troops should remain in the great square, already referred to, two carts should be sent to bring into that square the percussion-cap cases from the magazine.

The order was obeyed. The 10th Foot, two companies of the 37th Regiment, and the company of European Artillery were drawn up on the morning of the 25th in the great square, and the two carts were despatched to the magazine under the charge of an officer and a small guard. The carts reached the magazine, were loaded with the cap-cases, and set out on their return. As they passed the lines of the 7th Native Infantry, the Sipáhis showed the greatest excitement. Those who were being paraded for guard summoned their comrades to join them in preventing the carrying off of the caps. Their officers, however, succeeded in pacifying them. The men of the 8th Native

July 25.
First conse-
quences of
Major-General
Lloyd's half-
measures.

Infantry were less demonstrative. Those of the 40th even showed a disposition to oppose the angry demonstrations of the men of the 7th. For the moment the difficulty was tided over; the cap-eases were brought safely into the square, and the parade was dismissed. The General, perfectly satisfied with the manner in which he had solved the difficult question and believing, as he says himself, that the Sipáhis would feel it "quite madness to attempt resistance with only fifteen caps per man," determined then to carry out another measure, still more delicate, still more likely to cause opposition. (He issued orders accordingly to the commandants to hold a second parade of their regiments without arms, that afternoon, and to take from the men the caps in the regimental magazines and those in their actual possession.)

Their apparent success.

The Major-General resolves to proceed further.

A more difficult operation than that entrusted to the regimental officers of the native regiments can scarcely be conceived. Nor, in the presence of the manifestation of the 7th Native Infantry in the morning, is it possible to imagine how the Major-General could have believed that the Sipáhis would calmly surrender the one thing still in their own hands which made their muskets valuable. However, the order of the Major-General had to be carried out, and the regiments were paraded at 1 o'clock.

At that parade the General was not present. Neither had he taken the precaution to order the attendance of the European troops of the garrison. In point of fact, at the hour ordered by the General himself for the parade, the European troops were in their barraeks, eating their dinners. The General himself, after giving some vague instructions as to how to act in case of a difficulty which he regarded as impossible, proceeded on board a river steamer which had arrived that morning. He stepped on board just after the mutiny, now about to be recorded, had broken out.

On the men falling in without arms the several commanding officers directed the native officers to collect the caps in pouch from each Sipáhi, explaining to them as they did so that the measure was one of precaution designed to save the well-disposed from being led away by the machinations of those bent on mischief. The native officers, who probably sympathised in a great measure with their men, might as well have spoken to the winds. The demand for the

Consequences of his resolve.

caps, was, in the 7th and 8th Regiments, the signal for mutiny. The men rushed tumultuously to the bells of arms, seized their muskets, and began to fire on their officers. The 40th showed some hesitation, but, after a short period of doubt, they too were carried away by the example of their comrades.

Whilst this was happening, Major-General Lloyd was stepping on board the steamer, and the European soldiers were at their dinners. The Major-General had previously arranged, however, that in the event of any disturbance two musket-shots should be fired in quick succession by the European guard at the hospital—a large building between the smaller square and the native lines, and commanding a good view of the latter. At half-past 1 o'clock the report of those shots informed Major-General Lloyd and the Europeans that the native regiments had mutinied.

The mutiny,
—and how it
was not sup-
pressed.

No sooner was the signal given than the “assembly” sounded in the large square. The 10th Regiment turned out under Lieutenant-Colonel Fenwick, two companies of the 37th under the senior captain present; the artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Huyshe. But there was no one to take the command. Major-General Lloyd states that he had previously given instructions how to act on an emergency to Colonel Huyshe, and that he considered that these orders would ensure the attack and pursuit of the mutineers by the European infantry and artillery. Uneasy at the quiescent attitude of the troops, he, at a later period of the afternoon, despatched one staff officer to order the guns to advance, and another to direct the officer commanding the detachment of the 37th Foot to place himself under the orders of Colonel Fenwick.

Whether the orders of the Major-General, given, it must be remembered, before the event, were sufficiently clear and precise, may be doubted. This at least is certain, that his absence from the parade-ground caused considerable delay in the advance of the troops. When at last they did move from their ground it was too late. No one knew where the Major-General was; neither the Commander of the 10th Regiment, nor the Commander of the battery of artillery, considered himself invested with power to act in the absence of the Major-General. And it was only when, after a prolonged delay, the two staff officers referred to hurried up from the steamer that the order to advance was issued.

Meanwhile, the mutineers, astonished at their easy triumph,
 and seeing that they were being disturbed only by
 some shots fired by the guard at the hospital,
 hastened to divest themselves of their red coats, to
 pouch all the caps in the regimental store, and to start off as
 fast as they could towards the river Són, in the direction of
 Árah. A few of them attempted to cross the Ganges; but the
 steamer, on board of which was the Major-General, effectually
 prevented this movement.

When, then, the European troops reached the native lines,
 they found that the Sipáhis had already disappeared.
 They set fire to their huts, and then halted for
 orders. No orders came. The Major-General was
 still on board the steamer, and no one cared to usurp his
 powers.

Such was the rising of Dánápúr,—a rising long foreseen, and
 yet managed as though it had been regarded as
 impossible. Who was to blame? First and princi-
 pally, certainly, the Government of India, which,
 though warned in a manner compared to which the hand-
 writing on the wall at Belshazzar's feast after it had been
 interpreted was an insoluble mystery, not only persistently
 declined to take upon itself the responsibility of ordering the
 disarming of the Sipáhis, but thrust that responsibility upon an
 officer unfit, mentally and physically, to bear it. Secondly, and
 only to a less degree than the Government, Major-General
 Lloyd himself, who, under the weight of the responsibility
 thrust upon him, preferred to a decided, though simple and
 easy plan, a scheme elaborate and delicate, certain to wound
 whilst likely to fail; and who, further, deprived that scheme of
 all possibility of success by absenting himself from the parade-
 ground at the critical moment, and by leaving the European
 troops without orders. Had Major-General Lloyd mounted his
 horse and led on the European troops when the signal of
 mutiny reached him, the mutiny would have been crushed in
 the bud, and the terrible consequences which followed would
 have been averted.*

* General Lloyd states in a letter to Sir John Kaye, that he "had no horse in cantonments. My stable was two miles distant, and being unable at that time to walk far or much, I thought I should be most useful on board the steamer with guns and riflemen, &c." But surely, at such a crisis, whilst a

Precisely on the day on which these events were taking place at Dánápúr, a bloodier tragedy was enacted at Sigauli, the frontier station of the division. Here was quartered the 12th Irregular Cavalry, commanded by Major Holmes.

I have said that Major Holmes trusted his men, and he showed the absolute trust that he felt in them. Mutiny at
Sigauli.

In dealing with a great crisis he went all the lengths of the great Lord Strafford. He was urgent for a "thorough" policy, for a prompt and sharp punishment for overt acts of treason and disaffection. Impressed with these views, he took the law into his own hands. He proclaimed, on his own authority, martial law in the five civil districts contiguous to his own station. Trusting absolutely, as I have said, his men, he sent them out in detached parties of from twenty to fifty all over these districts to overawe the disaffected and to maintain order. Every Sipáhi or mutineer caught in the act of rebellion he caused to be seized, tried by a court-martial, and, if found guilty, hanged. In all this he acted with the cordial approval of the Commissioner of Patná, for whom he had the highest admiration. It is probable that if the strain on his men had been eased a little earlier Major Holmes would have carried his district through the crisis. But the inaction of the Government with respect to the Dánápúr regiments, and probably the knowledge that a concerted movement between them and the native landowners would soon come to maturity, were too much for his men. They determined to cast off the mask. On the evening of the 25th of July, then, four troopers suddenly attacked Major Holmes and his wife, a daughter of the heroic Sale, and killed them. The other Europeans in the station shared the same fate. The Murder of
Major and
Mrs. Holmes. mutinous soldiers then plundered the treasury, and let themselves loose on the country, now at their mercy.

The fears of the mercantile community, expressed on the 20th of July to Lord Canning, were thus promptly realised. Lord Canning had on that date refused to order disarming. (The troops, not disarmed, had mutinied, and on the 25th the richest province in India was at their mercy.)

very delicate measure ordered by him was in operation, Major-General Lloyd ought at least to have taken care not only to have his horse in cantonments, but that it should remain saddled and accoutred at his very door. The duty of a general is to command.

I now return to Patná. The event so long dreaded, so long foreseen, to guard against the effects of, which so many precautions had been taken by the Commissioner, had now occurred. The native troops had revolted; Bihár was without force to resist them. Early in the day of the 25th, Mr. Tayler had received from Dánápúr intelligence which left on his mind no doubt that the crisis there was imminent. He at once summoned the residents to the protection afforded by his house. The residents had scarcely arrived when the sound of the firing of the two guns announced that the outbreak had occurred. Later in this day of suspense intelligence arrived that the mutineers had left the station, and that the European troops had not followed them. The direction taken by the native troops was unknown, but Mr. Tayler, guided by a true military instinct, determined at once to do all in his power to intercept them. He organized, therefore, a party of volunteers, and combining with them fifty Sikhs, fifty native police, and a small levy of horse, detached the party that night to Phúlwarí, about eight miles from Patná, there to bivouac for the night. He sent intimation of this movement to Major-General Lloyd, with a request that he would detach a small body of the 10th Foot to co-operate with this party, should he have reason to believe that the Sipáhis had taken that route.

The dawn of the following day, however, disclosed to Mr. Tayler the evil which, at the moment, appeared the more formidable of the two—the mutiny of the 12th Irregulars, and the murder of their commandant and others. This event gave to affairs a most serious aspect. A whole regiment of cavalry was thus let loose on the country, and it was difficult to say in what quarter they would strike their blow. An absolute necessity was thus created that all the available means of defence should be concentrated. The detachment, then, was at once withdrawn from Phúlwarí. (The fate of Patná and of Bihár seemed now to depend upon the conduct of Major-General Lloyd. Should he have directed a rapid pursuit in force of the mutineers all might yet be well.)

But at Dánápúr affairs had taken a very different turn. The native troops had, we have already seen, been allowed time to march clean away with their muskets and their ammunition. The European troops after burning the native huts, had, in consequence of

How Mr.
Tayler met
the danger.

Uncertainty
at Dánápúr.

the absence of the Major-General, returned to their barracks. No one knew certainly the ultimate direction which the Sipáhis might take. It was believed, however, that their passage across the Ganges having been prevented, they would march on Árah.

Here was an opportunity such as a real soldier would have clutched at—an opportunity of repairing every mistake, of atoning for all shortcomings. Dividing the district of Sháhábád, of which Árah was the capital, from that of Patná, and some fourteen miles south-west of Dánápúr, is the river Són, swollen at that season by continuous rain, and traversable only by boats, not then collected. Had Major-General Lloyd, on landing from the steamer that evening, at once detached a strong force of infantry and artillery in pursuit of the mutineers, he must have caught them *in flagrante delicto*, with an unfordable river in their rear.

But such an action was far above the calibre of the mind of Major-General Lloyd. He has placed on record that probably a direct pursuit would not have been of much avail.* A dim idea of the use which might be made of the Són river to stop the enemy prompted him however, the following morning, to send some riflemen in a steamer up that river, but there was not sufficient draught of water, and the steamer and riflemen returned, having accomplished nothing. But before they arrived the Major-General had received information which diverted his thoughts entirely, for the moment, from an offensive movement, and directed them to the securing of the safety of his garrison by intrenching Dánápúr.†

He will not take it.

July 26.

The information referred to was to the effect that Kúnwar

* His words are: "It is perhaps to be regretted that some (European troops) were not sent that night or next morning, but only a small party, in comparison to the strength of the mutineers, could have been detached; no guns could have gone, and as the mutineers avoided the road and kept to the fields, where they could scarcely have been effectively followed by a small party of Europeans, they probably would not have been of much use." It is difficult to see the force of this argument. The high road to Árah was traversable by artillery. Though the Sipáhis might have spread over the fields they yet followed the line of that road.

† "That afternoon the General wrote to tell me he proposed intrenching Dánápúr as it was ascertained that the mutineers had gone off in a body towards Árah, and it was apprehended by him that they might be joined by Kúnwar Singh, and return to attack Dánápúr."—W. Taylor's "Patna Crisis."

Singh, the great landowner mentioned in a previous page, whose estates lay in the vicinity of Árah, and along the banks of the Són, had raised his tenantry and was about to join the mutinous Sipáhis.

Kúnwar Singh, a Rájput chieftain of ancient lineage, had been made an enemy of the English rule by the action of our revenue system. The action of this system, which he imperfectly understood, had reduced his means so considerably that some short time before the outbreak of the mutiny his estates had been placed in liquidation. Still, there was one case pending which, if decided in his favour, would go a great way towards recouping his losses. After the mutiny had broken out, and when Kúnwar Singh was eagerly watching the turn of events, doubtful as to the course which he should pursue, the law courts decided this case against him. About the same time the supporting hand of Government was withdrawn from the management of his case.* Thenceforward his mind was made up. Old as he was, and he had seen eighty summers, he resolved to seize the first opportunity of striking a blow for his freedom. When he learned, therefore, that the Sipáhis at Dánápúr had successfully risen and were marching towards Árah, he resolved to co-operate with them with all his power.

This was the information which influenced Major-General Lloyd to stop, for the moment, any further movement, and to intrench himself at Dánápúr. But the Commissioner of Patná, to whom he had imparted his resolve, deprecated it with all the fervour of his daring and energetic nature. He implored the General to pursue the rebels immediately. He pointed out that there might be yet time to catch them before they could cross

Mr. Tayler
throws him-
self into the
breach.

* It would appear that Kúnwar Singh had engaged, when his estates were placed in liquidation, to raise a sum of £200,000 for the payment of his debts. Naturally some delay occurred in raising so large a sum; the money, however, was gradually coming in when the Board of Revenue informed him, through the Commissioner of Patná, that unless he should raise the whole sum within one month, they would recommend the Government "to withdraw all interference with his affairs, and to abandon the management of his estates." This decision of the Board of Revenue was regarded by Kúnwar Singh, and very naturally, as tantamount to the sequestration of his property. The course of the Board of Revenue was strongly objected to by Mr. Tayler—who even went so far as to protest against it in a private letter to Mr. Halliday—but in vain.

the Són; that vigour and energy would yet retrieve the disaster.

Had Mr. Tayler been Major-General Commanding the Dánápúr division, the disaster would have been retrieved promptly and effectually. But, in that case, there would have been no disaster to retrieve. As it was he could only advise.

Further information, to which I am about to refer, added force to Mr. Tayler's recommendations, and at last determined the Major-General to detach a force in pursuit of the Sipáhis.

Intelligence that the Sipáhis had crossed the Són and were besieging Árah caused the Major-General to detach, on the evening of the 27th, a body of 193 men belonging to the 37th Regiment, in a steamer. The commander of this steamer was directed to steam up the Són, and to land the troops at the point where the road to Árah joins the river. The instructions given to the troops were that they should, on being landed, proceed to Árah, and bring away the civilians there besieged. It happened, however, that the steamer, running on after the moon had gone down, stuck fast on a sand-bank. Major-General Lloyd then resolved to recall his troops and attempt nothing more. But Mr. Tayler succeeded in inducing him to change his mind. The Major-General, then, in consultation with the captain of a river-steamer but just arrived, directed that a party of 250 men from the 10th foot, with 70 Sikhs and some volunteers, should leave Dánápúr in the morning of the 29th, in the steamer, which, picking up on its way the flat attached to the steamer which had stranded, should convey the troops, commanded by Colonel Fenwick, up the Són, to the point previously indicated.

Some difficulties raised by the commander of the steamer caused the reduction of the European force by 100 men. The remainder constituting too small a command for an officer of high rank, Colonel Fenwick remained behind, and Captain Dunbar of the same regiment took the whole body under his orders. The steamer, with her 150 Europeans and 70 Sikhs, taking also two gentlemen volunteers, left Dánápúr amid the enthusiasm of the European population, picked up the detachment of the 37th Regiment,

July 27.
Troops are
sent to re-
lieve Árah.

The Major-
General re-
solves to re-
call them.

Mr. Tayler
encourages
him to perse-
vere.

July 29.

The expedi-
tion sets out.

Regiment,
E 2

reached the appointed spot in safety, and began to disembark the troops at 2 P.M. Before recounting their further movements I must return to the revolted Sipáhis.

Those Sipáhis, leaving Dánápúr with their arms and accoutrements, had arrived at the Són on the morning of the 26th. For want of means to cross the river they did not reach the opposite bank till the evening.

The mutineers cross the Són.

In the interval the servants of Kúnwar Singh had been busy in collecting boats for the mass, whilst as many as could be conveyed crossed by the ferry. Before night had set in every man was on the opposite bank. Short was the consultation that followed. Kúnwar Singh himself was on the spot, and, under the influence of the advice of this honoured Rájput landowner, it was decided to march on Árah, slaughter the residents, and plunder the treasury. The subsequent movements of the little army would necessarily depend on circumstances, but it was an object with Kúnwar Singh to keep the Sipáhis, if possible, within the limits of Bihár.

A great portion of the expectations of the Sipáhis were realised almost at once. Having reached Árah, they released the prisoners from the gaol (27th of July), plundered the treasury, and then set forth to slaughter the European residents. But in the attempt to prosecute this part of their scheme they met with an opposition on which they had not counted.

The residents of Árah, in fact, had not awaited in idleness the visit which they had deemed always possible, and which, since the 25th, had been certain. One of their number, Mr. Vickers Boyle, a civil engineer connected with the railway, had, from a very early period, regarded it as quite a possible contingency that the station might be attacked by the mutineers. He, therefore, despite the jeers of some, and the covert ridicule of others, had fortified the smaller of the two houses in his compound in a manner which would enable it, if defended, to resist any sudden assault. This house was a small detached building, about fifty feet square, having one storey above the basement, and surmounted by a flat roof. As soon as a message from Dánápúr brought the information of the successful rise and departure of the Sipáhis, the residents resolved to take advantage of Mr. Boyle's prescience, and to defend themselves in his house against the enemy. Supplies of all kinds,—meal, wine, beer,

Árah.

Mr. Vickers Boyle.

water, biscuit, and sheep—had been gradually stored up by Mr. Boyle during the month.

Additional means of defence were now provided. Ammunition was collected; loopholes were drilled in the walls, and sand-bags were placed on the roof. At the same time, the front portion of the other and larger house in the same compound, about fifty yards distant from the improvised fortress, was entirely demolished, so as to prevent it ~~from~~ affording shelter to any possible assailants.

The European and Eurasian residents in Árah amounted in number to fifteen; but there was besides a Muhammadan gentleman, whose fate was joined to theirs.* With so small a garrison, a successful defence of Mr. Boyle's house would have been impossible. But with the prescience which, in those trying days, marked every act of the prescient Commissioner of Patná, Mr. Tayler had, in anticipation of the crisis, despatched to Árah fifty of Rattray's Sikhs. 157
Prescience of Mr. Tayler.
 These men were on the spot, and they too cast in their lot with the English. The united garrison thus numbered nearly seventy souls, and these, when information reached them of the crossing of the Són by the Sipáhis, threw themselves, armed with their muskets, their guns, and their rifles, into the house of refuge, resolved to defend it to the very last.

Great, then, was the surprise of the Sipáhis when, having released the prisoners and plundered the treasury, they set forth to slaughter the Europeans, they found that their progress was stayed by the occupants of one small house. Still confident in their numbers, and elated by the success which had attended all their movements, they advanced unhesitatingly, and in unbroken order, towards the last refuge of their enemy. The garrison reserved their fire till the Sipáhis came within range, but they then let fly

* The garrison consisted of Mr. Littledale, the judge; Mr. Combe, the collector; Mr. Herwald Wake, magistrate; Mr. Colvin, assistant; Dr. Halls, surgeon; Mr. Field and Mr. Anderson of the opium department; Mr. Vicars Boyle; Saiad Ázim-ul-dín Khán, deputy collector; Mr. Dacosta; Mr. Godfrey; Mr. Cork; Mr. Tait; Mr. Delpcison; Mr. Hoyle; and Mr. de Souza. The Sikh force consisted of a native lieutenant and two native sergeants, two corporals, forty-five privates, a water-carrier, and a cook. The charge of the defences was entrusted to Mr. Vicars Boyle, whilst Mr. Herwald Wake took the command in chief of the garrison.

with so sure an aim that the rebels fell back surprised and disconcerted. These, changing their tactics, then dispersed into groups, and, taking possession of the larger house, commenced from it and from behind the trees near it, a continuous fire on the garrison. The commanding position and the artificial defences of the smaller house enabled the latter to return the fire with terrible effect. Not a Sipáhi dare expose his person. If he chanced to do so, a bullet from a musket behind the sand-bags on the roof was certain to find out his weak point.

Meanwhile the Sipáhis had discovered that a portion of the garrison were Sikhs. They had some men of that nation in their own ranks. These were commissioned to use every possible argument to win over their countrymen. When the offer to share with them the plunder of the treasuries, of those sacked and of those still to be sacked, proved unavailing, threats of the doom which hung over them were freely used. The most earnest appeals to their nationality and their religion were alike rejected. Rattray's Sikhs remained loyal to the Government which gave them their salt.

During the next day the rebels brought two guns to bear on the besieged edifice. From these they fired every possible kind of projectile on which they could lay hands. They riddled the walls of the house, but they did not lessen the courage of the garrison. A musketry fire, carefully husbanded, yet used unsparingly whenever a chance presented itself, told them, in unmistakeable language, that they were still defied. This did not, however, prevent the rebels from offering terms. Possibly the Sipáhis were acquainted with the story of Kánhpúr. But it is certain that every evening a Sipáhi standing behind the pillar of the larger house, summoned the garrison, in the name of their General, a Subahdár of the 8th Regiment Native Infantry, to surrender on conditions.

The following day, the 29th, the same tactics were continued, the enemy's guns being shifted from point to point so as to bear on the weakest point of the besieged house, but with the effect only of increasing the damage effected in the outer wall.

At last the enemy succeeded in placing the largest of the two field-pieces on the top of the vacated house, and began to direct a fire on the smaller house as fast as they could collect or



THE HOUSE AT ÁRAH.

improvise cannon-balls. But nothing intimidated the gallant men who formed the garrison. When the enemy raised a barricade on the roof of the adjoining house, the besieged raised one still higher on their own. When provisions began to fail, a sally procured more. In fact all the means that courage, labour, daring, and energy could suggest were used to the fullest extent to baffle the enemy.

At midnight on that day, the 29th, the garrison were aroused by the sound of repeated volleys of musketry about a mile distant, in the direction of the Són river. For a moment hope suggested the idea that the garrison of Dánápúr was about to relieve them. But the hope flickered and died almost as soon as it had received life. The sound of the firing became more and more distant—at last it ceased altogether. It was clear that the relieving party had been driven back.

We left that party, consisting of 343 Europeans, 70 Sikhs, and two gentlemen volunteers, 415 in all, having just succeeded in effecting their disembarkation, at two o'clock on the afternoon of the 29th, on the point

Captain Dunbar's march.

nearest to the station of Árah. The order was at once issued for the men to dine, when suddenly firing was heard from the advance-guard. It was ascertained that this firing had been caused by the presence of a body of Sipáhis on the banks of a wide and deep rivulet, about two miles distant, and upon whom the advanced guard had opened fire. On receiving the fire the Sipáhis retreated. Then, though pressed to stop and bivouac for the night, Captain Dunbar determined to push on at once. It is true that his men were fasting; but it was a fine moonlight night, and both officers and men were cheered by the news brought by the villagers that the garrison was still holding out, whilst the sound of the booming of the guns in the direction of Árah showed that our countrymen were hardly pressed. Fifteen miles lay before the men, through a well-wooded country, traversed by an unmacadamised road, heavy from recent rain. The dinners, then, were left uncooked, the rivulet was crossed, and when, about 7 p.m., all had disembarked on the other side, the column started, led by a native guide. The force marched on for about eleven miles without seeing any traces of the enemy. A few minutes later, however, a body of horsemen appeared in front of the advancing column, but before they could be fired at they had galloped off. It was now 11 o'clock, and the moon went down. Dunbar was now urged to

halt for the night, and wait for the dawn. But the possibility that he might arrive too late probably induced him to reject this suggestion. Still hopeful and confident, he pressed on till within a mile of Árah, no enemy in sight. Here Dunbar called in the skirmishers, and moved on in column of march. He suspected nothing, when suddenly, as the column was marching along, giving its flank to a dense mango-grove on the right of the road, the grove was lighted up by a tremendous volley poured into the long flank of the column, whilst almost simultaneously a smaller volley from a group of trees in front struck down the leading files. Captain Dunbar and several officers were shot dead at the first discharge. The enemy was invisible. The firing was taken up from the other flank, and renewed from the quarters whence it had first proceeded. The Europeans, in their white summer clothing, were splendid marks for the enemy. The confusion consequent upon the surprise was terrible; the men were bewildered, and there was no one to give the command. The natural consequences ensued. On recovering from their surprise the men formed into groups and began to fire wildly in all directions, often, possibly, on each other.

It is hard to say how many minutes this fatal disorder lasted, but at last the only possible mode of restoring order was resorted to. An officer managed to find a bugler, and, taking him to an enclosed field at a short distance from the grove, sounded the "assembly." The men promptly rallied round him. They were fortunate enough to discover in this field a disused and half-empty tank, the hollows of which would suffice to protect them to a certain extent from the enemy's fire. From this place of refuge our men opened a fire which, however, the enemy returned with interest. The white clothing of the English troops still operated greatly to their disadvantage, whilst the Sipáhis, in a state of semi-nudity, fired from behind trees and walls.

Under these difficult circumstances the surviving officers held a council of war. They felt that with their dispirited and diminished numbers it would be impossible to reach Árah; that they would be fortunate if they could fall back upon the Són. They resolved, then, to commence a retrograde movement as soon as the not then distant dawn should permit them to find the road.

As soon as that dawn was visible the men formed up in

order, and marched out on the Árah road. But the enemy had been as vigilant as they. They had occupied in force every point in their route—the ditches, the jungles, the houses. But the British troops marched straight onwards, returning, in a desultory manner, the fire which was poured upon them, but intent only on reaching the Són. The power of driving back the enemy was denied to them by the fact that no enemy was in sight. They were sheltered behind the trees, the copses, the bushes, the ditches, and the jungle. Occasionally, indeed, maddened by the sight of their comrades falling around them, the men constituting by accident the rear-guard formed up, faced about, and tried to charge. But there was no enemy to receive the charge. Five or six thousand men, the revolted Sipáhis and levies of Kúnwar Singh, kept themselves under the shelter offered by the natural obstacles of the country.

The retreat.

At last, after losing many of their comrades, the main body of the British force reached the banks of the rivulet, to cross which the previous night they had found boats ready to their hand. The boats were indeed still there, but during the night, the water had run down, and only two of them were floating. These were promptly seized by the men in advance and pushed off. Then ensued a scene which it is impossible to paint in living words. It was a scene to which the imagination alone could do justice. There lay the remaining boats stranded on the bank of the river; the defeated soldiers rushing at them to push them further into the stream amid the musketry fire from the victorious Sipáhis, the cries of the wounded and dying, the disorder and confusion inseparable from a military disaster. It was a scene to call forth all that was manly and heroic, all that was mean and selfish. But whilst the first-named qualities were markedly visible, the latter were conspicuous only by their absence.

Confusion accompanying it.

The difficulties already enumerated were soon added to by fire breaking out on board of some of the boats. Order had now become impossible. To push a boat into the stream, to climb into it, to help others in, was the aim of every man's exertions. But when boats would not be moved the chance of drowning was preferred to the tender mercies of the Sipáhis. Many stripped and rushed in, until at last the majority of the survivors found themselves in safety on the opposite bank. The losses sustained by the British on the banks of this rivulet

exceeded those they had suffered on the occasion of the surprise and during the retreat.*

When the remains of the party mustered there, it was found that out of four hundred and fifteen men, only fifty The survivors reach Dánápúr. had not been hit, and out of fifteen officers only three were unwounded. Those survivors made their way sadly and disconsolately to the steamer. They were then conveyed back to Dánápúr.

There the European population were awaiting their return in triumphant expectation. The possibility of disaster had not crossed a single mind. But when, as the steamer approached, no signs of life on board were visible, when the very captain and his subordinates seemed cheerless, and the silence was the silence of the grave, it began to be felt that, at the least, our losses had been heavy. It was not, however, until the steamer had moored off the hospital that the full truth was realised, that the conviction rushed to the mind of every Englishman in Dánápúr, not only that our troops had suffered an overwhelming catastrophe, but that the little garrison of Árah was irremediably lost.†

The Englishmen garrisoning Mr. Boyle's little house at that place had, then, rightly interpreted the reason for The gallantry of the Árah garrison. the gradual lessening of the sound of volley-firing which had reached their ears at midnight on the 29th. Even if they had had any doubts these would have been removed by the arrival under their walls of a wounded Sikh, a member of the relieving force, who had managed to crawl to the house to tell the story of the disaster. The intelligence

* Many acts of daring were performed during the retreat and crossing. Mr. Ross Mangles, of the Civil Service, one of the volunteers, supported and helped along for five miles of the retreat a wounded soldier of the 37th, who, but for that support, would have been left to die. For this act Mr. Ross Mangles received the Victoria Cross. Another of the volunteers, Mr. McDonell, also of the Civil Service, received the same distinction for cutting the lashings of one of the boats, full of men, amid a storm of bullets, to which he was exposed from the opposite bank. Private Dempsey and another man of the 10th carried one of their officers, Ensign Erskine, who had been mortally wounded, for five miles to the boats. Lieutenant Ingelby, who had volunteered to command the Sikhs, was the last man to leave the shore. He plunged into the water, and was shot in the act of crossing. These are a few amongst the many instances which occurred of combined courage and humanity.

† Mr. Taylor's *Patna Crisis*.

was black indeed, but its only effect on the hearts of the gallant members of the garrison was to steel them to resist to the bitter end. They at least believed in their countrymen. The story of the "leaguer of Árah" had spread, they were well aware, as far as the means of communication would admit. Many detachments of Europeans were passing up country. By whom these detachments were commanded they knew not. But they did know that the several commanders were Englishmen, and they felt confident that amongst Englishmen in authority to whom the story of their plight might be conveyed, there would be at least one who, bound though he might be by the red tape of regulations, would yet laugh at responsibility when he should learn that his countrymen were in danger; who would possess the brain to conceive and the nerve to carry out a plan for their relief. They judged rightly; and yet they were fortunate, for it is not every day that Nature matures the substance which is required to mould a Vincent Eyre.

Meanwhile the Sipáhis returned to Árah, red with the slaughter of our countrymen. If their victory had not increased the courage which now, as before, recoiled from an assault in masses on the besieged mansion, it had yet had the effect of stimulating their inventive powers. At one time they attempted to smoke out the garrison. With this object they collected and heaped up during the night, beneath the walls of the house, a large quantity of combustibles, and surmounting these with ehilies—the raw material of the famous red pepper of India—ignited the mass. The effect would have been most serious had the wind only favoured the enemy; but the element was against them, and before it had injured the garrison, the pungent smoke was blown towards the hostile encampment. The same wind saved the garrison likewise from the putrid smell emanating from the rotting carcases of the horses, belonging to the garrison, which had been shot at the commencement of the siege, and which the rebels piled up in close proximity to the bingulow. Mining was then attempted, but Mr. Wake met this device by a countermine. The gun raised to the roof of the larger house occasionally caused injury to a weak place in the beleaguered castle; but Mr. Wake and Mr. Boyle were there, and in a short time the place was made twice as strong as before.

After all these measures had failed, it seemed as though the

The rebels
renew their
attack.

garrison would be more likely to suffer from a deficiency of supplies than from the enemy's attacks. And, in truth, on the third day, the supply of water began to run short. With unremitting vigour, however, the garrison within twelve hours had dug a well of eighteen feet by four. Four sheep rewarded one of their attempts at sallying out for supplies. The earth excavated from the well was used to strengthen the works on the roof. Cartridges were made from the powder which Mr. Boyle had been careful to store, and bullets were cast from the lead which he had laid in. Every means that energy could do, that skill could devise, and that valour could attempt, were successfully resorted to by that daring garrison, ably directed by Mr. Herwald Wake, Mr. Viears Boyle, and Mr. Colvin.

But resources limited in extent must, sooner or later, come to an end. But for succour of an effective character the garrison would have been eventually forced—not to surrender—the possibility of such a catastrophe never formed part of their calculations—but to endeavour to force their way to some ford on the river Són. Happily the necessity to have recourse to so desperate a chance was spared them. (On the morning of the

August 2.

2nd of August, just one week after they had been shut up in their improvised fortress, a great commotion amongst the enemy gave warning that something very unusual was taking place. The hostile fire slackened early, and almost ceased during the day. But few of the

They are relieved.

Sipáhis showed themselves. Suddenly, towards the afternoon the sound of a distant cannonade reached the ear. Minute succeeded minute, and yet the sound seemed neither to advance nor to recede. All at once it ceased altogether. Some hours later and the absolute discontinuance of the fire of the besiegers gave to the garrison a sure forecast of the actual state of affairs. A sally made by some of them after darkness had set in discovered the positions of the enemy abandoned; their guns unguarded; a canvassed tube filled with gunpowder lying unused close to the mine which had reached the foundations of their fortress. It was clear then to the tried and gallant men who had so successfully defended themselves against enormous odds, that a deliverer had driven away their enemies, and that before many hours they would be able to render honour to the name of him who had so nobly dared to rescue them.

Who was that deliverer? Amongst the many detachments which left Calcutta during the month of July was one commanded by Major Vincent Eyre, of the Bengal Artillery. The detachment consisted of a company of European gunners, and a horse-battery of six guns. Major Eyre was an officer possessing natural ability improved by study, great determination, a clear head, and a lofty sense of duty. He had had great experience of men, had mastered all the details of his profession, was fit for any employment, but, like Dumouriez, he had reached the prime of life before the opportunity arrived which was to show the stuff that was in him. He had served during the first Afghanistan war, and had been one of those who had been selected by the British General as hostages* to be made over to Muhammad Akbar Khán. Subsequently he had been appointed by Lord Ellenborough to raise and to command a company of artillery for the newly formed Gwáliár Contingent. In 1855, Eyre had visited Europe. On his return to India, early in 1857, he had been sent to command a horse field-battery in British Burmah. Recalled thence with his battery, when the eyes of the Govern-

His previous
career.

* A little episode in Eyre's history at this period deserves to be recorded. On a previous occasion, the Afghan chiefs had required four married officers with their wives and children as hostages. Certain officers, of whom Eyre was one, were invited by the General, by an official circular, to undertake this risk. The following were the replies as given by Lady Sale in her journal:—"Lieutenant Eyre said, if it was to be productive of great good he would stay with his wife and child. The others all refused to risk the safety of their families. One said he would rather put a pistol to his wife's head, and shoot her; and another, that his wife should only be taken at the point of the bayonet; for himself he was ready to perform any duty imposed on him." On this incident the "Naval and Military Gazette" of the day thus commented:—"Channing, in his eloquent and philosophic analysis of the character of Napoleon, has felicitously defined three orders of greatness, in the last of which he assigns a place to the great conqueror of Europe. Following the spirit of that great thinker, we cannot but recognise in Lieutenant Eyre's noble reply a higher tone of feeling than can be traced in the answers of either of his gallant comrades. Therefore, while we may award to the latter niches in the same order with Napoleon, our acquiescence in the sentiments of Dr. Channing leads us to hail in Lieutenant Eyre's conduct on this occasion the lineaments of that *first* order—moral greatness—through which the soul defies all peril, reposes an unflinching trust in God in the darkest hour, and is ever ready to be offered on the altar of his country, or of mankind." The reader will not be slow to recognise the same lineaments of that first order in the conduct of Major Eyre on the occasion I am now recording.

ment of India were being opened to the gravity of the situation, Eyre arrived in Calcutta on the 14th of June. There he was kept for several days in a state of uncertainty, terminated only by his being ordered to leave with his battery in a steamer and flat, on the 10th of July, for Alláhábád.

Steaming from Calcutta, on that date, Eyre arrived off Dánápúr on the afternoon of the 25th of July.

July 25. Learning from a gentleman who had ventured in a small boat from the shore the catastrophe of that day, Eyre landed at 6 P.M., to offer his services to Major-General Lloyd. At his desire he disembarked three guns for the service of the Major-General until those sent after the mutineers should return,—an event which happened the same evening.

Re-embarking his guns the following morning Eyre proceeded up the Ganges towards Baksar. On reaching that place at noon, on the 28th, Eyre was informed that the three revolted Dánápúr regiments were advancing by way of Árah, with the apparent intention of crossing the Ganges above Baksar, and that they had actually sent forward a party to secure the necessary number of boats. This information decided Eyre to detain the steamer and flat at Baksar to afford time to one of the detachments, which he believed to be steaming up behind him, to come up.

It must be borne in mind that Baksar was the head-quarters of a valuable Government stud, and that thirty miles above it lies Gházípúr, where was a branch of the same stud. There were no troops at Baksar, but Gházípúr was garrisoned by a strong native regiment held in check by only one weak company of the 78th Highlanders. Noting the importance of preventing the passage of the river by the mutinous Sipáhis, and observing no signs of the advance of the detachments he believed to be

July 29. on their way, Eyre, on the morning of the 29th hastened with his battery to Gházípúr, landed two of his guns and his only subaltern for the protection of the place, and taking on board in their stead twenty-five men of the 78th Highlanders, returned that night to Baksar.

On reaching Baksar, Eyre discovered to his intense satisfaction that one of the detachments he had expected, consisting of 154 men of the 5th Fusiliers, commanded by Captain L'Estrange, had arrived off that place. As the information he had received pointed to the conviction that our countrymen were still holding out at Árah,

Resolves to
attempt the
relief of Árah.

Eyre despatched at once a note to L'Estrange, proposing to join forces for an immediate attempt to relieve that station. L'Estrange promptly replied in the affirmative, stipulating only that Major Eyre should send him a written order to that effect, and should take upon himself the entire responsibility.

Eyre did not hesitate a moment. He despatched at once an official letter to L'Estrange, directing him to place himself and his men at his disposal. He took upon himself the further responsibility of requiring the captains of the steamers to place themselves unreservedly under his orders.

Assumes
great respon-
sibilities.

Early on the morning of the 30th, the guns and troops were disembarked, and arrangements were made for a march to Árah, about forty-eight miles to the eastward. At the same time one of the steamers was despatched to Major-General Lloyd with a letter informing him of the intended movement, and inviting his co-operation—for at that time Eyre was ignorant, not only of the defeat of Dunbar's force, but of the fact that any force had been sent to Árah.* The field force thus extemporised consisted of forty artillery men and three guns, one hundred and fifty-four men of the 5th Fusiliers, six officers, including Major Eyre, two assistant surgeons, and eighteen volunteers, mostly mounted, of whom three were officers, one a veterinary surgeon, and one the joint magistrate of Gházípur.† The twenty-five Highlanders, whose

July 30.

Strength of
his force.

* Major Eyre's letter was dated the 30th. It reached Dánápúr that night. It elicited from Major-General Lloyd the opinion, dated midnight on the 30th, that "the advance from Baksar towards Árah would have been useful had the attack on the rebels succeeded: as it is, the Baksar force is too weak to venture far from Baksar, and it should occupy that place till further communication is sent from Dánápúr." Two letters from the Assistant Adjutant-General of the division, both dated the 31st, and despatched by the same steamer, informed Eyre of the disaster at Árah; threw upon his own judgment and discretion the course he should adopt; warned him against expecting any co-operation from the Dánápúr side; and advised the utmost caution. A letter dated the day following reiterated the same arguments. Major Eyre did not receive these letters till after he had left Baksar.

† The names of the officers were; of the Artillery, Major Eyre and Assistant Surgeon Eteson; of the 5th Fusiliers, Captains L'Estrange and Scott, Ensigns Lewis, Oldfield, and Mason, Assistant Surgeon Thornton; of the volunteers, Lieutenant Wild, 40th Regiment, Native Infantry; Captain the Hon. G. P. Hastings, Lieutenant Jackson, and Veterinary Surgeon Liddell; the Civil Magistrate was Mr. Bax, later known as Mr. Bax-Irnside.

presence might at any time be necessary at Gházípur, were left behind at Baksar, with orders to take the first opportunity of returning to their station. Eyre appointed as his staff officer Captain Hastings, an officer whose acquaintance he had made only two days before, but by whose energy and enthusiastic support he had been greatly impressed. Much required to be done. There were no horses for the guns, and bullocks from the plough had to be impressed. Carts for the reserve ammunition and commissariat supplies had to be secured. In this work Major Eyre found an able and willing coadjutor in Mr. Bax, the district magistrate. This gentleman likewise used successfully his influence to borrow from the Dumráo Rájah four elephants for the conveyance of tents and bedding.

At 5 o'clock in the afternoon all preparations had been completed, and the column set out. But the roads were
 Sets out. very heavy from recent rain, and the bullocks, unused to drag guns and heavily laden carts, not only moved slowly, but required frequent halts to enable them
 July 31. to move at all. Owing to the delays thus enforced the day broke before the first encamping ground was reached.

Brief was the halt made here. The column pushed on after a short and hurried meal. When about twelve miles from Baksar a mounted scout was descried. Pursued, wounded, and taken prisoner, he proved to be a free lance in the service of Kúnwar Singh. As the presence of this man proved that the enemy was on the alert, Eyre pushed on as rapidly as he could, and did not halt for repose till he had reached Sháh-púr, twenty-eight miles from Baksar.

Whilst encamped at this place tidings were brought to Eyre
 First hears of Dunbar's defeat. of the defeat and slaughter of Captain Dunbar's party. Here, too, he had further proof of the vigilance of the enemy, many of whose scouts were discovered. Eyre halted the early part of the day to refresh the cattle, but eager to rescue the garrison and to restore the
 August 1. Prestess on. *prestige* of our arms, he set out at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the 1st, having now but twenty-two miles to traverse. After marching four miles, the column was checked by finding the bridge over the nála* at Baláoti had been cut through and was impassable for guns and carts. In an hour, however, the mischief was

* Sometimes incorrectly spelt "nullah."

sufficiently repaired, and the force pressed on to the village of Gajrájganj, on the further side of which it bivouacked for the night, a strong guard being posted to protect the bridge over the nálá near it, and which Eyre had been delighted to find uninjured.

At daybreak the following morning (2nd of August) the force resumed its march. It had not, however, cleared a mile beyond its camping-ground before ^{August 2.} bugle-notes were heard sounding the "assembly" ^{The mutinees s} in a wood which bounded the view about a mile ^{come to meet} ahead, and through which lay the direct road to Árah. ^{him.} The road between the position occupied at the moment by our men and the wood was bounded on either side by inundated rice fields.* Eyre at once halted to reconnoitre. The enemy now began to show themselves in great force, and, not content with occupying the wood in front, to send out large bodies on both banks, with the evident object of surrounding the Europeans. This movement on their part decided Eyre. Judging, and rightly judging, that this double flank move- ^{Eyre attacks} ment must weaken the enemy's centre, he boldly ^{them.} pushed forward his men in skirmishing order, his three guns opening fire to the front and on the flanks. Under the pressure of this fire, the enemy abandoned his flank movement, and fell back on the position in front. It was the object of Eyre to force this. He, therefore, then massed his three guns, and poured a concentrated fire on the enemy's centre. This had the effect of driving them from the direct path. Eyre then rapidly pushed on his guns, covering their advance by a continuous fire from the Enfield rifles of his infantry, and succeeded in making his way through the wood before the enemy could again close his divided wings. Emerging from the wood, the road became an elevated causeway, bounded on both sides by inundated rice fields, across which the baffled enemy could only open a distant fire. Their intentions thus frustrated, the Sipáhis hurried round to oppose the advancing force at Bibíganj, a village about two miles ahead, and situated on the opposite side of a river spanned by a bridge, which they had destroyed, and the approaches to which they had covered by breastworks.

After driving the enemy from the wood, Eyre pushed on. When, however, within a quarter of a mile of the village of

* Called in India "pádí fields." "Pádí" is rice in the husk.

Bibíganj he halted to refresh the men and cattle whilst he should reconnoitre the position. Finding that the bridge had been destroyed, that the direct approaches to the river had been covered by extensive earthworks, and that the Sipáhis were occupying in force the houses in the village, Eyre, unable through his scouts to find a ford, determined to make a flank movement to the nearest point of the railway embankment, distant about a mile, and along which there was a direct road to Árah. He endeavoured to mask this movement by directing the fire of his guns on the village, whilst the infantry and carts should push forward in the new direction. The enemy, however, soon discovered this manœuvre, and hastened in great numbers to intercept the force at the angle of a thick wood which abutted on the embankment, and which it was necessary that Eyre should pass.

It was clear that the enemy would reach the wood first. They evidently recognised this certainty, and, to increase the difficulties in the way of Eyre, they detached a portion of their force, the irregular levies of Kúnwar Singh, to harass his rear. They did this with such effect that when the British reached the wood they found it strongly occupied by the enemy, who opened at once from behind the trees a most galling fire. Eyre's position was now becoming critical. He must carry the wood or be lost. He halted his troops, formed them into skirmishing order, and opened fire from his infantry and artillery. But the numbers of the enemy, and the cover afforded by the trees gave them a great advantage. During the hour which this combat lasted, the enemy twice charged our guns, exposed by the necessity of keeping the infantry in skirmishing order, but each time they were driven back by discharges of grape. At the end of the hour, Captain Hastings brought word to Eyre, who, having no subaltern, was compelled to remain with the guns, that the Fusiliers were losing ground, and that the position was becoming critical.

Eyre upon this resolved to solve the question with the bayonet, and despatched Hastings with an order to L'Estrange to that effect. This order was promptly executed. The men hastily closed, and, gallantly led on the one flank by Hastings, on the other by L'Estrange, rushed forward with a cheer, cleared the deep stream—here confined within narrow limits—at a bound, and charged impetuously an enemy twenty times as numerous as

The battle.

Severity of
the fight.

Eyre orders
a bayonet-
charge, which
decides it.

they were. The enemy, taken completely aback, did not await the onslaught. They gave way in the utmost disorder; the guns opened on the retreating masses, and in a few minutes not a man of them remained to oppose the passage of the force.

An open road, skirting the railway to within four miles of Árah, was now available. Eyre marched along it. A little before nightfall, however, he came upon an impassable torrent. This forced him to halt. But he spent the night in endeavouring to bridge the torrent by casting into the stream large piles of bricks collected there by the railway engineers. In this way the stream was narrowed sufficiently to allow the construction across it of a rude sort of bridge formed from the materials of his country carts. Over this, in the early morning, the infantry, the guns, and the baggage crossed, and in little more than an hour afterwards the relief of

August 3.
Relief of Árah.

the garrison of Árah was an accomplished fact. The Sipáhis, after their crushing defeat, had hastily abandoned their position in Mr. Boyle's larger house, and, packing up their spoils, had fled precipitately to the jungle stronghold of their leader, Kúnwar Singh, at Jagdispúr. Then it was that the gallant band, led with such skill and such daring courage, by the civilians Herwald Wake and Colvin, and by the engineer, Vicars Boyle—three names ever to be revered by Englishmen—discovered what manner of man he was who, serving a Government which up to that time had judged the conduct of its servants mainly by results, had assumed the responsibility of turning from his ordered course, of turning others from their ordered course, to endeavour, with a force inferior in infantry by more than one-half to that which had already been ingloriously beaten back, to rescue his countrymen from dejection, to save Bihár and India from an impending great calamity.*

The rebels
flee to Jagdispúr.

* Mr. Edward Eastwick, who visited India in 1880, thus describes the house so gallantly defended, as he saw it in that year. "The house stands in the judge's compound, about fifty yards south of his house. It is nearly a square, and has two stories, with a verandah on three sides, supported by arches, which the besieged filled with sandbags. The lower story is a little over ten feet high, and was held by 50 Sikh soldiers. Behind one of the rooms, the outer wall of which had no arch nor opening, the garrison dug a well, and that was all the water they had. From the flat roof Boyle and the judge killed many of the assailants, who mounted a small cannon on the house which is now occupied by the present judge, Mr. Worgan. He has a ball which was fired by the gun mounted by the rebels, and which was found imbedded in the wall of Wake's (Boyle's) house. How the latter could

To return to Patná. (If the effect of the revolt of the Dáná-
 Vincent Eyre púr Sipáhis, the mutiny of the 12th Irregular
 and William Cavalry, and the defeat of Dunbar's force, had been
 Tayler. to neutralise all the prudent measures taken up to
 that time by the Commissioner of the Patná Division, the effect
 of Eyre's victory was to restore the confidence which the three
 events alluded to had so severely shaken.) In taking, then, a
 comprehensive glance at the province of Bihár at this particular
 moment, we see, standing out from the mass, two prominent
 figures in whose presence all the others, the garrison of Árah
 alone excepted, are completely effaced. (These two figures are
 William Tayler and Vincent Eyre.) In spite of unparalleled
 difficulties Mr. Tayler had, up to the 25th of July, saved Bihár.
 The Government of India and Major-General Lloyd then
 suddenly stepping in, neutralised to a great extent his stu-
 pendous exertions, and allowed the province to drift to the very
 verge of destruction. Major Eyre, dropping, as it were, from
 the clouds, warded off that impending destruction. Those who
 had caused the danger were thus blotted out from the public
 view. The wisdom and daring of Mr. Tayler, the energy and
 determination of Major Eyre, had atoned for the feebleness and
 timidity of the leaders who did not guide.

But there was an intervening period which, for the right
 understanding of the subsequent action of the Governments of
 India and of Bengal, it is necessary that I should notice. (I
 mean the period which elapsed between the mutiny
 of the native troops at Dánápúr and Sigaulí and the
 relief of Árah by Major Eyre.)

The interval
 at Patná.

The mutiny of the native troops had been an event to try to
 the utmost Mr. Tayler's hold on the province of which he was
 pro-consul. He had heard the Major-General commanding the
 division talking seriously of intrenching himself at Dánápúr.
 There was no assistance, then, to be looked for from that
 quarter. In the other direction, his right-hand man, Major
 Holmes, had been murdered by his own soldiers, and to those
 soldiers, about five hundred in number, the lives of the Europeans
 and the treasuries all over the province, might at any moment
 fall a prey. We have seen how Mr. Tayler behaved under

have been defended against 2000 Sipáhis and others seems past compre-
 hension, and shows what determination can do against the most over-
 whelming odds."—*Murray's Handbook of Bengal*, p. 198.

these almost desperate circumstances; how he had posted to Major-General Lloyd to implore that officer to send out at once a force to attack the rebels. It certainly was not Mr. Tayler's fault that the force despatched at his earnest instigation should have been badly commanded and disgracefully beaten.

But the fact that that force was disgracefully beaten added enormously to the difficulties of Mr. Tayler's position. The chances that Árah would almost immediately fall seemed reduced to a certainty.

Enormous
difficulties of
Mr. Tayler's
position.

What could fifteen Europeans and fifty Sikhs effect against six thousand trained Sipáhis and a large body of irregular troops? * Granted even—in itself, if Eyre had been beaten, an impossible assumption, for the rebels would then have captured the guns necessary for their purpose—that the position at Árah was impregnable, the supplies of food and of powder were very limited. But for Major Eyre, the fears of every one in the province regarding the Árah garrison must have been speedily realised; and it was not given to Mr. Tayler more than to any one else to feel assured that amid the detachments steaming up the Ganges one would certainly be commanded by the very man for the occasion, by the Dumouriez, who, in the silence and solitude of Gwáliár, had trained himself to be prepared for any emergency. (The defeat of Captain Dunbar's force, then, seemed to leave the lives and the treasures of Bihár more than ever at the absolute mercy of the revolted soldiery.)

Now, for those lives and for those treasures, Mr. Tayler was responsible to the Government of which he was in Binár the representative. The danger was great, the emergency was unparalleled. The rebel army led, as was known, by a powerful and influential landowner, flushed with victory, and provided to a certain extent with guns which had been exhumed from that landowner's estate, was awaiting only the fall of Árah to overrun the province. The recent defeat had reduced the Dánápúr garrison to absolute inaction.†

Great respon-
sibilities
devolving
upon him.

* Amongst the Sipáhis slain in the battle, Major Eyre found men of nine different regiments, a sufficient proof that the three revolted Dánápúr regiments had been largely reinforced from other quarters.

† On the 31st of July, the Assistant Adjutant-General of the Dánápúr division, in a letter to Major Eyre, warned that officer that he "must not depend upon the co-operation of a force from Dánápúr, of which the present amount of troops here does not admit."

Rumours from the district were rife to the effect that the Damráon Rájah, whose estates extended along the line of road from Árah to Baksar, had joined or was about to join the rebels in Patná; the local police were distrusted; the Sikhs were for the most part employed on guard duties; very few even of them were available for any purpose outside the station.

In four out of the five districts the means of defence were even less. These districts, as already stated, were known under the names of Sháhábád, Gayá, Sárán, Tírhút. and Champáran. Árah, the capital of the district of Sháhábád, was virtually in the possession of the rebels; at Gayá, the chief station of its district, there were indeed one hundred Sikhs and forty-five European soldiers; Muzaffarpúr, the chief station of Tírhút, was undefended, whilst Chaprá and Mótihárá, the capitals respectively of the districts of Sárán and Champáran, had been abandoned by the European officials in consequence of the pressure of the mutineers.

It was at Gayá and Muzaffarpúr, then, that the greatest danger was to be apprehended. The position of these stations rendered them peculiarly liable to attack. They were exposed to the first brunt of the fury of the mutineers, and they had no sufficient means to resist them.

It must always be remembered that, at the period of which I am writing, the fall of Árah was considered certain. Equally certain, that a catastrophe of that nature would be promptly followed by a rising of all the disaffected through Bihár. The question which the commissioner of Patná had to solve, then, was this: whether he should trust to the seemingly impossible chance of Árah being relieved, and, in that case, risk the lives of the officers under his orders, and the treasure under their charge: or, whether he should prepare himself to meet the coming danger, by drawing in his too widely extended line, and massing his forces in a central position.

Had Mr. Tayler been a timid or a vain-glorious man, he would have shrunk from the responsibility of withdrawing his officers from the positions assigned to them by the Government. But being cool and resolute, ready to assume responsibility when

the public weal was endangered, and endowed with a remarkably clear vision, Mr. Tayler adopted the sensible course of directing the officials at Gayá and Muzaffarpúr to retire upon the central position of Patná.

Is devoid of the means to defend his extended line.

The question he had to solve.

Mr. Tayler draws in his extended line.

Mr. Tayler well knew that, serving a Government which judged only by results, and which had already displayed a desire to judge him harshly, the responsibility which he was thus taking upon himself was enormous. But with the knowledge which he possessed, that Gayá was filled with men waiting only their opportunity to rise; that the gaol there alone contained eight hundred prisoners ready to commit any enormity; that the fall of Árah would certainly prove the signal for an attack on Gayá, he felt that but one course was possible, and that course he adopted.

The order to the officials at Gayá and Muzaffarpúr authorised them to withdraw their establishments to Patná, bringing with them the coin in the treasury, unless by doing so their personal safety should be endangered.*

This order was transmitted on the 31st of July, after Mr. Tayler had become cognisant of the disaster which
July 31.
had befallen Captain Dunbar's expedition.

Mr. Tayler's order was acted upon with the best results at Muzaffarpúr. The residents there, utterly unprotected, and endangered further by the presence of a detachment of the 12th Irregular Cavalry, had been
Results at
Muzaffarpur.
very apprehensive of a rising, and had some days before vainly implored Major-General Lloyd to detach a few European soldiers for their protection. They, therefore, hailed Mr. Tayler's order as an order which saved them from death, and, perhaps, from something worse than death. Having no troops to form an escort, they were unable to take the public money with them. They left it, therefore, in the treasury, and moved upon Patná. During their absence the detachment of the 12th revolted, and attacked the public buildings. The rebels were, however, driven away by the native officials and the police, who encouraged by the wealthy and influential Hindu traders and bankers of the place, the safety of whose property depended on the maintenance

* The purport of Mr. Tayler's order could not be mistaken. It was clear that, in the presence of danger of an attack from an overwhelming body, with which their small force should be unable to cope, Mr. Tayler took upon himself the responsibility of saving the lives of his subordinates, even at the risk of abandoning the money, if the attack should take place, or if, in the opinion of his subordinates, it should be so imminent as not to admit of their taking the usual measures for removing the treasure. In a word, he relieved his subordinates of the responsibility of uselessly sacrificing their lives in attempting to defend money-bags which they could not save.

of British authority, remained loyal to the hand that fed them. When, a few days later, the European officials returned to the station, they found that order had been maintained in all the public buildings, and that the mutineers, baffled in their attempts upon the treasury, had vented their fury upon one or two private houses.

The case was far different at Gayá. The magistrate of that district was Mr. Alonzo Money. This gentleman had, three days before, recorded his opinion that, whilst nothing was to be feared from the townspeople, two causes of apprehension yet existed, viz., the inroad of any large number of the Dánápúr mutineers, and the approach of the 5th Irregular Cavalry. In any case he declared his intention to defend the station and the treasure to the utmost.

Two days subsequently to the despatch of this letter Captain Dunbar's detachment was surprised and beaten by the mutineers. Mr. Money received a letter informing him of this catastrophe the following day; but the messenger who brought that letter conveyed to him likewise an order from his Commissioner, Mr. Tayler, to fall back with the European residents and troops upon Patná, bringing with him the treasure, unless by so doing the personal safety of the European residents should be endangered.*

On receiving these instructions Mr. Money summoned the European civil officers of the station to advise him as to the course he should follow. Unfortunately timid counsels prevailed, and there was no Tayler present to override them. In vain did some of the residents entreat Mr. Money to remain at the station till carts could be procured to convey the treasure. He would not. But, acting as he considered the emergency required, he decided to obey that portion of Mr. Tayler's order which directed a retirement on Patná,—but to abandon the treasure.

No sufficient explanation has ever yet been afforded as to this extraordinary abandonment. The station was not then threatened. Mr. Money had previously recorded his conviction that the forty-five Europeans, the hundred Sikhs, and the new police at his disposal were more than sufficient to ward off danger on the

* "Everything," wrote Mr. Tayler, "must now be sacrificed to holding the country, and the occupation of a central position."

part of the townspeople.* A company of the 64th Regiment was within a few miles of the place. Mr. Tayler's order had been written, Mr. Money could not fail to see, solely with reference to danger to be apprehended from without—to the inevitable consequences of the fall of Arah. The instructions not to abandon the treasure unless the personal safety of the Europeans should be endangered, would justify its abandonment only in case an attack should be made upon that treasure by irresistible force. (It certainly conveyed no authority to abandon the treasure when it was yet unthreatened, when no danger was to be apprehended from the townspeople, before any attempt had been made to remove it, and when a sufficient body of troops to escort it was at hand.

However, Mr. Money, in consultation with the members of the station he had summoned, arrived, after due He sets out. deliberation, at this decision. He and they and their escort started at 6 o'clock that very evening, leaving behind them a gaol filled with prisoners, and eighty thousand pounds of Government money.

Some idea of the un-English character of this step would seem at a very early period of the retreat to have struck one of the members of the party. This was Mr. Hollings, of the opium department. As this gentleman rode further and further from Gayá the conviction continued to gain strength in his mind that he and his fellow-countrymen were committing a very disgraceful act. At last he could bear it no longer. He rode up to Mr. Money and imparted to him his doubts and his misgivings.

Mr. Money was the officer directly serving under the Commissioner of Patná, and the responsibility of the retreat from Gayá, however much he may have acted upon the opinions of others, really lay with him. He had moved off the troops and the other residents, leaving behind him the Government money. But, now, the arguments of Mr. Hollings seemed to convince him that in so acting he had acted wrongly. In- He repents and returns. stead, however, of ordering back the troops—an act which lay entirely within his competence—Mr. Money determined to return to Gayá with Mr. Hollings, leaving the troops and the others to pursue their way.

* Mr. Money's words, dated 28th of July, were: "There is nothing, however, to be apprehended from the townspeople. They are surrounded by a new and strong police, and have a wholesome dread of the forty-five English and one hundred Sikhs."

No greater condemnation of the part he had taken in leaving the station could be pronounced than this thus passed by Mr. Money upon himself. His return, too, would appear, at first glance, a very Quixotic proceeding. If the money could not be saved, and the station could not be maintained, when Mr. Money had under his orders a force of one hundred and fifty Europeans and Sikhs, what could he expect to accomplish when aided solely by Mr. Hollings?

But Mr. Money after all risked but little. He was well aware that within easy call of Gayá there was a detachment of the 64th Regiment, and almost his first act after his return was to summon that detachment to join him. The question might perhaps be asked, why he had not summoned it before he abandoned the station?

Mr. Money found the station still quiet, but he was by no means at his ease. He distrusted the men who surrounded him. The distrust, however, did not inspire him with prudence. The following morning he showed his hand to every native official by openly burning the Government stamped paper, thus proving to the natives of Gayá that he had returned solely to baulk them of their anticipated plunder.

Fortunately for Mr. Money, before any open manifestation of the public discontent had taken place, the company of the 64th returned (2nd of August). Mr. Money, then feeling himself strong, collected carts upon which to load the treasure. On the 4th the treasure was loaded, and sent off under the guard of the 64th detachment. Mr. Money intended to accompany the party, but returning to his own house to save a few things of value he was suddenly startled by hearing the yells of the prisoners whom the native station guards had just then released from the gaol. Mr. Money had but just time to mount his horse, fortunately kept saddled, and to join the detachment.

The question had arisen as to the direction which the convoy should take. Had Mr. Money decided to march upon Patná, he would yet, though in a clumsy and vacillating manner, have obeyed the instructions he had received from his official superior.

But he would appear to have been misled by false reports as to the danger of traversing the short distance which lay between Gayá and that station.

He decided, therefore, to move the Europeans so urgently required in the north-west, from the field of action, and to

Remarks on
Mr. Money's
vacillation.

Summons a
detachment of
the 64th Regi-
ment.

August 4.

Resolves to
proceed to
Calcutta.

undertake the far longer journey to Calcutta.* The detachment, after repulsing outside Gayá the hap-hazard onslaught of the released prisoners, reached Calcutta unmolested.

It is clear from the above plain story that whilst the conduct of Mr. Tayler in directing a general concentration of his subordinates on Patná, in the face of the blow delivered at British *prestige* on the banks of the Són, was marked by a statesman-like prudence and a thorough comprehension of the vital interests at stake, the action of Mr. Alonzo Money was dictated by a vacillating spirit, and by an unstable and impulsive nature. It is clear that, if Mr. Alonzo Money had carried out literally the orders of his official superior, though he might have gained no sensational triumph, he would have brought the treasure from Gayá safely into Patná. Indeed it may be confidently asserted that, in saving the treasure even as he did save it, he carried out, though in a style peculiarly his own, Mr. Tayler's orders. To himself, as a free agent, History will accord no merit whatever. He imperilled the success of his superior's scheme by abandoning the treasure when he quitted the station, in the face of the orders he had received to bring it with him if he could do so without endangering the lives of his coadjutors; he imperilled the success of his superior's schemes by returning with one companion to the station, after having advisedly denuded it of the European and Sikh troops; and, finally, he disobeyed his superior's orders and risked the whole policy of the Government by taking down the treasure to Calcutta, instead of moving it to the adjoining station of Patná. Fortune greatly befriended him; for Fortune changed a gross dereliction of duty, a disobedience to orders which would have subjected a soldier to a court-martial—into a sensational triumph almost unparalleled. For a very brief space, and in the

August 4.

Mr. Money's conduct from first to last inexplicable.

Is wonderfully favoured by Fortune.

* Mr. Money reported to Government: "The next day (August 3), brought a letter to Captain Thompson" (commanding the company of the 61th), "written by an officer at Dánipúr of his own corps. It contained these words in pencil, 'For God's sake look out. The 8th N. I. mutineers have marched upon Gayá, they say with one gun.' The news of martial law proclaimed in all the Bihár districts reached us the same morning. I called another council, and told Captain Thompson he was now the principal authority in the district. I gave him my opinion that, encumbered with treasure, we were too weak to run the risk of meeting so large a body of mutineers, and recommended falling back on the Grand Trunk Road." In such a case, the opinion of the chief civil officer was naturally decisive.

eyes of a very small, though a very influential body of men, Mr Alonzo Money became the hero of Bihár.*

Let us see now how it was that he became so.

The Government of India and the Government of Bengal had been terribly frightened by the story of the successful revolt of the Dánápúr Sipháhis, and of the defeat of Captain Dunbar's detachment. The Government of India, mistaking severity for vigour, showed the extent of their terror by at once directing that their agent—the man upon whom they had cast the responsibility properly belonging to themselves—that Major-General Lloyd should be tried by a court-martial. That Government had their scape-goat handy. Mr. Halliday, representing the Government of Bengal, was in a different position. He had, indeed, a score to settle with Mr. Tayler, because Mr. Tayler had maintained a bold and resolute front, and had preserved order in his province by measures not altogether approved of by the Lieutenant-Governor. But Mr. Tayler had been too successful to be touched. He had saved Patná. To remove him now, when Bihár apparently was at the mercy of the victorious mutineers, was not to be thought of—even by Mr. Halliday.

Mr. Halliday
before Eyre's
victory.

Suddenly, however, the scene changed. A God-like mortal shone through the mist, dispersed the black cloud, annihilated the revolted Sipáhis, removed all apprehension at once and for ever regarding the safety of Bihár, and left it free to Mr. Halliday to exercise to the fullest extent his undoubted right of patronage—and of revenge.

After.

Major Eyre virtually reconquered lost Bihár. He restored the province to the position in which Mr. Tayler, unaided, had maintained it, until the Government of India and Major-General Lloyd had contrived to plunge it into danger. But in the short interval the Gayá episode had occurred. Whilst Árah was yet trembling on the verge of destruction, Mr. Tayler had issued the withdrawal order. Eyre saved Árah. But before the results of Eyre's great feat of arms had become known, Mr. Alonzo Money, first disobeying, then half obeying, the directions of his Commissioner, was, by his vacillating and impulsive action, converting a plain act of duty into a sensational drama, of which he, for a few brief moments, was the star-bespangled hero.

* For his conduct on this occasion, Mr. Money was made a Companion of the Bath!

For to Calcutta, immediately after the news of Eyre's great triumph, came, in a distorted and inaccurate shape, the intelligence of Tayler's withdrawal order. ^{After.} The danger was now over; the tears in the council-chamber of Belvedere* were dried up; a feverish exaltation followed. It was necessary that some proof should be given that energy had not died out in Bengal. Mr. Tayler's withdrawal order furnished the opportunity. Forgetting, or choosing not to remember, his transcendent services; the fact that he had never despaired of the safety of his division; that he had baffled the counsels of the mutineers; and had suppressed, unaided, the rising of Patná; that he had been the rock on which every hope in Bihár had rested; that he had cheered the despairing, stimulated the wavering, roused to action even the faint heart of the soldier; forgetting, or choosing not to remember, these great achievements, the Government of Bengal, acting in concert with the Government of India, seized upon his withdrawal order to dismiss Mr. Tayler from his post, to consign the saviour of Bihár, in the very morning dawn of the triumph which he had prepared, to signal and unmerited disgrace.

Dismisses
from his post
the man who
saved Bihár.

The Government of Bengal added insult to injury. Not content with suppressing the fact that Mr. Tayler had coupled with the order for the withdrawal of the officials from Gayá a direction that they should bring with them the treasure under their charge, unless by so doing their personal safety should be endangered, Mr. Halliday did not scruple to charge with being actuated by panic† the man whose manly bearing had been,

* The official residence, near Calcutta, of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal.

† Mr. Halliday wrote on the 5th of August: "It appears from a letter just received from Mr. Tayler, that, whilst apparently under the influence of a panic, he has ordered the officials at all the stations in his division to abandon their posts and fall back on Dánájúr. . . . Under these circumstances I have determined at once to remove Mr. Tayler from his appointment of Commissioner of Patná." It was on Mr. Halliday's report that Mr. Tayler was subsequently described by the Governor-General as "showing a great want of calmness and firmness"; as "issuing an order quite beyond his competency"; as "interfering with the military authorities." Mr. Halliday subsequently "explained" officially, that "panic was apparent on the face of Mr. Tayler's order, and specially from his urgent and reiterated advice, if not order, to Major Eyre, not to advance to the relief which saved Arrah." With respect to this last charge it may be as well to state, once for all, that Mr. Tayler never addressed Major Eyre on the subject of the advance on

throughout, an example to the whole of India. It would be difficult to produce, in the annals of official persecution, rise as they are with perversions of truth, a statement more gratuitous.*

Árah. What he did do was simply this. On the evening of the day on which Mr. Tayler learned the defeat of Captain Dunbar and his detachment of upwards of 400 men, he received a letter from Mr. Bax, the magistrate with Major Eyre, informing him that Eyre at the head of 150 men was about to attempt the task in which Dunbar had failed, and asking his opinion. Mr. Tayler thereupon wrote to Mr. Bax, telling him of Dunbar's defeat, and expressing his opinion that it would be prudent if Major Eyre were to drop down in his steamer to Dánápúr, take up reinforcements there, and advance thence on Árah. Mr. Tayler did not even send this letter to Mr. Bax. He sent it open to Major-General Lloyd, that the General might forward it with such instructions as he might think fit to give. Who will deny that in thus expressing his opinion Mr. Tayler performed only a clear and imperative duty?

* Sir John Kaye has thus ably summarised the arguments on this point:—"On the whole, it appears to me, on mature consideration, that the orders issued by Mr. Tayler were not of such a character as to merit the condemnation which Government passed upon them. It is not to be questioned that, up to the time of the mutiny of the Dánápúr regiments, the whole bearing of the Patuá Commissioner was manly to a point of manliness not often excelled in those troubled times. He had exhorted all his countrymen to cling steadfastly to their posts. He had rebuked those who had betrayed their fears by deserting their stations. His measures had been bold: his conduct had been courageous: his policy had been severely repressive. If he had erred, assuredly his errors had not leaned to the side of weakness. He was one of the last men in the service to strike his colours, save under the compulsion of a great necessity. But when the Dánápúr regiments broke into rebellion—when the European troops, on whom he had relied, proved themselves to be incapable of repressing mutiny on the spot, or overtaking it with swift retribution—when it was known that thousands of insurgent Sipáhis were overrunning the country, and that the country, in the language of the day, was "up"—that some of the chief members of the territorial aristocracy had risen against the domination of the English, and that the predatory classes, including swarms of released convicts from the gaols, were waging deadly war against property and life—when he saw that all these things were against us, and there seemed to be no hope left that the scattered handfuls of Englishmen at the out-stations could escape utter destruction, he deemed it his duty to revoke the orders which he had issued in more auspicious times, and to call into Patná such of our English establishments as had not already been swept away by the rebellion or escaped without official recall. In doing this he generously took upon himself the responsibility of withdrawal, and absolved all the officers under him from any blame which might descend upon them for deserting their stations without the sanction of superior authority. (It was not doubted that if there had been any reasonable ground of hope that these little assemblies of Englishmen could hold their own, that they could save their lives and the property of Government by defending their posts, it would have been better that the effort should be made. But their destruction would

But the fiat had gone forth. Mr. William Tayler was dismissed from his post. His career in the Indian Civil Service was ruined by one stroke of the pen.

And yet this man had accomplished as much as any individual man to save India in her great danger. He had done more than Mr. Halliday, who recalled him; more than the Government which supported Mr. Halliday. With a courage as true and a resolution as undaunted as that which he showed when dealing with the Patná mutineers, Mr. Tayler has struggled since, he is struggling still, for the reversal of the unjust censure which blighted his career. Subsequent events have singularly justified the action which, at the time, was so unpalatable to Mr. Halliday. Mr. Tayler's denunciation to the Wāhābī leaders, treated as a fable by his superiors, has been upheld to the full by the discoveries of recent years.* It has been abundantly shown that, to his energetic action alone was it due that Patná escaped a terrible disaster. The sup-

have been a greater calamity to the State than their surrender. It was impossible to overvalue the worth of European life at that time, and the deaths of so many Englishmen would have been a greater triumph and a greater encouragement to the enemy than their flight. It was the hour of our greatest darkness and our sorest need. We know now how Wake and Boyle and Colvin and their comrades in the 'little house' held the enemy in check, and how Vincent Eyre taught both the Sipāhī mutineers and the Shāhābād insurgents that there was still terrible vitality in our English troops. Of this William Tayler knew nothing. But he had palpably before him the fact of Duntar's disaster, and he believed that nothing could save the little garrison at Ārah. The probabilities at the time were that the Dānāpūr regiments, with Kūnwar Singh and his followers, having done their work in that direction, would move, flushed with conquest and gorged with plunder, upon Gayā and other stations, carrying destruction with them wheresoever they might go. What the Commissioner then did was what had been done and what was being done by other authorities, civil and military, in other parts of the country; it was held to be sound policy to draw in our scattered outposts to some central points of safety where the enemy might be defied. In this I can perceive no appearance of a panic. If Tayler had not acted thus, and evil had befallen the Christian people under his charge, he would have been condemned with a far severer condemnation for so fatal an omission."

* In his admirable work, *Our Indian Muslims*, Sir William Hunter, K.C.S.I., LL.D., proved that even five years before the period of which I am treating there existed at Patná "a great treasonable organisation for supplying men and money to the fanatical camp on the frontier;" that this organisation was the organisation of the Wāhābīs; and that of the Wāhābīs one of the men arrested by Mr. Tayler was the determined and resolute leader. He was subsequently tried by Sir Herbert Edwards, convicted of treason, and transported to the Andamans.

pressed words of the withdrawal order have been published to the world, and the charge of panic has been recognised everywhere as untrue.

It is a curious and a very remarkable fact that of the members of the Council of the Governor-General who supported at the time Mr. Halliday's action, two have, in later years, expressed their regret that they acted hastily and on incorrect information. "Time," wrote, in 1868, one of the most prominent amongst them, Mr. Dorin, "time has shown that he (Mr. Halliday) was wrong and that you were right."* Another, the then Military Member of Council, General Sir John Low, G.C.B., thus, in 1867, recorded his opinion: "I well remember my having, as a Member of Lord Canning's Council, concurred with his Lordship in the censure which he passed upon your conduct . . . but it has since been proved—*incontestably* proved—that the data on which that decision was based were quite incorrect! . . . I sincerely believe that your skilful and vigorous management of the disaffected population of Patná was of *immense* value to the Government of India, and that in the last few months of your Commissionership, commencing with the arrest of the three Wáhábí conspirators, and the disarming of the greater portion of the inhabitants of Patná city, your services were of more vital importance to the public interests than those of many officers, both civil and military, during the whole period of their Indian career, in less critical times, who have been rewarded—and justly rewarded—by honours from the Queen; while your services, by an extraordinary combination of unlucky circumstances, have hitherto been overlooked." It is not less remarkable that three ex-Governors and two ex-Lieutenant Governors of the Presidencies and Provinces of India have recorded similar opinions, whilst one gentleman, decorated for his distinguished conduct in the province of which Mr. Tayler was the pro-consul, had not hesitated to inform him that until Mr. Tayler should be rewarded for the conduct which saved

* "I can, of course, have no sort of objection to repeat," wrote, in 1868, the gentleman who was Lord Canning's private secretary in 1857, "what is a very *sincere conviction*, that if Lord Canning had seen the papers which you have now to produce, and been made acquainted with the subsequent progress of events, he would most likely have changed his opinion as to the treatment you have experienced; and, if he had changed his opinion, a man of his noble character would have been forward to say so, and to do you justice."

the province, it would be too painful for him "to wear in your presence the decoration which I have so gratefully received from Her Majesty."

His comrades in India, then, and the public generally, have rendered to Mr. William Tayler the justice which is still denied him by the Government which he served so truly and with such signal success. The ban of official displeasure still blights his declining years. Whilst his rival, decorated by the Crown, has been awarded a seat in the Council of India, he "who was right when that rival was wrong" still remains in the cold shade of official neglect. Although with a pertinacity which is the result of conscious rectitude Mr. Tayler has pressed upon each succeeding Secretary of State his claims for redress, that redress has still been, up to the latest date, denied him. It seems to be considered that the lapse of years sanctions a wrong, should that wrong in the interval remain unatoned for. We English not only boast of our justice, but, in the haughtiness of our insular natures, we are apt to reproach the French for the manner in which they treated the great men of their nation who strove unsuccessfully to build up a French empire in India. We taunt them with having sent Lally to the block, and allowed Dupleix to die in misery and in want. But, looking at our treatment of Mr. William Tayler, can we say that, even with the advantages which a century of civilisation has given us, our hands are more clean? This man saved a province. In saving that province it is possible that he saved with it districts outside his own. Yet is he not, I ask, looking at the treatment he received, is he not entitled to use, if not the very words, yet the sense of the very words employed by Dupleix in 1764: "I have sacrificed," wrote three months before he died that greatest of Indo-French administrators, "I have sacrificed my youth, my fortune, my life, to enrich my nation in Asia . . . My services are treated as fables; my demand is denounced as ridiculous. I am treated as the vilest of mankind." To this day the treatment of Dupleix is a lasting stain on French administration. I most fervently hope, for the credit of my country, that our children and our children's children may not be forced to blush for a similar stain resting on the annals of England; that the French may never have it in their power to return the reproach which our historians have not been slow to cast on

Justice still
denied him.

Can the lapse
of time sanc-
tion a wrong?

them. (In the history of the mutiny there is no story which appeals more to the admiration than the story of this man guiding, almost unaided, a province through the storm, training his crew and keeping down the foe, whilst yet both hands were at the wheel, and in the end steering his tossed vessel into the harbour of safety. Character, courage, tact, clearness of vision, firmness of brain, were in him alike conspicuous.) May it never descend to posterity that in the councils of England services so distinguished were powerless in the presence of intrigue !

CHAPTER III.

BIHÁR, BENGAL, AND BANÁRAS.

WE left Major Eyre enjoying, on the early morn of the 3rd of August, the triumph of his decisive victory. It is difficult even to imagine a position more gratifying to a high-minded soldier than that which he then occupied. Of the dangers he had incurred in attempting the relief of Árah that to his life had been the least. He had risked his reputation as a soldier, his very commission as an officer; for he had turned aside without authority from his course. And, now, he could scarcely exaggerate to himself the importance of the results of his daring. (To have saved his fellow-countrymen was a great thing; but, for the interests of India, it was greater still to have dealt a staggering blow at victorious rebellion, to have saved all Bihár from the fate which, but for him, would have overtaken Árah.)

August 3.
Árah after
the relief.

But even in that hour of triumph Eyre must have felt, and Eyre did feel, that his task was but half accomplished. A "staggering blow" may baffle a murderous onslaught, but unless the recipient of it be thoroughly disabled a renewal of the attack is always possible. So reasoned Eyre. The rebels whom he had banked of their prey were still strong enough to return. His very departure would invite them. He felt, then, that he must follow up his victory and pursue the Sipáhis to the stronghold of the great landowner whom they had recognised as their leader.

Eyre resolves
to follow up
the blow.

The task was not easy. The roads were reported to be almost impassable; the country surrounding the stronghold of Kínwar Singh was described as inaccessible. But the events of the previous eight-and-forty hours had told their tale. The mental courage which had dared, the skill and gallantry which had carried to success, the march on Árah, had been marked and appreciated by the Englishmen who had followed Eyre.

No men are more quick to discern noble qualities in a leader than the private soldier. It was a striking testimony to the hold which Eyre's conduct and character had taken on the minds of the men of the 5th Fusiliers, that, when they heard that he was about to lead them across those impassable roads to an inaccessible stronghold, they were loud in their expressions of the confidence with which they would hail the order to move forward.*

But before setting out on this expedition something yet remained to be done at Árah. The townspeople had unmistakably sympathised with the revolted Sipáhis. Not a single voice had warned Captain Dunbar of the ambush into which he was leading his detachment. Some of the more prominent men of the city had even taken an active part against our countrymen. (As a preliminary measure, then, Eyre disarmed the population.) Men whose active aid on behalf of the rebels was indisputable were brought to trial. Throughout the district order was restored. At the same time Eyre communicated his intentions to the military authorities at Dánápúr, and solicited reinforcements of at least two hundred more European troops and a supply of ammunition. He took advantage, likewise, of the number of volunteers flocking to his camp, to organise a corps of European volunteer cavalry, the command of which he conferred upon Captain Jackson, of the Stud Department. His wounded he sent in to Dánápúr.

On the 8th of August Eyre was joined by two hundred men of the 10th Foot and five officers. Three days later a hundred of Rattray's Sikhs joined him. His total augmented force then consisted of three hundred and thirty European Infantry, thirty-six European Cavalry, one hundred and forty Sikhs, forty of whom were the Árah garrison commanded by Herwald Wake, and sixteen Volunteer Cavalry. With this force Eyre set out on the afternoon of the 11th, in the direction of Jagdíspúr, the hereditary stronghold of Kínwar Singh.

* In his report to Army Head-quarters, Captain L'Estrange, commanding the detachment of the 5th Fusiliers, after describing the reported difficulties of the march, added: "Under all the circumstances, a feeling of doubt, if not of apprehension, as to the success of our expedition might easily have pervaded troops less confident than ours were in the judgment, talent, and courage of our leader."

Meanwhile the troops under the orders of Kúnwar Singh had to a great extent recovered heart. The halt of eight days' duration made by Major Eyre at Árah had inspired them with the belief that no further advance was intended by the English, and that they would be left unmolested in their stronghold. Impressed with this idea, Kúnwar Singh detached small parties in the direction of Baksar, to feel their way and to intercept any small bodies of Europeans whom they might meet. In this they were partially successful, and this success would probably have incited their leader, had he been left alone, to make, a little later, a movement in force in the same direction. But Kúnwar Singh was well served by the country-people. He was informed, almost as soon as they arrived, of the reinforcements which reached Eyre. He felt certain, then, as to the next move of the British force, and he resolved, with the energy which formed so strong a feature of his character, to meet it with his remaining available strength.

Kúnwar
Singh.

Calling in, then, all his detachments within reach, he occupied, in considerable force, the village of Diláwar, about a mile and a half in advance of Jagdispúr, and covered by a river. This village he caused to be intrenched. It was connected with Jagdispúr by a very thick jungle, with the intricacies of which, however, his men were well acquainted.

Not content with occupying a position presenting difficulties to an assailant, and capable of being in a great measure masked, Kúnwar Singh was so ill-advised as to send a strong body of cavalry and infantry across the river to occupy a village, Tolá Nárainpúr, on its left bank. It was this cardinal error which rendered his defeat certain. He had in the field altogether about five thousand two hundred men, of whom twelve hundred were Sipáhis.

His faulty
tactics.

Eyre had advanced towards Jagdispúr the afternoon of the 11th. He marched eight miles, passing over *en route* his late battle-field, and encamped for the night on the banks of the Ghagar rivulet. Resuming his march with the early dawn, he halted at 9 o'clock to refresh his men. At 10 o'clock he again advanced, and in half-an-hour detected the presence of the enemy in Tolá Nárainpúr. He at once sent forward his skirmishers, supported by a fire of grape. This fire forced the enemy in and

Eyre's vic-
tory and cap-
ture of
Jagdispúr.

August 12.

about the village to discover themselves. Eyre then sent at them with the bayonet the detachment of the 10th, eager to avenge their comrades. The main body of the enemy stood their ground with great obstinacy, but were in the end driven across the river. Meanwhile the 5th Fusiliers, assisted by a field howitzer, had held in check the enemy's left, consisting of irregulars, horse and foot. These now simultaneously gave way. The river was crossed by our men, and an impetuous attack on the intrenchments of Diláwar placed that village almost immediately in their power.

Still there lay a mile and a half of thick jungle to be traversed. Eyre gave the enemy no time to recover themselves; but, sending on his infantry in skirmishing order, forced his way through the thicket, driving the Sipáhis before him. In their retreat the enemy left behind them two of their guns. Completely disheartened by the continuous advance of our men, they scarcely attempted to defend their leader's stronghold, but fled, taking Kúnwar Singh with them, in the direction of Sásarám. The battle had begun at half-past 10 o'clock. At 1 o'clock Eyre and his force were in possession of Jagdíspúr. The enemy lost three hundred men. The loss of the British amounted to six wounded.

On the morning of the 14th Eyre detached a force to Jataurá, about eight miles from Jagdíspúr, to beat up the quarters of Kúnwar Singh,—but the wily chieftain had had good information, and had retired early. The house he had occupied there was, however, destroyed. A similar fate befell the palace and other buildings, notably the property of rebels, at Jagdíspúr and in its vicinity.

The campaign terminated with the victory at Jagdíspúr. Two days after it had been achieved, the Assistant Adjutant-General of the Dánápúr division wrote to inform Eyre that Havelock, then attempting to relieve Lakhnao, had been compelled to fall back; that the cry at Kánhpúr was still for troops; and that he and those under his command were required to join a force then being collected at Alláhábád.

Eyre had accomplished his mission. His work was done. The mutineers had been driven from Bihár. He and his gallant comrades were then not at all unwilling to proceed to the part of India for which they had originally been destined, and where they might hope to render fresh services to their

Is ordered to
Alláhábád.

country. Eyre, therefore, bade adieu to Árah on the 20th, and on the following day set out for Baksar *en route* for Alláhábád. August 20.

Meanwhile events had been occurring in Calcutta calculated greatly to increase the means at the disposal of the Government for the suppression of the revolt.

On the 1st of August, Major-General Sir James Outram landed in Calcutta. The varied services of this distinguished officer at once marked him out for high command. The name of Outram had for years been a household word in India. A keen and successful sportsman, a quick-witted and energetic political officer, a hater and exposé of corruption, Outram had but recently figured as Commander-in-chief of the expedition despatched in 1856 to the Persian Gulf. His success there had been prompt and complete. When, on the conclusion of peace with Persia, the regiments which had composed his expeditionary force had been detached rapidly to India, Sir James Outram had followed to Bombay. It would seem to have been the original intention of the Governor-General to re-employ him in the political post which had been bestowed upon him before the mutiny, that of Agent to the Governor-General of Rájputáná. The mutinies at Indúr, at Nasírábád, at Nímach, and the outbreaks in other parts of Central India had thrown that part of the country into disorder, and Lord Canning felt that a strong hand controlling a strong force would be required to re-establish authority. The state of the country, however, rendered it impossible for Sir James Outram to proceed alone from Bombay to his post in Rájputáná; and he felt, moreover, that in the actual state of affairs his presence might be more useful to the Government in some other part of India. On arriving at Bombay, then, he at once telegraphed to the Governor-General for orders. Receiving no reply—for Lord Canning could not at the moment make up his mind—Outram cut the Gordian knot by steaming round to Calcutta. He arrived there, as already stated, on the 1st of August.

Meanwhile, Lord Canning had, on the 15th of July, determined to employ Sir James Outram in the command of an expeditionary force in Central India, and he telegraphed to Bombay to that effect. But again he changed his views, and resolved to use his services to restore order in the country between Patná and Kánpúr. Sir James Outram's arrival in Calcutta on the

Sir James
Outram.

1st of August coincided then with the latest wishes of the Governor-General.

The reader must remember that, on the 1st day of August, the only information possessed by the Government regarding Bihár was that Captain Dunbar's detachment had been beaten, that Árah was besieged, that the grand trunk road was unsafe, and that the entire province might at any moment be lost to them. From Kánhpúr they had information that Havelock was about to cross the Ganges with his small force, and to march on Lakhnao. Having regard to the fact that an entire province was arrayed in arms against him, his attempt did not seem promising. Altogether the look-out on the 1st of August was gloomy in Calcutta.

No sooner, then, had Sir James Outram landed, than Lord Canning felt that the man for the occasion had arrived. Four days later he appointed him to command the united Dánápúr and Kánhpúr divisions of the army, thus placing him in supreme military command of the country between the first of those stations and Lakhnao. Outram eagerly clutched at the offer. Like every true soldier, he was of opinion that "action, not counsel," was required. He set out to assume his command the very day after he had been nominated to it, taking with him a mountain train of artillery, but no gunners to work it, these not being, at the moment, available.

The day prior to Sir James Outram's nomination, Lord Canning, feeling the extreme inconvenience of leaving the civil divisions of Banáras, Alláhábád, Kánhpúr, and other outlying districts, without a supreme administrative officer to control them—the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces

being at the time shut up in Ágra—had given effect to a resolution at which he had arrived, to detach one of his councillors to Banáras to take up the lapsed authority in that part of India. His selection had fallen upon Mr. J. P. Grant. I have already alluded to this gentleman as the ablest member of the Council of the Governor-General. Mr. Grant was, indeed, a man of very remarkable ability. He had a clear and sound understanding, a quick and subtle brain, great independence, and great decision of character. If he had a fault, it may have been that he did not always make sufficient allowance for men whose intellect was less vast, and whose views were less sound than his own.

Is appointed
to command
the force des-
tined to relieve
Lakhnao.

Mr. Grant is
appointed to
administer the
central dis-
tricts.

He failed thus to rate at their full influence on the multitude opinions firmly advocated by others, but which he knew to be untenable. His prosciencce came thus to be mistaken for dogmatic assertion, his keen insight for conceit. But this slight defect, arising from want of European training, was overborne by the powerful intellect, the high and lofty ideas of one of the greatest members of the Indian Civil Service.

The despatch of an administrative officer of the first order to the civil districts north of Bengal had been further rendered advisable by the action of the Government of India at the very end of July. On the 31st of that month there appeared in the Official Gazette a resolution of the Governor-General in Council directing the course to be pursued in dealing with mutineers who might be captured or who might surrender to the authorities. This resolution was much criticised at the time, and in England as well as in India it was very generally condemned. After a lapse of thirty years it is, perhaps, possible to bring to its consideration a calm and unbiassed judgment.

July 31.
Resolution in
Council re-
garding the
treatment of
mutineers.

The avowed object of the resolution was to prevent the civil officers of the country from hastily resorting to and carrying too far measures of severity against the revolted Sipáhís, some of whom might, possibly, have been unable to withstand the influence of their comrades; some might have endeavoured to protect their officers; some might have merely revolted without murdering their officers; and some might have simply taken their way to their homes on the general revolt of their regiment.

Its object.

To carry out this object, it was ruled in the resolution, first, that no native officer or soldier belonging to a regiment which had not mutinied should be punished, even as a deserter, unless he were found with arms in his hand. Such men, it was directed, should be made over to the military authorities, or, when such a step were impossible, should be kept in prison pending the orders of Government.

Its provisions.

The second section provided for the treatment of native officers and soldiers, being mutineers or deserters, belonging to regiments which had mutinied, but the European officers of which had not been murdered. Such native officers and soldiers, when apprehended without arms in their possession, were to be sent to a certain fixed place, to be dealt with by the military authorities.

The third section dealt with mutineers or deserters who be-

longed to regiments which had killed a European officer, or who had committed some sanguinary outrage. Such offenders were to be judged by the civil power. In the event, however, of extenuating circumstances transpiring, the case was to be reported to the Government before the carrying out of the sentence.

These were the three principal provisions of the resolution. In the remaining portion of it Lord Canning dwelt very much upon the evil certain to arise by continuing to inflict indiscriminate punishment, after a district or division should have been brought into order, and after a sufficient impression should have been made upon the rebellions and the disorderly.

It was objected to this resolution that it was ill-timed ; that, Objections made to it at the time. issued when the struggle was still undecided, when the enemy still held Dehli, when our countrymen were besieged in Lakhnao, on the morrow, as it were, of the massacres of Fathgarh and Kánhpúr, and whilst the fate of Bihár was trembling in the balance, it was calculated to encourage the rebels, to show them that, through fear of them, we were anxious to entice them back to their allegiance. It is possible that the strong dislike with which the resolution was regarded at the time was in a great measure attributable to the want of confidence felt in the Government. Certainly, the provisions I have quoted were not only not objectionable, but the spirit in which they were conceived was worthy of the highest praise. They are not fairly liable to the condemnation that was Objections combated. passed upon them at the time. They do not condone mutiny or desertion. But—the public had no confidence in the Government. The order that, in certain circumstances, an appeal lay from the civil magistrate to the highest authority roused suspicion. It was considered, moreover, that the very publication of such a resolution was a tacit rebuke to those who had carried out severe measures of retribution.)

Examining the order after a lapse of thirty years, all the objections to it made at the time fade away. The provisions it contained are wise and statesmanlike.

Another measure contemplated by Lord Canning about this time filled to overflowing the measure of his unpopularity. The danger arising from allowing an entire population to carry arms had not been unremarked by the citizens of Calcutta. It was a danger obvious, and in many cases most pressing. On the 13th of July, then, the

The disarm-
ing order.

Grand Jury in their presentment suggested the disarming of the native population of Calcutta and its suburbs as a measure required for the preservation of peace and the prevention of crime. A disarming bill had for some time been under the consideration of the Government. The presentment of the Grand Jury stimulated their action regarding it. But the indignation of the Calcutta public was intense when it was found that the measure of the Government applied the order to disarm to Europeans as well as to natives. It was in vain that it was pointed out that the act of the Government contained a proviso under which it was possible for any man to apply for a licence to carry arms, and that it was not to be credited that such permission would be refused to an European. So profound was the mistrust of the Government that all argument was wasted. Again I have to record my conviction that the measure of the Government, accompanied by the proviso referred to, was a statesmanlike measure. Any other, partial or one-sided in its limitations, would have been wrong in principle and might have been mischievous in action.

Objections to
it at the time.

Whilst in these terrible months of June and July the Government of India had had to encounter dangers at a distance from their own door, they were being preserved by the commanding officer of a native infantry regiment from a peril close at hand, and which, but for him, might have been serious indeed. The station of Jalpaigori, on the Tista, a hundred and seventy-three miles from the capital, and in the direct route to the station of Dárjiling, was garrisoned by the 73rd Regiment Native Infantry. The commanding officer was Lieutenant-Colonel G. M. Sherer. This officer had passed nearly the whole of his Indian career in the Stud Department. His knowledge of horses was profound. In managing the quadruped he had learned, too, how to deal with his master. Transferred, according to the orders then in force, on his promotion to a Lieutenant-Colonelcy, from the superintendence of the stud at Baksar to the command of a native infantry regiment, having in the intervening period of thirty years forgotten all his drill, he very soon showed his officers that great natural ability is universal in its practical application, and that, whatever be the sphere assigned to a really capable man wherein to labour, he will always come to the front.

Lieutenant-
Colonel G.
M. Sherer.

Colonel Sherer had not been long in command of his regiment:

when the mutiny broke out. His position was full of peril. His men were, so to speak, masters of the situation. There were no Europeans within easy reach of them. There were, too, traitors in their ranks. But there were also men who still trusted to the fortune of the British. It must be remembered, moreover, that to this regiment the new cartridge, regarded by others as the symbol of the proselytising intentions of the Government, had not been served out. The station, likewise, was far from the high road. Still, rumours, detailed reports, letters, emissaries, found their way from time to time into the regimental lines. Alarm succeeded alarm. But Sherer and his officers were calm. They maintained a careful watch over the movements of their companies. At last there could be no doubt but that mischief was intended. Four of the most influential men in the regiment were indicated to Sherer as the heads of a conspiracy which would inevitably break out that or the following night. Sherer had them seized and tried. Their guilt was clearly proved, and they were condemned to death. The sentence, however, required the confirmation of the Major-General commanding the Presidency Division. It reached him when all was *couleur de rose* at Barrackpúr and at Calcutta. The hearts of the Major-General and of the Commander-in-Chief were inclined to mercy. It was considered that dismissal from the service was a sufficient punishment for mutiny with intent to murder. An order then was transmitted to Sherer to "dismiss the offenders from the service." Before this order could reach Sherer the horizon had darkened. The Sipáhis at Dánápúr had revolted; the Árah catastrophe had occurred. To temporise at such a crisis would be fatal. But Sherer had the order. He obeyed it—after his fashion. Commanding a parade for the following morning, he brought out the condemned Sipáhis and had them blown away from guns. The same day he wrote officially to the Major-General commanding the Presidency Division to inform him that, in obedience to his orders to dismiss the four condemned Sipáhis from the service, he had that morning dismissed them—from the muzzles of four loaded guns.*

Dismisses
four mu-
tineers—from
the service.

This act of vigour had its effect. The rising was postponed. Two days later Eyre's victory deprived the disaffected of all

* I not only received these details from Sir George Sherer himself, but I have read the proceedings of the Court Martial and the entire correspondence.

hope of success, and Sherer, continuing a combined policy of watchfulness, conciliation, and firmness, brought his regiment safely through the crisis, their arms retained, and their reputation unstained.*

Very shortly after this episode, Lord Elgin, then the British Plenipotentiary to China, arrived in Calcutta (8th of August). He was conveyed by H.M.'s ship *Shannon*, Captain William Peel, having on board three hundred marines and one hundred of H.M.'s 90th Regiment. Three days later, the consort of the *Shannon*, the *Pearl*, Captain Sotheby, brought, besides her crew, two hundred more men of the 90th. From that moment the arrival of reinforcements was continuous, and the country south of Alláhábád was for ever out of danger.

But the arrival of the *Shannon* and the *Pearl* had a result more practical than the mere announcement that they had brought to Calcutta Lord Elgin and some three or four hundred soldiers would seem to imply. In the month of July, Major-General Thomas Ashburnham, who commanded the China expedition, and who had proceeded by way of Calcutta on his way to his destination, had written thence to Lord Canning to express his great desire to send him a naval brigade to keep open under all circumstances his communications with Alláhábád. In the same letter General Ashburnham had likewise expressed his conviction that Captain Peel would be a most admirable coadjutor in carrying to perfection a scheme of that nature. Lord Canning clutched at the idea thus propounded; Lord Elgin assented to it, and, as we have seen, he arrived at Calcutta on the 8th of August, prepared not only to give moral aid to the Government, but "to place Her Majesty's ships *Shannon* and *Pearl*, with their respective crews," at the disposal of the Governor-General.

Lord Canning, as I have said, clutched at the offer. On the 10th the two vessels were officially placed at his disposal. On the 18th Captain William Peel started for Alláhábád with a naval brigade composed of four hundred men, six 65-cwt. 8-inch hollow shot or shell guns, two 24-pound howitzers, and two field pieces.

I must chronicle one more important event, and then quit

* Colonel Sherer was rewarded by receiving the order of a Knight Commander of the Star of India.

Calcutta for the scenes of turmoil and action. In the last week of July the new Commander-in Chief, Sir Colin Campbell, arrived in Calcutta. Lord Canning had recommended that the post he came to fill should be bestowed upon Sir Patrick Grant. But the Prime Minister of the day, Lord Palmerston, strongly held the opinion enunciated by Sir James Outram, that to suppress the Indian Mutiny action rather than counsel was required in a General. He, therefore, selected a plain, blunt soldier, and sent him to Calcutta to assume the supreme direction of military affairs in India. The selection was extremely popular with the army, for Sir Colin had served on the North-West frontier, and had won the confidence and affection of officers and men.

Calcutta may now safely be quitted. Numerous reinforcements had made her secure. The men who preserved Mr. Beadon's line of six hundred miles. The crisis which had menaced Mr. Beadon's line of six hundred miles had been successfully surmounted. Many dangers had been overcome. Banáras had been threatened and restored to order; Alláhábád had been snatched from destruction; Patná, Dánápúr, and Bihár, after a terrible trial, had been brought again under the ægis of British protection. Who had saved that line? Not the Supreme Government, for the action of the Government in refusing to disarm the native troops had increased, if it had not actually caused, the disorder. Not the Local Governments—the one shut up in Ágra, the other hair-splitting and venting its personal spite in Calcutta. No,—four names indicate the men who saved that line to the British. North of Bihár, Mr. Frederic Gubbins, of the Civil Service, the judge who virtually administered the great Hindu city, and Colonel Neill, whose prompt and resolute action stamped out rebellion whenever and wherever it raised its head. South of Banáras, Mr. William Tayler and Major Eyre. These are names to be honoured,—these are the subordinates who won the battle; the untitled upholders of the honour, the glory, and the fair name of England. They were alike the heads that devised, the hands that executed. (Associated for ever with theirs, too, in their undying glory, as supports who maintained the over-burdened structure, will be the names of those whose sphere of action, though confined, was of vital importance,—the names of the members of that Arah garrison, most fitly represented by their three leaders, by Herwald Wake, by Vicars Boyle, and by Colvin.)

BOOK VIII.—THE NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES, CENTRAL
INDIA, AND RAJPUTANA.

CHAPTER I.

ÁGRA AND GWÁLIÁR.

IN preceding chapters allusion has been made to the fact that the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces had been debarred from the execution of his administrative functions by the circumstance that he was shut up in Ágra. (It has now to be shown what constituted the North-West Provinces, who and what kind of man was the Lieutenant-Governor, and how it had come about that he had been forced to take refuge in the famous fortress which had been one of the glories of the Mughul rule.)

The provinces, named before the annexation of the Panjáb, in 1849, the North-Western, and continuing in 1857 to bear that title, comprehended the country lying between the western part of Bihár, the eastern boundary of Rájputáná and the Cis Satlaj States, and the northern line of the provinces comprised in the Central Indian Agency. They touched the Himálayas, included Rohilkhand, and ran into the Central Provinces below Jhánsí. Within their limits were the imperial cities of Dehlí and Ágra, the great Hindu city Banáras, the important station and fortress of Alláhábád, the flourishing commercial centres of Mírzápúr and Kánpúr. The rivers Ganges and Jamnah rolled in majestic rivalry through their length. They were peopled by a race the majority of whom we had rescued from the sway of the Maráthás, and whose prosperity under our rule had enormously increased. Here, too, the descendants of the courtiers of Akbar and of Aurangzib

The North-
West Pro-
vinces.

still continued to live, if not to flourish. For them, as for the landowners in Bihár, the action of our revenue system had been fatal. Their doom had been signalled when the Maráthá supplanted the Mughul. It had been pronounced when the Frank ousted the Maráthá.

But the change which had been fatal to the descendants of the men who had gained their position at the Mughul court partly by the sword, but more often by intrigue, had been extremely beneficial to the toiling masses. From the time when Máhmúd of Ghazní had introduced the crescent as a sign of rule and domination in the country of the Hindus until the period when Lord Lake conquered the imperial city in 1803, the cultivators of the soil of the North-West Provinces had been in very deed hewers of wood and drawers of water. Gradually, under the fostering rule of the English, they had been emancipated from this serfage, until, under the reign of Mr. Thomason, the immediate predecessor of the Lieutenant-Governor who ruled in 1857, they had attained a flourishing position; the rights of every village, and of every man in that village, being thoroughly understood and entirely respected.

The government of the North-Western Provinces was divided into eight commissionerships, those of Banáras, Alláhábád, Jabalpúr, Jhánsí, Ágra, Rohilkhand, Míráth, and Dehlí. The provinces were but poorly garrisoned by European troops. (In fact, when the mutiny broke out, there was but one European infantry regiment, and one battery, at Ágra.) The only other European troops were at Míráth.

The Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces was Mr. John Colvin. Mr. Colvin was a man of considerable ability; conscientious, painstaking, courteous, and amiable. He was animated by a thorough sense of duty, gave all his energies to the public service, and never spared himself. It is not too much to affirm that had his lot been cast in ordinary times his reputation as Lieutenant-Governor would have rivalled that of the most eminent of those who, before and subsequently, have held that office. But with all his ability, his experience of affairs, his devotion to duty, Mr. Colvin lacked that one quality, the possession of which is absolutely necessary to enable a man to buffet successfully against the storms of fortune. Mr. Colvin wanted, in a word,

Benefits
arising to the
cultivators of
the soil from
British rule.

Political
arrangement
of the North-
Western
Provinces.

Mr. John
Colvin.

that iron firmness—that rare self-confidence—which enables a man to impress his will upon others. Supremo at Ágra, his was not sufficiently, during the mutiny, the directing mind. Surrounded by civilians of high standing, men of ability and of consideration in the service, but holding, and tenaciously holding, theories regarding the mutiny diverse from his, although differing widely amongst themselves, Mr. Colvin allowed himself to be swayed too much by the views of others. It often happened that the course he had proposed to follow was a wiser course than that which he ultimately pursued. Owing possibly to the fact that the circumstances of the time differed widely from those to which he had been accustomed, he almost always renounced his own ideas, and accepted the opinions pressed upon him by one or other of his advisers. Yet,—the responsibility of every action fell upon him.

It is possible that Mr. Colvin's earlier career was to a certain extent answerable for this defect in his character as a ruler in troublous times. He had been private Mr. Colvin's earlier career. secretary to Lord Auckland, when Lord Auckland was Governor-General of India. In all the arrangements which led to the Afghanistan war, with its delusive triumphs and its disastrous results, Mr. Colvin shared the responsibility with the Governor-General, of whom indeed he was believed to be the intimate adviser.* Up to the hour of the catastrophe he was jubilant regarding the success of the policy. But when the catastrophe did come, with its loss of human life, its lowering of British *prestige*, its humiliation to the national arms, it was a blow sufficient to destroy the convictions of a lifetime, to change a man's nature. It is probable that, thenceforward, Mr. Colvin became less inclined to trust entirely to his own opinion, more ready to accept the suggestions of others.

The disaffection displayed by the 19th Regiment of Native Infantry at Barhampûr in the early part of the year, and the events at Barrackpûr which followed, had not apparently been regarded by Mr. Colvin as The Miráth mutiny a surprise to Mr. Colvin.

* Sir John Kaye states that Mr. Colvin was supposed to exercise over Lord Auckland, "an influence far greater than has been exercised by any officer in the same subordinate position."

indicative of any general plan of insurrection on the part of the native army. The rising at Míráth, then, on the 10th of May, took him entirely by surprise.

Mr. Colvin received intelligence of the Míráth outbreak on the 11th of May. Further information leading him to believe that the mutineers had sacked Delhí and were marching on Ágra, he summoned a council of war. As the seat of the North-West Government Ágra was the residence of many notabilities. There were members of the Board of Revenue, judges of the Court of Appeal, a brigadier, colonels, majors, and officers of lower grades. The scientific corps were well represented. Besides these were commissioners, magistrates, civil servants of degrees, covenanted and uncovenanted, a Roman Catholic bishop, and two Protestant chaplains. The

He summons a general council, Chiefs of this large society responded to Mr. Colvin's summons to what might be termed, without any decided misuse of its natural signification, a general council. Probably in the whole annals of the mutiny there

at which the opinions are discordant. never assembled a body of men whose opinions were so discordant, so distracted, so void of any fixed principle of action. Mr. Colvin himself was in favour of abandoning the station of Ágra and taking up a position within the fort. Indeed, he not only announced this as his intention, but intimated that he had already issued the order for the native regiments to evacuate the fort, that the Christian population might take refuge within its walls. Against this course of action many of those present, notably Mr. Harrington—an ex-judge of the Court of Appeal, but just then nominated member of the Legislative Council of India—and Mr. Drummond, the magistrate, loudly protested. As to the actual policy to be followed, there were nearly as many opinions as counsellors. The information that the mutineers were marching on Ágra—information proved that same evening to be untrue—clouded the intellects of many. (At last, however, a definite decision was arrived at. It was resolved to

Resolves to show a bold front. show a bold front to the enemy, to secure the fortress by a detachment of European troops, to raise volunteer corps, cavalry and infantry, and to hold a general parade of the troops the following morning, when the Lieutenant-Governor should deliver an address to the European and native regiments.)

The troops stationed at Ágra consisted of one battery of

Bengal Artillery, the 3rd European Regiment,* the 44th and 67th Native Infantry. On the morning of the 14th,† these were brigaded on their own ground. The Lieutenant-Governor, and the principal civil officers of the station were present. Mr.

May 14.
Harangues
the Euro-
peans,

Colvin addressed the European soldiers first. He told them not to distrust their native fellow-soldiers, but with an inconsequence scarcely in keeping with his recommendation, added: "the rascals at Delhi have killed a clergyman's daughter, and if you have to meet them in the field, you will not forget this." He then turned to the sipáhis. He told them that he fully trusted them, asked them to come forward if they had any complaints to make, and offered to discharge on the spot any man who might wish to leave his colours. "Prompted by their officers to cheer," records a civilian of high rank, who was present on the occasion,‡ "the sipáhis set up a yell; they looked, however, with a devilish scowl at us all."

and the
sipáhis.

That yell, and that "devilish scowl," should have opened the eyes of the Lieutenant-Governor. He might have read in the symptoms thus displayed that the sipáhis of those two regiments, like the sipáhis of all the other regiments of the Bengal army, were but watching their opportunity. There were not wanting at the elbow of the Lieutenant-Governor men animated by the conviction that the rebellious movement had been concerted, that the sipáhis as a body were involved in it, that the time had passed by when phrases however neatly turned, and expressions of confidence however sonorous, could avail anything. The Chief Engineer, Colonel Hugh Fraser, noting the signs of the times, had advised Mr. Colvin to distrust everybody and to recognise the emergency. In plain language he counselled a removal into the fort,—a removal not only of the treasure, the records, the women and children, but likewise of the Lieutenant-Governor and his staff. But Mr. Colvin, who but the previous morning had been led by his own instincts to order an identical action, had at this time fallen under the influence of other advisers. He saw not the significance of the "devilish scowls," and re-

Mr. Colvin
does not yet
recognise the
magnitude of
the crisis.

* Now 2nd Battalion, Royal Sussex Regiment.

† Mr. Colvin in his report to Government gives the date as the 13th; but that is evidently a mistake. The general council was held on the 13th.

‡ *Notes on the Revolt of the North-West Provinces of India*, by Charles Raikes, Judge of the Sadr Court of Agra.

garded not the counsel of the engineer. He reported to Government his confident expectation that quiet would be maintained at Ágra; his opinion that it was not by shutting themselves up in forts that the British could maintain their power in India.

But there was a potentate whose capital lay some seventy miles from Ágra who had taken a more accurate view of the situation. This was Mahárájah Jaiají Ráo Sindhiá, ruler of the Maráthá kingdom called generally, after the name of its capital, Gwáliár.

Mahárájah Jaiají Ráo Sindhiá afforded throughout his career an example of the wisdom exercised by the paramount power in dealing generously with native princes. The history is remarkable. It happened in 1843, when the Mahárájah was a minor, that Gwáliár, worsted in a war which the intriguers who conducted its government had provoked, lay at the feet of the British. Many courses lay open to the then Governor-General, Lord Ellenborough. He might annex it, as Lord Dalhousie, under precisely similar circumstances, did, six years later, annex the Panjáb. He might confiscate a portion of it, just as four years later Lord Hardinge acted with regard to Jándhar. He might lay upon it a heavy contribution in the shape of money. But Lord Ellenborough was a prescient statesman. He did none of these things. On the contrary, he conceived that it might be possible by a generous treatment of the fallen State so to bind it to the British that it might become a source of strength to our empire. To the minor Mahárájah, of whose infancy his counsellors had taken advantage to provoke the war, Lord Ellenborough restored, then, the whole of his patrimony. But his army he disbanded. In place of it he raised another army, to be administered by British officers, but to be at the charge of the State of Gwáliár. He placed at the same time near the person of the Mahárájah a Resident, whose duty it should be to watch over and counsel the youthful monarch.

This generous policy produced all the results which had been hoped for it by its author. The Mahárájah, as he grew up and studied the history of the past, recognised in the British Government the Suzerain to whom he was bound by considerations alike of gratitude and of interest. He resolved frankly to recognise the supremacy of

Believes in
the possibi-
lity of main-
taining order.

Mahárájah
Sindhiá.

Wise action
of Lord Ellen-
borough
regarding
Gwáliár in
1844.

Excellent
results of his
policy.

that Suzerain, and to prove himself worthy of the position assigned to him—that of one of the main pillars of the British Empire of Hindustan. When, therefore, the Mírath revolt became known at Gwáliár, the Maharájah had no hesitation as to the course it was incumbent upon him to pursue. At all risks he would support his Suzerain. The very fact of his being a native of India had given him a more complete insight into the secret reasons which prompted the revolt than could be claimed by any European. He was conscious that the dominant power was about to encounter a shock, which would tax all its resources, and which might terminate fatally for it.

Sindhia resolves to cast in his lot with the British.

At the very time, then, when the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces was congratulating himself, and was assuring the Supreme Government of his belief that the two native infantry regiments stationed at Ágra would remain quiescent, Sindhia, well assured that the entire native army was undermined, was warning the political agent at his court that the disaffection was universal, and that the men of his own contingent would, sooner or later, follow the example of the regular army.

He recognises the gravity of the crisis.

The ideas which Mr. Colvin had apparently imbibed at this time regarding the mutiny had taken the shape of a conviction that, far from being caused by the spontaneous action of the sipáhis, it was a movement prompted by the Court of Delhi. He considered it, then, very important to enlist on the side of the British those races which, in former times, had been most antagonistic to the representative of the Mughul dynasty, and whose timely support might, at this critical moment, influence the sipáhis. (Of these there were two in close proximity to Ágra—the Maráthás represented by Gwáliár; the Játs, enthroned at Bharatpúr.) To both of these, then, Mr. Colvin applied at once for material assistance. The replies were favourable. Sindhia at once dispatched to Ágra a battery of six guns, commanded by Captain Pearson, and Captain Alexander's regiment of cavalry,—followed, a little later, by Captain Burlton's regiment. On the part of Bharatpúr Captain Nixon was sent to occupy the station of Mathurá with a detachment of infantry.

Mr. Colvin applies to Sindhia and to Bharatpúr for aid.

which is given.

But this timely assistance in no way retarded the quick approach of the evil which had been foreshadowed.

On the 21st news reached Ágra that the native troops at Áligarh had mutinied. By this revolt direct communication with Míráth was cut off. It deserves, therefore, to be recorded in full detail.

The station of Áligarh lies on the grand trunk road, not quite midway between the cities of Ágra and Míráth, being distant about eighty miles from the latter, and fifty from the former. It possesses a bastioned fort, well capable of defence, and memorable in Indian history as having been the scene of the first of the many effective blows dealt by Lord Lake at the Maráthá power in 1803. In May 1857, the fort was not occupied, but the station was garrisoned by four companies of the 9th Regiment of Native Infantry—a regiment which bore a very high character, and which, it was very generally believed, would prove faithful, even should all the others mutiny.

The events of the 10th of May, at Míráth, had naturally been reported at Áligarh; but the story had had no effect on the outward behaviour of the men of the 9th. Rumours of disorder in the district having subsequently reached the commanding officer, a detachment of the regiment was sent out to ascertain the truth. The detachment returned at the end of two days with a report that the rumours had been greatly exaggerated. And although it was stated that as they marched through the town to the regimental parade ground the butchers had endeavoured to work upon the minds of the sipáhis and to induce them to revolt and shoot their officers, still the fact remained that they had not revolted, and that they had not shown the smallest sign of disaffection. (On the contrary, both at that time and subsequently, the sipáhis delivered up to their officers men who had entered their lines to seduce them from their allegiance.)

It happened, however, that one of the men thus delivered over to justice was a Brahman who had acted as the agent of some villagers in the neighbourhood. This man had imagined a plot, whereby, under cover of the noise and excitement of a simulated marriage procession, the European officers might be murdered, and the money in the treasury, amounting to about £70,000, secured for the revolters. The Brahman, caught in the act, was tried by a court composed of native officers, and condemned to be hanged on the evening of the

News arrives
of the revolt
at Áligarh.

Áligarh.

Effect pro-
duced there
by the Míráth
revolt.

Apparent
calm attitude
of the sipáhis.

Incident of
the Brahman.

same day, the 20th. On that evening the native troops were drawn up, and in their presence the sentence was read to the condemned prisoner. The latter was then taken to the gallows, the rope was adjusted, the cart was taken away. During the whole of these proceedings the sipáhis had maintained their usual passive demeanour. Suddenly, however, one of their number, bolder than his comrades, stepped forth from the ranks, and pointing to the dangling corpse, exclaimed: The spark which ignited the powder. “Behold a martyr to our religion!” This exclamation touched in the heart of the sipáhis a chord which had till then lain dormant. As if struck by the wand of a magician, these men—who had passed the sentence and had assisted at the execution—broke out into open mutiny. They dismissed their officers, unharmed; but they compelled them and all other Europeans at the place to quit Aligarh.* They then plundered the treasury, opened the gates of the gaol, and went off bodily to Dehli.

This occurred on the 20th of May. There were detachments of the same regiment, the 9th Native Infantry, at Balandshahr. Balandshahr, at Itáwah, and at Mainpúrí. To these stations information of the revolt at Aligarh, promptly conveyed, produced the natural result. At Balandshahr, the outbreak was attended by no violence. The sipáhis simply plundered the treasury and went off. The case was different at Mainpúrí and at Itáwah.

Mainpúrí lies seventy-one miles to the eastward of Ágra. The detachment of the 9th Native Infantry at this Mainpúrí. place was commanded by Lieutenant Crawford. Information of the revolt at Aligarh reached the station the evening of the 22nd. Mr. Power, the magistrate, May 22 who received it, at once consulted the Commissioner, Mr. Arthur Cocks, as to the course to be followed. These two gentlemen decided to send all the ladies and children into Ágra and meanwhile to march the sipáhis out of the station in the direction of Bhángáon. The detachment of non-combatants set off very early the following morning under charge

* Amongst these were Lady Outram, wife of Sir James Outram, and their son, Mr. Francis Outram, of the Civil Service. Lady Outram succeeded in reaching Ágra in safety, and without molestation. Mr. Outram, and other Europeans, led by Mr. Watson, C.S., took the road to Ágra, escorted by a party of the cavalry of the Gwáliar Contingent. Their adventures belong to a part of this history yet to be related.

of the assistant magistrate, Mr. J. N. Power. This gentleman

May 23. escorted the ladies and children one stage. There
 Mr. J. N. he placed them under charge of a faithful Mu-
 Power escorts the non-com-
 batants to- wards Ágra, J. N. Power, on their departure, returned to
 and returns. Mainpúrí.

Meanwhile, the officers of the 9th Native Infantry, Lieu-
 tenants Crawford and de Kantzow, were endeavouring to
 induce their men to march out of the station. (The sipáhis
 set out, but on reaching the limits of their parade ground, they
 refused to proceed further; and breaking out into
 mutiny, warned their officers with menaces to
 depart—some even going so far as to fire at them.)

In the confusion that followed the officers were separated from
 each other. De Kantzow dismounted, and Crawford, unable to
 see him for the tumult, and believing he had been killed,
 galloped back to warn the civilians of the mutiny, and to
 announce his own intention of riding for Ágra.

Crawford found assembled Mr. Arthur Cocks the Commis-
 sioner, Mr. Power the magistrate, Dr. Watson the civil surgeon,
 and Mr. Kellner, a missionary. After a short consultation,
 Mr. Cocks, declaring that no one was bound under the
 circumstances to remain at Mainpúrí, started off.

Devotion of the
 two Powers, of
 Mr. Kellner, of
 Dr. Watson,
 three sergeants
 and a clerk. Mr. Kellner, Mr. Power, and his brother,—who
 just then returned from escorting the non-com-
 batants,—refused, with a noble devotion to duty,
 notwithstanding the reports of musket-firing which

reached them from the parade-ground, to quit the station. In
 this resolve they were joined by Dr. Watson, as well as by
 three serjeants of the Road and Canal Departments, Mitchell,
 Scott, and Montgomery, and by a clerk, Mr. Glone. The first
 cousin of the Rájah of Mainpúrí, Ráo Bhowání
 Singh, with a small force of horse and foot, agreed
 at the same time to stand by Mr. Power.

Meanwhile, de Kantzow, dismounted, had been opposing to
 the mutinous sipáhis a firm and courageous will.
 He implored them, he upbraided them, he threatened
 them. Muskets were levelled at him in vain. The
 courageous attitude of the solitary officer, en-
 deavouring to recall to duty men whose hearts told them they
 were doing wrong, overbore for the moment physical force.
 Not, indeed, that he entirely mastered the sipáhis. But they

Loyalty of
 Ráo Bhowání
 Singh.

Daring and
 presence of
 mind of de
 Kantzow.

did not kill him. They still rushed on madly towards the treasury, bearing with them their earnestly gesticulating, madly imploring lieutenant. Arrived at the iron gates of the treasury de Kantzow made one last appeal. Turning suddenly from his own sipáhis, he threw himself on the loyalty of the civil guard of thirty men, posted to protect the Government money. They responded; they rallied round him; the officials of the gaol added their efforts; and for the first time since the actual outbreak on the parade-ground the torrent was stemmed.

He checks the mutineers.

Even more,—it was stopped. Not, indeed, at the instant. De Kantzow, with a wisdom beyond his years, avoided precipitating a conflict. He forbade the civil guard to fire, but drew it up to oppose a resolute front to the halted sipáhis, whilst with all the energy of an excited nature he again implored these not to add plunder and murder to mutiny. For three hours his arguments, backed by the physical efforts of the civil guard, kept the rebels at bay.

and keeps them at bay.

The iron gates to the last resisted all the efforts made to force them. It is possible that, unaided, de Kantzow might even have persuaded the mutineers to withdraw. But help, not in numbers, but in influence greater than his own, brought about this coveted result. When almost exhausted by his efforts, he was joined by Ráo Bhowání Singh, deputed by the magistrate, Mr. Power.* The arguments of this gentleman added to those of de Kantzow were successful. The sipáhis agreed to withdraw provided that the Ráo should accompany them. He did this, and the Treasury was saved. The sipáhis, after plundering their lines and other buildings, left the station. Their repulse and departure restored order and confidence throughout the city and district of Mainpúrí.)

Is opportunely joined by Ráo Bhowání Singh.

They save the treasure.

The gallantry, the devotion, the cool daring of Lieutenant de Kantzow were not allowed to pass unnoticed by the Government. Lord Canning wrote to the young subaltern an autograph letter, in which in vivid and touching language he described the impression which his conduct had made upon him. ‘Young in

Lord Canning gracefully acknowledges the service rendered by de Kantzow.

* Mr. Power was anxious to join de Kantzow, but he was assured by that officer, in a few lines he managed to convey to Mr. Power, that the sipáhis were yelling for his life, and that he, de Kantzow, was gradually quieting them.

years," he added, "and at the outset of your career, you have given to your brother soldiers a noble example of courage, patience, good judgment, and temper, from which many might profit." None will deny that the encomium was well deserved; that an act such as that I have recorded merits to be treasured up in the archives of a nation's history.

It remains to be added that the revolted sipáhis went off to Dehli, and that de Kantzow, left by their departure without employment, was at once placed in command of a body of police for special service in the district.

The scene at Itáwah was more tragic and more bloody than that just recorded. Itáwah lies seventy-three miles south-west of Ágra, and about a hundred miles north-west of Kánhpúr. It was garrisoned by one company of the 9th Regiment of Native Infantry. The chief civil officer was Mr. Allan Hume, the magistrate and collector. The assistant magistrate was Mr. Daniell. On receiving intelligence

of the events at Mirath and at Dehli Mr. Hume had organised patrolling parties to watch the roads, to intercept, if possible, any small detached parties of mutincers, and at all risks to debar them free access to the station. On the night of the 16th of May the patrols fell in

with, and brought in as prisoners, seven troopers of the 3rd Cavalry, a regiment which had mutinied. They had however, omitted to deprive these men of their arms, and the troopers, brought face to face with the native infantry drawn up at the quarter-guard, suddenly levelled their carbines or drew their swords, and assaulted the European officers on duty. The guard instantly turned out, and in the *mêlée* that followed five of the mutineers were killed. Of the two who escaped one was shortly afterwards captured.

Three days later the patrols stopped at Jaswantnagar, ten miles from Itáwah, a large cart containing several revolted troopers, all belonging to the 3rd Cavalry, and well supplied with sabres, pistols, and carbines. This time the patrols attempted to disarm their captives; but attempting it without due precaution they paid dearly for their rashness. Pretending to deliver up their arms, the troopers fell suddenly upon their captors and shot them down. Having done this they took up a position in a Hindu temple near at hand, small, but of great strength, the approach to which lay along a grove with walls on either side.

Itáwah.

Mr. Hume
organizes
patrolling
parties.

May 16.

The want of
caution dis-
played brings
on the crisis.

Prompt intelligence of this untoward event was conveyed to Mr. Hume. That officer, accompanied by Mr. Daniell, proceeded to the spot, followed by some troopers and foot police. A glance at the temple showed Mr. Hume the strength of the position. The approach to it was thoroughly commanded by the carbines of the enemy. The inhabitants of the neighbouring village showed likewise a strong disposition to aid the troopers, for they not only opened communications with them, but sent them a supply of food and ammunition. To storm the temple by a front attack was dangerous, but it was the only possible course, unless the honours of the day were to be conceded to the troopers. This was not to be thought of, so Mr. Hume and Mr. Daniell, summoning the police to follow them, advanced boldly to the assault. But one man answered to their call. He was killed, Mr. Daniell was shot through the face, and Mr. Hume thought it then advisable to renounce an undertaking which never had a chance of success. Supporting his wounded friend, he gained his carriage, and returned to Itáwah. That night the troopers, fearing lest a more formidable attack should be made upon them, evacuated their position.

Mr. Hume and Mr. Daniell attempt to meet it,

but unsuccessfully.

The mutineers, however, retire.

The fourth day subsequent to this event the detachment of the 9th Native Infantry at Itáwah mutinied. The ladies and children, accompanied by the civilian officers, and by some native officers who had remained staunch, retired in safety to Barpúra, a police station on the road to Gwáliár. Itáwah was sacked, the treasury was plundered, the prisoners were released from the gaol, anarchy was inaugurated. The reign of terror, however, was not of long duration. On the evening of the 24th, a regiment of the Gwáliár contingent, the 1st Grenadiers, reached Barpúra. The following morning this regiment marched on Itáwah, and restored order. For the moment British authority was again supreme, though no one dared conjecture how soon or how late the restorer might become the persecutor!

May 23.

The detachment of the 9th N. I. at Itáwah, mutinies,

May 25.

but order is soon restored.

Whilst the spirit of disaffection was thus spreading from station to station Mr. Colvin was cherishing the hope that even a majority of the sipáhis might be amenable to reason. He believed that whilst the ringleaders had deliberately set the Government

Mr. Colvin determines to offer a golden bridge to the well-disposed sipáhis.

at defiance, others had been induced to follow them solely by fear of the consequences of not following them; that to inaugurate a policy of general severity towards all, because of the misconduct of a few, would precipitate a general insurrection of the native army. But if, he argued, means of escape, by a proclamation of pardon, should be opened to all who could properly be admitted to merey, it would gladly be seized by those who had no heart in the business. Impressed with these views, which, it would appear, were shared by almost all the officials about him, by soldiers as well as civilians, Mr. Colvin.

Issues a proclamation giving effect to his views.

without awaiting the sanction, for which he applied, of the Supreme Government, issued, on the 25th of May, a proclamation giving effect to them. He was catching at a straw, but, in the sea of difficulties in which he was struggling, there was positively nothing more tangible at which the hand could grasp!

Mr. Colvin's proclamation was disapproved of, on several grounds, by the Government of India, who substituted for it another of their own composition. There was really little substantial difference between the two, and both were useless. In point of fact, the time had not arrived to issue proclamations of pardon. Mr. Colvin's offer was well meant, but, though the proclamation was sown broadcast over the province it failed to bring in a single penitent

It has no effect.

sipáhi. The straw at which he clutched crumbled in his hand.

Mr. Colvin's proclamation was issued on the 25th of May. On the 30th, three companies of native infantry which happened to be at Mathurá, only thirty-five miles from Ágra, belonging to the two regiments stationed at Ágra, suddenly mutinied, shot down one officer, wounded another, plundered the treasury, fired the houses of the English, released the prisoners from the gaol, and went off to Dehli. This was the first practical answer given by the sipáhis to Mr. Colvin's proclamation.

Events which followed on its issue.

But the Rájah of Bharatpúr had, as I have shown, despatched a detachment of his troops, under Captain Nixon, to aid the British at Mathurá. When the three companies at that station mutinied on the 30th, the Bharatpúr detachment was occupying a position at Hódal, a small town lying between Mathurá and Dehli, thirty-seven miles north of the former and only sixty from the latter. Being on the high road, it was the place of all others to be occupied with

The Bharatpúr troops mutiny.

advantage by a body of men wishing to intercept troops marching from Mathurá on Dehlí. So at least reasoned, on the morning of the 31st, Mr. Harvey, the Commissioner of Ágra, who was with the Bharatpúr troops; so reasoned Captain Nixon, who commanded them. A position was accordingly marked out and the troops were ordered to take it up. But here occurred an unexpected difficulty. The sipáhis of the Rájah of Bharatpúr not only refused to obey, but they warned the British officers to depart. The rebellion, then, was not confined to sipáhis in British pay. It was becoming hourly more national.

May 31.

Drive
away their
British
officers.

Remonstrances, threats, entreaties, were alike useless. It was not, however, until the guns were turned upon the group of some thirty Englishmen, who were present, that these yielded reluctantly to the mutineers. A few minutes after their departure, the shouts of the sipáhis, and huge bonfires caused by the burning of their tents and the few bungalows built for Europeans, showed that the mutiny had been consummated. The officers escaped with difficulty and after many perils to Bharatpúr.

Information of the mutiny at Mathurá disturbed the calculations and destroyed the hopes of Mr. Colvin. That mutiny had been the act of the men whom he had harangued on the 14th, and amongst whom his proclamation had been most freely circulated. It had been their own unadulterated work; conceived by their own brains, neither prompted from outside, nor produced by contact with other regiments. It became evident then, even to Mr. Colvin, that other means than those which he had employed would be necessary to put down "this daring mutiny."

Effects of
the mutiny
at Mathurá
on Mr. Col-
vin.

The news of the mutiny at Mathurá reached Mr. Colvin at midnight of the same day on which it occurred. The bearer of it was Mr. Drummond, the magistrate. At the time when the first "general council" was held at Ágra, Mr. Drummond had been of opinion that the disaffection was partial, and that our policy should be to appear to trust everyone. It was Mr. Drummond who had most strenuously opposed Mr. Colvin's policy of retiring within the fort. But Mr. Drummond's views were altered now. Far from endeavouring to restrain the action of the Lieutenant-Governor, he had now to stimulate it. Mr. Drummond, then, when he woke Mr. Colvin with the news of the Mathurá disaster, pointed out to him the necessity it had

created of at once disarming the regiments at Ágra. And when Mr. Colvin, only half-convinced, seemed inclined to hesitate, the magistrate called attention to the fact that any sudden outbreak on the part of the sipáhis would probably result in the liberation of the prisoners from the gaol, with its consequent disorder and possible disaster. Then Mr. Colvin hesitated no longer. The order was at once issued for a general parade the following morning.

He resolves
to disarm
the Ágra
brigade.

At dawn of day on the 31st of May the troops were drawn up on the Ágra parade-ground. There was Captain D'Oyley's battery, the 3rd Europeans, and the two native regiments—these so posted as to be under the fire of the Europeans. The Brigadier—Brigadier Polwhele—an officer of the Indian army—then directed the commandants of the native infantry regiments to order arms to be piled. The order was given. “There was a moment of hesitation, a look of discontent. The officers sternly reiterated the order. Silent and sullen, the sipáhis obeyed—piled their arms, and marched off to their lines. The 44th and 67th Regiments, whose colours had waved from the Indus to the Brahmapútra, were no more.”*

Disarm
them.

Fuller effect was now given to the carrying out of the resolution passed at the general council regarding the organisation of volunteers, horse and foot. The class appealed to, composed of clerks in the public offices, pensioned soldiers, Eurasians, tradesmen, independent gentlemen, responded freely to the call. A body of infantry was formed for the protection of the station itself, whilst Horse Volunteers were enrolled to guard and escort to the fort the women and children in case of a sudden rising, and to afford aid to fugitives from neighbouring stations.

Raises volun-
teers.

Notwithstanding the disarming of the sipáhis, the mind of Mr. Colvin was far from easy. The country around Ágra was in a blaze. Direct communication with the district to the north-west had been cut off in the last week of May; that with Calcutta was

Difficulties
of Mr. Col-
vin's posi-
tion.

* Raikes's *Notes on the Revolt*. Mr. Raikes adds: “On examining the musquets, many were found loaded with ball. It was afterwards well known, that on this very Sunday morning, the sipáhis had conspired to overpower the European regiment when in church, to rush upon the guns, and then to shoot, plunder, and burn, from one end of Ágra to the other.”

covered the first week in June. In the capital of his own provinces the Lieutenant-Governor was isolated. One by one the towns and districts around him fell away from his grasp. The disbanding of the sipáhis, and the presence of a regiment of European infantry and of a battery of European artillery, had for the moment saved Ágra. But Ágra was within seventy miles of the capital of the greatest of the Maráthá rulers, faithful himself to the British, but whose troops, levied in the recruiting ground which had supplied the British native army, were not to be perfectly trusted. Ágra again was the natural and historical point of attack for the contingents of the native princes of Central India,—and, however favourable might have been Mr. Colvin's opinion of the native princes, the example of Bharatpúr had led to the inference that their contingents sympathised with the mutineers.

Mr. Colvin's position, then, even after he had, by disbanding his two native regiments, removed the immediate danger, was extremely critical. Every day events were passing beyond his control; his power to initiate was disappearing; it was becoming more incumbent upon him to shape his action so as to meet the manœuvres of others. The initiative in fact had passed into the hands of the rebels.

The initiative passes into the hands of the rebels.

The danger nearest to him was that which might come from the Gwáliár contingent. I have stated in a preceding page that immediately after the outbreak at Mirath Sindhiá had placed a considerable body of troops of his contingent, commanded by British officers, at the disposal of the Lieutenant-Governor. But these men were the brothers of our sipáhis, allied to them by caste, by religion, by sympathy. Sindhiá not only did not trust them, but he had warned the British political agent at his Court, Major Charters Macpherson, that they would inevitably seize their opportunity to follow the example set them at Mirath and Dehlí. Major Macpherson, an officer of a stamp especially fostered by the East India Company, thoroughly acquainted with the natives of India and trusted by them, pointed out then to the Mahárájah, that, holding the convictions he had expressed regarding the men of his contingent, it would become him to show the sincerity of his attachment to his Suzerain by placing his body-guard, Maráthás of his own kindred or caste, at the disposal of

The Gwáliár contingent.

Sindhiá sends his body-guard to Ágra.

the Lieutenant-Governor. To this proposal Sindhiá had acceded, and the body-guard had been sent off to Ágra. Later events were to show that not even the comrades and kinsmen of the Mahárájah had been able to escape the infection.

The Gwáliár contingent was composed of four field batteries of artillery, a small siege train, two regiments of cavalry, and seven of infantry, aggregating eight thousand three hundred and eighteen men. The greater portion of the force was stationed at Gwáliár, under the command of Brigadier Ramsay, with outposts at Síprí and Ágra.

The cantonment at Gwáliár was occupied by the officers of the contingent, their wives and families. It may excite surprise that with the avowed conviction of the Mahárájah regarding the degree of confidence that could be placed in the soldiers of the contingent—convictions shared by his Prime Minister, Dinkar Ráo; by the Resident, Major Maepherson; and communicated, it must be presumed, to the Lieutenant-Governor—the ladies and children should not have been placed in security, whilst yet there was time to remove them. The subject had not been neglected.

Policy of
having the
ladies at
Gwáliár.

The Mahárájah himself had, so early as the last week of May, suggested the removal of the ladies and children from the cantonment to the Residency.

which was beyond the city, and about five miles from the cantonment. It so happened that, on the 28th of May, in consequence of a strong impression that the sipáhis would rise, the ladies did actually spend a night there, protected by a portion of the Mahárájah's own guard. Well would it have been if they had been allowed to remain, or if they had been sent to Ágra! But on receiving a remonstrance from the native officers, affirming the excellent disposition of their men,

but ordered
back to can-
tonments.

and protesting against the slur which had been cast upon them by the transfer to the protection of the Mahárájah of the ladies and children, the

Brigadier recalled the latter to the station.

Though confidence had disappeared, the illusion was maintained. This, too, despite the fact that almost

Forebodings
of disaster.

every post brought to Gwáliár convincing proofs that of all possible illusions this was the most baseless. With rumours of the wildest character from the North-West there came from places nearer at hand accounts in detail the truth of which was apparent. Now it was that the

troops at Ajmír and at Nasírábád had mutinied, and had made their way to Dehli; now, that their example had been followed by the Nímaeh garrison: now, that the province of Rohilkhand had risen: now that there had been a massacre at Jhánsí; and now that the panic had even reached Calcutta. From Kánhpúr, from Alláhábád, and from the stations in their vicinity, the absence of news gave birth to even more sinister forebodings.

Such was the life from day to day in Gwáliár during the first fortnight of June 1857. It was a life of terrible suspense, of pressure on the nervous system, difficult to endure.* "Suspense," wrote Mr. Disraeli, "suspense is agony, but decision may be despair." There were some of our country women at Gwáliár, one certainly of the fairest and most gifted amongst them, to whom it was allotted to pass through the suspense to succumb in the end to the ruthless and too cruel decision. At one time during that fortnight it had been almost resolved to send the ladies into Ágra, and a proposal to that effect had been made to the Lieutenant-Governor. The idea that he would accede to this plan kindled some hope in the minds of those most interested. But on the 12th that hope was blighted. A telegram from Mr. Colvin directed that the ladies were not to be sent into Ágra until mutiny should have broken out at Gwáliár.†

The terrible
suspense.

June 12.
Reaches the
verge of
despair.

* "We lived in a state of dreadful uncertainty," writes Mrs. Coopland (*A Lady's Escape from Gwáliár*). "My husband seldom undressed at night, and I had a dress always ready to escape in. My husband's rifle was kept loaded (I learned to load and fire it), as we were determined not to die without a struggle. Oh, the misery of those days! None but the condemned criminal can know what it is to wait death passively; and even he is not kept in suspense, and knows he will be put to a merciful end."

† *A Lady's Escape from Gwáliár* by Mrs. Coopland. With admirable good sense Mrs. Coopland indicates the fatal error of thus keeping ladies and children in a dangerous position. "Before this," she adds, "my husband had often wished to send me to Ágra; but he would not desert his post, and I would not leave him. I have often thought since that had I done so he might have escaped, by riding off unimpeded by me; many unmarried officers have escaped in this way. When the mutinies first began, if all the ladies and children at the numerous small stations had been instantly sent away to Calcutta or some place of safety before the roads were obstructed, their husbands and fathers would probably have had a better chance of escape. Instead of which, the lives of men, women, and children were sacrificed, through the efforts to avoid arousing the suspicion of the troops."

At last the crisis came. It was Sunday, the 14th of June. June 14. The Europeans in Gwáliár had attended the service of the Church in the morning, passing on their way The crisis at Gwáliár. many sipáhis loitering about the road. During the day fuller details of the Jhánsí massacre had been received—details but ill-calculated to dispel the gloom that hung over the station. The prevailing idea in the minds of the residents as they read those details was that the same fate was reserved for themselves,—“for now they were more than ever isolated, revolted provinces on three sides of them, and the telegraphic communication with Ágra severed.”* Suddenly, about midday, the alarm was given that one of the bungalows was on fire. This circumstance, the unvarying precursor elsewhere of a rising, warned the residents that their hour had arrived. Begins by an act of incendiarianism. But they had prepared themselves for a crisis of that character. Waterpots had been stored up in readiness. On the alarm then being given the occupiers of the several thatched houses had their roofs well saturated. But the wind was high, incendiaries were creeping about, and there were some houses not at the moment occupied. The fire caught one of these, then speedily spread to the Mess-house, and thence to a large swimming bath-house adjoining it. These and the bungalow first attacked by the flames were burnt to the ground. But the further progress of the fire was then arrested. The wind fell, precautions had been taken, every European was on the look-out, and the day had not waned.

Few, however, doubted as to the course events would take as soon as darkness should set in. A little incident confirmed the already too certain conviction. Mrs. Coopland, the wife of the chaplain of Gwáliár, relates † how on that afternoon she and her husband went for a drive. “We saw scarcely anyone about, everything looked as it had done for days past; but as

* “My husband laid down and tried to get a little sleep, he was so worn out. He had just before been telling me the particulars of the Jhánsí massacre, too frightful to be repeated; and we did not know how soon we might meet the same fate ourselves.

“I hope few will know how awful it is to wait quietly for death. There was now no escape; and we waited for our death-stroke. The dread calm of apprehension was awful. We indeed drank the cup of bitterness to the dregs. The words ‘O death in life, the days that are no more,’ kept recurring to my memory like a dirge. But God helps us in all our woes; otherwise we could not have borne the horrible suspense.”—Mrs. Coopland.

† *A Lady's Escape from Gwáliár.*

we were returning, we passed several parties of sipáhis, none of whom saluted us. We met the Brigadier and Major Blake, who were just going to pass a party of sipáhis, and I remember saying to my husband, 'If the sipáhis don't salute the Brigadier the storm is nigh at hand.' *They did not.*

Keen insight
of Mrs.
Coopland.

See

The instincts of Mrs. Coopland were true. The storm was nigh at hand. That night, immediately after the firing of the evening gun—9 P.M.—the sipáhis of the Gwáliár contingent rose in revolt. They rushed from their

The mutiny
breaks out.

huts in tumultuous disorder, sounded the alarm, discharging their loaded muskets, and then set fire to the lines. The officers, as in duty bound, galloped down to the lines in the vain endeavour to recall their men to order. They were met by murderous volleys directed at them. Captain William Stewart, commanding a battery of artillery, was severely wounded, and afterwards when a prisoner was deliberately shot dead. The return of his riderless horse to the house-door conveyed the sad news to his wife. She herself, fair and bright as the Morning Star, did not long survive him. She, too, was shot dead, and her boy with her. The sipáhis spared her little girl. Major Hawkins, also commanding a battery, Majors Shirreff and Blake, commandants of infantry regiments, shared the same fate. Dr. Kirk, the superintending surgeon, was discovered in the place in which he had sought refuge and was killed before the eyes of his wife.* Mr. Coopland, violently separated from his wife, who was spared, was murdered.† Others managed to escape; but of the fourteen British officers present that morning at

Its fatal re-
sults.

* "Then poor Mrs. Kirk, with her little boy joined us. She had that instant seen her husband shot before her eyes; and on her crying: 'Kill me too!' they answered, 'No; we have killed you in killing him.' Her arms were bruised and swollen; they had torn off her bracelets so roughly; even her wedding ring was gone. They spared her little boy, saying, 'Don't kill the *bachchá* (child); it is a *missie bába* (girl).' Poor child; his long curls and girlish face saved his life. He was only four years of age."—Mrs. Coopland.

† "We all stood up together in the corner of the hut" (to which they had been conveyed by Mr. Blake's faithful Muhammadan servant, Mirza); "each of us took up one of the logs of wood that lay on the ground, as some means of defence. I did not know if my husband had his gun, as it was too dark in the hut even to see our faces. The sipáhis then began to pull off the roof; the cowardly wretches dared not come in, as they thought we had weapons.

Gwāliār one half were slain. With them likewise, three women and three children, and six sergeants and pensioners.*

Those who escaped, men, women, and children, made their way as best they could, some in parties, one or two almost singly, into Ágra.† Their sufferings were great.

The survivors find their way to Ágra.

The agony of that terrible night weighed upon them long afterwards. The widowed wife, the orphaned child, the bereaved mother, were indeed bound to each other by the sympathy of a common sorrow. But until Ágra was reached danger seemed still to threaten them all. They, the survivors, could derive little satisfaction from the fact that their dear ones had been shot down solely because the Government had been afraid to show mistrust of the sipáhis. They could not but know that their actual condition was the result of that simulated reliance. They felt, then, as they had felt before, that the timely withdrawal of the ladies and children would have at least given the officers a chance of escape. But now all was over. The murdered husbands had died in the performance of rigorous duty. The wives, the children, who had perished, had been the holocausts of a policy, timid, irrational, even provocative of disaster. In deciding to have recourse to such a policy the impress of a strong character had been painfully and fatally wanting.

Intelligence of the Gwāliār mutiny reached Ágra on the 15th. Following it came likewise the information that the Mahārājah, and his able minister, Dinkar Ráo, still loyal and true, would use every means in their power to restrain the over-charged aspirations of their followers and

When they had unroofed the hut they fired in upon us. At the first shot we dropped our pieces of wood, and my husband said, 'We will not die here, let us go outside.' We all rushed out; and Mrs. Blake, Mrs. Raikes, and I, clasped our hands and cried, '*Mat máro, mat máro* (do not kill us).' The sipáhis said, 'We will not kill the mem-sáhibs (ladies) only the sáhib.' We were surrounded by a crowd of them, and as soon as they distinguished my husband, they fired at him. Instantly they dragged Mrs. Blake, Mrs. Raikes, and me back; but not into the bearer's hut; the *mehter's* (sweeper's) was good enough for us, they said. I saw no more; but volley after volley soon told me that all was over."—Mrs. Copland.

* Mrs. Stewart was the only lady killed; but with her her boy and her European nurse. The wife of a warrant officer was also killed. The officers murdered were Dr. Kirk, Majors Slirreff, Blake, Hawkins, Captain Stewart, Lieutenant Proctor, and the Reverend Mr. Copland.

† Many of them came through the Dholpúr country, the Rájah of which was prodigal in his attentions and in his provision of conveyances and escort.

their sipáhis. But graver events were at hand. Central India had risen; Rohilkhand had risen; and it was soon seen that the safety of Ágra was imperilled from without. It will be my duty now to recount the nature of these perils, and then to describe the mode in which they were met by the ruling powers of the North-Western Provinces.

Risings all
about Ágra.

Ágra, 1st Aug.

10.20

11.00

11.30

12.00

12.30

1.00

1.30

2.00

2.30

Thence

to 6

1.00

1.30

CHAPTER II.

JHÁNSÍ AND BUNDELKHAND.

THE events which were occurring at the period at which we have arrived at Alláhábád, Kánpúr, Banáras, and in the Míraṭh division have been already related. From those quarters there came no light to Ágra. From others, within and without the circle of the North-Western Provinces, issued those menacing demonstrations which forced at last a decisive policy on the Government. These have now to be noticed.

In writing the history of the mutiny in the North-Western Provinces, it has to be borne in mind that three central positions stand out, each distinct from the others, and each attracting to itself separate attacks, unconnected with the others.

Three central points
in the
North-West.

These three central positions were Ágra—the point aimed at by the mutineers on the right bank of the Jamnah—by those, in a word, issuing from Central India:—Kánpúr, connected henceforth intimately with Oudh:—and Dehlí, attracting the rebels from Rohilkhand and the northern part of the Duáb. To preserve, then, unbroken the narrative of the events affecting Ágra as a main central point, it is necessary that I should leave for a future chapter the stations and districts on the left bank of the Jamnah, and endeavour to concentrate the attention of the reader on Bundelkhand, on Central India, and on Rájputáná.

The town of Jhánsí lies a hundred and forty-two miles south of Ágra. It is the capital of the province of the same name. The history of this province has been peculiar. Amid the general plunder and robbery which accompanied the break-up of the Mughul empire under the successors of Aurangzib, a portion of Bundelkhand belonging to the dominions of the Rájah of Urehá had been appropriated by one of the Maráthá officers serving under the Peshwá, and to

him confirmed by *sanad*. The territory so appropriated, containing nearly three thousand square miles and a population of about a quarter of a million, was called after the chief town within its borders, Jhānsí. As long as the power of the Peshwá lasted the Maráthá officer and his successors ruled Jhānsí as vassals of that prince.

Its early
history.

But on the downfall of the Peshwá in 1817 the territories possessed by him in Bundelkhand and elsewhere were ceded to the British. Amongst these territories was Jhānsí, the ruler of which, known under the title of Subahdár, accepted the protection of the British, and agreed to pay an annual tribute of seventy-four thousand rupees of the currency of his State. In return the British Government declared him hereditary ruler of the country. The name of the Subahdár with whom this arrangement was concluded was Rám Chand Ráo. Fifteen years later the British Government, to mark their approval of his rule, exchanged his title of Subahdár for the higher rank of Rájah. Rám Chand Ráo enjoyed his new dignity for three years and then died without issue (1835).

The Rájah had died, and had left no direct heir, natural or adopted. But in the guarantee given eighteen years before the State had been declared to be hereditary in his family. It was therefore, incumbent upon the British Government to acknowledge as Rájah the member of that family nearest in relationship to the deceased. Ultimately the choice fell upon Ráo Ragunáth Ráo, his uncle.

This man was incapable, and a leper. After three years of unpopular rule he died, and the throne became again vacant.

There were several claimants to succeed him. Their pretensions were examined by a commission appointed by the Governor-General of India, and after a long interregnum all but one were pronounced invalid. The excepted claim was that of Bábi Gangádhār Ráo, brother of the deceased. He, therefore, was nominated Rájah.

Disputes re-
garding the
succession.

Meanwhile the revenues of the country had been falling. During the reign of the leper there had been practically no government. Everywhere disorder had been rampant. Bábi Gangádhār Ráo was not the man to remedy this state of things. He, too, was an imbecile, and it was conjectured that under his sway, disorder, far from being checked, would be increased tenfold.

Under these circumstances, the British Government stepped in as the paramount power, and resolved to carry on the administration of the country by means of British agency. To the Rájah an annual allowance was granted, and he was informed that the government of the country would only be made over to him when it should appear that he was fit to conduct it properly.

British
agency in-
troduced.

That happy period arrived in 1843. By the exertions of the British officers the country had been restored to more than its former prosperity. It was then made over to the Rájah, subject to a small cession of territory in commutation of the annual payment previously made for the support of the Bundelkhand legion.

The Rájah
restored.

Bábá Gangádhār Ráo ruled Jhánsí for eleven years neither very wisely nor very well. He died in 1854 without heirs. He was the last male descendant of the family to which the British Government in 1817 had guaranteed the right of succession. (The Governor-General of the day, Lord Dalhousie, was of opinion that the treaty of 1817, whilst it did guarantee the right of succession to the members of a certain family, gave no right of adoption, after the disappearance of that family, to the widow of its latest representative.) He was fortified in this view by the opinion of the commission appointed by Lord Auckland in 1838, and which had unanimously rejected the pretensions of all the claimants excepting one. And now that one had died, childless. Lord Dalhousie, therefore, in spite of the protestations of the widow of the deceased Rájah, declared the State of Jhánsí to have lapsed to the paramount power.

He dies
without heirs.

Jhánsí is de-
clared a lapse.

This happened in 1854. The three years which had passed between that date and the period of which I am writing had in no way reconciled the Rání to a policy which she regarded as unjust to herself, and insulting to the family of her late husband. On the contrary, the year 1857 found her brooding over her griefs and panting for revenge.

Anger of the
Rání.

The British Government regarded her anger and her remonstrances with careless indifference. They did what was even worse, they added meanness to insult. On the confiscation of the State, they had granted to the widowed Rání a pension of £6000 a year. The Rání had first refused, but

had ultimately agreed to accept this pension. Her indignation may be imagined when she found herself called upon to pay, out of a sum which she regarded as a mere pittance, the debts of her late husband.

The British Government takes no pains to mollify her.

Bitter as was her remonstrance against a course which she considered not less as an insult than as a fraud, it was unavailing. Uselessly she urged that the British had taken the debts of the late ruler with the kingdom of which they had despoiled her. Mr. Colvin insisted, and caused the amount to be deducted from her pension. Other grievancees, such as the slaughter of kine amid a Hindu population, and the resumption of grants made by former rulers for the support of Hindu temples, whilst fomenting the discontent of the population with their change of masters, formed subjects for further remonstrance; but the personal indignity was that which rankled the most deeply in the breast of this high-spirited lady, and made her hail with gratitude the symptoms of disaffection which, in the early part of 1857, began to appear amongst the native soldiers of the hated English.

The garrison of Jhānsí was composed entirely of native troops. There was a detachment of Foot Artillery, the left wing of the 12th Regiment of Native Infantry, the head-quarters and right wing of the 14th Irregular Cavalry. Jhānsí is a walled town, overlooked by a stone fort surmounted by a round tower. The cantonment lay outside, and at a little distance from, the town. Within its limits was comprehended a small fort, occupied by the artillery and containing the treasure chest, called the Star Fort. The troops were commanded by Captain Dunlop, of the 12th Native Infantry. The political and administrative officer was Captain Alexander Skene.

Garrison of Jhānsí in 1857.

The account of the events at Mírath on the 10th of May produced the effects which might have been expected on the mind of the Rání of Jhānsí. Her hopes at once revived. From the doors of her palace there started at once confidential servants towards the sipáhi lines. These returned with reports fully responding to her highest hopes. The time so eagerly longed for was approaching. Her task, then, was to lull the English into security. It would appear that in the political officer, Captain Skene, she had soft material to work upon. She

The Rání is encouraged by the Mírath revolt.

succeded so well in impressing the mind of this gentleman with a conviction of her loyalty, that she obtained from him permission to enlist a body of armed men for her own protection from any attack from the sipáhis! This permission obtained, she rapidly invited the old soldiers of the State to rally round her, at the same time that she secretly caused to be unearthed heavy guns which had been buried at the time of her husband's death.

Meanwhile, Captain Skene, utterly unconscious of the impending danger, was reporting to his Government his confidence in the state of affairs at Jhánsí. Neither from the native soldiers of the Company, from the levies of the Rání, nor from the nobles of Jhánsí, did he apprehend the smallest disturbance. Captain Dunlop and his brother officers were almost equally trustful. Reports were made to them from time to time regarding the difficulty felt by spies in their attempts to enter the lines of the men. The fact that difficulty should have been experienced was, in their eyes, a sufficient proof of the fidelity of the sipáhis. Besides, Captain Dunlop trusted the irregular cavalry, and he felt satisfied that with their aid he could suppress in the bud any outbreak on the part of the other native soldiers.

The burning of the bungalows occupied by the English officers at Jhánsí, the invariable precursor of a rising, did not disturb the serenity of Captains Skene and Dunlop. A fire, which occurred on the 1st of June, was attributed to accident. But on the afternoon of the 5th of June an event occurred the bearings of which it was impossible to mistake. A company of the 12th Regiment of Native Infantry,

Incendiarism
at Jhánsí.

June 5.

The sipáhis
seize the
Star Fort.

led by one of its native sergeants, and cheered on by the native gunners of the battery, marched straight into the Star Fort, and announced their intention to hold it on their own account. Captain Dunlop rushed instantly to the parade ground, accompanied by his officers. The remaining four companies of the regiment professed themselves highly indignant at the conduct of the rebellious company, and they and the cavalry declared they would stand by their officers. The following morning they were paraded. They repeated their protestations. Captain Dunlop was then proceeding to prepare measures to bring the revolted company to reason. Whilst engaged in these preparations at the quarter-guard of his regiment he was visited

by Captain Skene, and by his assistant, Captain Gordon. After these had left him, Dunlop wrote some letters and posted them himself. But on his way back from the post office he was shot dead by his own men.

In fact the preconcerted day had arrived. The capture of the Star Fort on the 5th had simply been a feeler to test the officers. Finding on the following morning that these were as credulous as they had been the preceding day, the sipáhis resolved to strike at once. The afternoon of the 6th, then, the Rání, escorted by her new levies, came from her palace, and went in procession towards the cantonment. As she issued from the town, a Mullá* called all the true believers to prayers. This was the signal. The cavalry and infantry at once rose in revolt.

June 6.
The affair develops into mutiny.

They met Captain Dunlop, as already stated, on his return from the post office, shot him dead, and with him another officer, Ensign Taylor. Then the Irregular Cavalry scoured the plain with loaded carbines in pursuit of others. The sergeant-major Newton was their next victim. To him succeeded, in the list of victims, Lieutenant Turnbull, of the Survey, an officer of the highest promise, who, however, did not succumb until he had made his assailants pay dearly for their treachery. Lieutenant Campbell, the only officer with the Irregular Cavalry, was wounded, but being well mounted, he succeeded in reaching the larger fort in safety.

The mutineers kill their officers.

Meanwhile, Captains Skene and Gordon had returned to that larger fort. There also were the wife and two children of the former; Lieutenant Burgess, of the Survey Department; Dr. McGon, 12th Regiment of Native Infantry, and his wife; Lieutenant Powys, of the Canal Department, his wife and child; Mr. W. S. Carshore, collector of Customs, and his family; Mr. T. Andrews; Mr. R. Andrews and family; Mrs. Browne and her daughter; Mr. Scott and family; Messrs. Purcell, two brothers; two brothers Crawford; Mr. Elliot, Mr. Fleming, and others in the subordinate departments of the Government, chiefly Eurasians, and whose names I have been unable to ascertain. The total number, including women and children, was fifty-five.

Some officers occupy the larger fort,

The sipáhis having killed all the officers on whom they

* "Mullá:" a Muhammadan lawyer, a doctor of religion.

could lay hands, marched with loud shouts towards the fort overlooking the town. But Captain Skene and his comrades had not been inattentive spectators of the scene in cantonments. They had bestirred themselves with the instinct of self-preservation to defend their position. Rifles had been distributed ;

which they
prepare for
defence,

the ladies told off to cast bullets and to cook ; piles of stones had been heaped up behind the gates, and positions allotted to each member of the garrison.

When, therefore, the rebels approached the fort, they were received with so well directed a fire that they fell back in confusion to prepare renewed efforts for the morrow.

and repulse
the sipáhis.

The resource now available to the besiegers lay in the guns which the Rání had unearthed. During the night these, and the smaller *matériel* from the cantonment, were placed in position. On their side, too, the English had held a council of war. A successful defence seemed impossible.

Send three
envoys to
treat with
the Rání,

Guns, provisions, a continued supply of water, were all wanting. It was decided, then, at that council to send three of the garrison under a safe conduct to treat with the Rání for the retirement of the men, women, and children within the fort, to a place of security in British territory.

On the morning of the 7th, Messrs. Andrews, Scott, and Purcell, issued from the fort. They were almost immediately seized by the rebels, and conveyed by them to the palæe. The Rání by this time had become thoroughly intoxicated with the success that had been achieved. Declaring that "she had no concern with the English swine," she ordered her followers to conduct the three prisoners to the Risáldár, commanding the Irregular Cavalry, to be dealt with as he might direct. This was equivalent to their death-warrant. The Englishmen were then dragged out of the Palæe. Mr. Andrews was killed before its gates by a native who was supposed to harbour a grudge against him ; the two others were dispatched beyond the walls of the town.

who has
them killed.

The rebels then renewed their attack on the fort, but again without success. The guns had not been brought up. On the following morning (the 8th) this operation was attempted, and soon after daybreak a brisk cannonade was opened against the walls. But whether from

The rebels
renew their
attack,

want of skill, or from defect in the guns, not a single brick was displaced by the fire.* A stray shot, however, carried off Captain Gordon. The fire of the musketry from the fort did, meanwhile, a great deal of execution, and the rebels were deterred from approaching too near to its gates.

Hope was now beginning to dawn upon the fated garrison, when, as if the overwhelming force outside was not a sufficient foe to contend against, they discovered treachery within the fort. Certain native servants had been admitted for the performance of menial offices. Two of these men, in concert with the rebels outside, were found in the act of opening the door of a secret passage communicating with the town. Lieutenant Powys, who discovered them, shot one man dead, but was himself cut down by the other. Captain Burgess avenged him in a second, and the two traitors were laid prone side by side in a ditch.

but are repulsed.

The garrison discovered traitors within.

This attempt frustrated, the garrison attempted to open communication with Nagód and Gwáliár. But the bold men (Eurasians) who attempted to carry out this resolve were intercepted and killed. Provisions now began to fail; ammunition was becoming scarce—assistance from outside seemed impossible. Despair seemed to clutch at the smallest chance of escape. Just at the moment one seemed to present itself. The Rání and the sipáhis had been baffled by the unexpected resistance offered. What if it should continue? What if these Europeans had supplies of which they knew nothing? Their own guns had failed: assault was dangerous; would it not be advisable to get these bold men into their power by soft promises, and then to make away with them?

The Rání offers terms.

This idea, so consonant to the principle of Asiatic warfare, had no sooner been entertained than it was acted upon. The Rání sent messengers to the fort under a flag of truce, demanding a parley. Captain Skene responded. The native messengers then declared that the Rání wanted only the fort; that if the Europeans would lay down their arms and surrender the position they held, they should be escorted to some other station. These terms having been

which are accepted.

* Narrative of a native of Bengal attached to the office of the Collector of Customs at Jhánsi.

affirmed by the most solemn oaths, Captain Skene, on behalf of the garrison, acceded to them. They seemed indeed to offer the only chance of life. The members of the garrison then laid down their arms, and walked out of the fort.

Then commenced the last act of the drama. No sooner had the Europeans issued from the fort than the rebels
Massacre of the garrison. fell upon them, bound them, and carried them to a garden, called the Jókan Bágh. Arrived there they were halted near a cluster of trees. The word then passed that the Risáldár had ordered them to be massacred. The prisoners, disarmed and bound, were then ranged in three lines, the first containing the adult males, the second the adult females, the third the children. Then, suddenly, the head native official of the gaol raised his sword, and cut down Captain Skene. This was the signal. The murderers then went to work, each armed with a lethal weapon. The captives were pitilessly hewn down. Not a man, woman, or child, survived that afternoon's butchery.

Such was the massacre of Jhánsí. A doubt has been raised as to the complicity of the Rání in the atrocious deed. But it must be remembered that not only was it the Rání who had instigated the slaughter of the three envoys sent by Captain Skene the morning after the investment, but it was she who profited by the slaughter. She wished to be rid of the English that she might seize the principality which she considered to be rightfully her own, and she hesitated not at the means by which

The Rání bribes the sipáhis, they were moved from her path. Her conduct after the massacre disclosed the passion of her soul. For a moment it seemed very doubtful whether she would not quarrel with the sipáhis about the division of the spoil. To coerce her the latter even threatened to bring upon the scene an illegitimate relation of the late Rájah as a rival. But the Rání was a very clever woman. The sipáhis had their price, and she was prepared to pay it. She wanted the title,—they the coin. She gave them the coin; whereupon they proclaimed her Rání of Jhánsí. She proved herself a most capable ruler. She established a mint, fortified the strong places,

and is proclaimed Rání of Jhánsí. cast cannon, raised fresh troops. Into every act of her government she threw all the energy of a strong and resolute character. Possessing considerable personal attractions, young, vigorous, and not afraid to show herself to the multitude, she gained a great influence over

the hearts of her people. It was this influence, this force of character, added to a splendid and inspiring courage, that enabled her some months later to offer to the English troops, under Sir Hugh Rose, a resistance which, made to a less able commander, might even have been successful.

Her great
abilities.

The right wing of the 12th Regiment of Native Infantry, the left of the 14th Irregular Cavalry, and a detachment of Native Artillery,—constituting in fact a moiety of the regiments, of each of which one wing was located at Jhānsí—were, during this period, stationed at Nágáon, about two hundred miles eastward of the former station. The station was commanded by Major Kirk, of the 12th Native Infantry. At Nágáon perfect confidence reigned up to the 23rd of May. On that day, however, a sipáhi reported the presence in the lines of suspicious characters. The report of the sipáhi caused considerable excitement. It related to natives of Bundelkhand, men not connected with the sipáhis, who were supposed to harbour a design to massacre the British officers. By some the story was credited, by others it was disbelieved. It had, however, this apparently most gratifying result, that the sipáhis manifested towards their officers a warmth of affection which touched to the quick those who were the objects of it.

Nágáon.

During the week that followed, although many circumstances occurred well calculated to rouse suspicion, the confidence of the British officers never wavered. They slept every night in their lines, and took every opportunity of showing unlimited trust in their men. But on the 30th of May reports of intentions expressed by the native gunners to rise were again rife. Four men, proved to be implicated in this plot, were dismissed from the station, and subsequently to that night Major Kirk took the precaution to have the guns of the battery brought in front of the quarter-guard of the 12th Regiment.

Precautions
taken by the
authorities.

Quiet now seemed to be restored. On the morning of the 5th of June the men of four companies of the 12th even volunteered to serve against the rebels. Those of the 5th company were about to express a similar wish, when suddenly an express arrived from Jhānsí, written by Captain Dunlop, with the information that the artillery and infantry at that place had mutinied. This intelligence caused great excitement amongst the native soldiers,

News arrives
from Jhānsí.

but it elicited from them, especially from the infantry, enthusiastic expressions of fidelity to their officers.

Quite assured regarding his men, Major Kirk at once took steps to open communications with Jhānsí and Lalatpúr. For four days nothing occurred to disturb public order. On the

June 9.

9th, however, the news of the mutiny of the four companies of the 12th at Jhānsí and of the murder of Captain Dunlop and Ensign Taylor reached the station. The following day brought tidings still more disastrous. The native magistrate of Mau Ránípúr wrote that morning to Major

Further intelligence from that place.

Kirk to inform him of the murder of every European in Jhānsí, and that he had received an official order to the effect "that the Rání of Jhānsí was seated on the throne, and that he was to carry on

business as hitherto."

The effect of this news was electric. At sunset of that day as the guards were being paraded three Sikhs of the 12th Regiment came to the front, shot the native sergeant-major through the head, and seized the guns. The English sergeant-major, fired at ineffectually, fled to the mess-house to warn the officers. The latter hurried down to the lines. But by this time the farce of loyalty had been played out. The officers arrived in time only to see their sipáhis, the cavalry troopers, and the artillerymen, in full revolt.

The sipáhis at Náoágún mutiny.

In vain were these adjured to remain faithful. The *furor* was on them. (There was nothing, then, for the Europeans and their families to do but to retire, if retirement were still possible. They attempted it, accompanied by a number, increased ultimately to eighty-seven, of their men who still remained faithful.)

The story of that retirement has been written by four of the survivors. It is a story of misery and suffering hardly to be surpassed. First it was decided to move on Chhatarpúr, but in the darkness of the night the fugitives took by mistake a road which branched off to Garani. This mistake saved them. The mutineers, counting upon their choosing the Chhatarpúr road, followed the fugitives, after they had plundered the station, in that direction. Other rebels had been sent to occupy different points in the main line of retreat, and, they, too, were waiting for the disheartened Europeans. The mutineers, finding these

The British leave the station.

men on the road, and learning that our countrymen had not passed, retraced their steps. The fugitives, meanwhile, making mistake after mistake as to the road, still pressed onwards, and were fortunate enough to reach Chhatarpúr by a circuitous route, unmolested, by daybreak the following morning.

Chhatarpúr was the capital of a small State of the same name, governed by a Rání. This lady behaved well and loyally. Though pressed by her Muhammadan advisers to follow the example set at Jhánsí, she rejected their counsel, and showed her intention to defend the English to the utmost of her power.

Are well received at Chhatarpúr.

The fugitives halted at Chhatarpúr the 11th and 12th. On the last named day, two officers, Captain Scott and Lieutenant Townshend, were sent into Náogáon to reconnoitre the state of affairs there. Strange to say, these two Europeans succeeded, by the simple discharge of their guns, in re-asserting British authority there for the few hours they remained. They returned, however, the same evening.

The fugitives left their hospitable quarters at Chhatarpúr on the night of the 12th, and marched in the direction of Alláhábád. Hearing, however, on the 16th, of the mutinies at Bandah and Hamirpúr, they changed the route on the 17th to Kalinjar. That night they found their progress stopped by bandits who occupied a pass it was necessary they should traverse. The bandits demanded money. The British officers wished to force the pass. The faithful Sipáhis, assenting at first, recommended in the end that the money should be paid. It was paid. But next morning before daybreak, as the party was preparing to move on, the bandits commenced a fire upon them. The faithful Sipáhis began to fire wildly in return, but with the exception of ten or twelve, they speedily dispersed. All attempts to rally them were vain. The fugitives were now deserted. One of their number, Lieutenant Townshend, fell shot through the heart. The others, returning the bandits' fire, moved as best they could in one direction—whither they knew not. Fortunately the road they had taken led them back to the hospitable territory of Chhatarpúr. Across the border the bandits did not follow them, and though some villagers fired at them, they reached the village of Kalhai at 3 P.M.

June 16.
Their sufferings alter leaving Chhatarpúr.

Not all of them, however. Townshend had been shot through the heart; Major Kirke and Mrs. Smalley, and a native, had

succumbed to sunstroke or apoplexy. The women and children had been brought on with the greatest difficulty. The officers
 Their losses. had given up their horses, and on these the non-combatants had been laden like so many sacks. On that day and on those that followed many of these poor creatures perished, and had to be left by the wayside.

There was no safety for the English at Kalrai. The majority
 Are terribly of them—for some, and all the Eurasians, elected to reduced in remain behind—pushed on to Mahóba. By this number. time the party was reduced to seven officers, one sergeant, two civilians, three women, two children,*—with nine horses amongst them. The other Europeans had either been killed, had died, or had stayed behind at Kalrai.

The fugitives moved on again on the 20th of June; but they were attacked on their way and dispersed. The subsequent sufferings which some of them endured were extraordinary. Dr. Mawe, Lieutenant Barber, Lieutenant Ewart, and Mrs. Smalley's child, died of sunstroke or fatigue. Sergeant Kirchhoff, assaulted by the villagers, was left for dead, but ultimately escaped. Captain Scott saved Mrs. Mawe's child, carrying it in front of him whilst Mrs. Smalley sat behind. The villagers, especially those in British territory, were found generally most hostile. But for the generous kindness of the Nawáb of Bandah and of the Rání of Azigarh not one of the fugitives would have escaped. The Nawáb and the Rání did more than protect them in their States,—they used every means in their power to assuage the hostility of the villagers. To them alone was it due that a remnant of the party which had fled from Náogáon succeeded ultimately in reaching territory still possessed by the British.†

I have spoken in the preceding narrative to the generous conduct of the Nawáb of Bandah. But Bandah was itself a military station. There was quartered a detachment of the 56th Regiment of Native Infantry. These men, in correspon-

* Their names were, Captain Scott, Lieutenants Ewart, Barber, Jackson, Remington, and Franks, Dr. Mawe, Mrs. Mawe and child, Mr. Harvey Kirke, Mr. Langdale, Mrs. Smalley and child, Sergeant Kirchhoff and wife.

† There are most interesting narratives of these events by Captain Scott, Mrs. Mawe, Lieutenant Jackson, Sergeant Kirchhoff, and Mr. Langdale. Of the men left behind at Kalrai, forty-one persons, drummers, buglers, and their families, ultimately reached Bandah in safety.

dence with their brethren of the 12th, were equally tainted. Learning betimes of the successful outbreak at Náogáon they followed its example. Rising on the 14th of June, and making common cause with the troops of the Nawáb, they plundered the treasury and went off to join their comrades. Tho Nawáb was able to save the lives of tho officers. He extended the same protective power to the Europeans who had escaped from Hamirpúr, and to those likewise who had fled across the Jamnah from Fathpúr. The time, however, was to arrive when the Nawáb, like Sindhiá and the Hindu princes of Rájputáná, would find himself unable to contend any longer against the excited passions of his followers. True, however, to his British Suzerain, he extended hospitality and protection to every European fugitive as long as he could do so, and when the insubordination of his troops rendered it impossible for him to afford them further protection, he caused his guests to be safely escorted to territory still owning the British rule.

Generous
conduct of
the Nawáb
of Bandah.

There was one station in Bundelkhand, and only one, in which the native troops stationed did not then mutiny. This was the station of Nagód. The regiment thero quartered, the 50th Native Infantry, stood firm for a time, fourteen men in the whole regiment having alone shown symptoms of disaffection. But the time was to come when the entire regiment was to give way. How and when this happened will be recorded in the fifth volume.

Fidelity of
the 50th N. I.

CHAPTER III.

DURAND AND HOLKAR.

MORE important in their results on the general situation were the occurrences taking place about the same time in the States of the native princes in Central India and Rájputáná. I have narrated a portion of these under the head of Gwáliár. It is necessary now to invite the attention of the reader to the larger remainder as yet untold.

The acting representative of the Governor-General at Indúr, the capital of the dominions of Holkar, and the head-quarters of the Central Indian Agency, was Colonel Henry Marion Durand. Colonel Durand was one of the most remarkable of the remarkable men for the production of whom the East India Company was famous. Endowed with a clear head, a comprehensive grasp of affairs, a quick and keen vision, a singularly retentive memory, and an energy that nothing could tire, Durand could not escape distinction. Anywhere, and under any circumstances, he would have attained it. Seldom has there served in India a man who could do all things so well; who could successfully apply to so many diverse subjects his vast talents. His character. was equally at home in planning a campaign, in giving, as he did give, the soundest advice to a Commander-in-Chief, after an indecisive action, such as that of Chiliánwálá, and in devising schemes for the improvement of the complicated revenue system of the North-West Provinces. Nor did his private character belie his conduct as a public officer. Large hearted, full of sympathy for the suffering and the oppressed, he had unsparing scorn and contempt for those only whom he believed to be false, to be treacherous, to be corrupt, to be time-serving. For a man of that class, when once he had found him out, Durand had no pity. But the true man, however poor, however neglected by Fortune he might be, always

received from Durand support, encouragement, and sympathy. This remark applies alike to Colonel Durand's relations with natives and with Europeans. It is not true that he had a scorn for Asiatics as Asiatics. He had scorn for corrupt Asiatics, as he had scorn for corrupt Europeans. But in his mind the colour of the skin weighed not at all. With him honesty was honesty, falseness was falseness; and wherever he detected these opposite qualities, he loved or despised the possessor, whether he were Asiatic, or whether he were European.

It is a remarkable fact that throughout his long career in India—a career extending over forty years—Durand owed nothing to Fortune. On the contrary, his life was a constant struggle against the efforts of the blind goddess. She made his path hard and difficult. He rose to one of the highest positions in India,—the Lieutenant-Governership of her most important province—in spite of envy, in spite of calumny, in spite of the thousand and one indirect obstacles which can be and are used to thwart the upward career of an able and honest man, who, connecting himself with no party, dares to have the courage of his opinions. There have been epochs in Indian history when it has been possible for men without brains to rise very high indeed. Servility, complaisance, a cautious reticence, a suppression in fact of one's inner consciousness, are sometimes found useful and are often rewarded. But Durand scorned the backstairs path. He always spoke exactly what he thought, always acted as he believed to be right, regardless of consequences. This manly action made him many enemies, and these enemies thwarted him, as enemies in high places can thwart a man true to his own convictions. That he succeeded in spite of them was due partly to his indomitable strength of will, partly to the fact that, in times of pressure and adversity, Governments find themselves forced to replace the smiling sycophant by the skilled workman.

Colonel Durand belonged to the Engineers. Yet, so great had been his capacity, and so comprehensive his intellectual range, that he, then a Lieutenant of Engineers, had been selected in 1838 for the post of Secretary to the Board of Revenue of the North-West Provinces. He had accepted this post when he was invited to accompany the army which was to march under Sir John Keane

His constant
struggle
with
Fortune.

His hatred
of intrigue.

His manli-
ness.

His earlier
career.

into Afghanistan. He threw up his civil appointment, joined that force, and was one of the two officers who blew in the gates of Ghazní, thus admitting the storming party. His health requiring a change to England, he had returned to India with Lord Ellenborough in 1841 in the capacity of aide-de-camp. Before landing in Calcutta Lord Ellenborough had promoted the aide-de-camp to be private secretary. Durand held this office during the brilliant Indian career of Lord Ellenborough. On the recall of the latter by the Court of Directors he was appointed Commissioner of the Tenasserim Provinces. Then

Cabal against
him.

came into play those arts which incompetent rulers employ to get rid of men, subordinate to them in position, but in every other respect their superiors.

Charges, frivolous in themselves, and subsequently proved to be utterly unfounded, were trumped up against Durand. He was removed from his Commissionership. He returned

How he
met it.

to England with the justificatory pieces in his pocket; convinced the Court of Directors, convinced the Board of Control, and went back to India with an

Returns
to India.

order from the President of that Board that he was to receive an appointment equal to that of which he had been unjustly deprived. But Lord Dalhousie

was then Governor-General of India. Lord Dalhousie did not like Durand. He offered him an appointment in the Panjáb so inferior to that he was entitled to expect that Durand unhesitatingly refused it. He re-entered upon his duties as a military Engineer, joined the army then fighting in the Panjáb, was

Joins the
army in the
field.

summoned to the councils of war held by Lord Gough after Chillianwála, and aided by his practical advice in ensuring the victory of Gujrat. An

account of this campaign from his pen enriched shortly afterwards the pages of the *Calcutta Review*. After the annexation of the Panjáb, Durand accepted from Lord Dalhousie the post of

Becomes
political
agent at
Bhopál.

political agent at Bhopál. His labours of years here were most useful. He formed the mind of the Begam; taught her those golden lessons of true and honest dealing as a ruler, from which she profited so

much afterwards; and showed her, from the examples of the Muhammadan rulers of India, the material advantage a

Is forced
by ill-health
to visit
England.

sovereign reaped from the prevalence of the knowledge that he was to be believed on his own word. Severe illness drove Durand to England in 1854.

His appointment at Bhopál lapsed to another, and he returned at the end of 1856 to the corps of Engineers. But shortly afterwards, Sir Robert Hamilton, the agent for the Governor-General at Indúr, having decided to take furlough to Europe, Lord Canning sent Durand to act for him. Thus it happened that when the Mutiny broke out in 1857, Colonel Durand was the representative of the Government of India at the court of Holkar, and had political charge of Central India.

Appointed the Governor-General's Agent for Central India.

Colonel Durand took up his office at Indúr on the 5th of April. At that time all was quiet in Central India. The excitement which had prevailed in Bengal regarding the greased cartridges had not penetrated to Máu,* nor even to Indúr. On the 25th of April, however, a Sipáhi of the 30th Native Infantry was apprehended in the act of conveying a treasonable message to the Darbár of Rewá. There is no doubt that he was one of many sent by the several regiments to ascertain the temper and sentiments of the native courts. From this time an uneasy feeling began to prevail throughout Central India—a feeling brought to a climax by the mutiny of the 10th of May at Miráth.

April 25.
Earliest warnings of the mutiny.

To understand the position of Colonel Durand when the news reached him of the revolt at Miráth it is necessary to define the nature of the territory of which he had political charge, its extent, its resources, and its position with regard to other States, Native as well as British.

Central India comprised the Native States in subsidiary alliance with the British Government, of Holkar, of Sindhiá, of Bhopál, of Dhár, of Dowás, and of Jaurá.

Central India.

The dominion of Sindhiá may be roughly stated to comprise the territory bordered by the river Chambal to the north and north-west, severed on the east by the river Sind from Bundelkhand, and, further south, by the Betwá, from the British possessions. Between it and the British territories due south, lies Bhopál, divided from the latter by the river Narbadá. To the west of Bhopál is the dominion of Holkar, comprising likewise a portion of the country south of the Narbadá, and reaching nearly to the

Its geographical position.

* Máu is the British military station between thirteen and fourteen miles by the then existing road, south-west of Indúr.

Taptí. This dominion is, so to speak, pressed in by its neighbours. Its capital, Indúr, lies in a tract of country separated from the remaining part of the dominion by the independent State of Dewás to the north and north-east, and by the independent State of Dhár to the west. On the north it is hemmed in by the south-western limits of the dominion of Sindhiá, whilst, separating it again from its northernmost districts, is Jaurá, nominally a fief of Holkar, but really independent. To the north of Jaurá, again, the dominion of Holkar thrusts its head into Rájputáná, by which it is surrounded on three sides.

It will thus be seen that of all the dominions under the Central Indian Agency, that of Holkar was the least compact. (Hemmed in on three sides by Native States, its various component portions were isolated from each other, likewise by Native States. Each of these had its own troops.) First in order may be named Gwáliár, possessing a force of 8,000 men, disciplined and led by European officers. The main body of this force was at Gwáliár itself, but it had detachments at Siprí; further south still, at Guna; and, on the very borders of Holkar's territory, at Ágar. Thirty miles from Ágar was Mehidpúr, the headquarters of the Málwá contingent, a small force comprising a regiment of infantry, a battery of artillery, and some cavalry, likewise officered by British officers. Immediately to the north of Mehidpúr lies Jaurá, and to the north of that again, and on the high road to Dehlí, are the stations of Nímach and Nasírábád, garrisoned by troops of the regular army.

The purely native force in the dominions of Jaurá, of Dhár, and of Dewás, was contemptible in point of numbers and efficiency, but to the east of Indúr, and about a hundred miles from it, was the Bhopál contingent, a body of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, commanded by British officers, and stationed at Sihor. To the east and north-east of this, again, were native troops of the regular army, in the Ságár and Narbadá territories and in Bundelkhand.

It will thus be seen that Indúr was completely cut off on three sides from the British territory by native troops and native contingents. On the south, indeed, rather more than thirteen miles distant from it, and about five-and-twenty miles north of the Narbadá, lay the British station of Máu, garrisoned by

Military
occupation
of Central
India.

The purely
native force
there.

Its position
with respect
to British
territory.

the 23rd Regiment of Native Infantry, commanded by Colonel Platt, a wing of the 1st Cavalry, under Major Harris, and Captain Hungerford's battery of Artillery, having European gunners but native drivers. Thus, if Indúr was isolated, Máu was still more so. For while, to the north of it, Indúr was occupied by a large native force under the personal direction of Holkar himself, to the south it rested, so to speak, in the air, no British troops intervening between it and the military stations in the Madras and Bombay Presidencies.

Garrison
of Máu.

It is clear, then, that, in the event of the mutinous contagion spreading to Central India, the maintenance of order in the country north of the Narbadá would depend entirely on one of two contingencies. The first of these was, naturally, the early fall of Dehli; the second, the advance of reinforcements from the south. (In view of the latter contingency, the paramount importance of maintaining, at all risks, the line of the Narbadá will at once be recognised.)

Political con-
siderations
which af-
fected Central
India.

Crossing the Narbadá below Indúr, and running right through the territories under the Central Indian Agency to a point on the Chambal directly north of Gwáliár, ran the direct road from Bombay to Ágra. Not only was this road invaluable as a postal and telegraphic line,* but it was absolutely necessary as a military road, constituting, as it did, the direct route by which troops from the south could advance. The importance of maintaining this line, more especially the portion of it south of the Narbadá, cannot be over-rated. Its weak points were those where it was commanded by the troops stationed at Mehidpúr and at Ágra, and where it passed through stations held by troops belonging to the Gwáliár Contingent, such as Sipri and Gwáliár, and where it traversed Dholpúr.

The line of
the Narbadá.

Weak points
of that line.

At Indúr, for the protection of the treasury and other public buildings, was a detachment of the Málwá contingent, two hundred strong. These were the only troops stationed there when the news of

The troops
at Indúr.

* There was, in 1857, no direct telegraphic line between Madras and Calcutta, and the only circle by which telegraphic communication with the Madras and Bombay presidencies could be effected was that by Ágra and Indúr.—*Central India in 1857.*

the mutiny of the 10th of May at Míráth reached the Residency.

Colonel Durand received this intelligence on the 14th of May. He comprehended at a glance its importance. He saw that it was but the first act of a very tragic drama. But his duty was clear to him. To maintain his own position at Indúr as long as it could be maintained; to sever all intercourse between the native troops of the regular army and the soldiers of the native contingents; to secure the Narbadá, and the important road I have described; to re-assure the native princes under his superintendence:—these were his first considerations, and he set himself at once to act upon them.

It happened that, in addition to the troops I have mentioned, there was a regiment of Bhíls at the station of Sirdárpúr, near Mandlésar, about forty miles from Indúr. The Bhíls are men who have no caste prejudices, and who, reclaimed from a wild life by the British, had always proved good soldiers. Durand sent at once to Sirdárpúr for two hundred and seventy of these men. (Believing, too, that of all the contingents, those who had been raised at Bhopál were the least likely to waver in their fidelity, he ordered up a strong detachment of cavalry and infantry and two guns from that place. These troops, using every expedition, reached Indúr on the 20th of May. As Colonel Durand was precluded by his position as an officer in political employ from exercising military duties, the command of these detachments, and the arranging for the protection of the Residency, devolved upon Colonel Stockley of the Bhíl corps.

The detachments arrived just in time. The native troops in Máu had not escaped the contagion of the disease by which the entire native army had been infected. Not only were they, at this very time, ripe for revolt, but they had even debated whether it would not be advisable to make at once a dash for the scene where their brethren were fighting, by way of Indúr.

Conscious that such a move was possible, that, under certain circumstances,—such, for example, as the presence in the ranks of the native troops of a master mind,—it was certain, Durand had made every preparation to meet the contingency. In consequence

Policy of
Colonel
Durand.

Summons
troops from
Sirdárpúr
and Bhopál.

Mutinous
disposition of
the troops at
Máu.

Durand ac-
cepts a guard
of Mahárájah
Holkar's
troops.

of his requisition, Maharájah Holkar had supplied him with cavalry* to form pickets on the roads. From the same source he had received half a battery of guns and three companies of infantry. These had been posted so as to command the approaches to the Residency. A certain number of troopers were kept always in the saddle. Yet, after all, if the attempt had been made, the chances of the English at Indúr would have been poor. For the question *quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* had not then been solved. A few days later it was solved, not exactly to the credit of the *custodes*.

In the middle of June a further detachment of cavalry from Bhopál, under their commandant, Colonel Travers, arrived at Indúr. The command of the entire force round the Residency devolved, then, on Colonel Travers, as the senior officer. This onerous duty could not have fallen to a more gallant soldier or to a truer-hearted man. To him was then committed the military care of the Residency, and it is only just to record that not a single precaution was neglected to ensure the safety of its occupants against the effects of a sudden rising.

Colonel Travers arrives and assumes command at Indúr.

For some short time prior to the arrival of Colonel Travers affairs had appeared to move more smoothly. From the outer world, however, there came intelligence which more than ever convinced Durand that, unless a decisive blow should be struck speedily at the heart of the rebellion, the drain upon his resources would be hard to meet. Thus, disquieting rumours from Nasírábád and Nímach; the more than doubtful behaviour of detachments of the Gwáliár contingent; the receipt of a letter from the officer commanding that contingent expressive of his distrust of their loyalty; intelligence that emissaries from the native regiment at Mau had been discovered tampering with the men of the Bhopál contingent:—these reports following in quick succession, were more than sufficient to satisfy Durand that, literally, he and his were standing on a quicksand. It is true that their feet still rested on the treacherous surface, but every wave of the tide, every effort to move forward, made the position more perilous, the danger more apparent.

Gloomy intelligence from the outer world.

Durand is perfectly conscious of the danger of his position.

* The cavalry furnished by Holkar were never considered trustworthy. When, therefore, Colonel Travers arrived at Indúr, the Maharájah was requested to remove them, and to send them on distant duty. This was done.

This was the case when, on the 1st, Durand received intelligence of the mutiny at Nasirábád; on the 6th, of that at Nimach. The information which reached Durand could not be hidden from the regular troops at Máu. The head-quarter wing of the cavalry regiment there stationed had just mutinied at Nimach.

Possibility
that the
disastrous
news might
affect the
troops at
Máu.

How would the men of the other wing, and the men of the infantry regiment, receive the news? Should they revolt, would the European battery be able to disperse them? Should they make a rush for Indúr, would the troops of Holkar oppose them or unite with them? These were questions on the solution of which depended, not only the lives of the Europeans, but the maintenance of British authority in Central India.

For a moment it seemed as though the native troops at Máu were about to prove an exception to their comrades, that amid the faithless they would be faithful. Reports, indeed, to their discredit were rife. It was openly stated that they were in league with the troops of Holkar, and that, strong in that alliance, they intended to master the guns at Máu, and then march on Indúr. But they showed no outward sign of ill-will or of disaffection. Never were they more respectful; never more fervent in their protestations of loyalty.

But they are
apparently
not affected
by it.

Durand was not taken in. He saw through it. As he wrote to Lord Elphinstone, "it was all moonshine." But to him there was still a glimmering of hope. Though the news of the revolt at Nimach was followed by that of the mutiny of the cavalry of the Málwá contingent—pushed up, contrary to Durand's orders, into contact with the mutineers—accompanied by the murder of their officers; though reports arrived of the massacre of the Europeans at Jhánsi, with its accompanying horrors; and though, last and most fatal of all, intelligence was received of the revolt of the bulk of the Gwáliár contingent at Gwáliár itself, Durand still hoped. There was a chance,

Durand is
not taken in.

The one
hope on
which he
depends.

and apparently a good chance, that he might yet over-ride the storm, that a ray of sunshine might yet harden the treacherous soil.

This chance lay in the march of a column despatched to Máu from the Bombay Presidency under Major-General Woodburn. It was the approach of this column, consisting of five troops of the 14th Dragoons, a

General
Woodburn's
column.

battery of artillery, a company of sappers, and a native regiment, that had caused hesitation in the minds of the native garrison at Mau. It was the approach of this column that gave a degree of confidence to Durand. Had it only pushed on, Central India would have been saved from a great calamity.

It happened, however, that General Woodburn's column was suddenly diverted to another point. Disturbances had broken out at Aurangábád. It was believed that on the suppression of those disturbances depended the fidelity to British interests of the troops of the Nizam, and that, therefore, at any sacrifice, they must be suppressed. General Woodburn, then, turned off to Aurangábád. He suppressed the disturbances there, but, having suppressed them, did not move forward. He remained at Aurangábád, halted, I must suppose, in deference to superior orders. To compensate, as far as he could, for the alienation of this force, the Governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone, ever zealous for the public service, was seeking the means of equipping another column for the relief of Central India.

The column
is diverted
to Aurang-
ábád.

The hope, then, so promising, apparently so well grounded, was destined to prove delusive. Even before it had utterly flickered away there had come tidings sufficient to daunt the most stent-hearted, but which did not daunt Durand. The northern portion of the great road between Ágra and Bombay had, he knew, been lost when the troops at Jhánsí, and when, subsequently, the Gwáliár contingent, had mutinied. But now he learned that his communications were still further threatened; that the troops at Jabalpúr, at Lalatpúr, and at Ságar, were on the verge of mutiny; that throughout Bundelkhand the natives were rising, and that the temper of the troops in Mau was becoming daily more uncertain.

Durand's
one hope is
thus disap-
pointed.

But in these desperate circumstances there suddenly appeared in the north-west the reflection of a light sufficient, had it been real, to calm all apprehensions. Just at the time when Durand received information that General Woodburn had crushed the rising at Aurangábád the report reached him that Delhi had fallen. This was the blow at the heart which would have paralysed intending mutineers—this the light which would have diffused

Another
hope glim-
mers on the
horizon.

its cheering ray into every corner of the Empire. It was not Durand alone who heard the report. It had crept into the counting-houses of the native bankers and been whispered in the furthest recesses of the bazaars. The quieter demeanour of the lower classes of the population showed how markedly the confirmation of the rumour would have affected the course of events.

But it proved to be a will o' the wisp—to be premature—to be untrue. Not to Durand, in the first instance, came the denial of the rumour. Certain information that the intelligence was false reached a banker of the city. He refused to disclose to Durand the nature of the information it was known he had received. But a little later it came to Durand direct.

July 1. On the morning of the 1st of July a letter from Ágra, dated the 20th of June, was handed to him. From this he learned for the first time that the previous report regarding the fall of Dehli was untrue, that, up to the 17th, the British, forced to remain on the defensive, had been repeatedly attacked; that they had with difficulty held their own; and that the General commanding had determined to suspend all offensive movements pending the arrival of reinforcements.

The communication from Ágra was placed in Colonel Durand's hands about 8 o'clock on the morning of the 1st of July. About half an hour later he sat down to condense its contents into a letter to be despatched to the Governor of Bombay, when he was startled by the sudden dischargo of the three guns in the Residency enclosure.* A second later, and one of his official servants rushed in to report that the whole place was in an uproar. Durand rose and walked hastily to the steps of the Residency. The scene that met his gaze left no doubt upon his mind. The crisis, so long and so skilfully averted, had come upon him.

Before I recount the measures taken by the Agent and the commander of the force round the Residency to avert this sudden danger, I propose to describe that place and its environs, and to show how the troops under the orders of Colonel Travers had been posted.

* In his letter to Holkar, dated the 3rd of August, Durand stated that the attack began at twenty minutes to nine.

The Indŭr Residency is a double-storied house built of stone, in an open enclosure, about four hundred yards to the north of the Khán river, flowing in a north-westerly direction towards the city of Indŭr, from which the Residency is two miles distant. In the same enclosure are bungalows for the assistants to the Agent and other buildings and bazaars. Within its circumference, in fact, was comprised the entire civil station of Indŭr. It is an open park-like place surrounded by groves and gardens. Immediately on its western front runs the road to Máu. This, passing the Residency, crosses the Khán river about four hundred yards to the west by south-west of that building. To the south-east of this road are thickly wooded groves and gardens; but immediately to the west of it, and, in some instances, bordering it, were bazaars and a number of native buildings of various sorts. These extended for a considerable distance on either side of the road leading to the city. Not more than a hundred yards intervened between the easternmost of these buildings and the Residency. (In and about these were located the native troops, three companies of infantry, and three field guns, sent by Holkar to protect the Residency.*)

The Indŭr
Residency.

Its situation
with respect
to the city,
the bazaars,
the river,
and the road
to Máu.

To the north of that building, and still nearer to it, was the stable square, in the immediate vicinity of the post-office, the telegraph office, and the treasury. Here was the cavalry picket. Round about it were the camps of the Bhopál cavalry, one hundred and fifty strong, the infantry of the Bhopál and Mehidpŭr contingents, numbering about four hundred men, and the detachment of Bhils, two hundred and seventy strong. Of all these detachments the cavalry was the most remote from the Residency.

The location
of the troops.

* Major Evans Bell (*Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor*) implies that the Residency was not made defensible. But the following description of that building will show how impossible it was to make it proof against cannon shot. Not only was the Residency built of stone, but in the lower storey it is entered by from twenty-four to thirty glass and Venetian doors, incapable of resisting even a kick. The chief entrance to the upper storey is from outside, by a handsome flight of stone steps. The glass and Venetian doors on this storey are as numerous as those below, but are larger.

It was impossible to throw up earthworks in front of the Residency, for the simple reason that there was no earth wherewith to make the works. The Residency stands upon ground not having an inch of soil in depth. Even for the small flower-beds in front of the building earth had to be brought from a considerable distance.

On the morning of the 1st of July neither were these men nor their officers under the smallest apprehension of a rising. The men were scattered about in undress; some were bathing; some were cooking their food. The native officers and non-commissioned officers had just come up to transact their morning business at the orderly-room. Colonel Travers himself, in conversation with some of them, was on the point of entering that room. Suddenly they were all startled by the same artillery fire and the same tumult which had drawn Durand to the steps of the Residency. A moment's glance sufficed to show them that the rebels were upon them.

Who were these rebels, and who set them on? The rebels were the men of the three companies of Holkar's army, and the gunners of Holkar's three guns, posted for the protection of the Residency in the buildings between it and the city, and distant from it, at the nearest point, only a hundred yards. To these men, a little after 8 o'clock, a man named Saadat Khán,* an officer in Holkar's cavalry, followed by eight troopers, coming from the direction of the palace, galloped, shouting: "Get ready, come on to kill the sáhibs; it is the order of the Mahárájah." Saadat Khán was followed at a distance by the rabble of the town, eager for blood and for plunder; for the word had gone forth that Durand was about to remove into Máu the treasure,† amounting to £150,000 in silver, which he had guarded in a strong building, erected by the Government for

* In a work recently published, *Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor* (Major Evans Bell), Saadat Khán is described as "a sort of half-pay officer, with no men under his command." Again, "a man of good family, considering himself to have some claim to be hereditary Bakhshi of Holkar's army, but out of employ and in disgrace." But the Governor-General's Agent—who then was Sir Robert Hamilton—describes him in 1858, in his official letter to Government as a "Durbar officer of cavalry." Major-General Sir Henry Daly, subsequently the Governor-General's Agent at Indúr, thus described him officially in 1874: "Saadat Khán was a man of weight in Indúr in 1857; his father was commandant of Cavalry, in which he was known as Risáldár. The Customs Department was also under his control." The fact is that Saadat Khán, although influential with the Muhammadans, did not occupy a position of authority, nor was he in favour with the Durbar.

† Major Evans Bell states, as I understand him (*Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor*, page 89), that Durand had given orders for the removal of the treasure of Máu on the 1st of July. But there are the most convincing reasons for believing that no such order was issued. The Treasury Guard

the purpose, close to the Residency. Others of the same class mingling with Durbar soldiers had rushed to seek out the Christian population who had remained in their own homes or in their offices, unprepared for and not expecting the sudden murderous onslaught which was to lay them low.*

Murder of the Christians not in the Residency.

The Durbar troops thus appealed to by Saadat Khán, turned out at once. They were not taken by surprise. Their commandant, Báns Gopál, admitted subsequently that his men had been demoralised. Certainly neither he nor any other officer made the smallest attempt to check the outbreak. On the other hand, no men could have shown themselves more ready and eager for mischief. They at once began to shout vociferously as they formed up, whilst the gunners placed their three guns in position, and opened fire on the picket of cavalry.

The troops sent to guard the Residency join in the revolt.

Such was the sight and such were the sounds that met Durand and Travers about half-past 8 o'clock that morning. Sudden as was the outbreak, it found the two men cool and collected.

was under the orders of Colonel Travers. On Colonel Travers it would have devolved to furnish the escort for the treasure. Now Colonel Travers received no order whatever on the subject. Not a cart, not even a camel had been obtained. The Treasury was closed. Had Durand intended to remove the treasure, the fact could not have been kept secret from the officers, nor could he have overlooked communication with Colonel Travers.

* Lieut.-General Travers, V.C., C.B., states (*The Evacuation of Indore*), that the number of the English population, men, women, and children, murdered by these ruffians amounted to thirty-nine. In a work recently published, *Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor* (Major Evans Bell), it is stated that this statement is erroneous, that the murdered were only twenty-five in number, and that of these only two were Europeans. But the Agent to the Governor-General in 1874, Major-General Sir Henry Daly, K.C.S.I., writing officially to the Government in that year (10th of September), reports as follows (para. 5): "It was recorded in the Durbar Diary of July, 1857, that Saadat Khán, after the attack on the Residency on the 1st of July, which resulted in the slaughter of British subjects, European and native, women and children, in all, 39," &c. It would thus appear that the only mistake made by Lieut.-General Travers is in the use of the adjective "English in the sense of English-born." That thirty-nine persons were massacred by the rebels is clear. Not less so, that these thirty-nine persons were British subjects. (It is no exculpation of the brutality of the assassins to state that of the total number only two were full-blooded Europeans and the remainder half-breeds, or Eurasians.) The numbers given by General Travers are those attested to by the Durbar records, and quoted as indisputable by the highest British authority on the spot.

Travers, who, I have said, was at the moment talking to his native officers, hastened to the picket in the stable square, ordered the troops to turn out and the guns to be placed in a position to open fire on the rebels. The men, surprised, half-stupefied by the suddenness of the attack, showed at first no hesitation. While they were turning out, Travers caused the men of the picket to mount, and rapidly conducted them to a point whence they could most advantageously charge the enemy's battery. He then attempted to form them up to charge. But here, likewise, treason had done its work. The native officer of the picket had been "got at." And though the picket was three times formed for attack, three times did this man break the formation from the rear. This action threw the men into confusion. Two opposite feelings seemed to contend in them for mastery. But to stand still was fatal. Travers felt this, and feeling it strongly, he gave, notwithstanding that success seemed hopeless, the order to charge. Gallantly leading, he reached the guns, and though followed by but five of his men, drove away the gunners, wounded the inciter of the mutiny, Saadat Khán, and for a few moments had the guns in his possession. Had he only been properly supported this charge would have been decisive. But not only was he not supported, but he and his five men were exposed to the fire of the enemy's infantry, now drawn up in order. For a moment, indeed, that infantry seemed inclined to waver; but when they recognised the small number of the men who had followed Travers, they opened a musketry fire against the Residency.

The gallant charge of Travers had not, however, been useless. It had given time to Durand to make hasty preparations for the defence of the Residency, to the gunners to place the guns in position, to the officers to turn out and form up their men. Durand, too, had utilised the few minutes at his disposal to write a letter to Colonel Platt, commanding at Máu, telling him that he had been attacked, and requesting him to send Captain Hungerford's battery to his aid.

Durand had just come out with this note in his hand when he met Travers returning from his charge. He gave

Colonel
Travers.

Turns out
the men.

Traitors in
his ranks
attempt to
balk him,

Notwith-
standing, he
leads a gal-
lant charge
on the
enemy's guns,
which he
captures.

He is not
supported.

His charge,
however, is
opportune
and useful.

Durand
writes to
Máu for
Hungerford's
battery.

Travers the note, with a request to forward it at once. Travers entrusted the important missive to a trooper on whom he believed he could depend. But he felt even then that absolute confidence was to be placed in no native soldier, and he more than doubted whether the letter would be delivered.

Meanwhile the enemy, recovering from the effect of the spirited charge of Travers, moved their guns round the left flank of the barracks into the open ground, with the intention of taking up a position for a front attack on the Residency. To meet this, Travers pushed

The enemy recover from the effect of the charge of Travers.

forward his two guns two hundred yards to the right front of the Residency, and directed the gunners to open a concentrated fire on the enemy's supports. The guns, well served by two serjeants, Orr and Murphy, and by fourteen native gunners, who had remained faithful, at once opened with effect, disabling one of the rebels' pieces, and forcing their infantry to retire. Again was a splendid chance offered to the garrison. A charge in force now would have decided the day. The head was there to see the opportunity, the hands were there that might have seized it, but the hearts that should have animated those hands were cold and lifeless.

He, however, again forces them back.

In a word, the cavalry, who could have gained the victory, would not. They came up in excellent formation, but despite the efforts of their officers and of Durand they melted away. Twenty-five or thirty of them galloped off at once to Sihor, filling the air with cries that the Europeans were being massacred. The greater number remained helpless, panic-stricken, afraid of each other. The Hindus and Sikhs amongst them suspected the Muhamminadans, and the Muhammadans suspected the Hindus and Sikhs. Divided into parties they scattered themselves over the enclosure, seeking the best available shelter from the enemy's fire, passive spectators of an assault which with union and heartiness they might have prevented.

A golden opportunity of deciding the day.

Frustrated by the refusal of the native troops to act.

Still conscious of the possibilities before him, and maddened by the refusal of the Bhopál men to seize them, Travers ordered Captain Magniac to ride after the men and to do his utmost to bring up a dozen or even half a dozen to attack the battery still lying defenceless in the open. But again he was disappointed. The men would not respond to his call.

Travers renews his attempt to charge, but in vain.

Baulked by the behaviour of the cavalry, Travers turned to the infantry, feeling, like Eyre at Árah, that a bayonet-charge would yet save the day. But here again he was disappointed.

The infantry also refuse to fight. The two hundred men of the Mehidpúr contingent absolutely refused to fight. Of the two hundred and seventy men of the Bhopál contingent only about twelve showed signs of obedience. The rest levelled their muskets at their officers, and drove them off. They declined even to lift a finger on behalf of the British. The Bhíls allowed themselves to be formed up but would not act.

Even the Bhíls refuse to discharge their pieces. Still the defence was not abandoned. It was determined to bring the Bhíls—the only troops not in open mutiny—under cover. They were accordingly brought inside the Residency in the hope that they might be prevailed upon to discharge their pieces at the enemy when sheltered by stone walls. But, meanwhile, the rebels, finding that no advantage had been taken of their first check, and rightly conjecturing that the trained Sipáhis had refused to fight them, had completed their artillery movement, and were pouring in many directions a fire of round shot and grape. Under the influence of this fire the Bhíls were completely cowed, refused even to discharge their pieces, and abandoning their posts at the outer windows, crowded into the centre rooms. The rebel infantry was forming up, evidently with the intention of taking advantage of the effect of the fire of their guns. (To defend the Residency there now remained,

The number of defenders is reduced to a handful. besides the fourteen faithful native gunners, eight combatant officers, two doctors, two sergeants, and five Europeans* of the telegraph department.) Under their charge were eight ladies and three children.

The forces were too disproportionate for the contest to continue longer, unless succour should arrive. The enemy's officers were calling on their men to assault, and their ranks were rapidly filling. The position seemed desperate.

Too few to continue the contest. At this crisis, the few cavalry who had remained huddled up, passive and inactive, behind the Residency, sent a message through their officer, Captain Magniac, that they were about

* One of them was Post-master. All, however, were unable, either from alarm or from being unnerved by the slaughter which they had escaped, to use their arms. They did not fire a single shot.

to consult their own safety, further defence being hopeless; that if they did not then move, their retreat would be cut off, and they begged that this last chance might be taken of saving the women and children.

The "loyal" cavalry determine to retire.

I pause for a moment to ask the reader to take a glance at the position. Let him imagine a large stone house, occupied by seventeen Englishmen and fourteen faithful natives, with two guns for its defence, attacked by about six hundred trained Sipáhis, swelled by the constantly augmenting rabble of the city*:—the besieged embarrassed, moreover, by having eleven women and children to protect, and encumbered and threatened by having nearly five hundred mutinous troops within the range of their defence—troops who, if they acted at all, would act against them. But this is not all. The assailants occupied the buildings and roads all about the Residency. But there was besides a body of native cavalry, willing to protect the Europeans from actual assault if they would abandon the Residency and retreat, but unwilling to stir hand or foot in defence of that building. But now this body of cavalry was being outflanked. It was threatening to ride off. Should it go, its place would inevitably be occupied by the enemy, and the Residency would be attacked on four sides.

Summary of the situation.

This was the position. How was Durand to act? Could he cut his way through the enemy? He and the other men might possibly have done so; but they would have exposed to certain death the women and the children. As a body, the civil portion of the Europeans were unarmed. They had escaped to the Residency with their bare lives. No valid assistance then was to be looked for from these. To remain was impossible. Could the attack be resisted there were no supplies—even water would have failed the garrison. Could Durand wait for Captain Hungerford's battery from Máu? He had written for it at a quarter to 9 o'clock. It was then half-past 10, and there was no sign of its approach. In any case it was impossible it could arrive before half-past 12,—and then the enemy would be concentrated to receive it, whilst the last hope of saving the women and children

Courses which might be open to Durand and Travers.

* The six hundred trained Sipáhis were composed of about two hundred of all ranks of Holkar's men, and the contingent infantry who, just about this time, fairly went over to the rebels.

would have been lost. Under these circumstances there was really but one course to pursue. On this all were agreed, Durand as well as Travers; all the other officers as well as Durand and Travers. They collected then the little garrison, and placing the ladies on gun-wagons, moved out of the Residency, covering their rear with the

Of these only one really feasible. cavalry, ready to follow the Europeans though not to fight for them. It was then half-past 10 o'clock.*

They evacuated the Residency.

Maharajah Holkar.

But where, all this time, it may be asked, was Holkar? Where was Captain Hungerford's battery? These are the questions I now propose to answer.

Few matters have been more debated than the conduct of Holkar at this critical period. There are those who believed then that he was disloyal, who believe still that he was a wateher of the atmosphere. There are those, on the other hand, who consider that his loyalty was unimpeachable, and that the doubts cast upon that loyalty, culminating as they have in the denial to him, maintained to the close of his life, of a practical expression of the complete satisfaction of the paramount power similar to that bestowed upon his compeers, were insulting to his family and to his name.

Was he loyal or disloyal?

In writing history, sentiment is, or ought to be, excluded.

The historian has to deal only with facts. It is not very germane to the point at issue to inquire whether Durand disliked Holkar, or Holkar disliked Durand.

Considerations not germane to the question.

It may even be admitted that Durand did not admire the character of Holkar; and that Holkar, regarding Durand as

* Major Evans Bell (*Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor*, page 99), has laid some stress on the fact that no one was killed during the withdrawal from the Residency. I have communicated on this subject with Lieutenant-General Travers, V.C., C.B., and I append his reply. "The Residency," writes General Travers, "stands upon the shoulder of slightly rising ground which falls away towards the enemy's position and the river, and, rounding the shoulder, slopes in the other direction for some distance. The ground is open and smooth, and by keeping the building as long as possible between the fugitives and the enemy's artillery, a considerable advantage was gained. Indeed, by holding the cavalry as an additional screen, the enemy's attention was withdrawn, and he was delayed in bringing his guns into action. What damage was done by his fire I cannot say. We could not possibly know what natives composed our mixed party. I myself can only speak to one man, an European or Eurasian—a clerk, I believe—whose head was taken off by a round shot. He fell in a little jungle, and might not have been discovered had not his horse stood by the corpse."

a *locum tenens* only, as one who would shortly make way for the man whom he really cared for, took no special pains to conciliate Durand. But there is unquestionable evidence to prove that up to the 1st of July Durand did believe in the loyalty of Holkar. I have been assured by a distinguished officer,* present with him throughout this critical time, and who enjoyed his confidence, that up to the time of the outbreak Durand constantly insisted that Holkar must know the strength of England too well to be other than loyal. That there was cordiality between the Agent and the Prince may well be doubted; but Durand gave a positive proof that he trusted Holkar when he accepted from him, for the protection of the Residency, three companies of his troops and three of his field-guns. That he should withdraw that confidence pending explanation, when those troops and those guns turned against him, without any apparent prohibition on the part of Holkar, was, to say the least, a very natural proceeding.

To return to the region of facts. What was Holkar's conduct on the eventful 1st of July?

It is only due to the Mahárájah to state the explanation which he himself gave.

For some time past Mahárájah Holkar had felt the control of his troops slipping out of his hands. Only the day before the 1st of July some of his men had assumed so mutinous an attitude that he provided them with carriage and supplies in order to rid Indúr of their presence. It is not at all surprising that this should have been so. Under the trying circumstances of that trying period the most popular sovereigns could not command the obedience of their followers when they called upon these to act against their strong inner convictions. The loyalty of Mahárájah Sindhiá, in 1857-58, has never been questioned. Yet his own clansmen turned against him rather than fight for the British. There can be no question but that the troops of the native princes did sympathise deeply with the mutinous Sipáhis, and did regard their cause as their own. At Indúr, moreover, in 1857,

The explanation of his conduct given by the Mahárájah himself.

* Lieutenant-General Travers, V.C., C.B.

† I may mention another proof. A very few days before the mutiny, Holkar represented to Durand that his magazine was almost empty of artillery ammunition. Without inquiry or question Durand had him supplied from the Máu magazine at once.

there was a strong Muhammadan faction, scarcely less hostile to Holkar than to the British. Holkar, himself, prior to the 1st of July, had shown that he was well aware of the disorder fomenting around him. He had candidly told Durand that he mistrusted his own troops. Taking the above facts into consideration, the circumstances that the day prior to the mutiny he had sent away from Indúr his most uncontrollable troops, that the leader of the assault on the Residency was a prominent member of the Muhammadan faction, I think it sufficiently established that on the 1st of July his mutinous soldiers took the bit into their mouths, and acted without his knowledge and in spite of him.

Makes it clear that his troops acted in spite of him.

But the part of Holkar's conduct, which, up to the present time, has seemed the most to require explanation, is that which relates to his action whilst the attack on the Residency was proceeding. In the explanation which he offered at the time the Mahárájah stated that the confusion had been too great to allow of any communication being made to the Residency; that on learning what had happened, he was preparing to set out for that place, when he was stopped by the intelligence that all was over. Now, the first discharge of grape into the Residency took place between 8 and 9 o'clock, the garrison evacuated the Residency at half-past 10. What was Holkar doing during those two hours? There is no doubt but that he was aware of the nature of the events which were taking place. Before 9 o'clock, Saadat Khán, blood-stained and wounded, had ridden into his presence to report that he had attacked the Residency, and wounded a *sáhib*. What, then, was he doing?

Why did not Holkar come to the Residency?

Here again we are met with opposite opinions. On the one side it is hinted, if not asserted, that he was watching the turn of events, not caring to interfere on behalf of the British, until it was certain that their sun had not set. On the other, it is declared that in acting as he did, he was unswerving in his loyalty to British interests; that had he mounted his horse and ridden to the scene of action, his presence would have sanctioned the mutiny, and given stability of action to the revolted soldiery; that in any case he would have been powerless to control them.*

The supposition that he was watching the turn of events.

Is combated by his supporters.

* *Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor*, Major Evans Bell.

I cannot but consider that there is force in this argument. Having regard to the fact that his army had slipped from his control, it is certainly possible, I think, that Holkar's presence on the scene might have been misinterpreted by the soldiery, and might have inspired them with the moral force of which actually they were in want. It is certainly true that Durand sent a letter to Holkar. But it is not less an ascertained fact that Holkar did not receive it. The messenger who carried it, alarmed, made for his own house, taking the letter with him. The passive attitude of Holkar, then, proves nothing against him. It is perfectly reconcilable with absolute want of sympathy with the mutineers. To gauge what were his real wishes, it is necessary to inquire into his conduct subsequent to the evacuation of the Residency.

Successfully.

On this point I find a general agreement as to the facts, combined with a marked difference with respect to the conclusions. It is not denied that Saadat Khán rode up, wounded, to Holkar's palace whilst the conflict was going on, and told Holkar that he had wounded a *sáhib* and had attacked the Residency. It is not denied that, though Holkar managed at the time to place that rebel leader in confinement, Saadat Khán was free a few hours later, and actually entered with his family into occupation of the Residency. It is asserted on the one side, and I cannot find it denied on the other, that Holkar remained in his palace till the third day in constant communication with the mutineers; that he then visited the Residency, and conversed with Saadat Khán, with Báns Gopál—the commandant of the infantry which had led the attack—and with the Subahdar of the 23rd Native Infantry, whose hand was red with the blood of his commanding officer.

His conduct subsequent to the evacuation.

Suspicious elements in that conduct.

Of these three facts, the only one apparently incriminating Holkar is the last. And his conduct here has been explained. It is but fair to the Maharájah to state that explanation in the very words of his advocate.* “On the 4th of July, mounted, and spear in hand, he (Holkar) confronted the mutineers boldly at the Residency. They received the Maharájah at first respectfully, but afterwards reminded him of the martial character of his ancestor, Jeswant Ráo, and reviled him as a degenerate Holkar. He absolutely refused

Have been satisfactorily explained.

* *Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor*, Major Evans Bell.

his countenance, and rejected all their demands." The visit of Holkar to the Residency is, therefore, entirely consistent with the theory that he had lost control over his troops, and that they acted without his orders and in spite of him.

It is, too, in my opinion, clearly made out that the Maharájah, on the day following the assault, refused the threatening demands of the mutineers from Máu to deliver up the Europeans and other Christians who had taken refuge in his palace.* He states himself that he offered to them his own person rather than the heads of those under his protection. It may be said that this proves only that Holkar had not fully decided to go against the British, that he was aware that the European battery held Máu. But, in judging his conduct as a person accused of complicity with the mutineers, this action is a strong point in his favour.

Another point, not less strong, perhaps even stronger, is the fact, that on the 1st of July, the very day of the mutiny, Holkar sent in to Máu, by the hands of Ganpat Rao, his agent at the Residency, a letter addressed to Colonel Platt, to inform him of the mutiny, and stating that his own troops had refused to act against the mutineers. On the same day he wrote also to the Governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone, telling him of what had occurred. He wrote also that evening to Durand, protesting his innocence, and begging that the march of General Woodburn's force might be hastened as much as possible. It deserves further to be stated, that none of the influential members of the Durbar, none of the Maharájah's kinsmen or associates, joined in the attack on the Residency.

Looking at the question as a whole, I am of opinion that Holkar was free from complicity with the mutineers; that his soldiers had slipped out of his hands; that his presence amongst them on the 1st of July would have been misinterpreted: and that subsequently he did his best to serve the British interests. But it must be admitted that, at the time, his conduct bore a very suspicious appearance. It must not be forgotten

* This protection was acknowledged by three Europeans, seven Eurasians, and some native Christians.

that, although Durand sent him a letter by the hands of a messenger, that messenger never appeared at the Palace; that his own troops, led by his own officer, Báns Gopál, attacked the Residency; that Durand had reason to believe that his retreat on Mandlísar was prevented by the occupation by Holkar's troops of the Simrol pass. These circumstances could not but seem most suspicious to the Agent on the spot, thus attacked and thwarted. Whilst, then, Holkar must be acquitted of complicity with the rebels, the conduct of Durand in refusing to hold confidential intercourse with him until the Government of India should clear him from the suspicions attaching to his conduct must be upheld and justified.

Though the facts justified the conduct of Durand at the time.

It is time now to turn to Máu. Colonel Durand's letter to Colonel Platt, the commandant of the 23rd Native Infantry and of the station, despatched from Indúr at a quarter to 9, reached Colonel Platt about 10 o'clock. Colonel Platt instantly gave orders to Captain Hungerford, commanding the battery, to set out for the relief of the Residency at Indúr. The battery,—why, has not been explained,—was not ready to leave Máu before noon. It then advanced on the Indúr road at a trot. It had reached the village of Ráo, half-way between the two stations,* when Captain Hungerford learned that Colonel Durand and the British residents had left Indúr, and had not taken the road to Máu. Hungerford at once turned about, and galloped or cantered back to Máu, arriving there at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.†

Máu.

Captain Hungerford's battery.

Leaves at noon.

Hungerford hears of the evacuation, and returns.

It is clear from this statement that Captain Hungerford's battery could not have reached Indúr, if it had continued the journey at the rate at which it was going, before 3 p.m.—equally clear from the narrative I have given of the events at Indúr, that Colonel Durand and the garrison could not have held out for the four and a half hours which would have elapsed between his departure and the arrival of Captain Hungerford. Further, it is tolerably certain that Captain Hungerford's battery, arriving at any hour after the

Facility of its proceeding further.

* Major Evans Bell speaks of the distance between the Residency and Máu as being ten miles. It is so now by the new road. But by the road which existed in 1857, it was more nearly fourteen than thirteen miles.

† Colonel Durand to Lord Canning's Private Secretary.

complete investment of the Residency, driven by native drivers, unsupported by cavalry or infantry, would have been unable to hold its own against the large force of all arms, which it would have found at Indúr. However, Captain Hungerford returned to Máu. The same evening, he took his battery within the fort

The troops at
Máu mutiny.

That night, the regular troops in Máu, in conformity with the arrangement made with their brethren in the service of Holkar, broke out into revolt. They began, as usual, by firing the mess-house. They then shot dead their colonel, Colonel Platt, and their adjutant, Captain Fagan, who had gone down to the lines to reason with them. The cavalry troopers, likewise, killed their commandant, Major Harris. The other officers escaped with their lives.

Hungerford
drives the
mutineers
from Máu.

On the first sound of the mutiny, Colonel Platt had called upon Captain Hungerford to turn out with his battery. Captain Hungerford proceeded to respond to the call, but by the time he arrived on the parade-ground the mischief had been done and no enemy was to be seen. Nothing fell upon his vision but the blazing bungalows till then occupied by the officers. In this perplexity Hungerford directed fire to be opened on the lines. Then poured forth the Sipáhis, liberated from restraint. They pushed on to Indúr, effected a junction with the mutineers at that place, and subsequently made their way to Dehlí.

Hungerford then held the chief authority at the station.

Assumes
charge of the
Central In-
dian Agency.

Occupying the fort which commands the military road from Bombay and the low country to the highlands of Central India, he was in a position to render excellent service. During the absence of Durand, he assumed the post of representative of the Government of India at the court of Holkar. The real authority however, still remained with Durand, whose course I now propose to follow.

The evacua-
tion of the
Residency.

We left Durand with the garrison, the women, and children, evacuating the Residency at half-past 10, on the memorable 1st of July. Travers made a last effort to induce the infantry of the two Contingents to make but one charge. These men, however, had by this time become so infused with the mutinous spirit, that Travers at once recognised that the attempt was useless, and if persevered in, might be dangerous. He managed, however, to collect the greater portion of the Bhopál cavalry, and though these refused

to charge, they assumed an attitude sufficiently threatening to prevent pursuit. The next point to be considered was the direction in which they were to retire.

The natural line of retreat was on Mán. By that road alone was it likely that assistance could come. A letter had been dispatched for that assistance at a quarter to 9. That letter could scarcely have reached Colonel Platt before 10. It was just possible that Hungerford might be starting.* But it was equally possible, and more probable, that the letter might not have reached Mán. At a time when the native cavalry all over India were falling away by hundreds, it would have been hazardous to carry out a military manœuvre, the safe execution of which depended on the fidelity of one solitary trooper.

Considerations regarding the line of retreat.

Still, in war something must be risked, and Durand and Travers were alike prepared to accept the chance that Hungerford had started to meet them. But there was an insurmountable difficulty to the retreat on Mán. In my description of the Residency, I have shown that the road to Mán passed near that building on its western front, and at a distance of about four hundred yards from it crossed the Khán river. I have shown, likewise, that it passed by the cluster of buildings occupied by Holkar's troops. When the Residency was evacuated, not only was the entire length of that road in their possession, but their right rested upon it, a few yards in front of the bridge and completely covering it. Had the men of our Contingents made one charge the enemy's right might have been forced back and the bridge secured. But—as has been already stated—the cavalry refused to act; the infantry, when appealed to by Travers, threatened his life. The timely devotion of a Sipáhi alone saved him. To move artillery without supports close to and in face of an enemy flanking the moving body is, in war, impossible. For four hundred yards the retreating party would have been exposed to the fire of an enemy elated by victory. The attempt to cross that bridge would then have been fatal to the entire party. Nor was it possible to cross the river itself above the bridge—for it had steep banks and was not fordable. I may add, with confidence, that even had the bridge been forced, the difficulties of the retreating

Insurmountable difficulties in the way of a retreat on Mán.

By the regular road.

* In point of fact he did not leave Mán till noon

party, harassed by a formidable enemy, would not have been lessened.

But there was another bridge across the Khán, higher up, and beyond the Residency garden. This might certainly have been crossed. But having crossed it where would the party have been? To gain the Máu road they would have had to move for about six hundred yards by the road on the left bank of the Khán—the only other traversable road. To the point where that road meets the Máu road the rebels were nearer by three parts of the whole distance to be traversed than were the ladies and the garrison. That is to say, the rebels, crossing by the lower bridge, were about a quarter of a mile distant from that point, whilst the garrison, leaving the Residency, would have to traverse more than a mile to reach it. Surely to attempt that road by the upper bridge would have been to draw rather too large an order on the blindness of an enemy reeking in slaughter and flushed with victory!

Another reason for not attempting the Máu road was based on the disinclination of the remaining cavalry to follow it. Their hearts were in their homes and with their families. Their homes and their families were at Sihor—and Sihor was the goal of their hopes.

Durand and Travers were forced then, most unwillingly, to renounce the idea of a retreat on Máu. The impossibility of reaching that station being clear to them, it devolved on Durand to decide the direction in which to retire. In connection with this point a plain duty, he conceived, lay before him.

I have already alluded to the Bombay column halted at Aurangábád. Under the circumstances of the case, attacked by Holkar's troops, with, as he undoubtedly believed at the time, the sanction and concurrence of Holkar; driven out of Indúr; cut off from Máu; it seemed to Durand to be his plain duty, at any and every sacrifice, to make his way to that column and urge its immediate advance. He believed that Central India was in the utmost peril; that the only mode of saving, or of promptly recovering it, lay in the immediate advance of Woodburn's column. (He resolved then to push on towards that column by way of Mandlésar.)

The other road equally out of the question.

Disinclination of the native troops to go to Máu.

Durand and Travers renounce the idea of Máu

Reasons which actuated Durand in his choice of a line of retreat.

The party started then on the Mandlésar road. But, after proceeding some distance, Travers found it might be within the range of possibility to communicate with Hungerford. It had occurred alike to Durand and himself that it was just possible that Hungerford's battery had started; that it would push on to Indúr, and that Hungerford, embarrassed by native drivers, might find himself in difficulties. To relieve Hungerford, then, Travers wrote to him two notes, stating that Durand had evacuated Indúr, and was endeavouring to effect a retreat by the Simrol pass. The notes were despatched, each by the hand of a trooper, in the hope that, finding his way across country, one at least would reach Hungerford.

Attempts
to move on
Mandlésar.

The troopers had not long started when reports from many quarters reached Durand that the Simrol pass was occupied by the cavalry and artillery of Holkar. These were, he was told, the very cavalry and artillery whom Holkar. to be rid of, had furnished with carriage and supplies. Durand, nothing daunted, resolved to force this pass. But again he was baffled by his following. The Bhopál cavalry were willing enough to follow the English residents to their own homes at Sihor, and to protect them from assault on the road; but they were not prepared to run any risk to escort them anywhere else. They positively refused to attempt the Simrol pass. They declared that they would go only to Sihor, in the first instance—thence to any station that might be named. No resource was left, then, to Durand but to retire upon Sihor. It was a bitter alternative, for it removed him from the line by which General Woodburn would have to advance. The distance, too, was long and wearisome for the ladies and children. More than that, it appeared to be surrounded by danger. The reception of the fugitive party at Sihor was by no means assured. Durand could not be certain that the Begam of Bhopál would be able to withstand the severe pressure that he well knew was put upon her, or that she would be able to restrain her excited Muhammadan subjects.* But there was no help for it. Could

The Simrol
pass is re-
ported occu-
pied by Hol-
kar's troops.

The Bhopál
cavalry re-
fuse to
attempt to
force it.

Durand com-
pelled to re-
tire on Sihor.

* General Travers, V.C., thus writes:—"When we reached Ashla" (in Bhopál territory), "on the 3rd of July the guard drawn up on the banks of the Parbatí, and across our road, and the crowd with it, made many think

he have seen his way to the Bombay column, *via* Máu, it is obvious he would have taken it. He could then have left his wife, then suffering, and the other ladies, in safety at Máu, whilst he should proceed on his journey to the south. But the evidence is overwhelming that such a movement was impossible. Forced, then, to take the road to Sihor, he proceeded by rapid marches to that place, and arrived there on the 4th of July with the guns and the Europeans who had left the Indúr Residency on the morning of the

1st of July.

I have occupied many pages in treating this interesting episode in the great Indian mutiny, but the widely diverse views disseminated, since his decease, regarding the conduct of the principal actor, have imposed upon me the necessity of making my narrative of the events which happened at Indúr as clear and as precise as possible. It has been more than insinuated that Durand needlessly abandoned his position; that he might have retired on Máu; that he was quite unequal to the occasion. Such charges, if made anonymously, might have been left to be disposed of by the judgment of those who knew Durand in India. But they have assumed the garb and the title of History. It was necessary, therefore, that their baselessness should be made clear by History. And no one will assert that, for such a purpose, the narrative of the events at Indúr in these pages is too long.

What, in fact, in a few words, was the conduct so carped at, but, in reality, so noble and meritorious, of Colonel Durand, in those dark days which intervened between the 14th of May and the 4th of July 1857? That conduct has been clearly, fairly, and briefly summed up in a manner which cannot be improved upon. "Without the aid of any European force," summarises the writer of *Central India in 1857*, "he had succeeded in maintaining himself at Indúr for six weeks after the outbreak at Dehli, by isolating the contingent troops, and playing them off against the regulars. When, contrary to his wishes, the two were allowed to come into contact, the fidelity of the Contingents gave way, and,

their last hour had come. The women and children were dismounted from the limbers, and the guns got ready for action, when a messenger arrived to announce it was the Guard of Honour! It was a relief."

gradually, the circle of insurrection closed upon Indúr. At last, driven out of the Residency by a combination of treachery and cowardice, he made a good, soldierly retreat, in the face of overwhelming masses, veiling his weakness by a show of force, and marched into Sihor without the loss of gun, standard, or trophy."

Such was the conduct of this noble representative of the English race up to the 4th of July. His subsequent action neither belied his reputation, nor conduced less to the security of British interests in Central India. Arriving at Sihor, Durand stayed there but one day, and then started off for Hoshangábád, on the southern bank of the Narbadá, in the hope of being able to communicate with General Woodburn. (At Hoshangábád he heard of the mutiny of the regular troops at Máu, and of their departure from that station, held, thenceforward, in security by Hungerford's battery.) Secure, then, of Máu, Durand was anxious that Woodburn's force should make safe the line of the Narbadá, and thus interpose a barrier "between the blazing north and the smouldering south." But here he met with an unexpected difficulty. Mr. Plowden, the Commissioner of the Central Provinces, under the impression that the rising at Máu had been fatal to all the Europeans stationed there, was urging General Woodburn to throw up the line of the Narbadá, and to march on Nágpúr. Durand strongly protested against the adoption of a course of action which would have roused Central India against us. He wrote to the Government of India; he wrote to Mr. Plowden; he wrote to General Woodburn. He even authorised the officers commanding military posts to disregard any orders they might receive to abandon their positions on the Narbadá. But he did more. Keenly sensible of the necessity for prompt action, of the delays entailed by correspondence, and of the value of enforcing his arguments by his personal presence, Durand started for Anrúngábád, where he believed Woodburn's column still to be. On his way, the gratifying intelligence reached him that his urgent requisitions for the advance of the column had been successful; that General Woodburn had returned to Punná in bad health; that Brigadier Stuart had succeeded him, with orders to push on at once, and that the column was on its way to Mán *via* Ásírgarh. To Ásírgarh, then, Durand hurried. His presence there, was a

He proceeds
to Hoshang-
ábád.

Urges the
advance on
Máu of
Woodburn's
column.

Joins that
column at
Ásírgarh

tower of strength. He impressed his own energy on every one present with the force. There were no further delays. Pressing onwards, the column traversed the pass of Simrol on the 1st of August, and entered Máu on the following day, just in time to escape the difficulties which the rainy season would have entailed upon them. The line of the Narbadá was saved.

Accompanies
it to Máu.

In this rescued position, for the present, I must leave Central India, to glance at the condition of affairs in the bordering States of Rájputáná, and then to record how the action in the Native States affected Mr. Colvin and Ágra.

CHAPTER IV.

GEORGE LAWRENCE AND RÁJPÚTÁNÁ.

RÁJPÚTÁNÁ—the country of the Rájputs—comprises eighteen native States,* seventeen of which were ruled by Hindús of the purest blood—the eighteenth, Tonk, by the Muhammadan descendant of the famous freebooter, Amír Khán. To most of these States was assigned a political officer, but the chief of all these, the Governor-General's Agent for the general control of Rájputáná, was Colonel George St. Patrick Lawrence, brother of Sir Henry and of Sir John Lawrence.

To Colonel George Lawrence had been allotted many of the great qualities of his famous brothers. He was high-spirited, conscientious, decided, a lover of truth and justice, frank, and straightforward. He had seen a great deal of service. As a cavalry officer he had, in his younger days, earned distinction. As a political he had played a considerable part during the arrangements which followed the conquest of Afghanistan. After the murder there, which he witnessed, of the envoy, and the annihilation of our army, he had shared the captivity of Eyre, of Colin Maekenzie, and of the last survivors of General Elphinstone's army. Employed in the most responsible position at Pesháwar after the first Sikh war, he was taken prisoner by the Afghan allies of the Sikhs during the second. Released after the peace conquered at Gujrát he continued to give to the Government able and conscientious service in the political department, latterly at Mēwar in Rájputána. In March 1857,

Rájputáná.

Colonel
George
Lawrence.His earlier
career.

* These states are Udaipur or Mewar, Jaipur, Jodhpur or Mirwar, Bindi, Kotá, Jhalawar, Tonk, Karauli, Kishengarh, Dholpur, Bharatpur, Alwar, Bikanir, Jaisalmer, Siróhi, Dongarpur, Banswari, and Patábgarh.

on the transfer of his brother Sir Henry to the higher post of Chief Commissioner of Oudh, Colonel George Lawrence was appointed to act for Sir James Outram as political agent to the Governor-General for the whole of Rájpútána. It was a post for which he was extremely well fitted, for George Lawrence was not only a man of exceptional ability, but he possessed to an extent equal to that of his brothers, Henry and John, the power of quickness of decision under difficult circumstances, which is the true strength of a man exercising authority.

In conformity with the prevailing custom Colonel Lawrence moved in the month of April to Ábu, a mountain in the Sirohí territory upwards of five thousand feet above the sea. All was quiet then in Rájpútána. Under the fostering suzerainty of the British the Rájpút dynasties had been, during the preceeding forty years, gradually recovering from the wounds inflicted upon them by the House of Taimúr, and from the severer gashes they had suffered from the Maráthá marauder and the Pindári plunderer. They were now protected, and they and their subjects were gradually reaping the benefits of that most efficient protection. If any of the officials holding high political and administrative office under the Government of India had reason to regard with a light heart the future as affecting his duties and his charge, that official was the Agent to the Governor-General in Rájpútána.

Colonel Lawrence went to Ábu in April, then, with serenity and confidence, nor had he any reason to feel uneasy until the account of the mutiny of the 10th of May at Míráth roughly startled him. The intelligence of this event reached Ábu the 19th of May. Colonel Lawrence at once comprehended its importance in all its bearings. His long connection with the native army had not weakened a judgment naturally keen and searching. He saw that the Barhám-púr mutiny, the Barraekpúr outbreak, the Míráth rising, were no isolated acts due to some local grievance, but that each of these constituted a scene in one and the same tragedy. He saw at a glance, in fact, that the whole army was contaminated.

His first thought directed itself naturally to the province under his charge. What, in fact, was the condition of Rájpútána? Its population numbered ten

Is appointed
to act as
Agent for
Rájpútána.

The Rájpút
dynasties
favourable
to British
supremacy.

April.
Colonel Law-
rence hears
of the mutiny
at Míráth.

The condition
of Rájpútána.

millions of men subject to protected kings: it comprised an area of a hundred thousand square miles; within that area were five thousand native troops of all arms, belonging to the British army, all of whom Colonel Lawrence, in his inmost heart, knew would take the first favourable opportunity to mutiny: within that area, excluding some twenty sergeants attached to the native infantry regiments, there was not a single European soldier fit for duty. (The nearest station held by English troops was the station of Dísá, in the Presidency of Bombay, about a hundred and fifty miles from Ábu.)

Such then was the position—a province inhabited by ten million natives, guarded by five thousand ill-disposed soldiers, presided over by a Colonel in the British army with some twenty or thirty British officers at his disposal, watching the certain approach of the wave of mutiny! It was a position to test the stuff that was in a man! How did Colonel Lawrence meet it?

The troops at the disposal of Colonel Lawrence.

One of the first thoughts that occurred to him was that the arsenal at Ajmír must at all hazards be secured.

Ajmír is a strip of British territory in the heart of Rájputáná, separated from the British provinces of the North-West by Jaipúr, Tonk, and other allied states. The capital, an ancient and famous city, bearing the same name, contains the mausoleum of the first Muhammadan saint of India, to whose tomb Akbar and his successors frequently made pilgrimages. Close to this city, and commanded by the heights outside it, was an old and dilapidated fort, and within the fort was an arsenal capable of furnishing a siege train of great strength, guns, muskets, and ammunition; and containing a large quantity of specie.* This arsenal was, when the mutiny broke out, under charge of the light company of the 15th Regiment of Native Infantry, a regiment notoriously disaffected. But, after the bad news from Mírath, the military authorities at Nasírábád, acting on a curious principle, somewhat analogous to that of setting a thief to catch a thief,† had

The arsenal at Ajmír.

Is garrisoned by disaffected troops.

bad news

Is now reinforced by other disaffected troops.

* *The Mutinies in Rájputáná*, by H. P. Prichard.

† “When the excitement began, in consequence of the news from Mírath, the grenadier company of the 15th Native Infantry was sent, ostensibly to reinforce the light company in the fort, in reality to act as a check upon it. This may appear a curious arrangement to some of my readers, as, if the protection of the fort was the object aimed at, it could scarcely be attained by doubling the

strengthened the light company by adding to it the grenadier company of the same regiment. The arsenal at Ajmír, containing the *matériel* for the whole of Rájpútána, was, then, when the news of the Mirath outbreak reached Colonel Lawrence, under the protection of two companies of a native regiment which all but its own officers knew to be disaffected.

It was most important to place this arsenal as soon as possible in secure hands. As quick as thought, then, Colonel Lawrence despatched a requisition to the officer commanding at Disá to despatch a light field force to enable him at the same time to assure

the safety of the arsenal and to overawe the regular native troops at Nasirábád. The force was despatched, but before it could arrive, the Commissioner of Ajmír, Lieutenant-Colonel Dixon, acting on the inspiration of a dying man—for he survived but a few days—had made the arsenal safe. This officer, feeling, as Colonel

Lawrence felt, that the caste question was a most important factor in the movements of the native army—that it was in fact the question of the hour—bethought him of the regiment, of which, in fact, he was commandant, raised for civil duties and appertaining exclusively to Rájpútáná, composed entirely of low-caste men, men who had no sympathy with the Brahmanical prejudices of the regular army. This regiment was the Mairwára battalion, quartered at Baur, a little place south-west of Nasirábád on the Disá road. Without the delay of a single day Dixon ordered Lieutenant Carnell, his second in command, to march at once with a hundred men of his battalion upon Ajmír. Carnell replied by acting with the most praiseworthy promptitude. Making a forced march of thirty-seven miles, he surprised the

Sipáhis before they had concerted their plans with their comrades at head-quarters. (The new arrivals at once took charge of the arsenal, and the regular troops were sent back to Nasirábád.)

This movement saved Rájpútáná.* The low-caste Mairs

strength of a traitorous garrison; but the grenadier company was generally supposed to be less tainted, or rather, I should say, more free from suspicion than the rest, and, in those days, we were all deceived alike."—*The Mutinies in Rájpútáná*. The author belonged to the 15th Native Infantry.

* It cannot be doubted that if the arsenal at Ajmír had fallen into the

continued to the end faithful to their European lords. To show his appreciation of their good service and their loyalty, Colonel Lawrence raised on his own authority a second battalion from the men of their tribe. Subsequently he did even more. He recommended that both battalions should enjoy all the privileges of regular native regiments, and this recommendation was complied with.

Col nel Lawrence raises a second battalion of Mairs.

To return. Colonel Lawrence, secure, on learning of Colonel Dixon's successful action, regarding the arsenal and important position of Ajmir, turned his attention to the native princes with whom he was officially connected. (Feeling that it was above all things necessary to maintain before their eyes a sovereign position, and to insist upon their fulfilling the duties which protected princes owed to the paramount power, Colonel Lawrence on the 23rd issued to them a proclamation. In this proclamation he called upon them to preserve peace within their borders, to concentrate their troops on the frontiers of their respective States, so that they might be available to aid the British, to show zeal and activity in dealing with any body of rebels who might attempt to traverse their territories. Whilst thus requiring the co-operation of the native princes, Colonel Lawrence warned the commandants at the several stations to act with promptness and vigour, and he made the request to the Government of Bombay, that any European troops, returning from Persia, who might be required for service in the North-West Provinces, should be sent to Ágra *viâ* Gujrât and Rájputáná.

May 23.

He addresses the native princes of Rájputáná.

The two military stations garrisoned by the native regular army, in the province under Colonel Lawrence's control, were Nasrábád and Nímach. The regiments and batteries at these stations being entirely native, it was not to be expected, and Colonel Lawrence did not expect, that they would escape the general infection. (Hence the precaution he had taken to send to Disá for troops.) It was a wise and prudent precaution, but unfortunately the troops could not march so quickly as the rumour which heralded their approach. Before they could

Nasrábád and Nímach are garrisoned wholly by native troops.

hands of the mutineers, and with it the city, Rájputáná would have been lost for the time.—Priebe's *Mutines in Rájputáná*, pages 39, 40.

arrive the mischief had been accomplished. They were able, however, to a great extent to repair it.

The garrison of Nasirábád consisted of the 15th and 30th Regiments of Native Infantry, a battery of native Artillery, and the 1st Bombay Lancers. Reports regarding the bad disposition of the men of the 15th had been circulated in the station very soon after the arrival of the news of the Mirath outbreak. But their officers considered these reports greatly exaggerated, believing that, although their men might follow the lead of others, they would not show the way. The result showed that they were mistaken.

In consequence of the prevalent rumours every possible precaution for the safety of the station had been taken. The cantonment was patrolled every night by parties of the 1st Lancers—believed to be faithful—the guns were kept limbered up and loaded with grape. But about 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 28th of May some

men of the 15th suddenly rushed to the guns, with loaded muskets, and declared themselves in revolt. The guns almost simultaneously opened fire. The officers galloped down to the lines and attempted to bring their men to reason, but in vain. Muskets were pointed, in some cases fired, at them, and they were warned to be off. The 30th Regiment, which till then had remained quiescent, apparently in a state of hesitation, joined the revolters about 4 o'clock. There still remained the Lancers. These at least, it was hoped, would remain true. In this belief the infantry and artillery officers joined them, intending with them to charge the rebels. They did charge, or rather, they pretended to charge. The first

discharge of the gun loaded with grape made them falter and break their ranks. Their gallant officers, hoping to incite them by their example, galloped on, charging home; only, however, in many cases, to be wounded or killed. One of them, Newbery, was cut down and hacked to pieces, Captain Spottiswoode also was killed, and two officers, Captain Hardy and Lieutenant Look, were badly wounded.

Then it was that, feeling all their efforts useless, the surviving officers resolved to retreat and accompany the ladies to Bikanr. These had been sent outside the cantonments when the first shot was fired. There the officers found them, and escorted them all that night and till 11 o'clock the next morning to their destina-

The disposition of the Nasirábád garrison.

Precautions there taken.

May 28. The Sipahis there mutiny.

Disaffection of the cavalry.

The officers, ladies, and children are forced to evacuate the station.

tion. There was but one casualty—Colonel Penny of the Lanciers dying of heat apoplexy on the road.

Nímach lies about a hundred and fifty miles south of Nasirábád. The troops at this station consisted of the 72nd Regiment of Native Infantry, the 7th Regiment of the Gwáliár contingent, and the wing of the 1st Bengal Cavalry. Sudden firing of houses, reports from the lines, and the unwonted presence of strangers, had foreshadowed for some time past a rising at this station. Yet the men loudly protested their fidelity and their indignation at the conduct of their brethren. All remained quiet till the 3rd of June. That day, full information was received of the events at Nasirábád on the 28th. That night about 10 o'clock the firing of two guns announced to the officers that the men had risen. Fortunately at Nímach there was a fortified square, which had been prepared as a place of refuge in case of an emergency. Its defence, however, had been entrusted to the men of the 7th Regiment of the Gwáliár contingent. The officers on the first sound of mutiny rushed to this square, and found the left wing of that regiment entering it, whilst the men of the right wing were lining the ramparts. The officers spoke cheerfully and encouragingly to the men. These promised fidelity, many declaring that they would rather die than surrender. Delusive were their promises. At 4 o'clock in the morning the Sipáhis guarding the fort mutinied despite the protestations of their officers, and filed out to join their comrades in the plunder of the station. No officers lost their lives, but there were some hair-breadth escapes. The wife of a sergeant and her three children were murdered before they could reach the fort. Ultimately the Europeans succeeded in making their escape to a village some fifty miles from Udaipúr. Thence, many of them being women and children, they despatched two of their party, Barnes of the artillery and Rose of the infantry, to solicit aid from the Ráná, in consultation with the political agent, Captain Showers. That prince promptly complied; Captain Showers himself, accompanied by the Ráo of Bedlá and by Captain Barnes, at once set out with a party of the Mewár horse, to bring in the fugitives. The village was duly reached, and the fugitives were escorted to Udaipúr by the gallant Ráo of Bedlá. Meanwhile the rebel Sipáhis at Nímach, after burning all the houses in the station but one, and plunder-

Nímach.

June 3.
The rising
there.

The officers
escape
to Udaipúr.

ing the treasury, had made, by way of Ágra, for Delhi. Their operations on the rear of our force, there and their sudden assault on Ágra, will be related presently.

Intelligence of the mutiny at Nasirábád reached Colonel Lawrence at Ábu on the 1st of June. He started at once for Bíaúr so as to be close to the scene of action. On his arrival at Bíaúr he found himself nominated Brigadier-General in command of all the troops in Rájpútáná. Almost his first act was to direct the repair of the dilapidated fort* of Ajmír, and to store it with provisions. But a general can do nothing without an army, and at the moment of receiving his grade, General Lawrence had not fifty European soldiers at his disposal. (The native regular troops had mutinied and taken themselves off.) The contingent corps attached to several of the native courts were, as a rule, not to be trusted. Unlike the men of the Mairwára battalion they were composed of Hindus—with whom food is a religion.

But very soon the results of the earlier inspirations of General Lawrence began to manifest themselves. On the 12th of June there arrived at Nasirábád the force for which he had made a requisition on Dísá. This force consisted of four hundred men of Her Majesty's 83rd; the 12th Bombay Native Infantry; and a troop of European Horse Artillery. He at once ordered a hundred men to Ajmír to reinforce the Mairs stationed there. General Lawrence then made that place his headquarters, making constant visits, however, to Bíaúr and Nasirábád.†)

* It should be stated that on the summit of the hill commanding Ajmír, and commanding the magazine and the city, was another and a smaller fort close to a shrino of the Muhammadan saint already spoken of. Not having at his disposal a sufficient number of men to guard the fort, General Lawrence entrusted the defence of this post to the Muhammadans of the shrine, the chief priests of which had satisfactorily proved that it was their interest as its guardians to remain faithful to the British. They were true to the end, performing the garrison duties with zeal and fidelity till the danger had passed away.

† "During June and July I resided alternately between Ajmír, Bíaúr, and Nasirábád, as I deemed my presence necessary at each place with reference to my military as well as civil and political duties. My head quarters were, however, at Ajmír, where I resided in the Daolat Bâgh, close to the city, with a native officer's party of the Mairwára battalion as my only guard. When at Ajmír I never once allowed the routine of civil duties to be interrupted, but held open court, almost daily visiting the city, where, although fierce and

After the revolt of the native troops at Nímach, General Lawrence had caused that place to be occupied by detachments from the contingents of Mewár, Kotá, and Búndí. He had no choice, for at the moment no other troops were available. A few indications, however, soon showed him that these men were as little to be trusted as were their brethren in the line. (He took, then, an early opportunity of replacing them by a detachment from the troops but just arrived from Dísá.)

and of
Nímach,

by Euro-
pean troops.

But it was impossible for General Lawrence to be everywhere ; it was impossible that he should be able to demonstrate personally to all the native sovereigns and chieftains with whom he was officially connected that the knell of British rule had not sounded ; it was impossible for him to enact at each native capital the policy which had been so successful at Ajmír. It is essential, therefore, to record that, whilst General Lawrence by his personal exertions and prompt action saved the great arsenal of Ajmír and recovered the two military centres of Nasírábád and Nímach, his lieutenants at Jaipúr, at Jodhpúr, and at Bharatpúr, nobly seconded his efforts. To the action of these, and of one other, I propose now to devote a few pages.

The Lieutenants of
General
Lawrence.

The agent at Jaipúr was Major William Eden, an officer possessing ability, firmness, and discretion. The reigning Rájah of Jaipúr, Mahárájah Rám Singh, owed his throne, his education, it might almost be said his life, to the British. He had been extremely well educated, was naturally intelligent, and, being well acquainted with the history of Rájputáná during the latter days of the Mughul sway and the entire period of Maráthá oppression, he was profoundly convinced that his own safety, the permanence of his rule, and the prosperity of his subjects, were bound up in the maintenance of the British suzerainty. The tale of the oppressions and tyrannies suffered by his ancestors and their subjects during the short period which had elapsed between the withdrawal of that suzerainty and its restoration—the period between 1805 and 1818—was still fresh in the minds of the prince and of his people. Major Eden then experi-

Major William
Eden.

Rám Singh,
Rájah of Jaipúr.

His reasons
for being
attached to
British over-
rule.

sullen faces were always to be seen, I was always treated with the greatest respect."—*Forty Years' Service in India*, by Lieutenant-General Sir George Lawrence.

enced no difficulty with the Mahárájah. He was as eager to show his loyalty as Major Eden was to demand it. The same spirit animated his people generally. Unhappily it was not so with his army. The Sipáhis composing it had come, for the most part, from the recruiting grounds which had supplied the British native army, and they were influenced by the same feelings of distrust and hostility. Here, too, as at Gwáliár, as at Indúr, it was plainly

His loyal
feeling is not
shared by
his troops,

shown that, when the fanaticism of an Oriental people is thoroughly aroused, not even their Rájah—their father as all consider him, their god as some delight to style him—not even their Rájah can

bend them against their convictions. Five thousand of the Mahárájah's troops were indeed put in the field:—they even marched towards the districts of Mathurá and Gúrgaon with the avowed mission to maintain order and re-establish civil government. But it quickly appeared that, if the maintenance of order and the re-establishment of civil government were to involve the necessity of fighting the revolted Sipáhis, the

who refuse
to wage war
for the Eng-
lish.

Jaipur troops would neither maintain the one nor re-establish the other. Like the Sihor cavalry, they were prepared to defend European fugitives, but they would not wage an aggressive warfare. (Their views in this respect having been practically established, the five thousand Jaipur troops were recalled to their own territory.)

At Jódhpúr, the agent was Captain Monck-Mason, highly gifted, energetic, and possessing tact and judgment. The position of Jódhpúr was peculiar.

Jódhpúr.

Its Rájah, Takht Singh, transferred in 1843 from the throne of Idar to that of Jódhpúr, on the failure of hereditary

Rájah Takht
Singh.

issue in the family of the deceased ruler of the latter State, had not succeeded in conciliating the respect

or the affections of his subjects. He had shown himself avaricious, careless of affairs, difficult of access. Many of his thákurs, or nobles, were extremely ill-

His mis-
government

disposed towards him; some were in veiled, others even in open, rebellion. The Mahárájah himself had no love for his Suzerain. Still he was not blind to the fact that, in the state of ill-feeling that existed between him and his nobles, it behove him to cling to the British as his surest anchoring

Places a small
contingent at
the disposal
of the British.

ground. He placed, therefore a small contingent—two thousand men and six guns—at the agent's disposal. Up to the end of June, then, matters

looked well in Jódhpúr. The events that succeeded belong to a subsequent period of this history.

At Bharatpúr, the agent was Major Nixon. The prompt action of the Durbar of the minor Rájah, and the mutiny of the troops of this principality, have been already related.*

Bharatpúr.

At Alwar there was no political agent. The Ráo Rájah, Bénéí Singh, at once placed a small contingent at the disposal of the British. His death, however, almost immediately afterwards, and the complications that ensued in his own State, rendered the proffered aid for all practical purposes nugatory.

Alwar.

There remains to be noticed Udaipúr, the most ancient and the most venerated of all the States of Rájputána.

Udaipúr.

The name of the Ráná was Sarúp Singh. He, like the Rájah of Jodhpúr, was not on good terms with his nobles.

The British agent at this court was Captain Lionel Showers. When the news of the Míráth mutiny reached Rájputána, Captain Showers was at Ábu,

Captain
Lionel
Showers.

with other officers the guests of Colonel Lawrence. Captain Showers was ordered to leave Ábu and to return to his post at Udaipúr. In the opinion of his chief, however, his movements in that direction had not been sufficiently rapid.† Nor did his subsequent proceedings meet more with General Lawrence's approval, and at a later date that officer was under the necessity of reporting to the Government Captain Showers's "repeated acts of disobedience and defiance of his authority." The ultimate result was the removal of Captain Showers from political employment; the immediate consequence,

a jar in the communications which it was necessary that the agent for the Governor-General in Rájputána should maintain with the staff of officers through whom he worked with the native princes.‡

Disapproval
of his con-
duct by
Colonel Law-
rence,
and its
consequences.

* Vide page 101. — 5

† "He was my guest at Ábu when the news of the Míráth outbreak reached us, and, when every officer hurried to his post, he alone loitered there and *en route*, and my orders to hasten to Udaipúr were disregarded."—Sir George Lawrence to Sir John Kaye.

‡ Captain, now General, Lionel Showers having protested, in the manner natural to him, against this brief criticism of his conduct, I am constrained to place on record the official opinion, formed, after a patient investigation of the case of Captain Showers, by the Council of the Governor-General of India,

I have endeavoured thus briefly to describe the condition of Rájputáná up to the end of June, 1857. We see the shock of the mutiny broken, the great arsenal saved, the principal native chiefs confirmed in their loyalty, by the vigorous and decided action of Colonel Lawrence. It is true that the regular regiments located in the two military centres had revolted. But Colonel Lawrence had recovered those centres. (In Rájputáná, in a word, defiance had been met by defiance, force by force.) Events proved this principle to be a sound one. Compare the instant relief of the regular garrison at Ajmír by troops who could be trusted, with the hesitation evinced at Ágra, Alláhábád, Bánárás, Dánápúr, and Barrackpúr. The policy first mentioned saved British interests without imperilling a single life; the second led through a sea of slaughter to the same results. Had Rájputáná risen, it is difficult to see how Ágra could have held out, how our force before Dehlí could have maintained its ground. (And that Rájputáná did not rise is due to the prompt, decided, and far-seeing action of Colonel George St. Patrick Lawrence.)

Summary of
Colonel
Lawrence's
conduct in
Rájputáná,

which was
saved by his
promptness,
decision, and
foresight.

The mutinous regiments are hurrying out of Rájputáná. It is time now that I should bring back the reader to the fortress which they are hoping to surprise and capture.

presided over by the merciful and lenient Lord Canning. Having read and considered the charges brought against Captain Showers by his official superior, and the replies to those charges by that officer, the Governor-General in Council addressed, the 24th February, 1860, a letter to the Governor-General's Agent for Rájputáná, which, after reviewing Captain Showers' conduct in detail, thus concluded: "On a full review of all the proceedings set forth in the correspondence, and especially of the particular instances above adverted to, His Excellency cannot avoid the conclusion that Captain Showers, notwithstanding his good abilities and his zeal for the public service, does not possess either the judgment or the temper required in an officer entrusted with political duties. His conduct has been marked by an unjustifiable opposition to the orders of his superior, needless disputes with other officers, and a desire to meddle with the duties which do not belong to him. He has failed to profit by the warning formerly addressed to him on this head. His Excellency therefore dismisses Captain Showers from the Rájputáná Agency, and directs that his services be placed at the disposal of the Military Department. You will accordingly take measures to relieve Captain Showers at once."

This order was never cancelled, and, though Lord Lawrence subsequently gave Captain Showers another trial by allowing him to act for a few months as Political Agent at Gwáliár, he assured me that "he bitterly repented his kindness." For a further notice of this officer see Appendix A.

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CHAPTER V.

ÁGRA AND SASSIAH.

THE events recorded in the three preceding chapters affected, more or less intensely, the situation at Ágra. That situation was becoming, towards the latter end of June, difficult to maintain. During that month the entire country on the right bank of the Jamnah, on which the city stood, had pronounced against the British.

Agra in the
last fortnight
of June.

Nor were any reassuring signs visible on the left bank. There, where the light of day was not entirely shut out, the lurid flame of insurrection alone was visible. In a word, towards the fourth week of June, the capital of the North-West Provinces had become entirely isolated. But her worst days had not even then dawned upon her.

Its gradual
isolation.

The mutiny at Gwáliár had occurred on the 14th of June. During the following days the fugitives had been gradually arriving at Ágra. They were received there with all the kindness and consideration due to suffering humanity, their wants were supplied, and their comforts were attended to. Up to this time the idea of retiring within the fort had not again been mooted. The defence of the station had been entrusted to the volunteer levies, and these had latterly been placed under the command of an officer in active service, Major Prendergast. Besides these were the regular European troops before alluded to, numbering altogether about six hundred and fifty fighting men.

Reception of
the fugitives
from Gwáliár.

and their
of retiring
The defence of

Disposable
troops at
Ágra.

In addition to these defenders was another body in whom the Lieutenant-Governor, Mr. Colvin, and the magistrate, Mr. Drummond, were unhappily disposed to place confidence. These were the native police, the leading spirits of whom were, to a man,

Mr. Colvin
and Mr.
Drummond
place confi-
dence in the
native police.

Muhammadans.* If the evidence of those who were at Ágra. and who enjoyed opportunities of noting the conduct of these men is to be trusted, the confidence reposed in them was entirely misplaced. They were in communication with the several bodies of mutinous men on the right bank of the Jamnah. It was in response to their entreaties that these latter turned their steps towards Ágra. They harassed and opposed the officers who were engaged in victualling the fort; they intercepted communication with the world outside Ágra; and they showed in various ways, unmistakably to all except to Mr. Drummond and the Lieutenant-Governor, that they too were watching their opportunity.†

Meanwhile, towards the end of the third week of June, the rumour gradually filled the air that the regular troops who had revolted at Nímaeh and at Nasirábád, reeruiting their strength by taking up stray revolted bodies in their course, were marching direct upon Ágra. Every item of ascertained information pointed to the conclusion that the rumour was true. The strength of the force was then estimated to be about two thousand six hundred men with twelve guns.

The virtual confirmation of this rumour decided Mr. Colvin. Certain now that the rebels were approaching Ágra. with the intention of attacking it, the Lieutenant-Governor felt how his position would be hampered by the necessity of defending the non-combatant population of a large and straggling station. (At the end of June, therefore, he authorised the retirement within the fort of the helpless members of the Christian population.) But, whilst he did this, he, with a fatuity which is inexplicable, forbade the transfer to the place of refuge of "any property beyond the sort of allowance which a French Customs' House officer at Calais or Marseilles passes under the term of a *sac de nuit*."† This extraordinary prohibition entailed subsequently "the loss and destruction of books, furniture, archives, records, public and private, and the ruin of hundreds of families."§ The victualling of the fort was, however, pushed on from this time with greater earnestness than before.

* Raikes's *Notes on the Revolt*.

† *Ibid*.

‡ *Ibid*.

§ *Ibid*.

These measures of precaution were taken not a day too soon. On the 2nd of July the rebel army had reached Fathpúr-Sikrî, only twenty-three miles from Ágra. This propinquity of an enemy who might, by a forced march, rush into the fort, still further opened the eyes of the authorities. How they acted in consequence I shall endeavour now to describe.

The rebels reach Fathpúr Sikrî.

I have already stated * that native troops from Gwáliár had been despatched to Ágra by Máharájah Sindhiá, on the requisition of Mr. Colvin, as soon as the intelligence of the Miráth outbreak had been received. These troops had been promptly despatched to endeavour to restore order in the Ágra and Áligarh districts and were no longer at Ágra.† (Subsequently a detachment of the Kotá contingent had arrived and had been retained at the capital.) (Besides these there was at the same place, under the command of Saifúlla Khán, a native civil officer of high character, a body of about six hundred Karankí matchlockmen and three hundred Bharatpúr horse, with two nine-pounder guns. Lieutenant Henderson of the 10th Foot acted as the agent of the Lieutenant-Governor with this force.)

Disposition of the native troops and levies at and near Ágra.

As soon as it was known that the rebel army was at Fathpúr-Sikrî a disposition was made of these two bodies of men by which they should command the flanks of a force marching on Ágra from the west. The detachment of the Kotá contingent was brought into the cantonment, whilst Saifúlla Khán's levies were ordered to the neighbourhood of Sháhganj, four miles on the road to Fathpúr-Sikrî. This disposition took effect on the 2nd of July.

Changes made on the approach of the rebels.

On the following morning there happened an event which took the supreme power out of the hands of the statesman who had up to that time directed it. Mr. Colvin was threatened with an apoplectic attack. If his measures had not been successful, his task, it must be admitted, had been most difficult. He had at least maintained his post at the helm and had done his best. Throughout a most trying period he had displayed great personal courage, an unselfishness not to be surpassed, whilst his kindness of heart and sympathy with suffering had endeared him to all with whom he had come in contact. Feeling himself,

July 3.

Mr. Colvin is forced by sickness to resign temporarily his office.

* Page 101.

† Their operations will be detailed in the next chapter.

for the time, incapable of the direction of affairs, Mr. Colvin made over charge of the Government, by warrant, the same day, to three officers—Mr. E. A. Reade, Brigadier Polwhele, and Major Macleod.

Mr. Reade was the senior member of the Board of Revenue. He was a man of considerable capacity, calm judgment, and coolness in danger. Major Macleod of the Engineers, Mr. Colvin's Military Secretary, had served with credit in the first Afghanistan campaign, and had a high character in the army. Brigadier Polwhele was the officer commanding the station. As it is action which is the truest test of the stuff which is in a man, and as the action of Brigadier Polwhele against the mutineers is now about to be recorded, I prefer that the reader should draw his own conclusions regarding his character from the manner in which he conducted himself on the occasion which called forth all his mental powers.

The day following the nomination of this Council active measures were taken for the defence of the place. Feeling that the prisoners in the large gaol might in the impending attack be released, and that their presence within our defences would be most undesirable, the Council had the able-bodied men removed from the prison to the opposite side of the river and there set free. The pontoon-bridge close to the fort, by which rebels from that side might cross, was broken down; the native Christians were all brought into the fort; the two nine-pounder guns with Saifúlla Khán's force were removed to the magazine; at the same time, orders were transmitted to the officer commanding the Kotá contingent to march out and attack the advancing rebels.

The first three of these measures were carried out successfully and with good effect. The two last produced a crisis—a crisis, which, whilst it materially diminished the number of fighting men at the disposal of our countrymen, yet cleared the air.

When Lieutenant Henderson, for instance, reached the camp of the Karaní and Bharatpúr levies and required that the guns should be returned to the magazine, great excitement was manifested. But no open opposition was shown, and by a mixture of tact and firmness the guns were brought in. That night, however, Saifúlla Khán reported that he could no longer depend upon his

Mr. E. A.
Reade.

Major
Macleod.

Brigadier
Polwhele.

July 4.
Active mea-
sures of the
new Council.

The native
levies not to
be depended
upon.

levies; that the Bharatpúr horse had deserted, and that the Karaulí men were discouraged by the removal of the guns, and would not fight. Prompt action followed this report. Saifúlla Khán and his levies were ordered to leave Sháhganj, and to start at once for Karaulí. They obeyed that night.

Even before the guns had been taken from these levies the Kotá contingent had mutinied. The order to them to advance had been designedly a tentative order—a test of their fidelity. It did test it—and to some purpose. No sooner had the men received the order to march than the leading spirit amongst them, a native sergeant, shot down the European sergeant in charge of the stores. This was the signal. Firing hastily at their European officers, happily without effect, the men rushed off to join the rebels. They were in such a hurry that a loyal gunner, by name Mathurá, had time to spike the guns, whilst their European medical officer, Dr. Mathias, aided by his servants and others, strewed in the sand their powder, ammunition, and case-shot.* The most serviceable portion of their armament was thus rendered useless. A party sent out from Ágra brought the guns to the fort.

Mutiny of
the Kotá
contingent.

On the evening of that day, the 4th of July, Mr. Colvin entered the fort. An improvement in his health enabled him to resume his authority. The movement into the fort had become absolutely necessary, the behaviour of the native troops who formed the two wings of the British force having left the station quite exposed. Still Mr. Colvin changed his residence with great reluctance and under the pressure of his advisers. He could not but see, however, that the advance of the enemy had made Brigadier Polwhele, for a time, master of the situation. And Brigadier Polwhele wished to have his hands entirely free.

Mr. Colvin
enters the
fort and
resumes his
authority.

The time for military action had indeed arrived. A strong picket of the volunteer cavalry, posted at Sháhganj, only four miles from Ágra, notified to the Brigadier, on the morning of the 5th, the approach of the enemy. The question as to whether the British force should

July 5.
Approach of
the rebels.

* *Official narrative of events attending the outbreak of disturbances and the restoration of authority in the Ágra district in 1857-58 by A. L. M. Phillippis, Magistrate of Ágra.*

wait to receive the rebels in Ágra, or whether it should go out and meet them, had previously been debated. Considerations before Brigadier Polwhele. Brigadier Polwhele had had to consider whether, having under his orders the only European force available between Ágra and the Bombay Presidency on the one side, and between Ágra and that forming at Alláhábád on the other, he would be justified in counting an engagement with an enemy about eight times as strong in numbers as he was, and in which defeat might be fatal. He felt that with his European force he could maintain the fort of Ágra against all comers. To attempt to defend the station without advancing, was impossible. Was he justified in risking his force, and possibly the loss of the fort, by advancing to meet the enemy in order to save the station of Ágra from destruction?

Brigadier Polwhele was a brave man. Beset by advisers, he had seemed at first to incline to a policy of defence, but when, on the morning of the 5th, he received the information that the enemy was advancing upon Ágra, his soldierly instincts at once asserted themselves. He determined, on his own responsibility, to go and meet them. He decides to meet the enemy.

It was a wise and prudent resolve. The history of India shows us that there is but one plain and simple mode of beating Asiatics, and that is to move straight forward. Their numbers may overwhelm a general if he tries to manoeuvre, but a steady advance is irresistible. It will be seen that Polwhele lost the battle of Sassiah because he did not sufficiently bear in mind the truth of this radical principle. Wisdom of his resolve.

The enemy's force had received considerable reinforcements at Fathpúr-Sikrí. It consisted now of about four thousand infantry, fifteen hundred cavalry, and eleven guns.* To meet these Brigadier Polwhele could dispose of five hundred and sixty-eight men of the 3rd European Regiment; one battery with sixty-nine Europeans, including officers, and fifty-four native drivers; fifty-five mounted militia; and fifty officers and civilians who had taken Numbers of the opposing forces.

* In his official report, Brigadier Polwhele states that, from the most accurate information he was able to gather, the enemy's force consisted of the 72nd Native Infantry; the 7th Regiment Gwáliar contingent; 4th and 6th troops 1st Light Cavalry; four troops of cavalry of Melhidpúr contingent; part of the Kolá contingent; one troop of horse artillery; and one horse field-battery; altogether more than five thousand men

refuge in Ágra. The European Regiment was commanded by Colonel Riddell; the Artillery by Captain D'Oyly. In the disposition of battle, however, the battery was divided,—Captain D'Oyly taking three guns on the right flank—an equal number on the left being commanded by Captain Pearson.

The British force left the Ágra parade-ground about 1 o'clock. It took the road to Fathpúr-Sikri and moved along

it till it reached Begam Samrú's walled gardens. On arriving at the village of Sháhganj, a halt was sounded to wait the return of the reconnoitring parties. These came in about half-past 2 o'clock with the information that the enemy were in strength at the village of Sassiah, about a mile distant. The force then advanced, but, after clearing the village of Sháhganj, it quitted the road, and forming up in the order indicated, the infantry in line in the centre, with the guns and a handful of cavalry covering either flank, inclined to the right over a sandy plain. As they marched across this they descried the enemy. Polwhele noticed that their infantry appeared to be posted in and behind the village of Sassiah; that their artillery likewise was on either flank, but that their guns were screened by rising ground, forming a natural breastwork, and by thickly planted trees. He observed that their cavalry was massed in considerable strength behind their flanks.

The British force advances to Sháhganj.

The enemy are descried.

The English force continued to advance to within half a mile of the enemy's position when the latter opened with a fire from their left battery. Brigadier Polwhele then, halted his men, and ordered the Euro-

They open fire,

peans to lie down and the guns on the flanks to return the fire. Owing to the screened nature of the enemy's position it soon became evident that the British fire was ineffective, and that, to drive the enemy from the village, it was necessary that the infantry should charge. In a short time, in fact, the enemy had acquired the exact range and had made such excellent practice that they exploded two tumbrils, and dismounted one of the guns in the half battery on the left, besides inflicting severe loss amongst the horses and drivers.

and make excellent practice.

Captains D'Oyly and Pearson, promptly realising the situation; that the exchange of artillery fire at the range was all to the advantage of the sheltered enemy; and that a continuance

of the same game would exhaust, without any corresponding advantage, the reserves of ammunition at their disposal; had sent repeated messages to the Brigadier reporting the fact, and urging him to attack the village with his infantry. The enemy, far from being checked, had been encouraged by the success of their guns to throw out skirmishers and to threaten our flanks with their cavalry. Every one in the British ranks who had an eye to see, realised that, if the battle were to be confined to a mere exchange of artillery fire, the enemy would have the advantage. Still, for two hours, the Brigadier seemed content to pursue that fatal course, keeping his infantry still lying down.

Captains
D'Oyly and
Pearson urge
an advance,

but without
success.

Probable
reasons in-
fluencing the
Brigadier.

Those about the Brigadier saw that, in continuing stationary, the Brigadier was simply courting disaster. At any period within those two hours Polwhele was in a more favourable position than Eyre had enjoyed in his fight near Árah. On that occasion Eyre, after pounding his enemy until he found that pounding alone would not win the day, had let loose his infantry upon him. He did not wait till his caissons had been exhausted, till every shot had been fired away! But this is just what Polwhele did do! The fact is, that, tenderness for the lives of the only European infantry available for the defence of Ágra had made him over-cautious. His men were comparatively safe, there, lying down. He could not make up his mind to give, in sufficient time, the order to advance. Fatal caution! Lamentable oblivion of the history of former wars! It needed but an onward movement of that thin red line to drive the enemy out of the village. The guns would then have completed their discomfiture. But minute succeeded minute, and our infantry still lay, prone and motionless, on the ground.

Inaction of the
infantry,

Brigadier Polwhele was yet considering whether the time had arrived to give the order to advance, when the explosion of another tumbril in the half battery on our left warned him that it had all but passed. That explosion was greeted by the enemy with a frantic shout of joy. Their cavalry, emerging in order from behind the village, swept round the left flank to the rear of our force, and from that point made a desperate charge at the disabled guns. Calm and collected, Captain Pearson wheeled

till too late!

(Charge of
the enemy's
cavalry,

round one of his guns and awaited their approach. The company of the 3rd Europeans nearest him rose likewise, and wheeled to face them. A volley of grapo and musketry greeted then the enemy as they charged the guns shouting and waving their swords. That volley sufficed to turn them. They rode back discomfited.

but are
driven off.

Almost immediately after the incident just related one of the enemy's horsemen was seen to approach our right flank, as if to ascertain our condition there. The horseman returned and apparently made his report. At once about two hundred of the enemy's cavalry advanced with the evident intention of charging Captain D'Oyly's half-battery. At this sight, Captain Prendergast, who commanded eighteen mounted volunteers, could not contain himself, but with his small following charged the two hundred. As a manœuvre to stop the enemy's advance this gallant charge was effective, but in other respects it was disastrous. In the hand to hand conflict which followed, the volunteers lost more than one-third of their number. Had the enemy not shown abject cowardice, not one of them would have escaped.

They attack
the right
flank.

Gallant
charge of
Prendergast.

Two hours and a half had elapsed. Captain D'Oyly now reported that his ammunition was all but exhausted. Then, and then only, did the Brigadier give the order to advance. The result showed how decisive would have been the movement had it been made earlier. The British infantry started to their feet, moved forward, and, though suffering severely from the enemy's guns and from the fire of marksmen stationed on the roofs of the houses, gallantly forced their way into the village. One of the enemy's guns was captured and spiked. But our loss in this advance had been severe. The gallant D'Oyly, whose horse had been shot under him early in the day, was mortally wounded by a grape-shot whilst endeavouring to set right one of his guns. Lifted on to a tumbril, he still, however, strong in the spirit of a soldier, continued to direct the fire of his battery. Careless of his own sufferings, his duty to his guns, his corps, his country, mastered every other thought. Overcome, at last, by intense pain, he turned to the man nearest him and said; "They have done for me now; put a stone over

The artillery-
ammunition
is exhausted,

when the
Brigadier
orders the
advance.

D'Oyly's
splendid
conduct.

my grave and say that I died fighting my guns." * He died, the second day after, in the fort.

In the village itself Major Thomas of the 3rd Europeans, a brave and accomplished officer, was mortally wounded. Many men fell with him. Every house, lane, and gateway was disputed. At last the enemy were driven out. It required now but the support of artillery to complete the victory. But here the fatal result of the delay in the advance became apparent. There was not a single round of ammunition left!

To continue the contest with small arms was useless, for the enemy, though driven out of the village itself, still occupied detached houses whence they continued to pour a heavy fire on our men. D'Oyly was mortally wounded: Pearson, with the other half-battery a complete wreck, had lost his only subaltern, Lamb, early in the action, and had suffered so severely in men and horses, and by the desertion of his native drivers with the spare horses, that he could not make a pretence of assisting. Meanwhile the enemy, attributing to the right cause the silence of our guns, and gathering courage, began to make a strong demonstration with all three arms. For all practical purposes Polwhele had only infantry to oppose to them. These, too, occupying the village, in face of a force largely superior in all arms, were liable, at any moment, to be severed from their base, the fort of Ágra. The British object had been to defeat the rebels; failing that, to guard the fortress of Ágra. The rebels had been repulsed, not defeated, and in the repulse the British had exhausted the material which would have sufficed to render it decisive. Under the circumstances the only possible course seemed to be to fall back to secure the base, if indeed even this were possible.

Polwhele then ordered the retreat. To fall back in face of an enemy is always grievous to brave soldiers, but on this occasion with grief were mingled rage and contempt. There was not one, even amongst the privates, who did not feel that the day had been lost by bad generalship; that an early advance would have gained the victory. They showed the stuff that was in them when the

* "If glory be a distinction, for such a man death is not a leveller."—Napier's *Peninsular War*.

enemy's horsemen seemed disposed to endeavour to hinder their movement. Waiting calmly till the enemy approached, somewhat hesitatingly, within musket range, they then delivered a volley which made many a horse riderless. Again and again the rebel cavalry tried the same manoeuvre, but always with a similar result. The fire from the rebel guns, which had been at first alarming, now gradually slackened, and, from the fact that in the last round they fired copper coins, it was inferred that they too had run short of ammunition.

in good order.

Meanwhile Pearson had made superhuman exertions to mount and get away his disabled gun. But horses, drivers, men, and time alike failed him. It did not, however, adorn the enemy's triumph, for it remained on the ground, and a day or two later was brought into the fort.

Pearson tries to save his gun.

Baffled by the result of their attempts to charge, and, probably, by the failure of their ammunition, the rebels, as they followed the retreating force, marked their triumph by setting fire to every building they reached. Returning then to Sháhganj, they took there a hasty meal, and set off that very night for Dehli. They reached the imperial city on the 8th of July, and were received there with a grand salute in honour of their victory of Sassiah.

The enemy, wanting ammunition, move on Dehli.

The beaten little army reached the fort as the day was closing. They had lost in killed forty-five, in wounded and missing one hundred and eight, of their number. Before the survivors entered, the blaze, advancing from house to house in the cantonments and civil station, had told the non-combatants and ladies within the fort how the battle had been appreciated by the natives. Hordes of villagers who had watched the contest from afar had at once dispersed to burn and to plunder. The previously released prisoners, and their comrades, now set at large, joined in the sport. All night the sky was illuminated with the flames of burning houses, and a murmur like the distant sea told what passions were at work. It was a magnificent though sad spectacle for the dispirited occupants of the fort.

The villagers "improve" our defeat.

During the two days following disorder was rampant in and outside the fort. The city, the cantonments, the civil lines were ruthlessly plundered. Of all the official records those only of the revenue department

The city and the station are plundered.

were saved. Even these were secured by the unauthorised action of a high official—Mr. E. A. Reade. The others were burned with the buildings in which they were stored. At the same time the King of Dehlí was proclaimed in the city.* The rabble, who had at first wondered at our inaction after a battle which, if we were beaten in it, had at least caused the enemy to move off to Dehlí, soon began to attribute it to fear, and to take advantage of it accordingly.

But there were men amongst them of a higher stamp who knew us better. One of these, by name Rájárám, a resident in the city, managed on the evening of the 7th to have conveyed to the magistrate within the fort a note in which he informed him that there were no rebel troops in Ágra; that the confusion which reigned was the work of the rabble; and that the entry of the magistrate into the city with a sufficient force would restore order.

An intimation of this nature was quite sufficient to stir to action a man possessing the energetic character of Mr. Drummond. The following morning he issued from the fort, escorted by a company of Europeans and some guns, made a circuit of the principal streets and of the station, and proclaimed the restoration of order and British rule. Then, too, he became for the first time aware of the manner in which the rabble had vented their fury upon the Christian population who had hesitated to avail themselves of the protection of the fort. It happened that whilst the great bulk of the European and Eurasian inhabitants had taken advantage of that protection, there had been men of the latter class, born in India, natives in habits, in modes of thought, in everything save religion, who preferred to confide in the friendship of their native friends: these had been sought out and slaughtered. At the same time, too, some Europeans on their way to the fort had been intercepted and murdered. The

* "On the morning after the battle the town crier, at the order of Murad Áli Kotwál, proclaimed the reign of the King of Dehlí through the city. The armed procession that accompanied the crier was composed of most of the leading Muhammadan police officers attached to the Kotwálí headed by the Kotwál himself, and followed by a crowd of inferior grades and rabble: there is no reason to suppose that a single Muhammadan of any respectability was in any way engaged or accessory to this proceeding."—Mr. Phillipps's *Narrative*, already referred to.

number of both these classes who thus fell outside the fort amounted to twenty-two.*

The restoration of order in the fort followed Mr. Drummond's action in the town. The natives of the lower class, prompt to appreciate decision, returned as if by magic to their duties. Prior to Mr. Drummond's triumphant tour through the city, there had been a great dearth of servants in the fort; but the day following small shopkeepers flocked in with provisions; domestics of every grade were eager to renew or proffer service. The battle of Sassiah had at all events cleared the air. The natives had seen the utmost the rebel troops could accomplish; and their faith in British ascendancy revived.

Order also
revives in
the fort.

Now began that long life in the fort of Ágra,—so tedious for soldiers, so conspicuous for the display of those splendid qualities which render a noble woman in very deed a ministering angel. The story has been told in graceful and touching language by one, herself a widowed fugitive from Gwáliár,—from whose account of the tragedy there I have already quoted†—and whose own sufferings never made her forget the griefs and necessities of others. There are some points in it which demand a place in History.

Life in
the fort.

As soon as the restoration of order outside the fortress had been completed, arrangements were made to provide for the necessities of the Christian population within. In addition to the residents of Ágra

Difficulties
which had at
first to be
overcome.

* Of these fifteen were men, four were women, and three were children. Most of them were slaughtered by our own rebellious police. Amongst them were Mr. Hubbard, Professor of literature, Ágra College; Mr. Hare, an old and paralytic man, and his son; Mr. Christie; Major Jacobs; Mr. and Mrs. Dennis; Mr. and Mrs. Derriden and their three children. A curious circumstance is related in connection with the murder of these last, illustrative of the fidelity, so often evinced during the mutiny, of native servants to their masters. Mr. and Mrs. Derriden and three children were murdered at the door of their house by a gang of Muhammadans. They had three other children and a Muhammadan nurse. Whilst her master and mistress were being killed this nurse was severely wounded. But with rare fidelity she carried two of the other children to the Kotwáli, and watched over their safety there. They were made over to Mr. Drummond as he rode through the city on the 8th. The third surviving boy, aged twelve, escaped by creeping through the legs of the assassins, and alone traversed the city in safety till he arrived at the fort. —Phillipps's *Narrative*.

† *A Lady's Escape from Gwáliár*, by Mrs. Coopland.

there were congregated there fugitives from many stations. The majority of these had lost all their property. Some had reached Ágra only with the clothes which they wore. A not inconsiderable proportion were children. It was difficult to provide for these all at once. For, it must be remembered, the non-combatant population of Ágra had been prohibited, prior to the mutiny of the Kotá contingent, to take with them into the fort more than the contents of a small hand-bag. Nor had this state of things been wholly remedied by the removal of Mr. Colvin and the civilians to the same protection. No one had seriously contemplated the defeat of our troops at Sassiah. Our force had marched out of the station the better to defend the station. No one had anticipated the actual result. The blaze of the burning bungalows which announced it gave to many, then, the first intimation that the bulk even of their wearing apparel had been lost to them for ever.

But, notwithstanding these and other more serious losses, the love of order, of arrangement, and of comfort, so characteristic of the British nation, quickly manifested itself.

The first necessity had been to set apart one of the buildings as a hospital for the sick and wounded. At first a barrack was selected for this purpose. At a later period the Motí Masjid, or Pearl Mosque, was also appropriated to the same object. This building, built entirely of a beautiful creamy white marble, was well fitted to be used as a hospital on account of the cloisters and cells by which its inner court was surrounded. These, formerly inhabited by priests and devotees, were now made over to those suffering from their wounds, their privations, or the climate. The civilians of Ágra were lodged in the small apartments ranged along three sides of the beautiful garden near the Díwání kháss, or privy-council chamber. For others, fugitive ladies and children, huts, separated the one from the other by grass screens, silky, strong, and flexible, were arranged in the stone gallery, twelve feet wide, the roof supported on arches, which runs round the Díwání'ám, the public hall of audience of Akbar.* To the senior officers and their families were allotted

* "The officers who had the allotting of the quarters (a task that was no sinecure) had appointed to us each one arch, which we divided as I have before described. The temporary partitions of grass were so thin that you could hear every word uttered in the next division."—*A Lady's Escape from Gwalíár*.

small tiled houses near the Motí Masjid. Separate houses were also made over to fugitives of distinction. For the officers, officers of a lower rank tents were pitched on a large green plot near the same building. The Roman Catholic Archbishop and his ecclesiastical staff were similarly accommodated. To the nuns and their numerous the priests and nuns, pupils were assigned the sheds or store-rooms where the gun-carriages had stood.* The Protestant chaplains had comfortable quarters, and the missionaries lived in the Palace garden. To the unmarried soldiers was assigned the soldiers, one set of barracks, whilst the married with their families occupied another set. These latter had saved their furniture and lived in comparative comfort. Those of the Europeans most to be pitied, in point of accommodation, were the merchants and shopkeepers. They had to content themselves with erecting small grass huts on the archways and tops of buildings. The shopkeepers, and the Eurasians, Eurasians were still less comfortably provided for. They had to find an abiding place "anywhere."† The total number of Europeans in the fort in July amounted to one thousand nine hundred and eighty-nine. Of these one thousand and sixty-five were men, the rest women and children. In addition there were three thousand eight hundred and fifty-six Eurasians and Natives. The total number in the Fort.

So much for the accommodation. In the course of a few days the various habitations came to be classified as "blocks" alphabetically arranged. This was the first dawn of order and arrangement. Several of the archways or vestibules within the fort were about the same time converted into shops; one into a post office. In the shops were sold the European stores which had escaped the savage instincts of the rabble. For some days no butcher's meat was procurable; but after the restoration of order in the city this defect was Further arrangements for supplies.

* "They turned one large room or storehouse into a chapel and fitted it up marvellously well with crucifixes, altars, and candlesticks."—*A Lady's Escape from Gwalior*.

† I have taken these details from Mrs. Coopland's book. Regarding the Eurasians she writes: "The half-caste, or 'Kalā Faringhī,' as the natives call them, who are uncharitably said to have the vices of both different races and the virtues of neither, were in immense swarms and had to accommodate themselves anywhere. A large number of them lived in our 'square' just beneath our balcony" (the balcony of the Dīwānī ān); "the rest lived in holes, tyconnds, or on tops of buildings all over the fort."

partly remedied, and the residents were supplied by the Commissariat Department. As time went on the natives began to bring in from outside, fowls, eggs, and butter.

But, if the accommodation was rough and the privations were for a long time great, there were those who were prevented by no personal suffering from devoting themselves to the wants of others. Before even the men wounded at the battle of Sassiah had been deposited in the first improvised hospital, mattresses, pillows, and quilts, which the ladies had been preparing for the event, had been arranged on hastily manufactured wooden cots. The ladies then formed themselves into a committee to assist the doctors in ministering to the wounded. At the request of the senior medical officer, Dr. Farquhar, one lady, Mrs. Raikes, undertook to preside over this committee. The ladies were then divided into watches, and to these watches certain hours during the day and night were apportioned. To avoid teasing the men by too much nursing, a small separate room was made up for the lady nurses. From this, at stated times, they issued and went their rounds distributing tea, jelly, soda-water, coffee, and soup, or helping to dress the wounds of the patients under the orders of the medical officers.*

Meanwhile the Government stores within the fort were opened for the supply of clothing to those who most needed it. By degrees tailors were admitted from outside, and, though the demeanour of these and other domestics was not always respectful, they showed yet the same regard as of yore for the punctually paid monthly stipend.

It is gratifying to be able to record that the charity and devotion to the cares and sorrows of others displayed in the Ágra fortress knew no differences of religion. There was no place for the display of narrowness on

Devotion of the ladies to the sick and wounded.

Charity knows no creed.

* Raikes's *Notes on the Revolt*. Mr. Raikes adds the following tribute to the feeling and conduct of the British soldier. "For weeks that the ladies watched over their charge never was a word said by a soldier which could shock the gentlest ear. When all was over, and when such of the sick and wounded that recovered were declared convalescent, the soldiers, in order, as they expressed it, to show their gratitude for the conduct of the ladies, modestly asked permission to invite their nurses and all the gentry and society of Ágra to an entertainment in the beautiful gardens of the Taj. There, under the walls of the marble mausoleum, amidst flowers and music, these rough veterans, all scarred and mutilated as they were, stood up to thank their countrywomen who had clothed, fed, and visited them when they were sick."

the one side or of bigotry on the other. The minute inquiries I have on this subject have convinced me that in their several spheres Catholic and Protestant strove to their utmost to do their duty to their neighbour.

The Civil Government all this time existed, but for all purposes of defence and provisionment the administration was in the hands of the military. Subsequently to his defeat at Sassiah Brigadier Polwhele had, by express orders from the Governor-General, been removed from command.* His place was taken by Colonel Cotton. That officer speedily inaugurated vigorous measures. The defences of the fortress were strengthened and increased; numerous guns were mounted on the ramparts; the want of garrison artillerymen was supplied by the enlistment of promising Eurasians to form gun detachments; from the same class volunteers were called and selected and trained to serve as drivers; the powder magazines were covered by mud ramparts to protect them alike against treacherous attack and against the chances of being shelled. It must be recollected that all this time the Gwáliár contingent, possessing numerous field guns and a heavy battering train, was within seventy miles of Ágra; that its leaders were constantly boasting that they would attack Ágra; and that they were with difficulty restrained by Mahárájah Sindhiá. Inside the fortress was Major C. Maepherison, the agent for the Governor-General at Sindhiá's court. His communications with Sindhiá were daily. The nature of them led the garrison to believe that they were always liable to an attack from that formidable contingent. They could not be certain that the loyalty of the Mahárájah and his minister would for ever be able to restrain the pressure of the soldiers. And this uncertainty, whilst it added no little to the difficulties of the garrison, hastened the completion of defensive preparations.

Amongst these was the provisionment of the fortress. The cares of the Commissariat Department in this respect were greatly lightened by the influence exerted by a character well known in Indian history, Lálá Jotí Parshád, a contractor whose successful

Brigadier
Polwhele is
removed.

Measures
taken by his
successor.

Dangers to
which the
garrison
were exposed.

The Commis-
sariat Depart-
ment.

* This order, dated 26th of July, was received in Ágra on the 5th of August.

provisionment of the army during the Afghan, the Sikh, and the Gwáliár wars had gained him a great and deserved reputation. A bazaar was established immediately outside the fortifications and quickly assumed the proportions of a regular market.

By degrees it began to be considered possible to organise an expedition for the relief of the neighbouring districts. Of these Áligarh, commanding the direct road to Dehlí, was the most important. Colonel Cotton, accordingly, equipped a small force composed of three companies of Europeans, three guns, thirty of the volunteer cavalry, and a few trustworthy native mounted levies; placed the whole under the command of Major Montgomery, the Brigade Major, having under him, as commandant of the volunteer cavalry, the gallant de Kantzow, famous for his conduct at Mainpúrí; and detached it for the purpose indicated. Leaving

August 24. Ágra on the 20th of August, the force reached Áligarh on the 24th. They found the rebels, consisting of a large body of Gházís (fanatics) and a detachment of the 3rd Cavalry, in the occupation of a walled garden. Montgomery found it difficult to ascertain the precise position of the main body of the enemy, but, some of their cavalry having been noted outside and on the left of the enclosure, he directed de Kantzow to dislodge them. That officer did not require more explicit instructions. Addressing a few words to the volunteers, he placed himself at their head and led them straight at the enemy. The rebels watched the approach of this handful of Europeans without flinching till they were within shot. They then raised their carbines and fired. A second later, and

The rebels there are defeated. without waiting to ascertain the result of their volley, they turned their horses' heads and fled. Meanwhile the Gházís emerging from the enclosure had attacked our infantry. A considerable number of them, dressed in garments white as the driven snow, suddenly dashed from the enclosure, flourishing their scimitars aloft, and crying out "Religion!" "Victory!" rushed on the advanced skirmishers of the Europeans. They fought with a desperation so furious and with a rage so frantic that it became necessary to bring up the guns to bear upon them. Then they retired, and our infantry, dashing after them, completed the overthrow. The Gházís and their allies were then driven out of Áligarh.

This was the last operation on anything like a large scale

in which the Ágra force was engaged until after the fall of Dehli. But before relating the manner in which that "crowning mercy" was achieved, it is necessary to turn to the events which were happening during this period in the districts on the left bank of the Jamnah—events less affecting Ágra than the operations in the vicinity of Lakhnao and of Dehli.

During a great portion of this period Mr. Colvin still continued to administer the duties attaching to his high office. But he was no longer the strong man Mr. Colvin's health fails. hoping for the prompt repression of the rebellion that he once had been. It was not alone the revolt that had broken him. The uprooting of convictions deeply held and long clung to had been a blow hard to bear. But it was rather the sense of his inability to restore order in his own provinces; the forced isolation to which events condemned him; the compulsory inaction; that preyed most deeply upon him. Of the fine courage, the devotion to duty, the earnest consideration for others, which had characterised his career, there never was the smallest abatement. These noble qualities shone brightly to his very last hour. Warned by his medical advisers that continued attention to the details of office would be fatal, that he required perfect rest of body and mind, Mr. Colvin refused, nevertheless, to relinquish the smallest of the duties attaching to his high office. He felt that it would ill become He continues, nevertheless, to perform the duties of his office. the captain to leave the deck of his ship when she was drifting on to a lee shore, the breakers almost in sight; that, ill as he was, it was his duty to set an example; and that, as he must die some day, it was better that he should die in the performance of duties for which he yet had strength, rather than seek to prolong his existence by casting his cares upon another.

Few will question the nobility of soul which prompted Mr. Colvin to direct the course of the State-vessel to the very last. It has been thought that he might perhaps have advantageously consented to leave some of the minor details to his subordinates. But when Mr. Raikes, a judge of the Court of Appeal at Ágra, wrote, so late as July, that if he wanted a sword or a pistol from the magazine Mr. Colvin's counter-signature was necessary, he only exposed the red-tape system of administration which flourished then, and which probably flourishes still, in other countries as well as in India. He exposed a system which was then Faults of the red-tape system.

ingrained in the country. It was but a briek in the wall of Indian administration. The reform of the system was necessary, but it could scarcely have been undertaken during the mutiny. It was not routine duties of this nature that affected Mr. Colvin. The real pressure which broke him down has been already indicated.

“Early in September,” wrote Mr. Raikes in his journal, “Mr. Colvin asked me to prepare a plan for the restoration of the Police in the North-Western Provinces, and I submitted a note on the subject; on the 7th I called to talk over the matter, but found the Lieutenant-Governor too ill to attend to business. On Wednesday, the 9th, to our great sorrow, he died, and on the next day, I, as pall-bearer, paid my last tribute of respect to his memory. After ruling over the fairest provinces of India in her palmiest days he died without secure possession of an acre of ground beyond the Fort, and his body was interred within the walls.”

Thus died in the performance of his duty, before the dawn of the triumph of which he never despaired, the brave, true-hearted, and noble Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces. Whatever failings or prejudices he may have had, they are all obliterated by the recollection of the earnestness, the single-mindedness, the devotion to duty that characterised him in a most critical period. He was sustained to the last by the consciousness that “he had not shrunk from bearing the burden which God had called upon him to sustain”; by the conviction that he had performed his duty to his God and to his country, and that he had ever striven to have a conscience void of offence towards God and man. His death was deeply felt by all with whom he was connected by private friendship or by official ties; and the Government of India only gave utterance to a feeling that pervaded all classes when by a notification in the Official Gazette it paid a just tribute to his name and memory.*

* The following is the text of the notification referred to: “It is the melancholy duty of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council to announce the death of the Honourable John Russell Colvin, the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces.

“Worn by the unceasing anxieties and labours of his charge, which placed him in the very front of the dangers by which, of late, India has been threatened, health and strength gave way; and the Governor-General in

CHAPTER VI.

THE NORTH-WEST PROVINCES.

IN the first chapter of this Book I have described the mutiny of the 9th Regiment of Native Infantry cantoned in detachments at the stations of Áligarh, Mainpúrí, Itáwah, and Balandshahr. It remains now to give an account of the subsequent occurrences in the districts represented by those stations, and in the districts adjoining; and of the action induced by the mutinous feeling in the province of Rohilkhand.

I propose in the first instance to take the reader back to the station of Áligarh. The mutiny at that station, occurring on the 20th of May, has been already related.* Intelligence of this disaster had reached the Lieutenant-Governor on the 21st. Mr Colvin at once organised an expedition to hold the line. Acting under his orders, Captain Alexander, commanding 1st Irregular Cavalry Gwáliár contingent, sent by Sindhiá to aid in maintaining order, detached Lieutenant Cockburn, with two hundred and

Despatch of
Sindhiá's
troops to the
districts.

Council has to deplore with sincere grief the loss of one of the most distinguished amongst the servants of the East India Company.

"The death of Mr. Colvin has occurred at a time when his ripe experience, his high ability, and his untiring energy would have been more than usually valuable to the State.

"But his career did not close before he had won for himself a high reputation in each of the various branches of administration to which he was at different times attached, nor until he had been worthily selected to fill the highest position in Northern India; and he leaves a name which not friends alone, but all who have been associated with him in the duties of Government, and all who may follow in his path, will delight to honour.

"The Right Honourable the Governor-General directs that the flag shall be lowered half-mast high, and that seventeen minute guns shall be fired at the seat of government in India upon the receipt of the present notification."

* Page 102.

thirty-three troopers, on the 13th, to Áligarh. Cockburn, making forced marches, reached that place on the 26th.

He arrived in time to protect and to escort to Háthras, a walled town twenty-two miles distant, the Europeans who had till then maintained their position in the vicinity of Áligarh. At Háthras, however, about a hundred of his men, principally Muhammadans, rebelled, and, after having vainly attempted to invite their comrades to join them, rode off to stir up the villagers in the districts. But Cockburn, though his party was reduced to a hundred and twenty-three men,

1857.
May 26.
Some of them
mutiny at
Háthras.

resolved to be even with his revolted troopers. Receiving information that they had been joined by about five hundred villagers, and that these were organising a system of plunder and murder, Cockburn formed a plan by which to entrap them. He procured a curtained bullock cart, such as native women generally travel in. Inside this cart he placed four troopers with loaded carbines, and drew the curtains. He then sent the cart on the road towards the rebel camp, he following with his main body under the shade of some trees. No sooner did the rebels see the cart than they dashed forward to secure the lady whom they imagined to be inside. The troopers behind the curtains waited till the foremost men approached, when they discharged their carbines with fatal effect. On the sound of the discharge, Cockburn and his men dashed forward, killed forty-eight of the surprised foe, and dispersed the remainder.

Cockburn out-
manœuvres
the rebels.

An action like this was, however, but a transient gleam of sunshine. To aid in pacifying the districts, Mr. Colvin had ordered thither, likewise, detachments of the 2nd Cavalry, under Captain Burlton and Lieutenant Salmond, and Captain Pearson's battery of the Gwáliár contingent. Lieutenant Cockburn's detachment had also been strengthened by the main body of his regiment, the 1st, under Captain Alexander. Up to a certain point, the men belonging to these several arms and detachments behaved perfectly well. Gradually, however, as the villagers rose on every side, the pressure became too much

The detach-
ments of the
Gwáliár con-
tingent
mutiny.

for them. (On the 1st of July, the 1st Cavalry, then at Háthras, mutinied. The men showed no ill-feeling towards their officers, but simply told them they must go. When hundreds with arms in their hands issue orders to

July 1.

units, the units must obey. Alexander and the officers with him had, then, nothing for it but to ride for Ágra, a journey they successfully accomplished. The following day, the men of the Artillery, under Pearson, and those of the 2nd Cavalry, commanded by Burlton, and then stationed at Sânsí, seven miles beyond Háthras, incited by letters from their comrades at that place, likewise rose in revolt, and intimated to their officers that they no longer required them. Pearson, Burlton, and Salmond did all that men could do to keep their men true, but in vain. The men still insisted on joining their comrades at Háthras. The cavalry started off the following morning for that place, their officers still accompanying them. There, having effected a junction with the 1st Cavalry, they once again, in a very peremptory manner, insisted that their officers should leave them. Burlton, Salmond, and the surgeon, Dalzell, at once then took the road to Ágra. Shortly afterwards, Pearson, who had clung to his battery, arrived with his mutinous gunners. The only other European with him was his staff-sergeant. Pearson found the two regiments of cavalry drawn up as if on parade. He rode up to them, received their salutes, questioned them about their officers, and was told they had left for Ágra. He then calmly and coolly rode down their ranks, speaking to the men he knew, and exchanging greetings with the native officers. His position was full of peril. At any moment he might have been shot down. An imprudent gesture, a sign of alarm, would have been fatal to him. But Pearson was equal to the occasion. He continued his ride down the ranks coolly, followed by his sergeant, mounted on his second charger; nor did he change his pace till the line had been well cleared. He and the sergeant then put spurs to their horses. A little beyond the village they overtook the cavalry officers. The whole party then rode on, hiding by day, and reached Ágra in time to share in the disaster of the 5th.

Courage and coolness of Captain Pearson.

The officers escape to Ágra

It is remarkable that the men made no attempt to molest them. Most remarkable when the fact is taken into consideration, that the foot-soldiers of the same contingent evinced the most bloodthirsty feelings towards their officers! Could there have been any significance in the fact that the cavalry soldiers were mostly Muhammadans, whilst nineteen-twentieths of the infantry men were Hindús? more I cannot say. The fact, how-

Were the Muhammadans less bloodthirsty than the Hindús?

deserves to be considered in connection with the cause of the rebellion.

Meanwhile, some well-mounted volunteers, consisting of civilians, of officers whose regiments had mutinied, of clerks in public offices, of planters, of shopkeepers, all animated by one feeling, had been doing good service in the districts. Their first act had been to relieve a body of six or seven of their countrymen, besieged by the rebels in an indigo factory. They then pushed on to Áligarh, where they were joined by Mr. Watson, the magistrate, a man of remarkable courage, and by others. They now discovered, however, that the rebellion had grown beyond their strength; so, unable to coerce the revolted villages, they gradually fell back on Ágra. Twelve* of them, however, disdaining a retreat so rapid, remained behind, occupying a factory about five miles from Áligarh. But, resolute as were these men, they, too, were forced to retreat when the Gwáliár cavalry mutinied. On the concentration of the volunteers at Ágra, they were employed as pickets on the Mathurá road to watch the approach of the Nímach brigade. How they behaved towards that brigade has been already related.

It will thus be seen that the efforts of the Government of the North-West Provinces to stay the plague in the districts lying on the left bank of the Jamnah, between Dehlí and Ágra had signally failed. In the more northerly districts, and in the districts of the Rohilkhand division, rebellion had been even more rampant and more successful.

Although the troops in Rohilkhand rose in revolt a few days earlier than did those in the more northerly districts, the plan of the narrative, leading southwards to Kánhpúr and Lakhnáo, renders it necessary that the latter should in the first instance be considered. I therefore propose to carry the reader with me to the districts known as Saháranpúr and Muzaffarnagar, to descend thence through Rohilkhand to Fathgarh.

The station of Saháranpúr was, before the mutiny, essentially a civil station. It was situated on the bank of the Damáula Nadí, about two miles from the city of

* Cocks, Watson, and Outram, C.S.; Saunders and Tandy, planters; Stewart Clarke, surgeon; Castle, Ilinde, Burkinyoung, and Harington; Ensigns Marsh and Oliphant.

the same name, and which was the capital or chief town of the district, also called Saháranpúr. The population of the town amounted to about forty thousand—many of them Muhammdans, with rather a bad character for turbulence. In the earlier portion of the present century Saháranpúr had been one of the frontier stations of the British territories. To guard it, a rather strong fort had been built on its northern face. But to such an extent did confidence in their star override in those days all suggestions of prudence in the British mind, that, on the extension of our frontier, the executive of the day had converted the fort into a civil gaol, whilst the same authority had allowed the Stud Department to run up the ditches and mud walls of their paddocks so close to the ramparts of the said gaol, that it would have been easy from their cover to pick off the sentries on its walls.

Description
of the civil
station.

When the mutiny broke out at Míráth, the European male population of Saháranpúr, including clerks, numbered only six or seven persons. The Eurasians were scarcely more numerous. There was over the treasury a native guard of some seventy or eighty Sipáhis, commanded by a native officer, and furnished by the 29th Native Infantry from Murádábád. The civil gaol guard, numbering about a hundred men, in addition to their duties connected with the gaol, furnished guards to the civil officers' houses. Throughout the district likewise, was scattered the ordinary police force, amply sufficient in times of peace* to repress the disorder of a population numbering even nearly a million souls.

Heads of its
population.

The position of Saháranpúr was in every respect of great importance. It was the point whence the road led to Dehrá and to the hill stations of Masúrí and Landáur; it was contiguous to Rúrki, from the canal establishments of which the army before Dehlí was largely supplied with men and materials for forwarding the siege; and it was the seat of one of the Government studs. Yet now the entire district, comprising likewise the Engineering College, the canal workshops and costly aqueducts, seemed to be at the mercy of the Sipáhis and the disaffected natives, for there were no European troops who could be summoned with any hope that the call would be responded to. There were

Importance
of its situa-
tion.

* Robertson's *District Duties during the Revolt.*

indeed European troops at Míráth, some seventy miles distant. But, until after the fall of Dehli, timidity bordering upon panic; selfishness, utterly neglectful of the general public weal; ruled with fatal effect the military counsels at that station.

Fortunately there were men at Saháranpúr whose bold spirit and ready resource supplied the place of soldiers. The magistrate, Mr. Robert Spankie, was an able public servant, full of energy and mental power. His lieutenant, Mr. Dundas Robertson, joined to a manly and energetic nature a clear head and a coolness not to be surpassed. A fit associate with these was Lieutenant Brownlow, of the Engineers, cool, daring, enterprising, and resolute. With such men at Saháranpúr there was yet a glimmering of hope that the crisis might be surmounted.

The news of the outbreak at Míráth reached Saháranpúr on the evening of the 14th of May; that of the massacres at Dehli on the following day. Mr. Spankie at once convened a meeting of the residents. At the meeting it was decided to hold the station, but to despatch the women and children to Masúrí. This arrangement was carried out at once. As soon as possible after the departure of the ladies, those of the gentlemen of the station who had remained behind* determined to unite and occupy one house. The clerks and Eurasians, invited to join them, showed at first some disinclination, but in a day or two they changed their minds and acceded to the proposal.†

Space will not permit me to detail in full the preliminary dangers which threatened these few bold men. Now, it was the mutiny at the not distant station of Muzaffarnagar; now, it was the approach of two mutinous companies of the sappers and miners; now, a combination of the villagers to attack them. This last-named danger, a very serious one, was warded off by acting on the principle, so conspicuous during the mutiny, and so successful whenever acted upon, that "boldness is prudence." Instead of waiting for the intended onslaught, Mr. Robertson, enlisting in his cause some influential and well-disposed land-owners, anticipated it by attacking and capturing the conspira-

Mr. Robert
Spankie.

Mr. Dundas
Robertson.

They send
the non-com-
batants to
Masúrí.

Dangers that
threatened
Saháranpúr.

* Two had quitted it, ostensibly to escort the ladies.

† *District Duties during the Revolt*, page 25.

tors. Continuing to pursue this policy, Mr. Robertson, taking with him a few of the 4th Lanciers (native), a detachment of the 29th Native Infantry, and some police, proceeded to the most important and the most disaffected parts of the district to assert British authority. By a combination of tact and daring Mr. Robertson accomplished a great deal. He soon ascertained, however, that the landowners sympathised with the rabble, and that the fact that rebellion, not plunder, was their object, would make his task extremely difficult. Further success, he felt, would depend on the fidelity of the Sipáhis. Hitherto these had shown no sign of wavering, but very soon there appeared amongst them the symptoms of disaffection so common elsewhere. On the 30th of May, Mr. Robertson had been joined by two companies of the 5th Regiment of Native Infantry. These mutinied on the 3rd of June. Undaunted, the gallant civilian still continued his noble efforts in the cause of order; nor, though the detachment of the 29th Native Infantry revolted on the 11th of July, did he, or his superior, for one single hour relax their hold on the district. This was still virtually British when the fall of Delhi removed from the native mind the calculations which till then had inspired them to resist.

Zeal and energy displayed by Mr. Robertson.

Disaffection amongst the Sipáhis.

Mr. Robertson holds his ground notwithstanding.

At the civil station of Muzaffarnagar, about midway between Saháranpúr and Míráth, the native guard over the treasury was furnished by the 20th Regiment of Native Infantry, quartered at Míráth. This regiment had taken a prominent part in the famous outbreak of the 10th of May. It was not to be expected, therefore, that the detachment would abstain from following the example set at head-quarters. For three days, however, it did abstain. Nor did the Sipáhis composing it make any demonstration until the British magistrate on the spot had given a signal proof of his belief in the collapse of British rule. That official, Mr. Berford, with a precipitancy as unworthy as it was rare, closed the public offices on the receipt of the bad news from Míráth. He subsequently took refuge in a small house in the town, withdrawing the guards posted over the gaol for his own personal protection. The consequence of this abnegation of authority was the rise in revolt of the inhabitants of the district. Landowners and peasants

Muzaffarnagar.

Mr. Berford.

The population rises.

alike believed that the sun of British rule had set, never to rise again. Every man who had a grievance, the plunderers by profession, the plunderers by opportunity, seized the golden chance.

and the
Sipáhis
mutiny.

Nor were the Sipáhis then backward. They broke open the treasury, carried away all they could convey, and marched for Murádábád. The bulk of the plundered money fell to the townspeople and district revolvers. There was no one to prevent or to remonstrate with them. Authority had disappeared with Mr. Berford.

But the risings in the northerly portions of the North-West Provinces were trifling compared with those in Rohilkhand. The principal station in Rohilkhand is Baréli. Here, in 1857, were cantoned the 8th Irregular Cavalry, the 18th and 68th Native Infantry, and a native battery of Artillery. The brigade was commanded by Brigadier Sibbald. (Baréli was likewise the chief civil station in Rohilkhand, being the head-quarters of the Commissioner.) The Christian population, including Eurasians, somewhat exceeded a hundred in number.

The garrison
of Baréli.

The uneasy feeling amongst the native troops, which had manifested itself so strongly in Bengal in the month of March, gradually travelling up country, had reached Baréli in April. During that month the men of the infantry regiments there stationed questioned their officers regarding the new cartridges, and asked pointedly whether it were true that those cartridges were greased with the fat of the cow and of the pig. The reply given by the officers was apparently satisfactory, for the excitement created by the rumour almost at once subsided. But the introduction into the regiments of the new musket drill again roused suspicion. The natives of India are essentially conservative in their views. A ease for innovation must be very clearly put to convince them. The Sipáhis at Baréli, their minds prone to suspicion, could not then understand the reason why, for any military purpose, a new musket or a new musketry drill should be necessary. "We and our fathers," they said, "have conquered Hindustan with the present musket; what is the use of a new one?" They continued, however, to practise the new drill, and, when taught singly, even touched the cartridges, though with evident dislike.

Excitement
at that
station.

The reasoning
of the Sipáhis.

Up to the beginning of the second week of May the men

when drilled together, by companies, had been taught only the new bayonet exercise. But in the second week it was deemed advisable to instruct them in the new system of ball-practice. The experiment began with the grenadier company of the 18th Native Infantry. But only one round per man was served out.

It happened that an arrangement previously considered—by which the guns of the battery were to be moved from their actual position close to the practice-ground*—had taken effect early on the very morning on which it had been decided that the men of the grenadier company of the 18th Native Infantry should make their first experiment with the new ammunition. To the minds of the Sipáhis, already over-excited, this change in the position of the guns

Their minds
prone to sus-
picion.

was a new revelation. The suspicion flashed upon their minds that the guns had been shifted with the sole object to decoy them into using the obnoxious eartridges. This, too, accounted for the fact, which at the time had seemed so strange to them, that only one round of ball ammunition had been served out to each man. They would thus be formed up on

the practice-ground, they argued, practically defenceless, liable, at a given word, to be swept away by the guns. The suspicion, soon become conviction,

Panic caused
by the change
in position of
the guns.

spread to the entire regiment. The grenadier company had already set out. A considerable number of the men of the other companies ran then to the artillery lines to upbraid the gunners for thus aiding the attempt to take away their comrades' caste; but the bulk of them, gloomy, anxious, but determined, waited in their lines the booming of the guns, or the return of the grenadiers. When these appeared, unharmed, the excitement for the moment cooled.

News of the
Mírath mu-
tiny.

Only, however, for the moment. The same day brought to the station news of the mutiny at Mírath, of the disaffection of the districts round Baréli, and

* The real object was to place the guns under the charge of the 8th Irregular Cavalry. They were in fact regularly confided to that corps. It will be seen in the text that subsequently they were withdrawn, and restored to their own men. This restoration was a part of the feigning-confidence policy so popular in the Government circles of Calcutta. The Subahdár of the Artillery, whose tearful protestations in favour of the restoration of the guns excited the sympathy of many, subsequently assumed the command of the rebellious brigade, and eventually commanded in chief at Dehli. His name was Bakht Khan.

of evil dispositions manifested by the native regiment stationed at Murádábád.

This was on the 14th. The Brigadier, Sibbald, was absent on a tour of inspection. His place was temporarily occupied by Colonel Colin Troup, a gallant and distinguished officer. Colonel Troup had not been an indifferent spectator of all that had been going on in the native army during the preceding two months. But, experienced as he was, shrewd, clever, and discerning beyond most of the old officers of the Company's army, not even Colonel Troup had detected the radical cause of the disease he was called upon to combat. He believed that it could be cured by persuasion, by an unbounded display of confidence, by, in fact, treating the Sipáhis as one would treat naughty children, by assuring them that all previous offences would be condoned, if they would behave well for the future. In a word, he was a believer in Mr. Beadon's theory of "a passing and groundless panic."

But Colonel Troup did not the less take every possible measure to meet an emergency which he foresaw might at any moment arrive. Of all the regiments under his command he believed most implicitly in the 8th Irregular Cavalry.

The antecedents of that regiment gave him reason for his belief. Not only was it a splendid regiment, well manned, well horsed, and well commanded, but it had but a very short period before come forward at a critical period to show its readiness to proceed wherever the interests of the British service might demand its presence. When, in 1852, the 38th Regiment of Native Infantry had refused to proceed to Pegu, on the ground that the caste of the men would be ruined by a sea voyage of eight days, the 8th Irregulars had volunteered to sail thither. Taken at their word,

they marched from Hánsi to the port of embarkation, a distance of a thousand miles, without losing a single man from desertion. Proceeding by sea to Pegu, they not only rendered there most excellent service, but made themselves remarkable for their discipline and their intelligence. Their native officers were men of good family, given to manly and intellectual pursuits, and proud of their regiment and their service.

The acting commandant of this regiment was Captain Alexander Mackenzie. Captain Mackenzie had been

Colonel Collin
Troup.

Is in favour
of persuasive
measures.

The 8th Irre-
gular Cavalry.

Their favour-
able antece-
dents.

Captain A. M.
Mackenzie.

some years with the 8th. He had served with it as adjutant and as second in command. He was devoted to the regiment, gave to it his undivided care, and was unsurpassed in all the qualities of a commanding officer. He was well supported by his second in command, Lieutenant Beeher.

Up to the period at which my narrative has arrived the conduct of this regiment had been most exemplary. Colonel Troup, then, looking at its antecedents and at its actual behaviour, had reason to regard it as his mainstay in case of an outbreak.

It was, I have said, on the 14th of May, that the evil news from the outer world reached Baréli. Colonel Troup at once directed that the strength of the regiment he most trusted should be doubled; he wrote to the civil authorities requesting them to place under his orders all the sawárs, or horse patrols, in their districts; he recalled all officers from leave; and he recommended that the ladies and children, in fact, all the European women and children, should be sent off to the hill station of Nainí Tál.* Large cavalry pickets were thrown out, and the Irregulars were kept ready to turn out at any moment. At the same time Colonel Troup paraded the brigade, and addressing the men assured them that they had nothing to fear as long as they continued to behave themselves; that no new cartridges were coming, and that, if any should come, he would destroy them on the parade-ground in their presenee. (On the following day, the 16th, further to allay the suspicions of the men, he had the guns moved back to their former position.)

But the evil was too deeply rooted to be removed by smooth words. Notwithstanding all Colonel Troup's efforts the suspicions were not allayed and confidence did not return. For some days, indeed, the Sipáhis continued to perform their duties with precision, but they were, whether in the lines or on guard, always in a state of excitement. This excitement was fed by the evil-disposed of the city, by emissaries from Míráth, from Dehlí, from Firúzpur, and especially by intriguers from the districts instigated by

Colonel Troup doubles the strength of the 8th Irregulars.

he recommended

Sends the ladies to the hills.

same time

And endeavours to remove the suspicious of the Sipáhis.

the 16th, the guns

by smooth

Causes working against him.

* The ladies, women, and children were at once sent off to Nainí Tál, escorted thither by a detachment of the 8th Irregular Cavalry.

one Khán Bahádur Khán, a pensioner of the Government, and the heir of the famous Rohilah chief, Háfiz Ráhnmat Khán.*

Brigadier Sibbald returned to Baréli on the 19th. From that date till the 29th, no material change occurred in the state of affairs. The brigadier confirmed and carried out all Colonel Troup's arrangements. Whilst the attempts at "management" on the part of the British were continued, the Sipáhis displayed the suspicions, the excitement, the sullen determined mien, combined with rigid performance of duty, which characterised their comrades at other stations. But on the morn-

Forewarnings
of mutiny.

of the 29th, Colonel Troup received a note from Mr. Alexander, the Commissioner, informing him that it had come to his knowledge that his, Colonel Troup's regiment, the 68th Native Infantry, intended to mutiny that day. Colonel Troup had but just perused that note when the native sergeant-major of his regiment ran breathless into his presence to tell him that whilst bathing in the river that morning, the men of both regiments, the 18th and 68th, had sworn to rise at 2 P.M. and murder their European officers.

Colonel Troup acted at once as the emergency required. He warned the officers of the three regiments and of the artillery; informed the brigade major, Captain Brownlow, of the notices he had received, and recommended him to ride off at once to report the information to the brigadier, fixing the lines of the 8th Irregular Cavalry as the place of rendezvous for all.

Colonel Troup
prepares for
the crisis.

It was about 1 o'clock in the day when Captain Maekenzie received the order to turn out his regiment. In a very few minutes the men were in their saddles, and certainly, as far as appearances went, no men could have displayed a more loyal spirit, or a greater readiness to do their duty, than did the men of the 8th Irregulars. The regiment continued mounted for two hours. In the interval, whether from the attitude of the cavalry, or from some other reason, the men of the infantry changed their plans. The rising was postponed.

Loyal spirit
of the 8th
Irregulars.

The behaviour of the 8th Irregulars had justified Colonel

* Háfiz Ráhnmat was the last independent Muhammadan ruler in Rohilkhand. He was defeated and slain in 1774 in a battle against the British, under Colonel Champion, fought near Fathganj. (Khán Bahádur Khán received one pension as the descendant and heir of the last ruler of the Rohilahs, another as a retired civil officer of the British Government.)

Troup's confidence. On this apparently crucial day not a symptom of disaffection had been manifested by a single trooper. Yet—curious fact—on the evening of that day, Colonel Troup received from a sure authority information that the men of that regiment were not absolutely to be relied upon; that they had sworn not to act against the infantry and artillery, though they would not harm or raise a hand against any European. The horizon was becoming darker.

Colonel Troup receives a private warning that the 8th are not to be relied upon.

The night of the 29th, the day and night of the 30th, were passed in excitement on the one side, in watchfulness on the other. Colonel Troup did not doubt now but that the outbreak was a question, not of days, but of hours. Few of the other officers shared his opinions. The brigadier, the brigade-major, the officer commanding the 18th, the officer commanding the battery, all believed that the storm would pass over. Captain Mackenzie, whilst sharing Colonel Troup's opinions regarding the other regiments, had still faith in his own men. It would have been strange had it been otherwise, for up to the 31st of May the fidelity and devotion of the 8th Irregulars and their officers had alone kept down revolt.

He feels the crisis upon him.

On the morning of the 31st the crisis came. It was heralded by the usual attempt at incendiarism, Captain Brownlow's house having been fired in the small hours of the morning. The only other warning given was that conveyed by the behaviour of the men on the treasury guard, who had snatched from a native official a letter he was carrying to the fort, torn it up in his face, and abused him. This was the first serious impropriety committed by the native soldiers at Baréli. These two occurrences put many on their guard. Still all continued quiet in the lines, when, just at 11 o'clock, the report of one of the battery guns, followed by a volley of musketry and the yells of the Sipáhis, warned every one in the station that the crisis was upon them.

May 31.
The crisis comes.

First manifestation of the Sipáhis.

The rising in fact had been thoroughly organised by the Sipáhis. Parties had been told off to murder each officer. The hour fixed was 11 o'clock on that Sunday, the 31st. No sooner had the regimental gongs struck eleven strokes than some Sipáhis of the 68th rushed to the guns and poured a volley of grape

Their actual preparations and resolves.

into the houses nearest to their lines. Small parties carrying with them their muskets went off to each separate bungalow; the remainder rushed out in a mass to burn, to kill, to destroy.

They mutiny.

The warning of which I have spoken had induced many officers to have their horses saddled, and to hold themselves ready for immediate action. (The rendezvous was the lines of the 8th Irregulars.) To reach those lines some had to gallop across the infantry parade-ground exposed to volleys of grape and musketry.

The officers make for the rendezvous.

Others, ignorant of the previous occurrences of the morning, and, therefore, not warned, were forced to take refuge in the city. The brigadier, mounting his horse on the first discharge of the battery guns, rode off at once, but was shot in the chest as he was making for the rendezvous. Other officers shared the same fate, some at the time, some later.

Brigadier Sibbald is shot.

But, whilst all are hastening to the rendezvous, the reader must outstrip them, and see what Captain Mackenzie and his regiment were doing there.

At 10 o'clock that morning a Hindu Risáldár of his regiment had reported to Mackenzie that some of the Hindus of his troop, while bathing, had heard the Sipáhis of the 18th and 68th say that they intended to rise that day at 11 o'clock, murder every European—man, woman, and child—in the place, seize the treasury, and open the gaol. Similar reports had been so prevalent during the preceding fortnight that Mackenzie was justified in not giving implicit credence to this. But, as a measure of precaution, he sent orders to his native adjutant to warn the native officers commanding troops to have their men ready to turn out at a moment's notice. He also imparted the information by letter to Colonel Troup. Then Mackenzie, Beecher, and the surgeon, Currie, had their horses saddled; they breakfasted; then donned their uniforms so as to be ready for immediate action. These operations had scarcely been completed, when the brigade-major, Captain

He and his officers prepare for action.

Brownlow, rushed in with the information that the row had begun. Almost simultaneously the fire of the battery guns and the discharge of musketry came to confirm his story. Colonel Troup followed almost immediately. Mackenzie and Beecher at once mounted their horses and rode down to their

lines to turn out the men. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd troops of the 8th, forming the right wing, were soon drawn up in front of their lines facing the station. But it seeming to Mackenzie that the troops of the left wing showed unusual delay, he proceeded amongst them to hasten their movements. Meanwhile, the confusion was every moment increasing. From all parts of Baréli, officers, civilians, and others, were running and riding into the lines for protection. The artillery and infantry were keeping up a constant and rapid fire on the fugitives, whilst all around bungalows were beginning to smoke and blaze. Keeping his head cool all this time, Mackenzie, gallantly aided by Beecher, had turned out the troops of the left wing, and was getting them into order, when happening to look round, he saw the troops of the right wing go "Threes right," and move off at a trot to the right and rear of the lines. Digging his spurs into his horse, Mackenzie quickly headed the wing, halted it, and asked by whose order they had moved. The Risáldár commanding the 1st squadron replied that Colonel Troup had given the order. Upon this, Mackenzie rode on to Colonel Troup, who had moved ahead in company with some officers and civilians, and asked what he proposed to do. Troup, who by the death of the brigadier had become the senior officer in the station, replied that he proposed to retire on Nainí Tál. Mackenzie, still feeling sure of his men, earnestly requested permission to be allowed to take his regiment back and try and recover the guns. Troup replied that it was useless; but, yielding at last to Mackenzie's urgent pleadings, he consented in these words: "It is no use, but do as you like."

The fact was that Colonel Troup, influenced by the information he had received on the night of the 30th of May and confirmed in his view by the delay of the left wing to turn out, had come to mistrust the 8th Irregulars. Mackenzie, on the other hand, whilst thoroughly believing in them, felt satisfied that the order given to them by Colonel Troup to follow the Europeans to Nainí Tál was the one order which would try their fidelity to the utmost, as the carrying it out would impose upon them the necessity to leave all their property, and

He turns out his men;

rides to hasten the movements of the left wing

sees the right wing go off;

gallops after them;

obtains Colonel Troup's permission to attack the mutineers.

Diversity of the influences operating upon Troup and upon Mackenzie.

in some instances, those for whom they cared more than for their property, at the mercy of the rebels. There can be no doubt now that the information on which Colonel Troup acted was partly true. There were traitors amongst the 8th Irregulars. Prominent amongst these was the senior native officer, Muhammad Shafi. This man had been gained over by Khán Bahádur Khán, and had in his turn done his best to gain the men. Yet it is to be regretted, I think, that Mackenzie's arrangements were interfered with before the temper of the men had been actually tested. The movement to the right, and the remonstrance with Colonel Troup, lost many precious moments at a most critical period.

The value, in fact, of a few moments was never more clearly demonstrated than on this occasion. Whilst Mackenzie had been talking to Colonel Troup, the left wing had been drawing up in line. The moment they were quite ready, the traitor, Muhammad Shafi, watching his opportunity, gave the order to the men of the wing to follow him, and at once rode towards the cantonment. Mackenzie heard the tramp of their horses' feet the moment after he had received Colonel Troup's permission to do as he liked. He did not at once realise the cause of their action, for almost simultaneously with it arose the cry that they had gone to charge the guns. Mackenzie at once addressed the men of the right wing, and told them he was going to take them to recover the guns. The men received the intelligence with apparent delight, and followed Mackenzie—accompanied by Mr. Guthrie, the magistrate, and some officers*—at a steady trot to the parade-ground. On arriving there they found the left wing drawn up, apparently fraternising with the rebels. It was necessary to bring them back, if possible, to their allegiance; so Mackenzie, leaving his right wing under charge of Beeher, rode up to them and addressed them. Whilst, however, in the act of speaking, and after the men had shown a disposition to follow him, there arose from the magazine of the 18th Native Infantry—the point where

* Their names were Captain Kirby and Lieutenant Fraser of the Artillery; Captain Paterson and Lieutenant Warde, 68th Native Infantry; Lieutenant Hunter, 18th Native Infantry.

the mutinous Sipáhis were massed and where a gun had been placed—a cry summoning all the sawárs to rally round the Muhammadan flag and to uphold their religion; “otherwise,” shouted the speaker, “the Muhammadans will be forced to eat pork, and the Hindus beef.” At the same time a green flag was hoisted. The cry, and the sight of the flag, arrested the favourable disposition of the men of the left wing, and Mackenzie, finding his efforts with them hopeless, rode back to the right. Here, however, a new disappointment awaited him. The men of this wing had felt the influence acting on the left, and had begun to steal off. By the time Mackenzie returned, men to the number of about one troop alone remained. Amongst these were most of the native officers. With so small a body it was hopeless to charge, and it was almost certain that an order to that effect would not have been obeyed. Mackenzie retired then in the direction taken by Colonel Troup and the others. As he passed his regimental lines more men dropped away, and before he had gone half a mile the number of the faithful was reduced to twenty-three, of whom twelve were native officers!*

Passionate
appeal of the
mutineers to
the 8th Irregulars,

who all go
over to the
rebels,

except
twenty-three.

* It is due to these twenty-three men to place on record that though every possible temptation was held out to them to desert the Europeans, not one of them yielded to it. Amid many trials they remained faithful, and managed to do excellent service. The Rísáldár, Muhammad Nazim Khán, not only left all his property, but three children behind, to obey the call of duty. Mackenzie's orderly, a Muhammadan, rode, throughout the retreat of sixty-six miles, Mackenzie's second charger, a magnificent Arab, on which it would have been easy for him to ride off. But he was faithful, and when the horse Mackenzie was riding dropped dead the orderly at once dismounted and proceeded on foot. These men had their reward when the regiment was re-organised, and they redeemed, on the 6th of April, 1858, the good name of their regiment, being commended for the “marked gallantry” they displayed at Harhá in Oudh under the command of Captain Mackenzie.

In the text I have recorded a plain and unadorned statement of the conduct of Captain Mackenzie and Lieutenant Becher on this trying occasion. It is but just to both those officers that the opinion of the officer commanding the brigade to which they belonged should be added. In his report on the events recorded in the text Colonel Troup thus wrote: “In justice to Captain Mackenzie and Lieutenant Becher I consider it my duty, however much they like others may have been deceived by their men, to state that in my opinion no two officers could have behaved better towards, or shown a better or more gallant example to, their men than they did. I was in daily, I may say hourly, communication with them, and I have great pleasure in stating that

and his party twenty-three miles from Baréli. Troup was warm in his acknowledgments. In truth he never expected to see them. "Thank God," he exclaimed to Mackenzie, as the latter rode up, "I feared you had gone to certain death." The retiring party now united, proceeded without a halt to Nainí Tál, accomplishing the distance, sixty-six miles, in twenty-two hours.

The Europeans reach Nainí Tál.

On the departure of the fugitives for Nainí Tál the rebel rule was inaugurated at Baréli. Every European house but one had been burnt down. Khán Bahádúr Khán was proclaimed Viceroy of Rohilkhand. His vice-royalty was baptised with blood. The two judges, Messrs. Robertson and Raikes; the deputy-collector, Mr. Wyatt; Dr. Hay, Dr. Orr, Mr. Buek, and three other civilians; all the merchants, traders, and clerks, and all the women and children who had not quitted the station, were murdered. Most of these were judicially slaughtered—slaughtered, that is to say, by the express order of the new viceroy, and many of them after having been brought into his presence. Exposed to this terrible ordeal, cast by ruffians at the feet of this greater ruffian, the English race still asserted itself.

by the slaughter of the English.

The gallant prisoners told the new viceroy to his face that, though he might water his new throne with their blood, it would yet take no root in the ground; that, though he might find it easy to slaughter unarmed men, women, and children, British power would yet assert itself to crush him.

The better to assure the mastery and to rid himself of all rival claimants, Khán Bahádúr Khán took the earliest opportunity to persuade Bakht Khán, the Subahdár of artillery before alluded to, and who had assumed the title of Brigadier, to lead the Sipáhis to Dehli, furnishing him with a letter to the king. He even made a show of accompanying him. But it was only a show. He returned from the first stage to Baréli, fortified his house, and, adding sacrilegious to murder, destroyed the tomb of Mr. Thomason, whilom Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces, to build with the materials, after the manner of

Khán Bahádúr Khán.

from the very first to the last they were unremitting in the performance of the many harassing duties required of them." Colonel Troup further recommended them to the favourable notice of the Commander-in-Chief.

the princes of the House of Taimúr, a mausoleum for himself. He at the same time enlisted all the Muhammadans who would carry arms, and with their aid began to oppress and plunder the rich Hindus. The latter began very soon to regret the overthrow of the British rule.

June.
Causes the
British rule
to be re-
gretted.

On the very same day on which the tragedy I have recorded was being enacted at Baréli, events not less startling were taking place at Sháhjahánpúr, but forty-seven miles distant. There was but one native regiment at Sháhjahánpúr, the 28th Regiment of Native Infantry. The news of the Míráth outbreak, arriving about the 15th of May, had not caused less excitement at this station than elsewhere. But whilst the residents, and especially the officers, continued to trust the Sipáhis, they looked for an outbreak on the part of the notoriously turbulent population. Little, however, occurred at the time to cause apprehension. But as day after day passed, and rebellion seemed to be gathering head, unchecked by all about them, the Sipáhis began to display a behaviour not entirely consistent with duty. Still, however, their officers believed that the bulk of them were loyal.

Sháhjahánpúr.

The Sipáhis
there are not
distrusted;

This belief was roughly and suddenly dispelled. of May was a Sunday. Many of the residents and officers had gone to church. They were still at their prayers when the Sipáhis of the 28th rushed upon them.

The 31st

but they
mutiny.

On hearing the tumult the chaplain went to the door of the church to meet the mutineers. He was at once attacked, but escaped for the moment with the loss of his hand, severed by a sword stroke. He was subsequently killed by some villagers. Mr. Ricketts, the magistrate, whose vigilance had attracted towards him the peculiar hatred of the mutineers, likewise received a sword cut. He then attempted to escape to his house, but was cut down about thirty-five yards from the vestry door. Mr. Labadoor, a clerk, was killed in the church. His wife, his sister-in-law, and the bandmaster of the regiment, escaped for the moment, but eventually met a worse fate. Another clerk, a Mr. Smith, stole away, but was tracked out and killed.

and attack
the English
when at
church.

The scuffle at the door of the church and the attack upon those who first presented themselves to the mutineers had given

time meanwhile to the other officers and ladies present there to improvise a defence. Captain Lysaght, Mr. Jenkins, and others succeeded in barring the chancel doors against their assailants. These, happily, had brought with them no muskets, only swords and elubs, and so mistrustful were they, that on observing the approach of one solitary officer, Captain Sneyd, armed with a gun, they made at once for their lines to get their muskets.

The gentlemen had, before this, placed the ladies in security in the church turret. Hardly had they done this when the Sipáhis went off in the manner described, and almost immediately afterwards their domestic servants, faithful in this extremity, arrived at the church, bringing with them their masters' guns and rifles. The English then ventured to open the doors. They found not only the horses and carriages, which had brought them to church, still at the door, but clustering round about a hundred Sipáhis, principally Sikhs, who had hastened up to rally round and to defend their officers. For the moment they were safe.

Meanwhile the cantonments had been a scene of tumult and bloodshed. When one party of the mutineers had rushed to the church another had fired the bungalows and sought out the Europeans. The assistant magistrate was killed in the verandah of his court, whither he had fled for refuge. Captain James, in temporary command of the 28th, was shot on the parade-ground whilst trying to reason with his men. In reply to his arguments they asserted that they were not after all such great traitors, inasmuch as they had served the Government faithfully for twenty years. As he turned away in disgust they shot him. The mutineers allowed Dr. Bowling, the surgeon of the regiment, to visit the hospital unmolested, but, on his return, after he had taken up and placed inside his carriage his wife, his child, and his English maid, they shot him dead and wounded his wife. She managed, however, to reach the other fugitives at the church.

There, now, were assembled all the Europeans remaining alive. What were they to do? It was a terrible extremity.

But desperate situations require desperate remedies, and the only sensible course seemed to be to make for the residence of the Rájah of Powáin—across the Oudh frontier, though but a few miles distant. Thither accordingly they proceeded, and there they arrived

The English
barricade
themselves.

Slaugh'er in
the canton-
ment.

The fugitives
take refuge
with the Rájah
of Powáin.

the same day. But their reception was unfavourable. The Rájah declared his inability to protect them and refused them shelter. Mr. Jenkins, the assistant magistrate, who was one of the party, wrote at once to Mr. Thomason, the Deputy Commissioner of Muhamdí, in Oudh, to inform him of the events at Sháhjahánpúr, and to beg him to send all the available carriage to enable the fugitives to reach his station. Mr. Thomason received the letter that night, and complied, as far as he could, with the request. At Muhamdí the fugitives arrived, in a terrible plight,* two days later. But they were not saved. Their subsequent adventures form one of the saddest episodes in the Indian Mutiny.

Midway between Barélí and Sháhjahánpúr, though not in a direct line, and some thirty miles from the former, lies the civil station of Budáun. The magistrate and collector of this district, which took its name from the station, was Mr. William Edwards. Mr. Edwards had served as Under Secretary in the Foreign Department during the rule of Lord Ellenborough. A man of observation and ability, he had marked how, during the fifteen years preceeding the mutiny, the action of our revenue system had gradually ruined the landowners of the country and broken up the village communities. Under the action of that revenue system landed rights and interests, sold for petty debts, had been bought by strangers who had no sympathy with the people. The dispossessed landowners, irritated and discontented, smarting under the loss of their estates, looked upon the British Government as the author of their calamities; whilst the peasantry, connected with these landowners for centuries, bestowed upon them all their sympathy, reserving their hatred for the strangers—their patrons, the British.

Budáun.

Mr. William Edwards.

Effect of our revenue system.

The social state in Rohilkhand having been gradually growing to this point, it can easily be conceived that, when the mutiny broke out in the North-West, Budáun was ripe for revolt.

Mr. Edwards was well aware of the dangers which awaited

* "Sad was the appearance of the poor Sháhjahánpúr fugitives on their arrival at Muhamdí; weary and with naked feet did they with much difficulty and toil reach thus far."—*Narrative of the Sháhjahánpúr Mutiny and Massacre.*

him in his isolated position. He was alone at Budáun. As soon as the revolt at Mirath had disclosed to him the nature of the impending catastrophe he had sent his wife and child to Nainí Tál. He remained alone—well aware that the population all around him was discontented, that the company of Sipáhis who guarded his treasury was not to be trusted, that the police would join in the scramble which a signal from Baréli would inaugurate. To oppose an insurrection on the part of these men Mr. Edwards had no resource beyond his brave and resolute heart.

On the 29th of May Mr. Alfred Phillipps, the magistrate of Itah, a station in the Ágra district, on the right bank of the Ganges, rode into Budáun. He was on his way to Baréli to demand help from thence, his own district being in a state of insurrection. Mr. Edwards told him that help was not to be looked for from Baréli, as he had himself asked for it in vain. But two days later information reached Edwards that the important town of Bilsí was about to be attacked by the rebels. To allow this place to fall without an effort was not to be thought of. Edwards decided then to make another appeal to Baréli. The answer was favourable. He was promised a company of Sipáhis under a European officer.

June 1. Joyfully he was expecting these, when, on the 1st of June, he received information that the entire Baréli brigade had mutinied, and that revolt reigned at that station.

Mr. Edwards received this information early in the morning. He imparted it to Mr. Phillipps, who, realising at once the failure of his mission, started at once to return to his district before the roads should be barred by the rebels. Very soon after Mr. Phillipps's departure Mr. Edwards was joined by two indigo planters, the Messrs. Donald, and by a subordinate of the salt department, Mr. Gibson. These expressed their resolution to accompany Mr. Edwards whithersoever he might go. But at the moment

Mr. Edwards had no mind to go anywhere. The Sipáhis at Budáun had not yet broken into revolt, and their commandant, on receiving the intelligence from Baréli, had voluntarily assured Mr. Edwards that he and his men would defend the treasury confided to

Isolated position of Mr. Edwards.

His solitary resource.

Mr. Phillipps rides into Budáun.

Edwards asks help from Baréli.

News arrives of the mutiny at that station.

The troops and population rise in revolt.

them to the last man. That very evening, however, they rose, and being joined by a party from Baréli and by the released gael-birds of the place, began to plunder and destroy.

There was now nothing for the four Englishmen but flight. Their numbers, far from being a protection, were an embarrassment, for, with the districts all around them surging, concealment, difficult for one or two, would be almost impossible for four. But there was

Mr. Edwards
and three
others flee.

no help for it. The four Englishmen, accompanied by an Afghán servant of Mr. Edwards and by an orderly—a Sikh, Wazír Singh—both true men, rode at once for their lives. During the first few days, they galloped from village to village, quitting it, or remaining, as they found the native hostile or the reverse; often forced to flee when most in need of food and rest. They crossed the Gauges two or three times,

Their wander-
ings.

tracing out a zig-zag path in the hope of avoiding danger. Ultimately, with the loss of one of their

number, they reached Fathgarh. But Fathgarh, on the eve of

revolt, was no abiding place for fugitive Europeans. Mr.

Edwards himself wished to make for Kánhpúr, or even for Ágra. Both these routes having been pronounced

They reach
Fathgarh.

impracticable, he and his companions determined, in pursuance of the advice of his friend, Mr. Probyn,

the Collector of Fathgarh, to join Mrs. Probyn and her children,

then at Dharmpúr, the fortified residence of a friendly native,

Hardó Bakhsh. Mr. Edwards reached that place on the 10th

of June and found collected there many Europeans. Most of

these, however, returned to Fathgarh. Mr. Edwards,

Mr. and Mrs. Probyn and their children, remained

at Dharmpúr, and ultimately—after the party had

undergone terrible troubles and privations, the

weaker and more delicate of its members having been

forced to lie for weeks concealed “in a wretched hovel, occu-

pied by buffaloes, and filthy beyond description, the

smell stifling, and the mud and dirt over our

ankles,”—they reached Kánhpúr. They arrived at

that goal of safety on the 1st of September, just three

calendar months after Mr. Edwards had left Budáun.

Meanwhile at that place rebel rule had been

inaugurated. The authority of Khán Bahádúr

Khán was acknowledged, and the Sipáhis, after

having rifled the treasury, were persuaded to march to Dehli.

Mr. Edwards
takes refuge
at Dharm-
púr.

Shares the
fortunes of
the Probyns.

Rebel rule is
inaugurated
at Budáun.

Thanks to the prevision of Mr. Edwards, the rifling of the treasury was unusually unproductive, that gentleman having refused, with a view to possible eventualities, to receive the instalments of revenue due from the land-holders.

Murádábád lies forty-eight miles north-west of Baréli. In 1857 it was garrisoned by one native regiment, the 29th Native Infantry, and by half a battery of native artillery. It was likewise the seat of a civil district, with judge, magistrate and collector, assistant magistrate, and civil surgeon.

The news of the mutiny at Míráth reached Murádábád on the 16th of May. No immediate result was apparent; but on the evening of the 18th intelligence reached the authorities in the station that a small party of the 20th Regiment of Native Infantry—one of the regiments which had mutinied at Míráth—was encamped, fully equipped and with a large quantity of treasure, in the jungle, on the left bank of the Gorgan rivulet, about five miles from the station.

The opportunity was considered a good one for testing the loyalty, always loudly professed, of the men of the 29th Native Infantry. Accordingly, a company of that regiment, commanded by Captain Faddy, was ordered for duty that night. The night was pitch dark, but as a surprise was intended that circumstance was in favour of the British. At 11 o'clock, Captain Faddy set out, preceded by thirty horsemen and accompanied by his subaltern and some civilians. On approaching the Gorgan rivulet Faddy halted his infantry, and ordered the cavalry to take up a position to cut off the enemy's retreat. As soon as this movement had been satisfactorily accomplished he dashed on to the enemy's encampment with his infantry, overpowered their sentries, and roughly awoke them from their slumbers. The darkness was so great that friend could only be distinguished from foe by the flash of the fire-arms. Owing to this the bulk of the insurgents managed to steal off, with the loss, however, of all their arms and horses, ten thousand rupees in coin, eight prisoners, and one man killed.

So far the men of the 29th seemed to have stood the test well. It has indeed been asserted that they did not exert themselves as much as they might have done, and that, had their hearts

been in the struggle, they might have prevented the escape of so large a number of the insurgents. Such was not, however, the opinion of their officers at the time. At the best it can only be conjecture, for the pitchy darkness of the night was quite sufficient to account for the escape of the dark-skinned mutineers, roused suddenly from slumber.

Possible doubts are not entertained.

It would appear, however, that the mutineers themselves did not consider that the hearts of the men of the 29th Native Infantry were very much incensed against them. For the very morning following the surprise just narrated a few of them, escaped from that surprise, came into the station and boldly entered the lines of the 29th! But, again, the 29th displayed a loyal resolution. The native sergeant who was leading the rebel Sipáhis was shot down and the remainder were taken prisoners. It being considered unsafe to lodge the prisoners in the quarter-guard, they were sent to the gaol. It happened, however, unfortunately, that the native sergeant who had been shot had a near relation in the 29th, and that this near relation was a man of some influence in the regiment. No sooner had this man discovered who it was who had been slain than he collected about a hundred men, the worst characters in the regiment, led them to the gaol, stormed it, and released not only the men of the 20th, but the six hundred prisoners lodged there!

They stand a second test.

Some evince a mutinous spirit.

But the bulk of the regiment was still true. On hearing of the raid against the gaol the officers turned out their men, and these displayed the greatest alacrity in responding to the call made upon their loyalty. A number of them followed the Adjutant, Captain Gardiner, in pursuit of the rioters and the escaped convicts, and actually succeeded in bringing back a hundred and fifty of them. The civil authorities co-operated with the military in this well-timed expedition, and are entitled to share in the credit due to its success. Subsequently, more of the insurgents were caught. Some even returned of their own accord. But the real crisis, far from having been surmounted, was still looming in the future. On the 21st of May the authorities discovered that a number of Muhamadan fanatics from Rámpúr* had collected on the left bank of the Rámangá, opposite the

But the main body continues loyal.

* Rámpúr, the capital of a mediatised Afghán chief, Mahom d Yúsuf Ali Khán, lies eighteen miles to the east of Muráábád.

town of Murádlábád, had hoisted the green flag, and were in communication with the evil-disposed men of the town. In the town itself the threatening effect of this demonstration was manifest at a glance. The shops were all shut, the streets were deserted, the doors of the houses were barred.

Another crisis
arrives.

It was patent to all that unless this demonstration were encountered with a firm and resolute hand the British cause was lost. The judge, Mr. Cracroft Wilson, called upon the military authorities to aid him. The aid was given. Setting out then with some sawárs and with two officers and a company of the 29th, he attacked and dispersed the fanatics. One of the latter levelled at Mr. Wilson's head a blunderbuss loaded with slugs. Mr. Wilson seized it in time. The fanatic then drew a pistol from his belt; but before he could discharge it a Sipáhi of the 29th knocked him down. That night the chief of the evil-disposed party within the town was killed by the police.

Mr. Cracroft
Wilson's
energetic
measures

carry the
station
through it.

Two days later, the 23rd, another incident came to try alike the English and the Sipáhis. On that day intelligence arrived that two companies of sappers and miners, laden with plunder and fully equipped, were approaching the station. Instantly two companies of the 29th Native Infantry and sixty sawárs were warned for duty. Captain Whish, who commanded the party, took with him two guns and marched out on the road by which the enemy were to advance. But intelligence of his march had preceded him. The rebels, not caring to encounter him, crossed the river and made for the Tarái. The joint magistrate, however, tracked them with four sawárs, and kept them in sight till the detachment came up, when, without the semblance of a struggle, the rebels laid down their arms. Previous experience having demonstrated the impolicy of bringing any prisoners into Murádlábád, these men were deprived of their arms, their ammunition, their money, and their uniform, and were turned loose.

is success-
fully encounter-
ed.

The good conduct of the men of the 29th Native Infantry in these expeditions had nursed the hope that they might remain staunch and loyal to the end. But it is easy now to perceive how, in the times that were approaching, it was all but impossible that this

Causes which
were working
on the Sipáhis.

should be so. The districts around them were surging. Every day they were seeing and talking with men who appealed to the sentiment lying nearest to their heart—to their religion and their caste; who told them that it was the deliberate intention of the British Government to violate the latter; who pointed to the sufferings and privations their brethren were enduring in the sacred cause; and who appealed at the same time to the baser passions of cupidity and ambition. Murádábád was but forty-eight miles from the larger station of Baréli, and we have seen what was passing at Baréli during the last two weeks of May!

Until the 2nd of June, however, the Sipáhis of the 29th Native Infantry performed their duty loyally and well. But early on the morning of that day it became known throughout Murádábád that rebellion had proved triumphant at Baréli. The judge and the magistrate had received that intelligence at 2 o'clock in the morning by the hands of a special messenger from the Nawáb of Rámpúr.

News arrives
of the mutiny
at Baréli.

The effect of this intelligence upon the Sipáhis of the 29th Native Infantry and upon the townspeople was prompt and significant. No one doubted but that a crisis was at hand. The men were sullen, sarcastic, and even rude in their manner: the townspeople defiant and disrespectful. Mr. Wilson's energetic proposal to them to follow their officers to Míráth with their colours flying, taking guns and treasure with them, was met with derision. They had decided for themselves the part to be taken.

Effect of the
news on the
Sipáhis.

The following morning they threw off all disguise. They began by refusing to allow but the Europeans admission to the building in which the public moneys were deposited, on the ground that the fanatics from Rámpúr might return to attack it.

They throw
off all
disguise.

The civilians, prevented thus from exercising absolute control over the treasure, thought it would prevent a general disturbance if it were so disposed that the Sipáhis could take possession of it without opposition. They accordingly had it placed, the Sipáhis quietly acquiescing, upon tumbrils, and formally made it over to the treasury guard. The magistrate, Mr. Saunders, seized the opportunity to destroy as many of the Government stamps in store as he could lay hands upon. The amount of the money

They take
possession of
the money in
the treasury.

thus made over to the Sipáhis was but £7,500. They were greatly disappointed at the smallness of the amount. In the first burst of their fury they seized the native treasurer, dragged him to the guns, and threatened to blow him away unless he would disclose the place where the remainder had been concealed. Captain Faddy and Mr. Saunders rescued the man from his impending fate. But when the latter and Mr. Wilson were about to ride off a few of the disaffected men levelled their pieces at them and ran round to prevent their escape. Some of the native officers, however, reminding the men of the oath they had taken to spare the lives of the Europeans, induced them to lower their muskets and to desist.

Simultaneously with the seizure of the rupees the Sipáhis deliberately appropriated the opium, and all the plate-chests and other property consigned for security to the Government treasury. The police had ceased to act. The rabble were beginning to move. There was but one course to pursue, and that was to save for future service lives which, at Murádábád, would have been uselessly sacrificed.

The English started, then: the civilians and their wives accompanied by a native officer and some men of Irregular Cavalry, who happened to be there on leave, for Míráth; the officers and their families for Nainí Tál. Both stations were reached without loss of life.

Those who chose to remain behind, principally Eurasian clerks in offices, were not so fortunate. An invalided officer, an Englishman, Lieutenant Warwiek, and his wife, a native Christian, were killed. Mr. Powell, a clerk, was wounded. But he, and some thirty-one others, purchased immunity from further ill-treatment by embracing the Muhammadan faith. Their subsequent fate is uncertain; but it is believed that but few lived to hear of the fall of Dehli.

With the mutiny of the troops at Murádábád all Rohilkhand passed nominally under the sway of Khán Bahádur Khán, the descendant of its last independent ruler, and a pensioned civil officer under the British. I say, nominally, for his authority was never thoroughly established. His sway, in fact, was the sway of disorder. It can best be described by using a proverb familiar to the

and the other
property of
the Govern-
ment.

The English
evacuate
Murádábád.

Fate of those
who re-
mained.

Rohilkhand
under Khán
Bahádur
Khán.

natives: "The buffalo is the property of the man who holds the bludgeon." A social condition was inaugurated not dissimilar to that which prevailed throughout Maráthá India in the interval between the departure of Marquess Wellesley and the close of the Pindári War. Unarmed Sipáhis, if in small parties, were certain to be set upon by villagers armed with clubs, and plundered—often murdered. Pious Brahmans, telling their beads, were suddenly assaulted and murdered by Muhammadan stragglers, for the sake of the brass vessels in which they cooked their food. The landowners, dispossessed under the action of the British revenue system, resumed their lands, but in many cases, they, and the farmers generally, especially the Muhammadans, exercised the authority they thus acquired, or of which they were possessed, with so much severity that no peacefully disposed man would dare to venture beyond the limits of his village even in the daytime. If he travelled at night, the greatest secrecy and precaution had to be observed.

The social
life

was insecure.

Such was the social life in Rohilkhand under native sway in 1857. Nor was the political condition of the province more flourishing. By the Thákurs, or barons, the authority of Khán Bahádúr Khán was for a long time disputed. These men were just as greedy of plunder as had been the Sipáhis, and they rejoiced for the moment at the sudden acquisition of power to attack villages and towns. But from some cause or other they and their followers were very badly armed—their weapons consisting mainly of bludgeons and matchlocks, antique in form, and rusty from long disuse. Their power, then, was not equal to their will. Budáun, thrice threatened, successfully resisted them. Having no guns, they were unable to combat the trained troops of the native viceroy. Whenever these trained levies marched against them and beat them, they, their relatives, and their followers, experienced no mercy. Mutilation and murder followed defeat, and confiscation followed mutilation and murder. Sometimes stories of these atrocities induced several Thákurs to combine, but never successfully. Badly armed and untrained, the peasantry whom they led, even when they obtained a transient success, dispersed for plunder. In the end they were always beaten.

The political
life

was unsatisfactory.

It is scarcely surprising if, under these circumstances, the

hearts of the rural population began after a time to yearn for their old rulers. It was in vain that, in a boastful proclamation, Khán Bahádúr Khán denounced the English as liars, as destroyers of the creeds of others, as confiscators of property. In the recesses of their own houses the peasantry replied that at least the English were truth-tellers; at least, they did not war on women and children; at least, they were a moral race, above treachery and deceit. The longer the rule of the Muhammadan viceroy lasted the more these opinions circulated. His mis-government begat contrast. Contrast begat a longing desire for the old master, until at last the victory of the English came to be the hope of every peasant's hut, the earnest desire of every true working man in the province.

The people
long for the
return of the
British.

The course of events now takes us down to Fathgarh, a station in the Ágra division, on the right bank of the river Ganges, twenty-five miles south of Sháhjahánpúr.

Fathgarh.

Fathgarh was the seat of a gun-carriage manufactory—the works connected with which were carried on in a dilapidated fort—and the headquarters of the 10th Regiment of Native Infantry and a native battery. Three or four miles to the west of it lies the native city of Farrukhábád, the seat of a pensioned Pathán Nawáb. The inhabitants of the district numbered close upon a million. About one-tenth of these were Muhammadans, but Muhammadans of a peculiarly turbulent character, given to murder and rapine beyond their co-religionists in other provinces. They had been under English rule since the year 1802, but in their inmost hearts they had long rebelled against the system of order and care for life and property then imposed upon the district in which they lived.

Turbulent
character of
the Muham-
madans of the
district.

The events at Míráth on the 10th of May had awakened in the minds of the men of the 10th Native Infantry sentiments analogous to these which had been produced elsewhere. Like their comrades in those other stations, they resolved to temporise and to bide their time. In this way the month of May was tided over. But on the 3rd of June intelligence was received of the mutinies at Baréli and at Sháhjahánpúr and of the rising of Rohilkhand. It happened that Colonel Smith, commanding the regiment, was a man of energy and decision. He at once summoned a council of the leading residents, and

announced to them his intention of despatching that night the women and children by boat, down the Ganges, to Kánhpúr. It was known that Kánhpúr was then holding out; that European soldiers had arrived there; that more were on their way thither. It seemed in every respect eligible as a place of refuge.

Colonel Smith sends away the non-combatants;

At 1 o'clock on the morning of the 4th of June, then, about a hundred and seventy non-combatants, a large proportion of whom were women and children, started off in boats. The next day, all sorts of contradictory reports reaching the fugitives, it was resolved to divide into two parties. A hundred and twenty-six continued to prosecute their journey to Kánhpúr, only to be seized there by the order of Náná Sáhib, and by his order to be foully murdered; the other party, amongst whom were the wife and family of Mr. Probyn, preferred to accept the hospitality of a native landowner, Hardéo Baksh, at Dharmpúr; the same whom we have seen receiving Mr. Probyn and Mr. Edwards. They remained, whilst the majority, about forty in number, after some hesitation, returned to Fathgarh (13th of June).

June 4.
some of whom proceed to Kánhpúr;

others return
some stay at
Dharmpúr.

Meanwhile, affairs in Fathgarh had not progressed very favourably. On the very day of the despatch of the boats Colonel Smith had attempted to move the Government treasure into the fort. But the Sipáhis had flatly refused to allow this. With strange inconsistency, and although they were corresponding with the mutinous regiments in the province of Oudh, the same men cheerfully obeyed their Colonel's order to destroy the bridge of boats, the sole link between the district of Farrukhábád and that province. They seemed to evince a true and loyal feeling, when, on the 16th of June, they handed to their Colonel a letter written to them by the Subahdar of the 41st Native Infantry—a regiment which had recently mutinied at Sítápúr, in Oudh—in which that Subahdar announced that he and his regiment had arrived within a few miles of Fathgarh, and that he and they now called upon the 10th to murder their officers, to seize the treasure, and to join them. The native officer who communicated to Colonel Smith the contents of this letter added, that he and the men had replied that they had served the Company too many years to turn traitors; that they were resolved to remain true to their salt and to oppose by

Contradictory demeanour of the Sipáhis.

June 16.

force the 41st if they should march that way. It was after this correspondence that the men of the 10th aided in breaking down the bridge of boats across the Ganges. (Yet the very next day, the 18th of June, they warned Colonel Smith that they would no longer obey the British, and that he and his officers had better retire within the fort.)

It would appear from this warning and this action that the men of the 10th had no desire to kill their officers; that they cared only for the coin. The day following, the 41st crossed the river in boats and joined them. Bloodier counsels then prevailed.

Colonel Smith and the European population had not, meanwhile, been slow to avail themselves of the opportunity given them. To the number of upwards of a hundred* they entered the fort. Of that number only thirty-three were able-bodied men: the remainder consisted of women, children, and infirm non-combatants. Their first care was to mount guns on the ramparts. A 6-pounder was at once placed in position to command the gateway. By strenuous exertions a 3-pounder, a 9-pounder, a 12-pounder, an 18-pounder, and a 24-pounder, were likewise mounted. The last three were howitzers.

A small brass mortar, and three hundred muskets were also unearthed and made ready for use.

The next care was to search for ammunition. The supply of this was, however, extremely defective. The garrison could not lay hands on more than a few muster round shot and shells; six boxes of balled, and an equal number of blank cartridges. These latter were at once broken up, and the powder was put by for the use of the guns—a lot of nuts, serews, hammer-heads and such-like articles being collected to be used as grape. At the same time the garrison were told off into three parties, each under an officer, and to these distinct watches were assigned.

All these arrangements had been happily completed before the Sipáhis showed any sign of molesting our countrymen. The fact was that perfect union did not reign among the mutineers. The 10th Regiment, on dismissing its officers, had

* They had been joined by fugitives and travellers from other parts of the country.

placed itself unreservedly at the disposal of the Nawáb, but had refused to hand over to him the treasure. The 41st, meanwhile, crossing the Ganges in boats, had entered the city, and demanded from the men of the 10th their share of the plunder. The 10th refused to part with their spoils, whereupon the 41st, reproaching them with having spared the lives of their officers, went tumultuously to the Nawáb and implored him to order the 10th to join them in an attack on the fort. The Nawáb, it is believed, gave the required order; but, before they received it, the 10th had divided the treasure amongst themselves. Then the greater number of them seized the first opportunity to cross the river into Oudh, and to make their way to their homes. Those who remained were set upon by the men of the disappointed 41st. In the contest which ensued many on both sides were killed. It ended only by the survivors of the 10th agreeing to follow the counsels of the 41st.

Disunion
amongst the
mutineers.

The 41st were now masters of the situation, and the object of the 41st was European blood. The Nawáb threw himself heartily into their cause, and supplied them with provisions and all the munitions of war at his disposal. But the mutineers still delayed the attack. They were awaiting, they said, an auspicious day. This delay was of no small advantage to the besieged, as it enabled them, by means of the natives who still adhered to them, to store the fort with provisions.

June 19-21.
Bloody coun-
sels prevail.

The auspicious day was the 25th of June. But it was not till the evening of the day following that the first alarm was given. This was caused by the opening of a musketry fire upon some coolies employed by our people to pull down some walls outside, but contiguous to, the fort. It led to nothing. Before daybreak the following morning, however, the mutineers opened fire from their only two guns; but, finding it ineffectual, they soon caused it to cease. A little later, taking position behind trees, bushes, and any wall that afforded cover, they opened a heavy musketry fire. It was, however, quite ineffective, whereas many of them were hit by the English marksmen.

June 25.
The muti-
neers attack
the fort.

The only incident which made the following day differ from its predecessor was the display by the enemy of escalating ladders. But not one of these could be planted against the walls of the fort. The aim of our countrymen was too true.

They are
foiled.

For four days similar tactics were pursued, varied only by ineffectual attempts to escalate. The enemy suffered again and again, severely from the guns and muskets of the besieged, whereas the loss sustained by the latter was extremely slight. On the fifth day the rebels changed their tactics. They change their tactics, Ceasing direct attack, a body of them went to occupy a village called Husénpúr, the roofs of the houses in which commanded a portion of the interior of the fort. From these roofs they opened a deadly and effective fire, speedily productive of casualties amongst the garrison. At the same time another body took possession of a small outhouse about seventy yards from the fort and commanding the rampart, loopholed it, and opened a destructive fire on the gunners, rendering the service of the guns impossible. The garrison suffered a good deal from this fire, Colonel Tucker being amongst the slain. The enemy then began mining operations, and at the end of two days sprung the mine. The explosion shook the whole fort, but blew away only five or six yards of the outer wall, leaving the inner half standing. The rebels made two attempts, then, to storm. But the first but are again baffled. was defeated by the vigilance of one of the garrison, Mr. Jones, who noticing their assembling below the breach, poured into them, unaided, "the fire of two double-barrels and eight muskets, and again discharging them as they were reloaded by a native;" the second, by the excellent aim of Mr. Fisher, the chaplain, the leader of the storming party falling dead by a shot from his rifle.

The situation of the garrison was nevertheless sensibly deteriorating. They had lost some of their best men. Many of their defences were commanded. Difficulties under which the garrison labour. Ammunition was running short. The enemy, too, were daily devising fresh schemes of attack. The day following the repulse just recorded they managed to hoist one of their guns in a position to command the building in which the women and children were located; the New attacks. other to bear against the main gateway. The firing from these was effective. The building was struck, the gate was pierced, and, worse than all, two of the garrison guns were disabled. Still, however, damages were repaired with a will, and the enemy was again baffled. Under these circumstances, they once more had recourse to mining.

Up to this point the garrison had shown a spirit, an

energy, and a resolution not to be surpassed. But their losses had been severe. Their effective number, originally small, had considerably diminished. Excessive work had thus been thrown upon the survivors, and they were now fairly worn out by fatigue and watching. They could still have repelled a direct attack, but when they witnessed a second attempt to mine their position, despair of a successful defence began to steal over their minds. It would have been strange had it been otherwise. It was evident that after the firing of the second mine, two breaches would be available for the assault, and the garrison were not sufficiently strong in numbers to defend more than one. The case was desperate. Effective defence had become impossible.

Losses of the
garrison.

Their pro-
spects dete-
riorate.

But there remained to the garrison still one chance of escape. The rainy season had set in, and under its influence there had been a considerable rise in the waters of the Ganges. Three large boats had been kept safely moored under the fort walls. It might be possible, starting at night, to descend the rapidly-flowing river to a point where they would be far from the reach of the murderous Sipáhis. Such a course, at all events, offered, or seemed to offer, a better chance of escape than a continuance of the defence of the fort with numbers diminished and ammunition all but exhausted. So thought, after due consideration, Colonel Smith and the garrison. They resolved then to evacuate the fort and steal away in the boats. On the night of the 3rd of July the attempt was made. The ladies and children were divided into three parties and at midnight were stowed away in the boats. Meanwhile the pickets and sentries still remained at their posts, nor were they called in until all the non-combatants had embarked. But, before leaving the fort, they spiked the guns and destroyed the small amount of ammunition that remained. It was 2 o'clock in the morning before they had all embarked. The order was then given to let go. The boats started in good order, but the clearness of the night betrayed their movements to the Sipáhis. These at once guessed the truth. Raising the cry that the Faringhís were running away, they fired wildly at the boats, and then followed, still discharging their pieces, along the bank. But Fortune for the moment favoured our countrymen. The banks were

Possibility of
evasion.

July 3.
The garrison
attempt it.

Favourable
commence-
ment of the
enterprise.

unfavourable for running, and the current was strong. The hostile missiles all fell short.

I have already stated that the boats were three in number. They had been apportioned respectively to the commands of Colonel Smith, Colonel Goldie, and Major Robertson. But Colonel Goldie's boat was soon found to be too unwieldy, and

One boat is
abandoned.

was abandoned, its occupants being removed to Colonel Smith's boat. The delay caused by the

transhipment enabled the Sipáhis to bring down one of their guns to bear on the boats, but the balls still fell short. At length the fugitives resumed their journey, and reached without accident the village of Singhirámpúr. Here they stopped to repair the rudder of Colonel Smith's boat. But the

Attack by the
villagers.

villagers turned out, opened fire upon it, and killed one of the two boatmen. The villagers still continuing to turn out, five of the British officers*

jumped into the water, waded to land, and charged and drove back the enemy, numbering now about three hundred, killing

Major Robertson's boat
takes the
ground.

some of their leaders. They then returned to the boat, the rudder of which had been repaired. They had scarcely gone a few yards, however, before Major Robertson's boat grounded on a soft sand-bank.

Notwithstanding every effort, and despite the fact that the fugitives jumped into the water to push her off, she remained there immovable. Colonel Smith's boat, meanwhile, had gone down with the stream.

The rebels
approach in
two boats,

The grounded boat had been in the helpless position above recorded about half an hour when its occupants desisted two boats coming towards them

down the stream apparently empty. These boats approached to within twenty yards of them, when suddenly they became alive with armed Sipáhis. These opened upon our countrymen a murderous and continued

and attack
Major Robertson's
boat.

fire. Before the fugitives had time to recover from their surprise, many of them, including Major Robertson, had been wounded, and some Sipáhis had already

* These were Major Munro, Lieutenants Eckford, Sweetenham, and Henderson of the 10th Native Infantry, and Captain Edmund Vibart, 2nd Cavalry. The writer gladly takes this opportunity to offer his tribute of regret for the untimely end of the last-named officer, who to the form of an Antinous united the noblest and most manly sentiments and a ripe and brilliant intellect.

boarded the boat. The crisis was terrible, Major Robertson, retaining, despite his wound, all his coolness, and all his courage, implored the ladies to jump into the water and trust to the current rather than to the Sipáhis. Many of them did so, and some of them, assisted by the men, some by their own efforts, succeeded in swimming down the stream. Eventually many of these were drowned; many were killed. Those who were taken by the Sipáhis were carried prisoners to the Nawáb.*

Meanwhile, Colonel Smith's boat had been carried down by the stream. Its occupants received authentic intelligence of the fate of their friends from Mr. Jones, Colonel Smith's boat who, after having defended himself as long as defence was possible, and received a bullet-wound in the right shoulder, had struck out into the stream. Mr. Jones states in his narrative that on board that boat he found "everything in confusion," some having been killed, some wounded, by the villagers of Singhirámpúr. Shortly afterwards, Mr. Fisher was picked up. The boat continued to drop down without pursuit or molestation from, or intercourse with, the natives, till on the evening of the following day it reached a village reaches a friendly village. opposite Kúsúmkhor, in the Oudh territories. Here the villagers offered the fugitives assistance and protection. These at first feared treachery, but, becoming convinced of the friendly intentions of the peasants, they put to shore for the night, and were refreshed by a meal consisting of unleavened bread and buffalo milk.

Well would it have been if our countrymen The fugitives pursue their way, one of their number excepted. had remained with these kind-hearted villagers. One of them, Mr. Jones, whose wound had become most painful, decided on doing so. The others all set out that night. They set out to meet their death. The precise form in which that death was meted

* Amongst those who succeeded in swimming to the other boat were Mr. Jones, whose narrative I have mainly followed; Mr. Fisher, the chaplain, whose gallantry had endeared him to every one, and who, on this occasion supported his wife and child till they died in his arms. Mr. David Churcher, supporting Major Robertson, by means of an oar, succeeded in reaching the village of Kalhúr. Here the villagers sheltered them. Mr. Churcher remained here tending Major Robertson for two months. The latter then died. Ultimately Mr. Churcher succeeded in reaching Kánhpúr, then occupied by the British.

out to them may not be certainly known. Some believe that the boat was stopped near Kánhpúr, its occupants dragged out, and there murdered. There is, on the other hand, some ground for believing that as the boat passed Bithúr,* the stronghold of Náná Sáhib, it was fired upon by the Sipáhis, and all on board were killed. This, however, is certain, that they all met their death at or near Kánhpúr, on the order of Náná Dúndú Pant.

Fate of the remainder.

Thus had the Nawáb, Tafúzal Husén Khán, triumphed at Farrukhábad. He inaugurated his sūccession by the slaughter of some forty Europeans taken in various parts of the district. The prisoners brought back from Major Robertson's boat were kept for about a fortnight in confinement, and then murdered under most atrocious circumstances. But the blood thus spilt failed to cement his throne. It failed to win for him the affection of the Hindus, constituting nine-tenths of the population of the district. It failed to give him a sense of security. In a few short months, it was this blood which choked his utterances for pardon, and which, when the penalty he had incurred had been remitted by the unauthorised action of a subordinate official, condemned him to an existence more miserable than death. The Government could not recede from the plighted word of their officer; but, though the Nawáb was allowed to live, he lived only to see the utter annihilation of his own schemes, the complete restoration of the authority he had insulted and defied, to be made conscious every day of the contempt and disgust he had brought upon his person and his name.

* "The boat left. I heard nothing more of it for several days till their Mánjí (boatman) who took her down returned and gave out that Náná Sáhib had fired upon them at Bithúr, and all on board were killed."—*Mr. Jones's Narrative*. Mr. Jones himself succeeded in joining Mr. Probyn, and ultimately in accompanying him to Kánhpúr.

BOOK IX.—OUDH.

[MARCH—NOVEMBER, 1857.]

CHAPTER I.

OUDH AND HENRY LAWRENCE.

WHATEVER may be the justification offered for the annexation of Oudh, it cannot be questioned that the manner in which that policy was carried out tended to alienate from the British every class in India.) The absorption of an independent Muhammadan kingdom was alone sufficient to afford to the already disaffected section of the Musalmáns throughout India, especially in the large cities, not only a pretext, but a substantial reason for discontent and disloyalty. But the annexation of Oudh did far more than alienate a class already not too well affected. It alienated the rulers of Native States, who saw in that act indulgence in a greed of absorption to be satiated neither by unswerving loyalty nor by timely advances of money on loan to the dominant power. It alienated the territorial aristocracy, who found themselves suddenly stripped, by the action of the newly introduced British system, sometimes of one-half of their estates, sometimes even of more. It alienated the Muhammadan aristocracy—the courtiers—men whose income depended principally upon the appointments and pensions they received from the favour of their prince. It alienated the military class serving under the king, ruthlessly cast back upon their families with small pensions or gratuities. It contributed to alienate the British Sipáhis recruited in Oudh,—and who, so long as their country continued independent, possessed, by virtue of the privilege granted them of acting on the Court of Lucknow by means of petitions presented by the

Effects of the
annexation of
Oudh,

in alienating
every class
from the
British.

British Resident, a sure mode of protecting their families from oppression.* It alienated alike the peasantry of the country and the petty artisans of the towns, who did not relish the change of a system, which, arbitrary and tyrannical though it might be, they thoroughly understood, for another system, the first elements of which were taxation of articles of primary necessity. In a word, the annexation of Oudh converted a country, the loyalty of whose inhabitants to the British had become proverbial, into a hotbed of discontent and of intrigue.

On the 20th of March, 1857, Sir Henry Lawrence had assumed the Chief Commissionership of Lakhnao. His clear and practical eye saw at a glance that the new system was not working satisfactorily; that his predecessor had thrust it *en masse* on the province, and that its effect had been—alienation. Of all the men who have ever attained a prominent position in India, Sir Henry Lawrence was, perhaps, the most qualified to remove a discontent engendered by action on the part of the Government too fast, too hard, and too reckless. He had great sympathies with the people. He thoroughly understood them. He knew that their feelings, their instincts, were thoroughly conservative; that they distrusted change in the abstract; that, if one thing more than another would rouse their long-suffering and docile nature, it would be change coming upon them suddenly, harshly, unaccompanied either by warning or compensation. Sir Henry Lawrence noted, then, not only that there was discontent, but that there was reason for that discontent; and he at once made it his business to lessen, as far as he could, the oppressive action of the newly imposed regulations.

Sir Henry
Lawrence
arrives.

His fitness for
the office.

He at once
detects the
discontent,

* On this subject, after the appearance of the earlier editions of this work, I received from a retired officer of the Bengal Army a letter of which the following is an extract: "Fifty years ago, when Adjutant of the 15th Bengal N. I., the Sabahdar Major brought me a petition to be forwarded to the Resident in Oudh, and, on my remarking that John Company would soon take possession of that country when the Sipahis would not require to send any more petitions, he exclaimed in perfect astonishment, 'No, no, that would be an evil day for us, for then all would be alike, whereas now all who have relatives in the service (and their name is Legion) have the protection of the Company whenever they have any complaint to make against the Oudh authorities.'"

This expresses exactly the feelings of the Sipahis; I have heard it again and again from their lips.

The correspondence of Sir Henry Lawrence with the Governor-General and with his family shows clearly not only how the discontent of the people had impressed him, but how deeply he regretted the too hasty and too zealous action of the officials who had unwittingly fomented the ill-feeling. Suddenly to introduce a system which will have the immediate effect of depriving the territorial aristocracy of a country of one half of its estates is not a policy consistent with the diffusion of a spirit of loyalty,—and yet within a month of his installation in Lakhnao Sir Henry Lawrence wrote to Lord Canning to inform him that in the Faizábád division of Oudh the Talúkdárs had lost half their villages—that some had lost all! Nor did he find that the peasantry had benefited. Heavy assessments and increased duties had driven them frantic, whilst the large towns were inundated by the disbanded adherents of the late *régime*, all discontented and disaffected.

Which he regards as justifiable,

on the grounds which he assigns.

Amongst the population thus seething the dangerous spark of the caste question was suddenly thrown. Who threw it? Was it, as some have asserted, the ill-judged order of a thoughtless official? Was it, as others maintain, the angry retort of a low-caste lascar? Or was it rather the eager grasp, the clever appropriation of a clique thirsting for an opportunity? That is a question on which perfect agreement is perhaps impossible. This, at least, is clear to me, that the hold which this question took of the minds of the Sipáhis was due mainly to the fact that they were for the most part men of Oudh, and that annexation and its consequences had prepared the minds of the men of Oudh to accept any absurdity which might argue want of faith on the part of the British. That the Sipáhis believed that the greased cartridges were designed to deprive them of their caste is, I think, not to be questioned. But they believed that calumny mainly because the action of the British Government, with respect to their own province, had so shattered their faith in the professions of the ruling power, that they were ready to credit any charges that might be brought against it. Mr. Beadon spoke of the action of the Sipáhis, and the effect of that action upon others, as “a passing and groundless panic.”

The “caste question.”

Was it an original cause or a pretext, of discontent?

Reasons for believing that there was a cause of discontent independent of the caste question;

But, as I have said elsewhere, if it was a panic, it was not a groundless panic. In a greater degree the annexation of Oudh and the measures which followed that annexation; in a lesser degree the actual employment of animal fat in the composition of the cart ridges, constituted ample grounds for the distrust evinced by the Sipáhis.

In the earlier hours of his arrival in Oudh the attention of Sir Henry Lawrence had been mainly occupied by the condition and the discontent of the people he had come to govern. (He felt that, could peace be maintained, there was yet time to remedy the main evil.) In a very few days he had weighed the higher officials in Lakhnao and had satisfied himself that he could manage them. The question to be solved was whether the little cloud rising in the horizon near Barhám-púr would not develop into a tempest, fierce enough to disturb the tranquillity of the entire country, before he should have time to instil confidence in the minds of the people of the newly annexed province.

This question was unhappily solved in the negative. The feeling which had animated the Sipáhis at Barhám-púr, in the month of March, was more widely spread in Oudh than in any other province in India. For Oudh was the home of the Sipáhis. Oudh supplied three-fifths of the recruits annually enlisted in the Bengal army. Every feeling engendered in the ranks permeated through Oudh, whilst the notions imbibed in the homesteads of the peasants found an echo in every regiment of the native army.

Sir Henry Lawrence was not slow to detect the increasing feeling of mistrust in the very class on whose loyalty the British empire in India seemed to depend. Reports reached him from every corner of the province, all conveying the same story. He could not conceal from himself that the spirit of the people was deeply excited, and excited on the one subject on which to be excited was to be dangerous. He saw that credit was very generally accorded to the whisper that the British Government was bent on destroying the caste of the Sipáhis, and he knew that to maintain that caste inviolate the Hindu would risk his property, his home-

which, though a cause, was only a secondary cause.

Sir Henry studies the position,

and fears the evil is too far advanced.

The reason why the danger in Oudh was likely to be excessive.

The surging of the storm.

stead, all that he valued in this world ; that he would gladly sacrifice his life.

In the wars waged by Aurangzib against the princes of Rájputáná, to maintain the *jizya* or poll-tax upon all who did not profess the religion of Muhammad, the Emperor possessed the advantage of counting upon the religious bigotry of his Muhammadan subjects. But Sir Henry Lawrence was not blind to the fact that, in any contest which might be impending with the Hindus, the sympathies of that class would be denied him. Amongst the original fomenters of the rising disaffection many certainly were Muhammadan. The desire to recover their lost over-lordship, the ambition to revive their vanished empire, the longing to avenge themselves on the conqueror, were the motives which prompted them. But the Muhammadan customs have so much in common with the Christian customs, the food partaken of by the two communities is, with one exception, so similar, that they would have found it difficult under ordinary circumstances to persuade their brethren in the ranks of the army that their religion was in danger. The opportune discovery of the use of lard in the manufacture of the cartridges came to these conspirators as an inspiration from heaven. They used it with an effect that was decisive. The Muhammadan rank and file, disaffected on other grounds, determined from the moment of that revelation to cast in their lot with their Hindu comrades.

The secondary cause enables the Muhammadan leaders to work on their followers.

That a crisis of no ordinary magnitude was approaching became apparent, then, to Sir Henry Lawrence very soon after he had assumed the reins of office at Lucknow. He did not despair. His intimate acquaintance with the natives of India had satisfied him that there were no people in the world more tractable when once their reason had been satisfied. Fanatics, it is true, never reason. But there might, he thought, be some chance of enlisting on his side that divine faculty, if an opportunity could be secured of appealing to it before the stage of absolute fanaticism had been arrived at. On these slender grounds he built such hopes as he entertained.

The one slight chance in favour of a peaceful issue

Almost from the very moment of his arrival, Sir Henry Lawrence had laid himself out to remedy the most pressing material grievances complained of by the various classes of the population. The evil already effected had been too great to

admit of his being perfectly successful. The aristocracy of the Court, indeed, who, as I have already stated, had been ruined by the abrupt action which followed annexation, were pro-

Sir Henry
Lawrence
tries to re-
pair the faults
of his prede-
cessors ;

pitiated by the immediate payment to them of the pensions which had been promised, but till then had been withheld. An early opportunity was likewise taken of assuring the officials, who had served under the previous *régime*, that their claims

to employment would receive prior consideration, and that, as a rule, the natives of Oudh would be preferred to immigrants from the British provinces. The ease of the disbanded soldiers was more difficult. These men were promised preference in enlistment in the local corps and in the military police. Only a comparatively small number of the cavalry availed themselves, however, of this privilege. In many cases they did not hesitate to state the reason of their refusal. "I have eaten the king's salt, and will not touch that of another." * With the small traders in Lakhnao itself Sir Henry succeeded better. They were pacified by the personal interest displayed by the new Chief Commissioner in their welfare, and by the practical measures he took before their eyes to put a stop to the seizures and demolition of houses in the city, which had formed one staple of their grievances.

and partially
succeeds.

With the territorial magnates, Sir Henry, in spite of no slight opposition, dealt in the same enlightened spirit. He held Durbars to receive them, to listen to their views, to remedy their just complaints. And he did greatly pacify them by the enunciation of a policy, by the action of which they would be reinstated in the position they had occupied at the time of the annexation.

In this way, in a few weeks, the material evils complained of were placed in a fair way of being remedied. It was a more difficult and a more delicate task to remove the rising religious discontent. The mischief had been virtually accomplished before Sir Henry Lawrence reached Lakhnao. I think it quite possible that had he succeeded Wájid Áli Sháh

Might have
wholly suc-
ceeded if he
had, in the
first instance,
been sent to
Oudh.

* This was especially the case with respect to enlistments in the regular regiments, and in the military police. The disbanded soldiers accepted service more readily in the district police, in which a like amount of drill and discipline was not enforced.

The district police were under the civil authorities alone.

it would never have arisen. But in all such questions prevention is easier than cure. I repeat—fanatics never reason. And Sir Henry Lawrence soon discovered that before he had reached Lakhnao the religious question had assumed all the proportions of fanaticism.

The first practical intimation that the contagion of the cartridge question had reached Oudh was manifested early in April. Before advertng to it, it is necessary that I should state the troops by whom the newly annexed province was garrisoned.

At Lakhnao itself were quartered H.M.'s 32nd Regiment, about seven hundred strong; a weak company of European artillery; the 7th Regiment Light Cavalry (native) the 13th, 48th, and 71st Regiments of Native Infantry. Besides these, there were at Lakhnao, or in its immediate environs, two regiments of Irregular Native Infantry, raised for local service in Oudh, the 4th, and the 7th; one regiment of Military Police, the 3rd; a large proportion of the mounted Military Police;* one regiment of Oudh Irregular Cavalry; and two batteries of Native Artillery. Thus the native armed troops were in the proportion of nearly ten to one, the actual numbers being seven thousand to seven hundred and fifty. At Sítápúr in addition to local troops, was stationed the 41st Native Infantry, having a detachment at Maláun; at Sultánpúr the 15th Irregular Cavalry. The other stations, Daryábád, Faizábád, and Bahráich were garrisoned only by local corps.

The intimation that the caste contagion had reached Lakhnao occurred in this wise. The surgeon of the 48th Regiment had incautiously applied his mouth to a bottle of medicine. The Sipáhis attributed the surgeon's action to design, and, although the bottle which had been tasted was broken in their presence, they seized an early opportunity to burn down his house. The authors of this outrage, though known to belong to the 48th, escaped detection.

Garrison of
Lakhnao.

and of the
districts.

First symp-
toms of dis-
affection at
Lakhnao.

* The Oudh Military Police consisted of a thousand cavalry and three regiments of infantry. This force was commanded by Captain Gould Weston, an officer of great ability, who, prior to the annexation of the province, had been engaged for some years in the suppression of Thagi and Dakaiti in Oudh, and had rendered excellent service as Superintendent of the Frontier Police, and as one of the assistants to the Resident.—Sir William Sleeman's *Journey through Oudh*.

In ordinary times the incident of the bottle would have had little significance. But the vengeance wreaked on the surgeon showed the importance attached to it, in the month of April 1857, by the men of the 48th. Further indications soon intimated very plainly to the authorities that the feeling which had manifested itself in Barhampūr was not less strongly rooted in Oudh.*

Sir Henry Lawrence, I have said, whilst not insensible to the extreme difficulty of the task, had deemed it might just be possible to dispel, by plain appeals to reason and to facts, the cobwebs from the minds of such men as had not become absolutely fanatical on the subject of the alleged attempt on their caste. He made an earnest appeal, then, to the loyalty of the men. He pointed out to the native officers how contrary it was to the experience of a century that the English should attempt to produce by fraud a result which they would consider only valuable if brought about by conviction. He explained to them the danger which threatened them—the danger of being persuaded by evil-disposed men to become false to their salt. He warned them at the same time of the consequences. He would not palter with mutiny. Sharp and summary should be the punishment of those who should fail in their duty. “It is impossible,” writes one† who was at his elbow at this period, “it is impossible here to mention the various steps taken by Sir Henry Lawrence to preserve the soldiery in their duty and the people in their allegiance. Every conciliatory measure was adopted consistent with the dignity of the British Government; and there is no doubt that by his untiring energy, discretion, ability, and determination, he *did* fan into a flame for a while the wavering loyalty of many of the native officers and men, and that the army and people generally felt that his was a firm and

Sir Henry
makes earnest
appeals to the
native officers
and soldiers.

Partial suc-
cess of the
appeals.

* “Not long after it became known that the regiment was disaffected. Some of the native officers were reported by the police to be intriguing with relatives of the Ex-King of Oudh, residing in the city Not long after, Captain Adolphus Orr, commanding one of the regiments of military police, the 3rd, reported that an attempt had been made by some Sipāhis of the 48th to tamper with a native guard of his regiment.”—Gubbins, *The Mutinies in Oudh*.

† *Narrative of the Mutinies in Oudh*, by Capt. G. Hutchinson, now Major-General Hutchinson, C.B., C.S.I., then Military Secretary to Sir H. Lawrence.

experienced hand." This is most true. All that it was possible to do to check the mutiny was done in Oudh. Firmness combined with conciliation, fairness of speech with fairness of action, prompt punishment with prompt reward. Yet this policy—in the circumstances a model policy—though not wholly fruitless, though checking the outbreak for a time, did not ultimately prevent it. The reason is Too late. not difficult to find. Oudh had been undermined—the point of fanaticism had been very generally reached before Sir Henry Lawrence arrived there. He came too late indeed to repair the mischief, though not too late to save the British honour—not too late to preserve from the hands of the despoiler the plot of ground which constituted the seat of Government, and which will be referred to in future ages as the monument of his sagacity and of the prowess of his countrymen.

For he did not confine himself solely to the work of pacifying and of reasoning with the people. He realised almost at a glance the danger that threatened India. He felt that at any moment the handful of Englishmen in the country might have two hundred millions on their hands. Whilst, then, he used every persuasive argument, and put into action every precautionary measure to avert a crisis, he prepared to meet one.

He sees the full extent of the coming danger.

He began his preparations in April. His own head-quarters were at the Residency situated in the city, close to the river Gúmtí, and upwards of a quarter of a mile from the iron bridge leading to the Mariánn cantonments. At Mariánn were the native infantry regiments, a light horse battery of European artillery and a battery of native artillery. At Múdkipúr, a mile and a half further still from the Residency, was one native cavalry regiment. In an opposite direction, in a line in fact forming a right angle with the road to Mariánn and at a distance of a mile and a half from the point of the angle, the Residency, was H.M.'s 32nd Regiment, about seven hundred strong. Nearly a mile and a half directly north of the barracks of the British Regiment, and on the opposite bank of the river Gúmtí, was the only remaining regiment of native cavalry. South of the river again, at or near Músá Bágh, three miles from the Residency, were two irregular native regiments, and between them and the Residency was a magazine containing a considerable stand of arms.

He takes early precautions.

About the Residency itself were clustered several substantial buildings of solid masonry occupied by the higher European officials. Here also were the Treasury, the Hospital, and a gaol. A detachment of native troops guarded the Residency and the Treasury. One company occupied a curved line of buildings outside the principal gate leading to the Treasury. The whole of the Residency buildings were known to the natives throughout Oudh by the name Baillie Guard.*

The Resi-
dency.

Rather less than one mile from the Residency, on the same side of the river Gúmtí, and close to the brick bridge spanning it, is a castellated and picturesque stronghold called the Maehchí Bhawan—the fortress of the rebellious Shékhhs in the time of the vice-royalty of Asufu'd-daulah, but for many years used only as a depository of lumber—occupying a very commanding position.

The attention of Sir Henry was, in the first instance, directed to the making the Residency defensible, and to a better location of the European troops. With this end in view he began to clear away the huts and other obstructions which occupied the ground close to the Residency: to lay in supplies of grain of all sorts and European stores: to accumulate powder and small ammunition and to dig pits for their reception: to arrange for a constant water supply; by degrees to send for the treasure from the city and outlying station; and to form outworks in the ground encompassing the Residency. At the same time he moved to the vicinity of the barracks of the 32nd Foot four guns of the native battery stationed at Mariáun.

Sir Henry
prepares to
meet any
possible
emergency.

His preparations had not been made a moment too soon. On the 30th of April the storm threatened. On the 3rd of May it broke.

It happened in this wise. The 7th Regiment of Oudh Irregular Infantry was stationed at Músá Bágh, about three miles from the Residency. The adjutant of the regiment was Lieutenant Meeham of the Madras Army, a cool, determined, and resolute officer. On the 30th of April when he took his men to ball-practice, these suddenly showed a disinclination to use the new cartridge. Meeham pointed out to them that the cartridge was similar to that which they had been using the previous fort-

April 30.
The 7th Oudh
Irregulars
mutiny.

* The Guard in question, commanded by a Subahdar, was first stationed at this gate by Colonel Baillie, while Resident at the Court of Oudh. Hence the name.

night. This seemed to satisfy the men, and they proceeded with the practice. But the next morning the sergeant-major reported that the men positively refused to bite the cartridge, that many even declined to receive or even to touch it.

The day following was spent by the men in brooding over their grievances. They worked themselves to the state of fanaticism which will not hear reason, and at 10 o'clock, on the 3rd, they had arrived at the conclusion that they must kill their European officers. The latter, warned in time by the quartermaster-sergeant of the disposition of their men, nobly did their duty, and succeeded after a time in inducing the Sipáhis to return to their lines,* though they refused to surrender their arms.

May 3.
They are induced to return to their lines.

But Sir Henry Lawrence was not content with this doubtful triumph. Having organised a force to suppress any attempt which the Sipáhis might make to display insubordination, he sent that afternoon two officers with instructions how to act. The men of the 7th were paraded. The question was put to them whether they would continue to bite the cartridge or whether they would refuse. The men, after some hesitation, promised to obey, but their manner was so sullen and so insolent that Sir Henry felt he could not trust them. He at once proceeded to the spot with the force he had organised, consisting of the 32nd Foot, a European battery, three regular native regiments of infantry and one of cavalry. It was dark, but Sir Henry at once brought the 7th to the front and ordered them to lay down their arms. In the presence of the imposing force in their front and on their flanks and of the lighted portfires of the gunners, the courage of the mutinous Sipáhis oozed out at their fingers' ends. Many of them, panic-stricken, fled wildly from the spot, but, on being followed and assured that no violence would be used if they would obey orders, they returned, and before midnight all their muskets were secured. The next day the ringleaders were seized, and it transpired from their

Sir Henry Lawrence deprives them of their arms.

* It was related at the time of Lieutenant Mechem that he owed his life on this occasion to his coolness and presence of mind. Taken unawares by the mutineers and told to prepare to die, he replied: "It is true you may kill me, but what good will my death do to you? You will not ultimately prevail. Another adjutant will take my place, and you will be subjected to the same treatment you receive from me." The mutineers did not injure him.

admissions that a treasonable correspondence with the view to a general rising had been going on for some time between them and the men of the 48th Regiment of Native Infantry.

In the events which immediately preceded, and immediately followed, the affair of the 7th Oudh Irregulars, Sir Henry Lawrence had received valuable information from native officers and others. In the crisis which he saw advancing with rapid strides he considered that rewards should go hand in hand with punishment, that the justice—"the truth in action"—which had always been the maxim of the British Government, should at all hazards be maintained. He considered it advisable, moreover, that the bestowal of the rewards should be made the occasion for a solemn ceremony, at which he might speak the mind of the Government. With this view he invited the native aristocracy, the European and native civil officials, the European and native officers, and others to a Durbar on the evening of the 12th of May. Every

arrangement had been made to give solemnity to the scene. At 6 P.M. Sir Henry Lawrence entered, followed by his staff. Near him were deposited in trays the presents and rewards to be bestowed upon the loyal native officers and soldiers. But before distributing these

Sir Henry addressed in Hindustáni the assembled company. He went straight to the point; spoke of the fears for their religion entertained by the Hindus; reminded them how, under the Mughul rule, that religion had never been respected; how Aurangzib had imposed the *jizya*, or tax upon all who held to a faith differing from the Muhammadan; and how the flesh of the cow had been thrust down the throats of unwilling converts. Turning then to the Muhammadans, he reminded them that Ranjít Singh would never tolerate their religion at Láhor. Passing on from that, he begged them to recall to mind the toleration which for a century the English Government had afforded to both religions. He adverted next to our power, to our exploits in the Crimea, to our ships, our resources; pointed out how hopeless of ultimate success would be a crusade against the British. He next dwelt on the long and intimate connection between the Sipáhis and their officers, on the community of danger and the com-

* "It has been said by a great writer that 'Grace is Beauty in action.' I tell you that 'Justice is Truth in action.'"—Speech of Mr. Disraeli in 1850.

munty of glory between them, and begged the men to cherish as their most precious heirlooms the deeds of their ancestors. He concluded an eloquent speech, delivered, be it borne in mind, in the language of the people, by warning his listeners against becoming the dupes of designing men, and of the fate which would inevitably follow the neglect of his advice. He then caused the deserving native officers and soldiers to be brought up to him, and, in the name of the Government, delivered to them the rewards they had merited.*

The speech of Sir Henry Lawrence had, undoubtedly, some effect at the moment. His earnest manner, his character so trusted and so respected, added weight to his words. When the Durbar broke up there was not probably a man present who was not loyal. But the opposite feeling was too deeply rooted to be dissipated by a passing sensation. The listeners went from the Durbar into the society of the plotters and intriguers against whom Sir Henry had warned them. The whispers, constantly repeated, of these men, at first weakened, and ultimately effaced the effect which had been produced by the scene at the Durbar.

Its effect
passing and
transitory.

That Durbar was held on the 12th of May. The Míráth mutiny had broken out on the 10th. A telegram conveying information that something serious had happened in the North-West reached Sir Henry on the 13th. A second telegram giving fuller details of the Míráth revolt and an account of the seizure of Dehli reached him on the 14th. Averse as he was from any measures which might show premature distrust of the Sipáhis, Sir Henry felt that a crisis had come upon him which must be met by prompt action. His plans had been arranged beforehand. During the 16th and 17th they were carried out. The morning of the last-named day saw a moiety of the 32nd Foot occupying the ground about the Residency and commanding the iron bridge. The second moiety was brought up from the city into the cantonments of Mariáun. The bridge of boats was moved nearer to the Residency and brought under control, whilst a selected body of Sipáhis was detached to occupy the Machchí Bhawan, not yet sufficiently cleansed to be fit for occupation by European troops.

May 13.
News of the
Míráth revolt
arrives.

Prompt mea-
sures taken
by Sir Henry.

* Strange contradiction! Some of the men who were thus rewarded for loyalty were shortly afterwards hanged for proved disloyalty!

A central position was thus secured for the Chief Commissioner, for his officials, and his European soldiers. Sir Henry had by one movement prepared himself to meet any emergency. But, whilst prepared, he had not altogether abandoned the hope that the emergency might not arise. He apprehended danger less from the native population than from the native troops. But with time he hoped that the difficulty might still be surmounted. "Time," he wrote in a memorandum dated the 18th of May, "time is everything just now. Time, firmness, promptness, conciliation, prudence A firm and cheerful aspect must be maintained; there must be no bustle; no appearance of alarm, still less of panic; but at the same time there must be the utmost watchfulness and promptness; everywhere the first germ of insurrection must be put down instantly."

May 18.

Sir Henry is nominated to supreme military command in Oudh.

Immediately on receiving information of the occurrences at Mirath and Dehli Sir Henry Lawrence telegraphed to the Governor-General a strong recommendation to send for European troops from China, Ceylon, and other places, and for the Gurkhás from the Hill Stations and from Nipál. Feeling, moreover, that at such a crisis it was necessary that the Chief Commissioner of the province should be invested with plenary military authority, he asked the Governor-General to confer such power upon him. Lord Canning promptly replied. On the 19th he bestowed upon the Chief Commissioner the plenary power asked for, and on the 22nd he gave him authority to apply to Jung Bahádur for his Gurkhá troops.

Sir Henry Lawrence assumed the military command on the 19th. To understand the military arrangements which had been carried out two days previously under his instructions, it will be advisable to give an outline sketch of the city of Lakhnao.

The city of Lakhnao, forty-two miles distant from Kánbpúr, extends for about three miles on the right bank of the river Gúmí. All the principal palatial buildings, the Residency and the Machhí Bhawan, are between the city and the river bank. South of these buildings, and covering an immense space, is the city. This is intersected by a canal which falls into the Gúmí close to the Martinière College, about three miles south-east of the Residency. A little to the south of this is the Dilkushá, a hunting-box or

The city of Lakhnao.

palace, within an enclosed park. The space between the Residency and the Martinière is occupied by palaces, among which the Motí Mahall, the Sháh-Manzil, the Sikandrabágh, and the Farhat Bakhsh Palace, are the most conspicuous. South of the city, about four miles from the Residency on the southern side of the road leading to Kánpúr, is the Álabágh, a large walled garden, with a high and pretentious gateway.

Not counting the position of the native cavalry at Múdkipúr, Sir Henry possessed now three military posts. Two of these, the Residency and the Machchí Bhawan—he made as strong as he could. Having regard to possible eventualities he removed the spare ammunition from the magazines into the Machchí Bhawan. He seized the earliest opportunity of garrisoning that place with Europeans, of storing supplies there, and of mounting on the ramparts guns of all sorts. Many of these were taken from the King's palaces, and were useful only to make a show. In the Residency compound, over the Treasury, he posted a mixed guard of two hundred Sipáhis, a hundred and thirty Europeans, and six guns—the guns being so placed that they could, at the first alarm, be brought to bear on any mutineers. The third post was at the old cantonment of Mariáun. It was garrisoned by three hundred and forty men of the 32nd Foot, fifty European artillerymen, and six guns; the three native regiments and a battery of native artillery. Here Sir Henry, for the time, took up his quarters.

Sir Henry's
military ar-
rangements.

Having made these preparations, Sir Henry Lawrence took an early opportunity to move the ladies and children into the houses within the Residency enclosure. Here also were brought the families and the sick men of the 32nd Regiment. At the same time the clerks, copyists, section-writers, and others of that class, were armed and drilled. On the 27th of May he was able to write to Lord Canning, "both the Residency and the Machchí Bhawan are safe against all probable comers." Whilst thus preparing to meet all possibilities Sir Henry betrayed none of the anxiety which he felt, but went freely amongst the people, endeavouring to calm their minds, to reason with them, to lay bare to them their folly. It was, however, too late, and he was made every day to feel it. "I held," he wrote to Lord Canning early in May, "I held a conversation with a Jámadar of the Oudh artillery for more than an hour, and was startled"

The ladies
and children
are brought
into the Resi-
dency.

by the dogged persistence of the man, a Brahman of about forty years of age, of excellent character, in the belief that for ten years past Government has been engaged in measures for the forcible, or rather fraudulent, conversion of all the natives. . . . My interview with him was occasioned by his commanding officer having specially mentioned his intelligence and good character."

Towards the end of May the long smouldering discontent of the turbulent Musalmáns of the Malihábád district burst into a flame, and on the 27th of that month Sir Henry Lawrence detached thither Captain Gould Weston, the Superintendent of Military Police, to endeavour to restore order. Weston's escort consisted of a troop of his own cavalry and a company of the mutinous 7th Oudh Irregular Infantry, under the command of the gallant Meeham. In the midst of an insolent Muhammadan population, to whom everything was a grievance, and from whom

Captain Weston could elicit no real tangible cause of the rebellion, these two officers, leading men who were not to be trusted, were in imminent danger.* Their lives depended not less upon their own coolness and daring before their avowed foes than upon the personal influence they might exercise on the wavering fidelity of their escort. Happily these essential qualities were conspicuous; had it been otherwise, neither Weston nor Meeham would have fought his way back to Lakhnao when recalled thither by Sir Henry Lawrence the day after the mutiny of the troops at Mariáun.

On the same day, the 27th, Captain Hutchinson, of the Engineers, Military Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, an officer of great talent and daring, was ordered by Sir Henry Lawrence to accompany into the district, as political officer, a column composed of two hundred men of the 7th Cavalry, and two hundred men of the 48th Native Infantry. The object of sending this column was to rid Lakhnao of the presence of men who might there be dangerous, but who, posted on the northern frontier of Oudh, might be employed with advantage to restrain the turbulence of the inhabitants. The idea emanated from Mr. Christian, through whose districts the column would pass.

* Hutchinson's *Narrative of Events in Oudh*, published by authority. Captain Hutchinson adds: "Nothing but the bold determined firmness of Captain Weston over-awed the 3000 fanatic wretches who surrounded him."

Marching from Lakhnao on the 27th, the column passed through Malihábád on the 28th—scowled upon by the armed villagers—and reached Sandila, thirty-two miles to the westward of Lakhnao, on the 1st of June. There Hutchinson received accounts of the mutiny of the 30th of May at Lakhnao. The Sipáhis heard of it by the same post. It became at once apparent that they were biding their time. Hutchinson endeavoured to calm them by the disbursement of almost the entire contents of the treasure chest in the shape of pay. For the moment they seemed pacified. Their own senior officers, Captains Burmester and Staples, believed in them implicitly. Meanwhile the column was pressing on towards the Ganges. Hutchinson, who noted the increasing insolence of the men, urged the officers not to allow themselves to be taken in the net which was preparing for them on the other side of the river. But they were deaf and would not hear. The regiment crossed the sacred stream. On the 7th or 8th the men rose, massacred all their own officers but one, Lieutenant Boulton, who fled to perish elsewhere, and went off to Dehli. Hutchinson, accompanied by the paymaster of pensioners, Major Marriott, who with him had declined to cross the river, returned in safety to Lakhnao.

May 30.

Mutiny of detached parties of the 45th Native Infantry and 7th Light Cavalry.

The precautions I have before referred to had not been taken at that city at all too soon. On the night of the 30th of May the insurrection broke out. At 9 o'clock the evening gun fired as usual. The men of the 71st Regiment, previously told off in parties, started off at this signal to fire the bungalows and murder their officers. A few men only of the other infantry regiments, and some men of the 7th Cavalry, joined them. Their further proceedings will be related presently.

The Sipáhis at Lakhnao mutiny.

Sir Henry Lawrence was dining that night at the Residency bungalow at Mariáun. An officer of his staff had informed him that he had been told by a Sipáhi that at gun-fire (9 P.M.) the signal to mutiny would be given. The gun fired; but all for the moment seemed quiet. Sir Henry leaned forward and said to the officer, "Your friends are not punctual." The words were scarcely out of his mouth when the discharge of muskets proved that his staff officer had been well informed, and that his friends were punctual.

Warning given to Sir Henry.

A strange incident happened a few minutes later. Sir Henry Lawrence, surrounded by his staff, was standing on the steps of the Residency bungalow, waiting for the horses which had been ordered up from the stables. They were in the full glare of Mr. Couper's house, which, fired by the mutineers, had burst almost instantaneously in a blaze. Suddenly the Subahdar of the Sipáhis on duty at the Residency brought up his guard, and halted it facing Sir Henry and his staff at a distance of about forty paces. The Subahdar then came up to Captain Wilson, and saluting him, said, "Shall I order the guard to load with ball?" Wilson referred the question to Sir Henry, who replied, "Yes, let them load." The loading then

Danger of
Sir Henry
and staff.

began—Sir Henry and the officers still standing in the glare of the fire. The thud of ramming down the leaden balls was distinctly heard. The Sipáhis

then brought up the muskets to the capping position. The caps were adjusted. The next movement of the Sipáhis was eagerly waited for. They had the *élite*—the chiefs—of the British force at their mercy. One disaffected man bold enough could, then and there, have decided the fate of Lakhnao. The group standing on the steps of the Residency bungalow felt this in their inward hearts. But not an action, not a gesture, betrayed the thought within them. Yet they must have been relieved when the shouldering of arms followed the capping. The next moment the horses were brought up, and Sir Henry followed by his staff started for the lines.

On his way he found three hundred men of the 32nd. four guns, Major Kaye's battery, and two of the Oudh force, posted in a position on the extreme right of the 71st lines, and contiguous to the road leading from cantonments to the city. Recognising the

Sir Henry's
movements
to suppress
the mutiny.

necessity of preventing as far as possible communication between the mutineers and the evil-disposed in the city, Sir Henry took with him two guns and a company of the 32nd to occupy the road leading from the cantonment to the bridge. He sent back shortly for the remainder of the Europeans, and for two more guns. Meanwhile, the officers of the native regiments had hastened to the lines to endeavour to reason with the men. Many of these, however, had already begun the work of plunder. A considerable body had marched straight on the 71st mess-house, and failing to find the officers—who had but just left—they fired it.

Action of the
mutineers.

Very soon after a musketry fire from the 71st lines opened on the Europeans. These replied with grape, and with such effect that the Sipáhis made a rush to the rear. In their hurried course they passed the infantry picket, composed of natives, and commanded by Lieutenant Grant, 71st Native Infantry. Some of his own men tried to save this officer by placing him under a bed. But a Sipáhi of his own regiment, who was on guard with him, discovered the place of concealment to the mutineers, and by these he was brutally murdered.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Hardinge, taking with him a few of the Irregular Cavalry, had been patrolling the main street of cantonments, in the endeavour to maintain order and to save life and property. He was not, however, in sufficient force to prevent the burning and plundering of the officers' houses and the bazaars. The mutineers were prowling about in all directions. One of them fired at Lieutenant Hardinge, and when his shot missed fire he came at him with his bayonet and wounded him in the arm. During this time there had been great excitement in the lines. Gradually, however, some satisfactory symptoms evinced themselves. First, about three hundred of the 13th Native Infantry, with their British officers, their colours, and the regimental treasure, marched up and enrolled themselves with the British. They were followed by a very few of the 71st, without, however, their colours, or their treasure. Of the 48th nothing was heard that night. The Europeans still remained formed up in the position assigned to them in case of alarm by Sir Henry Lawrence, their front flanking that of the several native regiments. About 10 P.M. some of the mutineers crept up to and occupied some empty lines bearing on that position, and opened a musketry fire. Brigadier Handscomb, riding from his house straight into the 71st lines, was immediately shot. The fire, however, soon ceased, and arrangements having been made to protect the Residency bungalow and the part of the cantonment next the city road, and strong guards having been posted, the force piled arms and waited for the morn.

The main street patrolled.

Many Sipáhis prove loyal.

The mutineers baffled.

At daylight next morning, Sir Henry placed himself at the head of the force, and learning that the rebels had retired on Múdkipúr, followed them thither. Crossing the parade ground his men came upon the body of Cornet Raleigh, a newly joined

officer, who, left sick in his quarters, had been murdered by the rebels. Almost at the same moment the mutinous regiments were discovered drawn up in line. At this critical moment an officer on Lawrence's staff noticed, or thought he noticed, a mutinous disposition on the part of the, till then loyal, 7th Cavalry. Their attitude appeared to him to betoken an intention to charge the British guns. To set the matter at rest the officer directed the guns to open fire on the distant line. Then the men of the 7th Cavalry, with the exception of about thirty, raised a fearful yell, and galloped over to join the enemy, who turned and fled with them. Our troops followed them up for about ten miles and took sixty prisoners. In this pursuit Mr. Gubbins greatly distinguished himself, capturing several of the enemy with his own hand. By 10 A.M. our force had returned to cantonments, the heat being excessive.

In announcing the suppression of this rising to Lord Canning Sir Henry Lawrence wrote: "We are now positively better off than we were. We now know our friends and enemies. The latter have no stomach for a fight, though they are capital incendiaries." In the respect to which he referred he was indeed better off. He was rid of doubtful friends. Nearly the whole of the 7th Cavalry, a few men of the 13th, more than two-thirds of the 71st, a very large proportion of the 48th, and almost all the irregular troops, had shown their hand and departed. He could now concentrate his resources. But in other respects the day was full of foreboding. Intelligence received from the districts soon made it clear that the entire province was in arms against British rule.

Three days indeed prior to the rising at Lakhnao an incident had occurred at Sitápúr which showed very plainly that the train was laid at that station, and that a single spark would ignite it. Sitápúr, the head-quarters of the north-west division of Oudh, lies about fifty-one miles from Lakhnao, midway between that city and the Sháhjahánpúr referred to in the last chapter. In 1857 it was garrisoned by the 41st Regiment of Native Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Birch, and by the 9th and 10th Regiments of Oudh Irregular Infantry. The Commissioner of the Division, Mr. Christian, resided there, together with Mr. Thornhill and Sir Mountstuart Jackson, civil officers of the Oudh Commission.

About noon of the 27th of May the vacant lines of the 2nd Regiment of Military Police, commanded by Captain John Hearsey,* were fired. It had not then become generally recognised that incendiarism was the invariable precursor to rebellion. Although, therefore, the firing of the lines caused some uneasiness, no absolute suspicion was directed to any particular body of men. The Sipáhis aided in extinguishing the fire, and the incident was not immediately followed by any overt act of mutiny.

Precursors of
the mutiny.

Incendiarism.

It would appear that the firing of the lines had been a tentative measure. The Sipáhis were anxious to feel their way, to test the credulity of their officers, before taking the step which would be irrevocable.

Of all the regiments I have mentioned the 10th Oudh Irregulars were regarded as the most trustworthy. Great, then, was the surprise in Sitápúr when, five days later, the 2nd of June, it became known that the Sipáhis of that regiment had rejected the flour sent from the city for their consumption, on the plea that it had been adulterated for the purpose of destroying their caste. They insisted that the flour should be thrown into the river. The flour was thrown into the river.

June 2.

Plea that the
flour has been
adulterated.

They now became bolder. The same afternoon the men of the same regiment plundered the gardens of the European residents of the ripe fruit growing in them. Their officers rebuked them, and, after some time, the plundering ceased.

The gardens
plundered.

But every day furnished additional proof that the men were practically out of hand. Still, strange infatuation! the officers, whilst suspecting the other regiments, believed in their own. Lieutenant-Colonel Birch, commanding the 41st Native Infantry—a regiment which† showed itself as true as any which mutinied—had the most absolute confidence in the loyalty of his men. He put that loyalty to the test by marching his regiment out on the 1st of June on the Lakhnao road to meet the mutineers advancing along it from the capital, and his men had justified

Confidence
in regiment of
Lieutenant-
Colonel Birch.

* Captain Hearsey was formerly in the King of Oudh's service. He was a most amiable and excellent officer, much respected by his men.

† *Vide* page 227.

his confidence by firing on their comrades and forcing them to alter their route! After such behaviour it was treason in Sítápúr to doubt the loyalty of the 41st.

Yet Mr. Christian, a man of intellect and intelligence, did not feel secure. The idea of abandoning his post never crossed his mind. Like all the members of the noble service to which he belonged he felt that his place was where the Government had sent him.

Mr. Christian
prepares to
meet the com-
ing danger.

For himself he had no care; but reading rightly the signs of the times, he had deemed it his duty to invite all the ladies of the station to occupy his house with their children. All responded except four, who preferred to remain with their husbands. The house was well situated for defence, being cut off on one side from the adjoining ground by a rivulet. In front of it, and between it and the lines of the 41st, were posted four guns. The flanks were guarded by the irregular regiments, in whom Mr. Christian was inclined to place confidence.

The incidents of the flour and of the fruit robbery on the 2nd of June had been sufficient to warn the residents that a crisis was approaching. But Lieutenant-Colonel Birch still believed in the loyalty of the 41st. At sunrise on the morning of the 3rd, however,

Major Ap-
thorp reports
the disaffec-
tion of the
41st.

Major Apthorp of that regiment satisfied himself that the Sipáhis were no longer to be trusted. He communicated his suspicions to Mr. Christian and his Colonel. They were soon verified. At 8 o'clock a company of the regiment went off to the treasury to seize the public money, whilst the others advanced in a menacing attitude against the guns covering Mr. Christian's house, and against the irregular regiments on either side of it.

The safety of the Europeans seemed now to depend on the fidelity of the irregulars and native gunners. But before this could be tested Colonel Birch determined to make one effort to recall his men to duty.

They mutiny
and murder
Colonel Birch.

Accompanied by Lieutenant Graves he galloped towards the treasury. Mr. Christian, having first strengthened the garrison of his house by a small party of military police, about twenty, started to follow the colonel, when Captain John Hearsey, who had preceded him, rode hurriedly back with the information that that officer and Lieutenant Graves had been shot by their men. It was clear now that the Sipáhis were bent

on the blood of their officers. The 9th Irregulars almost immediately followed the example of the 41st, killing their officers; the 10th were not slow to imitate them. They suddenly rushed with yells against the bungalow, bent on slaughter.

The Irregulars mutiny also.

It is not easy to describe the scene that followed. The only possible safety lay in flight, and flight was difficult.

The only

The rivulet Sarayan, which protected the rear of the bungalow against attack, was now an obstacle to the fugitives. However, it was an obstacle that must be attempted. Mr. Christian, who had boldly started, rifle in hand, to meet the mutineers, seeing that all was lost, returned to his house to flee with his family. Preceded by his wife with an infant in her arms, he succeeded in crossing the rivulet, but he had scarcely reached the opposite bank when he was shot dead by the pursuing rebels. A similar fate befell his wife, her baby, and the nurse. (The elder child, a girl taken across the river by Sergeant-Major Morton, was conveyed by him to the estate of the Mitaulí Rájah and ultimately to Lakhnao, where she died.) Mr. and Mrs. Thornhill were shot dead either crossing the stream or just after. Sir Moncton Stuart Jackson, his sister, Captain Burnes, and some others

Slaughter of the English.

Some escape

likewise reached the estate of the Mitaulí Rájah. There Mrs. Orr had already found shelter, and thither Captain Patrick Orr escaped from the Mohamdí party to be presently referred to. The Mitaulí Rájah afforded to the fugitives only a half-hearted protection. Timid and fearing

to Mitaulí.

for himself, he allowed them to remain in the jungles in the vicinity of his fort unmolested—and he provided them with food. They stayed there till the end of October, when, as will be told, the rebel troops took the survivors prisoners into Lakhnao.

Of the other fugitives from Sítápúr, one party guided by Lieutenant Lester, who was intimately acquainted with the country, made straight for Lakhnao, which they reached. Another party, consisting of nine ladies, ten children, and three men, reached the same place, by circuitous paths, concealing themselves in the daytime, and indebted very much to the zamindár of Rámkót, on the 28th of June. A third party, composed of Mrs. Phillipps

Some to Lakhnao.

and a few friends, found shelter in a village, and remained in concealment there for ten months, when they were rescued by a column of Sir Colin Campbell's army. A

Some lie concealed.

fourth party escaped to Makimpúr, forty-eight miles from Baréli, and proceeded thence with the residents of that place and fugitives from Sháhjahánpúr to the estate of the Dauráhrá Rájah, eighty miles north from Lakhnáo. Here they remained in safety till discovered by a party of rebel Sipáhis, who took them prisoners towards Lakhnáo. They managed, however, to escape on the road, and, whilst some fled into Nipál, the majority, after concealing themselves for some time, were recaptured, and taken into Lakhnáo. A fifth party found their way to the estate of the Mitaulí Rájah as already related.

But if many thus escaped, some of them only for the moment, more succumbed. On that terrible 3rd of June, twenty-four English, men, women, and children, were murdered by the Sipáhis. This slaughter but whetted the appetite of the loyal 41st. How they proceeded from Sítápúr to Farrukhábad, and how there they incited the 10th Regiment to mutiny and murder, has been told in the preceding Book.

One detachment of that loyal regiment, and a detachment of the 4th Oudh Irregulars, were, however, stationed at Maláun, a town in the Harduí district, thirty-eight miles north of Kánhpúr, and forty-four north of Sítápúr. S. Here the only civil officer was Mr. Capper the Deputy Commissioner. His position had been long full of peril, for Maláun was on the high road to Farrukhábad, and the population of that district was the most disorderly in India. Long before the mutiny at Sítápúr Mr. Capper had felt the loneliness and the danger of his position. The natives round about his station had intimated in the plainest manner possible, short of actual speech, that they knew that the Sipáhis were watching their opportunity. But Mr. Capper did not flinch from his duty. He was at his post when the Sipáhis at Sítápúr mutinied. He remained there after they had mutinied. Nor did he entertain the idea of leaving it until the detachment at Maláun had shown unmistakably that they, too, were about to take the law into their own hands. He then mounted his horse and rode into Lakhnáo.

The third district in the North-West Oudh is Muhamdí. The Deputy Commissioner there was Mr. Thomason : his assistant Captain Patrick Orr.*

* Captain Patrick Orr was the second of three brothers, all, prior to the annexation, in the service of the King of Oudh. The eldest brother

In a previous page* I have recorded how some of the fugitives from Sháhjahánpúr reached Muhamdí. I propose now to recount the condition of that station before, and the events which happened subsequently to, their arrival there.

Neither Mr. Thomason nor Captain Orr had been blind or deaf to the signs of the times. The position of Muhamdí, almost on the frontier of Rohilkhand and Its position. but a short distance from Sháhjahánpúr, rendered it peculiarly sensitive to the insurrectionary feeling of the population in the British provinces. The garrison consisted of a Its garrison. detachment of the 9th Oudh Irregulars, a regiment formerly raised and commanded by Captain Patrick Orr, under the King of Oudh, before the annexation; two companies of military police, and about fifty troopers.

Alive as were both Mr. Thomason and Captain Orr to the gravity of the crisis, they were yet hopeful that so long as Rohilkhand should remain quiet they would manage to weather the storm. Nor was it until a letter written by Mr. Jenkins from Sháhjahánpúr, Mr Thomason hears of the mutiny at Sháhjahánpúr, reaching Mr. Thomason on the evening of the 31st of May, revealed the catastrophe at that station, that the two Englishmen felt that every faculty they possessed was about to be tried to the utmost.

The letter from Mr. Jenkins informed Mr. Thomason that the troops at Sháhjahánpúr had mutinied, that he and a body of fugitives, amongst whom were ladies and children, had reached Powain, that the Rájah of that place had refused them shelter, and it begged that all the available earriage might be sent out to bring in the fugitives to Muhamdí. receives a letter from the fugitives thence.

Mr. Thomason complied with Mr. Jenkins's request. At the same time he and Captain Orr, feeling that the crisis was upon them, determined to take active measures for the safety

Alexander, had then rendered excellent service as Assistant to the Superintendent of Frontier Police. After the annexation he was made an Assistant Commissioner. He was as able as he was hard-working. The second brother, Patrick, commanded originally one of the King's regular regiments of infantry. On the annexation he, too, was made an Assistant Commissioner. He was a brave, zealous, and able officer. The youngest brother, Adolphus, was, under the King, adjutant of one of his infantry regiments. On annexation he was appointed to command the 3rd Regiment of Oudh Military Police, which, on the outbreak of the mutiny, was stationed at the Moti Mahall, Lucknow.

* Book VIII. Chapter V. page 215.

of their own belongings and of the expected fugitives. Their first step was to despatch Mrs. Orr and child to Mitaulí, a distance of twenty-six miles. The Rájah of that place was under considerable obligations to Captain Orr, and he was indebted to Mr. Thomason for many acts of kindness and courtesy. Thither, therefore, Mrs. Orr and her child were sent under the guard of some Sipáhis of Captain Orr's old regiment, the native officer commanding which swore fidelity. He kept his word. Marching all night, Mrs. Orr and the party reached Mitaulí at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 1st of June. The Rájah, however, was asleep and would not be disturbed. When at the end of two hours he did awake, he sent a message to Mrs. Orr that he could not receive her in his fort, but that she must proceed to a place called Kachauna, in the jungles, where she would be safer—less likely to attract the notice of roving mutincers.

To Kachauna accordingly Mrs. Orr proceeded. After a weary journey of two hours she found herself and child in a mud fort, desolate and dreary, devoid of all furniture—the very picture of discomfort. There she had to remain. The Rájah came to see her that same evening, and, whilst promising to protect her as far as lay in his power, did not disguise from her that troublous times were upon them, and that the Sipáhis all over Oudh were pledged to revolt.

Meanwhile, Thomason and Patrick Orr, having thus despatched Mrs. Orr to a place of comparative safety, turned to provide for their own security and for that of their expected guests. They first caused the treasure to be moved into the fort of Muhamdí. They then marched with their troops into that fort (1st June). The day following the Sháhjahánpúr fugitives arrived from Powain. Weary, with naked feet, all exhausted, some badly wounded, they had with difficulty reached the place, which was not to be a place of refuge. Muhamdí was too close to the borders of Rohilkhand to be secure. It was considered certain that the mutinous regiments of that province would soon be upon the fugitives. On the other hand, up to that date no mutiny had, to their knowledge, broken out in Oudh. Sítápúr was regarded as safe. To Sítápúr, then, Mr. Thomason wrote for

He scents the coming storm

Mrs. Orr is sent to Mitaulí,

thence to Kachauna.

The fugitives reach Muhamdí.

They resolved to retire on Sítápúr.

carriage for the party. His letter reached Mr. Christian before mutiny had broken out at that place. Mr. Christian at once despatched the carriage—under charge of an escort of Sipáhis of the Oudh Irregulars.

The terrible tragedy which ensued began with the arrival at Muhamdí of this carriage—and of this escort. The escort brought infection with it. Immediately on arrival the men composing it disseminated the report that their brethren had been cut up at Laklnao for refusing to become Christians, and that they were resolved to be revenged. Captain Orr reasoned with the native officers. They knew him as an old servant of the King of Oudh, and his influence with them was not wholly extinct. After some conversation they announced their intention of marching back to Sítápúr. They solemnly swore, at the same time, that they would spare the lives of the Europeans; that they would take with them only Mr. Thomason and Captain Orr, and allow the others to go away unmolested. It remains now to tell how they kept their oath.

An escort
arrives.

Their first proceeding was to take possession of the treasure, their next to release the prisoners. Then, at half-past 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the 4th of June, they started. The Europeans accompanied them, two or three ladies crammed into a buggy, the remainder prone on baggage-carts.

June 4.

The first march of ten miles was accomplished without incident. Of the second march only about three miles had been walked when the halt was sounded, and a trooper told the Europeans they were at liberty to go where they liked. They pushed on at once towards the nearest town, Aurangábád, in the Kherí district. They had arrived within half a mile of that place, when the mutineers, regardless of their oaths, set upon them, and began the work of butchery.

The fugitives
are all murdered,

Of the whole party one alone was spared to tell the tale, and it is from his narrative that I am able to collect this story of perjury and murder.* It remains to add that Captain Orr, after some adventures, and communicating by the way with one of the fugitive parties from

but one.

* Captain Patrick Orr. The following is his account of the slaughter. "Next morning, Friday, the 5th, we marched towards Aurangábád. When we had come about two kos the halt was sounded, and a trooper told us to go on ahead where we liked. We went on for some distance when we saw a

Sítápúr—that led by Sir M. Jackson—succeeded in joining his wife and child at Kachauna. On arriving there he received a communication from the Rájah that the mud fort at that place was required for the Sítápúr fugitives; that it would not be safe for so many to be together; and that it was advisable that he and his wife and child should migrate to and live in the jungles about Mitaulí. This they did. By this term, jungles, the reader must not understand an ordinary forest, the noble trees of which would have afforded a grateful and necessary shade: he must picture to himself a vast and dreary extent of land, covered with thorny brushwood, and where it was necessary to light fires at night to scare away tigers, wolves, and other wild animals. Only the coarsest food was provided for them. The other fugitives were then sent from Mitaulí to occupy Kachauna.*

party coming along. They soon joined us, and followed the buggy which we were pushing on with all our might. When within half a mile of Aurangábád a Sipáhi rushed forward and snatched Key's gun from him and shot down poor old Shiels who was riding my horse. Then the most infernal struggle ever witnessed by man began. We all collected under a tree close by, and put the ladies down from the buggy. Shots were firing in all directions amidst the most fearful yells. The poor ladies all joined in prayer, coolly and undauntedly awaiting their fate. I stopped for about three minutes amongst them, but, thinking of my poor wife and child here, I endeavoured to save my life for their sakes. I rushed out towards the insurgents and one of our men, Gúrdín, 6th company, called out to me to throw down my pistol and he would save me. I did so, when he put himself between me and the men, and several others followed his example. In about ten minutes more they completed their hellish work They killed the wounded and the children, butchering them in the most cruel way. With the exception of the drummer boy every one was killed of the above list, fugitives from Sháhjahánpúr, besides poor good Thomason and our two clerks. They denuded the bodies of their clothes for the sake of plunder." The list above referred to comprised one civilian, three captains, six lieutenants, three ensigns, a sergeant, a bandmaster, eight ladies, and four children. Of the drummer, who was not a European, I can find no further mention.

* They consisted of Sir M. Jackson and his sister; Lieutenant Barnes; Sergeant-Major Morton, and Mr. Christian's little girl. Joined after a time by the party from the jungle, the fugitives remained in this fort, suffering great privations and subject to repeated attacks of jungle-fever, till the 25th of October. They were then ordered to depart, no one knew whither, under a guard furnished by the Rájah of Mitaulí. With scant clothing, bare-footed, the men loaded with chains, they were taken to Lakhaunao, and imprisoned in the Kaisar-bágh, one of the regal palaces, then strongly occupied by the rebels. The sufferings of the men did not last long. On the 16th of November they were taken out and shot by a party of Sipáhis of the 71st

Adjoining the Sítápúr division was the north-eastern or Bahráich division of Oudh, bounded on the south by the river Ghágrá, separating it from the Faizábád division, on the west by the Chauka or Sardá river, dividing it from Sítápúr and Kheri, and on the north by Nipál. The principal civil station, and the head-quarters of the Commissioner of the division, Mr. Charles Wingfield,* was close to the town which gave its name to the division—the town of Bahráich. The other stations were Mélápúr to the west, Sikrorá to the south, Gondah to the south-east. Of these, Sikrorá was the principal military station. In the month of April, 1857, it was garrisoned by the 1st Regiment of Oudh Irregular Cavalry, commanded by Captain Daly, by the 2nd Oudh Infantry, under Captain Boileau, and by a local horse battery, under Lieutenant Bonham.

During the month of April Mr. Wingfield had been driven by circumstances entirely unconnected with the rising storm to remove his head-quarters to Sikrorá. A man of ability, of culture, and of large views, he had not sympathised with the sweeping change of system which had inaugurated the transfer of Oudh from its Muhammadan king to British rule. He had ever been in favour of dealing gently with the territorial aristocracy. A system, roughly, even rudely introduced, which scarcely veiled its animating principle of raising the peasantry and small proprietors to a position which would enable them ultimately to oust the great landowners, was not in accordance with his ideas. He had done, then, all that lay in his power to make the transfer easy, to smooth down the rough edges, to mitigate the worst effects of the process. The appointment of Sir Henry Lawrence as Chief Commissioner, coming even when it did, was a great support to him. It would have been still greater, still more weighty, had it been made earlier.

Bahráich

Sikrorá.

Mr. Wingfield.

His sound views.

Native Infantry. A few days later the surviving daughter of Mr. Christian died. There remained then Mrs. Orr, Miss Jackson, and the child of the former. To save the child her death was simulated, and she was conveyed in safety to the house of Mán Singh, and ultimately to the British camp. The ladies remained in confinement till the 19th of March, when they were rescued by a party of Gurkhas commanded by two British officers, and conveyed safely to the camp of Sir James Outram.

* Now Sir Charles Wingfield, K.C.S.I.

Like his chief at Lakhnao, like that chief's brother at Láhor, like Durand at Indúr, like William Tayler at Patná, Mr. Wingfield had never been a partisan of the "passing and groundless panic" theory of Mr. Cecil Beadon. He had fully appreciated the events at Barhám-púr and at Barrackpúr. The revolt at Miráth he regarded as the practical answer of the Sipáhis to the policy of the Government. He felt, then, that an outbreak at the military station of Sikrorá was a mere question of time—that, given all the circumstances of the case—the composition of the native army, the annexation of Oudh—the province, a portion of which he was administering, would not be the last to feel the shock of mutiny.

Impressed with this belief, and having absolutely no faith in the men who composed the garrison of Sikrorá, Mr. Wingfield had endeavoured to enlist on the side of the British the members of that territorial aristocracy whom the annexation of Oudh had done so much to injure. (Chief among these was Digbijái Singh, Rájah of Balrámpúr, a town in the north-east corner of his division, and close to the Nipál frontier.) Rájah Digbijái Singh was a man of character and sense. He entertained towards Mr. Wingfield friendly—even grateful—feelings. He had not been inoculated with the poison that pervaded the atmosphere. He received, then, Mr. Wingfield's advances with courtesy; he responded to them, and even engaged to afford refuge, in case of necessity, to him and to the officers serving in his division.

The views entertained by Mr. Wingfield regarding the general untrustworthiness of the Sipáhis were fortunately shared by many other officers at Sikrorá. Neither he nor they, therefore, thought that either wisdom or courage required that the ladies and children should be left in a position, defenceless and incapable of being defended, until an actual outbreak should occur. It happened that an officer of Daly's Horse, Captain Forbes, was in Lakhnao early in June. He was confident that his own men would mutiny, and he knew that at Sikrorá there was no place of refuge in case of an outbreak. Anxious, therefore, for the safety of his wife, his children, and his countrywomen, he set out from Lakhnao with a party of Sikh and volunteer cavalry, reached Sikrorá, mounted the ladies on elephants and in doolies, and conveyed them safely to the capital. Mr. George Lawrence, the Deputy Commissioner,

Early fore-
sees the ten-
dency of
the policy
adopted.

Gratitude
felt towards
him by the
landowners.

Captain
Forbes es-
corts the
ladies and
children to
Lakhnao.

by the express order of his uncle Sir Henry, accompanied them. This move was accomplished on the 9th of June.

The same day the temper of the troops manifested itself in a way not to be mistaken. Intelligence had reached Sikrorá of the revolt of the troops at Faizábád on the previous day. Mr. Wingfield accordingly, mounting his horse, rode to the neighbouring station of Gondah, where was stationed the 3rd Oudh Irregulars, commanded by Lieutenant Miles. There I must leave him for a moment, whilst I narrate the occurrences at Sikrorá after his departure.

Mr. Wingfield scents the mutiny at Sikrorá.

The day of the 9th of June was a day of great excitement at that station. So violent was the manifestation, that early the following morning the officers of the infantry regiment—Boileau, Hale, and Kendall—mounted horse and rode straight for Balrámpúr. Lieutenant Bonham, of the artillery, refused to accompany them. He believed in his men—he certainly possessed great influence over them—and he was confident that they would stand by him in the cause of order. He elected, therefore, to remain at Sikrorá, alone of all the officers, and supported only by two farrier sergeants and the quartermaster-sergeant of the infantry regiment. Had there been no other native troops at Sikrorá, his courage and his influence might have prevailed. But the men of the cavalry and infantry had broken out; they had plundered the treasury, and they were thirsting for blood. Even over these men Bonham attempted to assert authority. But it was in vain. His own men would save his life, but they would not fire on their comrades. They told him at last that he must go. They brought him at the same time money and a horse, and warned him not to pursue a certain road, which they knew to be occupied by the rebels. Forced to leave, Bonham started with a heavy heart, accompanied by his three sergeants, crossed the Ghágrá by an unfrequented ferry, and reached Lakhnao the next day.

It breaks out.

Devotion of Lieutenant Bonham.

Strong feeling towards him of his men.

Meanwhile Mr. Wingfield had arrived at Gondah. He brought the intelligence that the troops at Faizábád had mutinied, and that those at Sikrorá were on the verge of mutiny. He found the troops at Gondah scarcely behind their comrades in that respect. They too had heard the news; they too were aware of all that had happened

Mr. Wingfield at Gondah.

at Faizábád. Before the night fell they had received accounts of the mutiny at Sikrorá. In vain they were harangued by their commanding officer. Their demeanour showed that they too were preparing for action.

The next day they mutinied. Mr. Wingfield had not waited for the overt act, but had started for Bahrámpür. The officers and the women * who remained at the station started as soon as the outbreak had pronounced itself, and reached the same place in safety. The number of individuals who thus received the protection of the Rájah was nineteen, exclusive of children. They all succeeded in crossing into British territory, and in reaching Gorákhpür.

At Bahráieh, the head-quarters of the division, were cantoned two companies of the 3rd Oudh Irregulars, commanded by Lieutenant Longueville Clarke. The Deputy Commissioner was Mr. Cunliffe and his assistant was Mr. Jordan. The main body of the 3rd Oudh Irregulars mutinied, as we have seen, at Gondah, on the 10th of June. As it was very clear that the two companies of the same regiment would at once follow their example, the three officers I have named wisely resolved to take advantage of their earlier information and to escape. They started off at once, then, northward, in the direction of Nánpára, twenty-two miles north of Bahráieh, the seat of a minor Rájah.

There, however, admission was refused them, and they were forced to retrace their steps. Returning to Bahráieh, they started for Lakhnao by way of Bairámghát. This was the road against which the native gunners of Sikrorá had warned Bonham. The fugitives, who had disguised themselves as natives, found the passage over the Ghágrá occupied here by the mutineers. Trusting to their disguise, however, they embarked on the ferry-boat with their horses. The ferry-boat started. At first the fugitives appeared to attract no attention, but they had crossed scarcely one-third of the river when the cry arose that Europeans were escaping. Instantly there was an uproar. The Sipáhis, crowding into other boats, made for the ferry-boat, opening at the same time a fire of musketry. The boatmen at once abandoned the ferry-boat.

He takes refuge with the Rájah of Bahrámpür.

The station of Bahráieh.

The officials scent the mutiny and leave it.

They are murdered crossing by the ferry.

* The ladies had been sent to Lakhnao, *via* Sikrorá, on the 5th of June.

Exposed to a concentrated fire, our three countrymen were unable effectively to work the boat, nor to prevent it, thus left to itself, from being borne back by the current to the bank whence it started. Before it reached the bank Cunliffe and Clarke had been shot dead. Jordan, taken alive, shared the same fate a few days later.

At Málápúr, in the Kherí district, sixty-three miles north-north-east from Lakhnao, there were no troops—consequently there was no open mutiny. The general disorganisation of the country soon, however, spread even here, and the civil officers, prominent amongst whom was the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Gonne, were forced to leave. Having been joined by other fugitives, they first attempted to make their way down the Sarjú river by boat. But, warned that all the landing-places were occupied, they abandoned this attempt; they set off northward and gained the fort of Mathiára, belonging to the minor Rájah of Dhuraira. Thence Mr. Gonne made more than one unsuccessful attempt to reach Lakhnao. At last even the resource of remaining at Mathiára failed them. The adherents of the minor Rájah proved faithless. In imminent danger of their lives, they had to flee. Three of the party were seized. The remainder gained the Nipál hills, where they found shelter till, gradually, with one exception only,* they yielded to the deadly climate of the Tarái.

Málápúr.

The officials
have,and even-
tually all
perish,

but one.

Faizábád is the eastern division of Oudh. It lies immediately south of the Bahráich division, and was divided into the three districts of Faizábád, Sultánpúr, and Saloní. The Commissioner was Colonel Philip Goldney.

Faizábád.

Colonel Goldney, and the Deputy-Commissioner of the district, Captain Reid, were at the head-quarter station of Faizábád. The troops here consisted of a horse battery of native artillery, the 22nd Regiment of Native Infantry, the 6th Oudh Irregular Infantry, and a squadron of the 15th Irregular Cavalry—the whole commanded by Colonel Lennox, of the 22nd Native Infantry.

Its garrison.

The officers at Faizábád entertained no delusion regarding

* Captain John Hearsey, commanding 2nd Regiment Oudh Military Police.

the intentions of the mutineers. The events that had taken place during the second week in May at Mírath and at Dehli had made it clear to them that their turn would come. They took precautions then, at an early date, to prepare for the rising storm. With this view they began in May to store supplies in a house occupied by Captain Thurburn, Special Assistant Commissioner. This house was chosen because it was surrounded by a walled enclosure. This walled enclosure was now fortified. So far the authorities at Faizábád acted with wisdom and forethought. But they counted likewise upon resources which were certain to fail them. They counted upon the aid of the pensioned Sipáhis, and of the landholders of the district. To count upon both these classes proved that they had not fully gauged the depth of the crisis.

Precautions
taken by the
officials

May.

Value of re-
liance placed
on the pen-
sioners;

It would seem, however, that it was but natural to count upon the aid of the pensioned Sipáhis. The yearly stipends drawn by these men were paid by the British Government, and their continuance depended on the existence of the British Government. The material interests of this class were, therefore, bound up in the maintenance of British authority. Old associations too, in many cases stronger than caste, bound them to the British. In its proper place it will be related how these men responded to the appeal made to them by Sir Henry Lawrence. But at Faizábád their numbers were too small, their influence was too slight, to weigh much in the balance against the rising discontent.

The case with respect to the landowners was different. It must not be forgotten that Faizábád was the division regarding which Sir Henry Lawrence wrote thus to Lord Canning in April, 1857: "The tálukdars have also, I fear, been hardly dealt with. At least in the Faizábád division, they have lost half their villages. Some tálukdars have lost all." It may be said that the remark of Sir Henry applied only to the higher order of the territorial aristocracy. But in reality it referred to the assessment as it touched every class connected with the soil. It could not have been seriously expected that the men who had suffered most from our rule would risk their lives to maintain it. No surprise, then, ought to be felt at the laconic record of the Deputy Commissioner: "We found that the zamíndars, however well-disposed, would not fight against disciplined troops, with guns."

on the
tálukdars.

The plan of defending Captain Thurburn's house was then, on the 5th of June, abandoned. For a moment, Colonel Goldney entertained the idea of sending the ladies and children into Lakhnao. But it was too late. (The road to Lakhnao passed through Daryábád, a station in the Lakhnao division ; and disorder reigned in Daryábád.

But another plan had a little before been presented to Colonel Goldney. The principal *tálukdars* of the Faizábád division, prominently amongst whom may be named Rájah Mán Singh, Udrés Singh, Thákur Nárain, Mír Bákir Húsen, and Nádir Sháh, had scented the mutiny from afar, and had warned Colonel Goldney of its approach. At this time the most considerable of these men, Rájah Mán Singh, was in disgrace. He was even under arrest. It happened that one of the assistant commissioners at Faizábád was Captain Alexander Orr. Captain Orr had well and truly served the old *régime* when Oudh had her king, had known intimately Mán Singh, and had conceived for him a great regard. When, then, the Rájah fell into disgrace, Captain Orr earnestly begged his release from arrest. His prayer prevailed. (Mán Singh was released from arrest, and, in return for Captain Orr's efforts on his behalf, he offered protection to his wife and children in his fort of Sháhganj during the troublous times that were coming. Captain Orr communicated the offer to the Commissioner. Colonel Goldney received it just about the time when the journey of the ladies to Lakhnao had been pronounced impracticable. He, in consultation with the other officers, determined to ask the Rájah so to enlarge his offer as to include all the ladies in the station. Rájah Mán Singh was communicated with by Captains Reid and Orr. He agreed to receive the wives and families of the civil officers, but demurred to a larger number, on the ground that secrecy would thus be rendered impossible. Finally, however, he agreed to receive all, provided that due caution were observed in moving them.

Rájah Mán
Singh,

is communi-
cated with
by Captain
Alexander
Orr.

He agrees to
protect the
civil officers
and their
families ;

and finally
those of the
officers
generally.

With one exception the wives of the regimental officers declined to accept the offer of Mán Singh. Not only did they distrust him, but they and their husbands considered that the movement would serve as a signal to the Sipáhis to mutiny. On the night of the 7th of June, however, the wives and children

of the civil officers, and the wife and children of the Executive Engineer, Captain Dawson, started for and reached Sháhganj. They were followed to the same place, the following morning, by the wives and children of the staff-sergeants.

Some take advantage of his offer.

That night the Sipáhis rose in revolt. More audacious than their comrades elsewhere, they did not pretend a grievance, but loudly asserted that, feeling they were stronger than the English, they intended to turn them out of the country. The senior Risáldár of the 15th Irregular Cavalry took command of the brigade, and endeavoured to induce the men to murder their officers. But the Sipáhis had not then wound themselves up to the pitch of blood-thirstiness. They were anxious to rid themselves of their officers, but not to take their lives. (Keeping them under restraint all night in the quarter-guard, they procured four boats for them, and in the morning gave them money and told them to be off. The boats were unprovided with boatmen, but they had oars.)

The Sipáhis rise in revolt.

but procure boats for their officers.

Faizábád is on the river Ghághrá, navigable thence to Bhaliá, where it joins the Ganges. Four boats containing the fugitive Europeans, and propelled by them, started before sunrise on the morning of the 9th of June. The mutineers, who had plundered the treasury and sacked the houses, did not interfere with them. But — strange contradiction — whilst protecting them against the more blood-thirsty of their own clan, whilst aiding them to depart, they sent a messenger begging the men of the 17th Regiment of Native Infantry to slay them on their way. The 17th, stationed at Ázamgarh, a station in British territory near the eastern frontier of Oudh, had arrived within a few miles of Faizábád on the 8th of June. Their line of march lay along the right bank of the Ghághrá. Their hands were already red with blood. They were willing to shed more.

The boats set out.

The Sipáhis send intimation to their brethren of the 17th Native Infantry.

The men of the 17th responded then to the call. They intercepted the two first boats at Begamganj, about twelve miles by the road from Faizábád, though far longer by the river. Here, at a point where the stream was the most narrow, they opened fire on the fugitives.

who intercept the boats.

A few moments later, and from the opposite bank there started boats full of armed men to attack their left flank. Recognising the impossibility of resistance, Colonel Goldney counselled a run for life. Too old to run himself, he remained to die. Seven, however, including, curious to relate, a Muhammadan Sipáhi of the 22nd, Téz Alí Khán, who had linked his fate to that of the British, followed the recommendation and ran across country. Two of the party were drowned endeavouring to cross a stream. The remaining five reached Amorah in safety. Here they were joined by the three officers, who had formed the crew of the fourth boat, and who had abandoned her on account of her slowness of pace before she had reached the point where the men of the 17th had been lying in wait. The party, thus augmented to eight, pushed on across country. Betrayed at Mohádaba by two policemen whom they had trusted, they were attacked by the villagers. Crossing a rivulet waist-deep, hotly pursued, they lost first Lieutenant Lindsay, then Lieutenants Thomas, English, Ritchie, and Sergeant Edwards. There now remained only Lieutenant Cautley, Sergeant Busher, and Téz Alí Khán. In the chase that followed Lieutenant Cautley was caught and killed. Sergeant Busher escaped for the moment, but was captured the next day. His life, however, was spared, and at the end of ten days he was released. He ultimately joined Colonel Lennox at Captainganj, where he found also his fellow fugitive, Téz Alí Khán. The fugitives who had remained in the first and second boats, numbering eight, were all massacred.

Of the Englishmen in three boats only one escapes.

Three boats have now been accounted for, the first, the second, and the fourth. But there was another manned by five officers, headed by Colonel O'Brien. This boat, following the first and second, had put in at the town of Ayudhya,* the birthplace of Rám—the town that gave its name to the province. Here they exchanged their boat for a larger one, and hired native rowers to row it. They then lay down, hidden by the thatch and matting from the gaze of inquiring eyes, whilst the natives pulled away singing a national air. The boat thus passed unsus-

Fate of those in the remaining boat.

* The name *Ayudhya*, has been gradually corrupted to *Avadh*, and *Avadh* to *Andh* or *Oudh*.

peeted through the hostile array, and the fugitives reached Dánápúr in safety.

But some had remained at Faizábád. Amongst these were Mrs. Mills, wife of Major Mills, of the artillery, and her three children. Mrs. Mills had refused to accept the hospitality offered by Mán Singh. When the mutiny broke out, she attempted to conceal herself in the city; but sinking from want of food she was obliged to discover herself to the leader of the mutineers. He sent her and her children across the Ghághrá into the Gorákhpúr district. Here she wandered for eight or ten days from village to village. A tender and delicate lady, her sufferings were terrible. Her youngest child died from the exposure. At last Rájah Mán Singh, hearing that there was an English lady in distress, sent for her to Sháhganj, provided for her wants, and, after a few days' rest, despatched her and the sergeants' wives into Gorákhpúr. Her husband was one of those murdered in the second boat.

Colonel Lennox and his family had not started with the other officers in the boats. At 2 P.M., however, finding the Sipáhis becoming riotous and insolent for plunder, he and they set out. They soon came upon the blood-thirsty 17th. But it was night. Realising their danger, they crept, unobserved, from their boat, and made their way into the Gorákhpúr district. They were soon, however, taken prisoners, and confined in the fort of Názim Mír Muhammad Húsén Khán. The Názim was disposed to be friendly. Threatened by the mutineers, he concealed the fugitives in a reed hut in rear of his zenana, and kept them there for nine days. He then made them over to an escort sent for them by the Collector of Gorákhpúr. On their way to the station, they picked up Sergeant Busher, and the Sipáhi, Téz Alí, whose adventures have been already related.

There is still a party of the officials of Faizábád whose fate has to be recorded. I allude to the civil officers who had not started in the boats. These were Captain Reid, Captain Alexander Orr, Captain Thurburn, and Mr. Bradford. The wives and children of those gentlemen were under the protection of Mán Singh at Sháhganj, where also were Captain Dawson, Executive Engineer, Corporal Hurst of the Sappers, and a clerk named Fitzgerald.

Sufferings of
Mrs. Mills
and her chil-
dren.

Escape of
Colonel Len-
nox and
family.

The civil
officers of
Faizábád.

When the mutiny broke out the four gentlemen just mentioned were together. Momentarily separated from, but soon rejoined by, Mr. Bradford, they reached Sháhganj on the 11th. Mán Singh was not there. He had gone to Ayudhya, probably to watch the course of events. Thence he had sent a message to say that he had made a compromise with the mutineers, by virtue of which he would be able to afford protection to the women and children, but not to the men; that these must depart instantly, as his house was to be searched the day following.

They take
refuge with
Mán Singh.

That day a boat was secured, and that night the party, including ladies and children, and consisting of thirty-eight souls, set out for the river. Twenty-nine of them reached its bank, eight miles below Faizábád, just before sunrise. The carriage containing the remaining nine had broken down.* It was impossible to wait for them. The country, especially that in the vicinity of the river-bank, was swarming with mutinous cavalry. The twenty-nine then started. Their boat proceeded for some time with only occasional alarms; but on the second day it was lured by the agent sent with it by Mán Singh into a position between two forts by both of which it was commanded. Here the fugitives were forced to give up their money, their arms, and their valuables. There was no help for them. After suffering much from hunger, from exposure, and other causes, and after constant detention, the fugitives reached Gopálpúr on the 21st of June. By the loyal Rájah of that place they were cordially received, hospitably entertained, and provided with the means of proceeding to Dánápúr, where they arrived the 29th of June.

Loyalty of
the Rájah of
Gópálpúr.

Sultánpúr, the chief town of the district of that name, lies on the right bank of the river Gúmtí, almost in a direct line between Faizábád and Alláhábád. The principal civil officer was Mr. Block, C.S. Sultánpúr was the head-quarters of the 15th Regiment of Irregular Cavalry, commanded by Colonel S. Fisher, one of the most gallant and daring officers in the service.

Sultánpúr.

On the 5th of June, Mr. Block received intimation from a

* This contained the sergeants' wives and children. They returned to Sháhganj and were ultimately sent into Gorakhpúr with Mrs. Mills, as already related.

native official, a Muhammadan, whom he had sent on duty to Chandah, that mutinous Sipáhis from Jaunpúr in British territory had arrived at that place, professing themselves to be in correspondence with the troops at Sultánpúr, and declaring their resolve to kill all the Europeans. This intimation was repeated the following day. Mr. Block at once ordered the man back to Sultánpúr, and communicated the intelligence he had received to Colonel Fisher, who at once despatched all the ladies in the station in the direction of Alláhábád under charge of two officers. The Muhammadan returned to Sultánpúr the 8th of June, saw Colonel Fisher and Mr. Block; told them that the Jaunpúr Sipáhis had plundered Chandah and were on their way to Sultánpúr; that their own men were not to be depended upon; and advised them, whilst there was yet time, to leave the place. But Colonel Fisher and Mr. Block could not make up their minds to do this.

Early next morning the 1st Regiment of Military Police, commanded by Captain Bunbury, rose in revolt. Colonel Fisher rode down to their lines, followed by his men, to endeavour to recall them to order. Whilst he was addressing them, a policeman came round and shot him in the back. He fell mortally wounded from his horse. His own men had been passive spectators of the deed. They would now not approach him, although they allowed the adjutant, Lieutenant Tucker, to tend him in his last agony. Whilst they permitted this, however, they turned upon the second in command, Captain Gibbiugs, shot him, and then shouted to Lieutenant Tucker to be off. By this time Colonel Fisher's last agony was over, and Tucker, having nothing more to do, mounted, and, riding for his life, succeeded in reaching the fort of Rústam Sáh, on the banks of the Gúmtí. By this chief he was sheltered. He eventually reached Banáras in safety.*

Meanwhile, the Muhammadan already referred to had conveyed to Mr. Block and Mr. Stroyan news of Colonel Fisher's death, and of the mutiny of the troops. The two gentlemen started off to flee, and reached a small house in the vicinity of the station. Imprudently stopping here, whilst their guide was sent to

* Captains Bunbury and Smith, Lieutenant Lewis and Dr. O'Donel also received hospitality from the same chieftain. They all reached Banáras.

ascertain how matters were progressing in the station, they were attacked and murdered.

Thus did Sultánpúr pass into the hands of the rebels. These, after plundering the houses and securing the treasure started off in the direction of Lakhnao.

The other district station in the division of Faizábád was Salóní. The Deputy-Commissioner here was Captain L. Barrow.* The troops consisted of six companies of the 1st Oudh Irregulars, commanded by Captain Thomson. By the exertions of the officers tolerable order was maintained here for the first nine days in June. On that day intelligence arrived of the mutinies at Sultánpúr and elsewhere, and of the approach of mutineers from other stations. The next day the troops threw off the mask and revolted. The officers succeeded in leaving the station in safety, and in reaching the fort of Darapúr, possessed by a tálukdar, Rájah Hanmant Singh of Kálá Kankar,† who not only sheltered them, but escorted them to the ferry opposite Alláhábád. It deserves to be recorded that ten of Captain Thomson's Sipáhis continued faithful and never left him.

Salóní

Generosity
of Rájah
Hanmant
Singh.

We come round now to the division from whose capital we started—the division of Lakhnao. The other two district stations here were Purwá and Daryábád.

At Daryábád, on the high road from Faizábád to Lakhnao, was quartered the 5th Oudh Irregular Infantry, commanded by Captain W. H. Hawes. This officer was zealous, active, and much liked by his men. It is scarcely

Daryábád.

* Subsequently Chief Commissioner of Oudh.

† This noble Rájput had been dispossessed, by the action of the revenue system introduced by the British, of the greater part of his property. Keenly as he felt the tyranny and the disgrace, his noble nature yet declined to regard the fugitive chiefs of the nation which had nearly ruined him in any other light than as people in distress. He helped them in that distress; he saw them in safety to their own fortress. But when, on bidding him farewell, Captain Barrow expressed a hope that he would aid in suppressing the revolt, he stood erect, as he replied: "Sáhib, your countrymen came into this country and drove out our king. You sent your officers round the districts to examine the titles to the estates. At one blow you took from me lands which from time immemorial had been in my family. I submitted. Suddenly misfortune fell upon you. The people of the land rose against you. You came to me whom you had despoiled. I have saved you. But now,—now I march at the head of my retainers to Lakhnao to try and drive you from the country." It is satisfactory to be able to add, that after the suppression of the mutiny his lands were restored to this true-hearted gentleman.

possible that even had no extraordinary temptation assailed them they would have remained faithful, for they were bound by the ties of blood and caste to the men who all around them were rising in revolt. But they were tempted beyond the ordinary temptation. In the public treasury of Daryábád lay stored £30,000 in silver—and they knew it. Captain Hawes knew it too, and, knowing that fact, and the inevitable consequences which would ensue were the money to remain at Daryábád, he had made an effort, in the early part of the last

Mutiny of
the Sipáhis.

week of May, to escort it into Lakhnao. In this attempt he was baffled by the ill-will of some of the men of his regiment. But Captain Hawes was a man who did not lightly resign a well-digested idea. On the

June 9.

9th of June, he made a second effort. On this occasion he succeeded, amid the cheers of his men, in escorting the money outside the station. But he could not persuade them to take it further. A portion of them suddenly mutinied, gained the upper hand, and drove their officers away. Captain Hawes escaped by a miracle. "He was repeatedly fired at, sometimes a volley being directed at him, and, at others,

Escape of
Captain
Hawes.

single deliberate shots."* But he escaped, and not only he, but, after various adventures, all the other officers, civil and military, with their wives and children, belonging to Daryábád. After the departure of the Europeans, the mutineers proclaimed Wájid Ali Sháh, ex-King of Oudh, as their king.

Púrwa is about twelve miles from the Ganges, not far from the high road between Kánhpúr and Lakhnao.

Púrwa.

There were no troops there. The Deputy-Commissioner there, Captain Evans, maintained his position in his district till the end of June, sending in all the information he was able to glean regarding affairs at Kánhpúr. His own wife and children, his assistant, Mr. Arthur Jenkins, were at that ill-fated station. Captain Evans, loyally assisted by his Muhammadan officer of police, Mansab Ali by name, was able to keep open communications till Sir Hugh Wheeler's force had succumbed. After that catastrophe, it was impossible for him to remain at his post. He, therefore, retired on Lakhnao.

To that city we must now return. We left it on the 31st of

* Gubbins's *Mutinies in Oudh*.

May, just after the outbreak there had been suppressed by the vigour and energy of the Chief Commissioner. We return to it on the 12th of June. In the interval every station in the province had been lost to the British. Writing on that day to the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West, Sir Henry Lawrence thus expressed his sense of the situation :—" We still hold the cantonment, as well as our two posts, but every outpost (I fear) has fallen, and we daily expect to be besieged by the confederated mutineers and their allies. The country is not yet thoroughly up, but every day brings it nearer that condition All our irregular cavalry, except about sixty Sikhs of Daly's corps, are either very shaky or have deserted The irregular infantry are behaving pretty well, but once we are besieged it will be black against white, with some very few exceptions. More than a hundred police deserted last night, and since I began this page I have received the report of the military police post having deserted the great central gaol over which they were specially placed Then, again, we ought to have only one position. I put this question to some sixteen officers five days ago, but all stood out for the two positions. I am convinced they were wrong, and the best of them now think so, but we are agreed that, on the whole, the Residency is the point to hold The talukdars have all been arming, and some have already regained possession of the villages of which Mr. Gubbins dispossessed them." On the day following he expressed a similar opinion in a letter to Lord Canning. After enumerating the native troops still faithful, about five hundred and thirty, he added : " few of them can be expected to stand any severe pressure. We, however, hold our ground in cantonment, and daily strengthen both our town positions, bearing in mind that the Residency is to be the final point of concentration." These extracts will suffice to show how fully Sir Henry Lawrence appreciated the situation. I propose to describe in the next chapter the manner in which he met the storm when it actually burst over his head.

June 12.
Lakhnao on
the 12th of
June.

The situation.

CHAPTER II.

THE LEAGUER OF LAKHNAO.

THE repression of the mutiny of the 30th and 31st of May at Lakhnao had, at least, rid the cantonments of the least trust-worthy of the Sipáhis. But the incessant labour, mental and bodily, the deprivation of sleep, the constant anxiety, had told on the already overtaken strength of the Chief Commissioner. His spare frame daily became still sparer, his physical strength diminished, under mental toil. His medical advisers insisted then that he should rest for a time from the labours of his office. Sir Henry Lawrence, I have already stated, had been on the point of proceeding to Europe for the benefit of his health when he was summoned by Lord Canning to Oudh. Regarding that summons as a call of duty, with characteristic forgetfulness of self, he had obeyed it. But under the fatigues, the excitement, the anxiety of his now life, his physical condition had become sensibly worse than it had been when his medical advisers had ordered him home from Rájputána. It was necessary that he should rest.

No one had felt less confident as to his power to stand the wear and tear of work in trying times than Sir Henry himself. His strength he knew might utterly fail him at any moment. Under ordinary circumstances he might, and probably would, have felt satisfied that the Government would on his death provide a fit officer as his successor. But the circumstances were not ordinary. In the then state of the country the Government had not the means to send to the province a successor from outside its borders. They might not even have the power of communicating with those in the province itself. In that case the succession would, by right of seniority, devolve upon a civilian, in

Illness of
Sir Henry
Lawrence.

His views
regarding his
successor.

whose judgment and capacity for the post Sir Henry Lawrence had no confidence.

To prevent the possibility of an occurrence which he could not regard in anticipation in any other light than as a public misfortune, Sir Henry Lawrence, feeling his strength daily failing, despatched to Lord Canning on the 4th of May a telegram, in which he earnestly recommended that, in the event of anything happening to himself, the office of Chief Commissioner might be conferred on Major Banks, and the command of the troops on Colonel Inglis. "This," he added, "is no time for punctilio as regards seniority. They are the right men—in fact, the only men—for the places."

Recommends
Major Banks
and Colonel
Inglis.

The Major Banks referred to was the Commissioner of the Lakhnao division. He belonged to the Bengal Army.

Major Banks.

He was distinguished by the wide range and the depth of his acquirements, by his thorough knowledge of the natives of India, by administrative talents of the highest order, by a large fund of humour, and by his large-hearted sympathies. He was the most promising political officer who had not actually attained the highest grade in that branch of the Indian Service. For languages he had a remarkable talent. He was familiar alike with Persian, with Hindí, and with Sanskrit. Major Banks had filled several offices with distinction, had gained the esteem of men so opposed to each other as were Sir Charles Napier and Lord Dalhousie, and, on the annexation of Oudh, had been selected by the latter to be Commissioner of one of the four divisions of the kingdom. Installed as Commissioner of Lakhnao, Banks speedily justified Lord Dalhousie's opinion. How he had impressed a man not easily deceived is apparent from the recommendation made by Sir Henry Lawrence to Lord Canning that Banks should succeed him.

Lieutenant-Colonel Inglis, the other officer referred to, commanded the 32nd Foot. He was in the prime of life, an excellent soldier, active, energetic, and quick-sighted. The native army having mutinied, and the only remaining reliable troops being European troops, it was practically necessary that the officer commanding the European regiment should have the chief military authority. It was, to repeat Sir Henry Lawrence's remark, "no time for punctilio" as regarded seniority. The recommendation, then, was characterised by practical good sense.

Lieutenant-
Colonel
Inglis.

Five days after the despatch of this telegram the health of the Chief Commissioner seemed to give way entirely.

June 9. On the 9th of June "an alarming exhaustion came on, and the medical men pronounced that further application to business would endanger his life." * In consequence of this sudden illness, a provisional council was formed of Mr. Gubbins, the Financial Commissioner, Mr. Ommaney, the Judicial Commissioner, Major Banks, Colonel Inglis, and the Chief Engineer, Major Anderson. Of this council Mr. Martin Gubbins was the President.

The character of Mr. Gubbins has thus been sketched by Sir Henry Lawrence: "He is a gallant, energetic, clever fellow, but sees only through his own vista, and is therefore sometimes troublesome." Now at this particular period the "vista" of Mr. Gubbins showed him the danger of retaining the armed remnants of the native regiments, the necessity of trusting the native military police. As President of the Council of Five, he insisted, then, that the Sipáhis who still remained in the lines should be disarmed and dismissed. In vain was it pointed out to him that these men had stood the test, that they had been tried in the fire, that they had not only resisted temptation, but had acted with spirit against their comrades on the 30th and 31st of May. Mr. Gubbins would listen to no argument. Opposed in the Council, he yet step by step carried out his favourite measures, until, on the 11th of June, he actually started off to their homes all the Sipáhis belonging to the province. This act had upon Sir Henry Lawrence an effect more decisive than the prescriptions of his medical advisers. It roused him to action. Shaking off his weakness, he immediately dissolved the Council, resumed authority, recalled the Sipáhis, and "had the satisfaction of seeing numbers return to their post with tokens of delight, the honesty of which was verified by their loyalty during the siege." †

Sir Henry Lawrence was particularly desirous to retain the services of a large portion of the native troops. He believed that those who had stood the ordeal of the 30th of May would

* Gubbins.

† MS. Memorandum, quoted by Merivale. *Life of Sir Henry Lawrence.*

thenceforth remain faithful. He believed that without the aid of native troops his position at Lakhnau would not be tenable. And he believed, likewise, that, by judicious arrangement, it would be possible to ensure loyalty and good service from those who still remained. On resuming office, then, he directed his energies at once to the organising of a force of native troops. He collected all the Sikhs from the three native regiments and formed them into one battalion; the Oudh men he likewise banded together, rejecting those only who had given evidence of disloyalty. Sir Henry had recourse likewise to men of another class. Confident that many of the men who had served in the Company's army prior to the annexation had carried with them to their homes their military pride and their fidelity to their masters, he summoned by circular to Lakhnau all of their number who would care to re-enlist for the cause of order. The response to this summons was very remarkable. About five hundred pensioned Sipáhis hastened to Lakhnau. Amongst them were the gray-headed, the halt, the maim—even the blind—some on crutches—all anxious to evince their loyalty. Sir Henry gave them a kind and cordial reception. He selected about a hundred and seventy of them for active service, and placed them under separate command. The number of the native brigade was thus brought to nearly eight hundred.

His views
regarding
the native
troops

and the pen-
sioners

That night the whole of the cavalry of the military police remaining at their head-quarters at Lakhnau broke into revolt. The cavalry were under the special command of Captain Gould Weston, and he at once rode down to their lines, situated near the Dil-árám Kothí on the left bank of the Gúmí, followed only by his two native orderlies. He came upon them as they were starting and exhorted them to listen to the voice of duty and of honour. But his efforts proved unavailing, and they galloped off into darkness.

The military
police cavalry
revolt.

The next morning (the 12th of June) the 3rd Regiment of Infantry of the Military Police mutinied at the Motí Mahall, about a mile and a half from the Baillie Guard. Captain Adolphus Orr, who, although he had removed his family into safety at the Residency, continued to occupy his house near his men, fortunately escaped uninjured, and riding in hot haste to the superintendent reported that the

and the
infantry.

regiment had gone off in the direction of the Dilkushá Park, and was in full march towards Káulpúr. Weston was engaged at the time with Mr. Ommaney, the Judicial Commissioner, but on hearing the evil tidings he instantly, with all the alacrity of a man to whom duty was the first consideration, rushed from the house, mounted the first horse he could find from the picket of the 7th Cavalry, and galloped after the mutineers. He overtook them about five miles from the Residency. It is impossible to over-estimate the danger of his position. There he was—a solitary European—in the presence of about eight hundred men who had mutinied, and who fully intended to join in the attempt to drive the English out of India. One shot would have sufficed to lay low the daring Feringhí. But it was that very daring that saved Weston. The bolder spirits were captivated by it. Dashing aside the muzzles already pointed towards their English commander, they declared in reply to his appeal to them to return to their duty that they must go—they were committed to it—but that his life should not be taken.

They then fell in and marched onwards. A few men of the 2nd Regiment of Military Police who had been on guard at Weston's house, but who had joined the mutinous 3rd Regiment, determined to remain with him, and they returned to the Residency that night to tell of Weston's escape from death, an escape which, bearing in mind the force of evil examples, and the fact that scores of officers had already fallen victims to their men, was well-nigh miraculous.*

On their way back Weston and his followers were met by the cavalry and the guns of the little force despatched in pursuit, under Colonel Inglis, and which had far outstripped the two companies of Her Majesty's 32nd intended for their support. These went on in their enterprise, but the ground was broken and difficult, and, although the artillery did some execution and the native troopers cut up a few stragglers, a fair blow was not struck at the main body. A considerable number of the mutineers had, in fact, occupied a village on the further side of some ravines, a position strong enough to resist cavalry. As his Infantry had not come up and the night was fast closing, Inglis determined to desist

* Hutchinson's Narrative; see also Rce's *Siege of Lakhnao*.

from further pursuit. Accordingly he brought back his men, much exhausted after a long and trying march in an exceptionally hot day. The enemy lost about twenty killed and had many more wounded, whilst some ten prisoners were captured. Two of the loyal troopers were killed, and others were wounded, including their gallant native officer; two of the Europeans succumbed to sun-strokes, and Mr. Thornhill of the Civil Service, a man of great, even remarkable, daring, was twice seriously wounded.

Mr. Thornhill, C.S.

Since the mutiny of the 30th of May efforts to make the Residency defensible had been pushed on with extraordinary vigour. The outer tracing had been connected by breastworks; ditches had been excavated in front of them, and parapets erected behind them; at certain points ramparts had been thrown up and embrasures had been pierced; slopes had been scarped; stakes and palisades fixed; some houses had been demolished, the roofs of others had been protected by mud walls; windows and doors had been barriaded; walls had been loop-holed. All the ordnance belonging to the ex-King of Oudh that could be found in the city had been brought within the defences. Some houses outside the walls of the Residency were left solely because time had not remained to level them, as had been intended. The omission to destroy them was at a later period much regretted, for they were used by the rebels as shelter houses whence to watch the movements of the garrison and to keep up a heavy fire on the defences.

Attempts made to render the Residency defensible,

Nor was the Machhi Bhawan neglected. Sir Henry Lawrence had originally resolved to hold this post in conjunction with the Residency, only to concentrate on the latter when threatened in overwhelming force. With this view he had strengthened it and made it habitable for Europeans. He then stored it with food and ammunition. On the 13th of June, Sir Henry Lawrence was able to write to Lord Canning in the words quoted: "We hold our ground in cantonment, and daily strengthen both our town positions, bearing in mind that the Residency is to be the final point of concentration." Sir Henry continued to strengthen the Machhi Bhawan till the very last, believing that the preparations made would be greatly noised abroad, and would affect the moral of the enemy.

and the Machhi Bhawan.

June 13.

A terrible anxiety which preyed upon Sir Henry Lawrence about this time, was caused by his inability to assist Sir Hugh Wheeler, then beleaguered at Kánhpúr. Sir Henry's anxiety about Kánhpúr. The seission of communication with that station on the 6th of June had made it clear that the native troops there had mutinied. That they had gone further, and, under the leadership of Náná Sáhib, had besieged the British general in his barraeks, shortly afterwards became known. Then there came from General Wheeler earnest appeals for help. Mr. Gubbins, generous, sympathetic, strong-willed, and eager, urged Lawrence to comply with these appeals. But compliance was, in point of fact, simply impossible. How it was so cannot more fitly be expressed than in Sir Henry's own words.

Writing to Sir Hugh Wheeler on the 16th of June, the Chief Commissioner said: "I am very sorry indeed to hear of your condition, and grieve that I cannot help you. I have consulted with the chief officers about me, and, except Gubbins, they are unanimous in thinking that, with the enemy's command of the river, we could not possibly get a single man into your intrenchment. I need not say that I deeply lament being obliged to concur in this opinion, for our own safety is as nearly concerned as yours. We are strong in our intrenchments; but, by attempting the passage of the river, should be sacrificing a large detachment without a prospect of helping you. Pray do not think me selfish. I would run much risk could I see a commensurate prospect of success. In the present scheme I see none." A week later he wrote to Lord Canning: "It is deep grief to me to be unable to help Kánhpúr; I would run much risk for Wheeler's sake, but an attempt, with our means, would only ruin ourselves without helping Kánhpúr." His reasons for not moving to its aid. No military critic will question the soundness of these views. Soundness of those reasons. To cross the Ganges, even with the entire force at the disposal of Sir Henry Lawrence, in the face of the army serving under Náná Sáhib, would have been impossible.

A few days later a letter reached Sir Henry with the information that Wheeler had agreed to treat with Náná Sáhib. He then knew that all was over. His forebodings were confirmed by the receipt of details of the massacre on the 28th of June.

"If Kánhpúr holds out, I doubt if we shall be besieged at all." Thus had Sir Henry Lawrence written to Lord

Canning on the 23rd of June. But five days later he learned that Káñhpúr had fallen. Prior to that date, and with more certainty every day, had come the intelligence that the mutinous troops of the Oudh Irregular force—the troops who had revolted in the provinces—were gradually collecting at a place called Nawábganj Bara Banki, only seventeen miles from Lakchnao. The subsequent movement of these troops, whose numbers were not inconsiderable, obviously depended on the result of the leaguer of Káñhpúr. It was known on the 28th that that place had fallen. The following morning the advanced guard of the enemy's force marched on Chínhat, a village on the Faizábád road, within eight miles of the Residency.

Learns the
fate of the
Káñhpúr
garrison.

Hears that
the enemy
are moving
on Chínhat.

This gave Sir Henry an opportunity for which he had been longing. With the foresight of a real general opposed to Asiatics, he felt that for him to await an attack would be to invite a general insurrection, whereas, an effective blow dealt at the advanced troops of the rebels would paralyse their movements, and spread doubt and hesitation amongst them. He hoped and believed, in fact, that it might not be impossible to reply to Káñhpúr by Chínhat. To say that because he did not succeed his plan was bad and impolitic is not a logical argument. His plan was justified alike by military science and by political considerations. Whilst he fought a battle in which victory would have been decisive, he lost little by defeat. He did not, in a word, risk his general plan, nor was he, in a military sense, in a worse position after his defeat than that which he had occupied before he went out to fight. In some respects, indeed, his general position became more assured, because more clearly defined.

His reasons
for deter-
mining to
strike a blow.

Those reasons
sound.

Sir Henry's first step was to withdraw the troops from the cantonments and to bring them within the Residency. He then ordered that a force composed of three hundred men of the 32nd Regiment; two hundred and thirty men of the regular native infantry; the small troop of volunteer cavalry, thirty-six strong; a hundred and twenty troopers of the Oudh Irregulars; ten guns and an 8-inch howitzer, should assemble at the iron bridge at daylight the following morning to march thence at once in the direction of Chínhat. It deserves here to be remarked that of the ten guns

Concentrates
his forces.

six were manned by natives and four only by Europeans. The howitzer was on a limber drawn by an elephant driven by a native.

The force had been ordered to march at dawn, but the necessary arrangements caused unavoidable delay, and the sun was already high—it was past 6 o'clock—when it moved from the iron bridge across the Gúmtí in the direction of Chinhat. After marching three miles along the metalled road it reached the bridge spanning the rivulet Kukrail. Here a halt was ordered whilst Sir Henry with his staff and a few cavalry rode in front to reconnoitre. Unable, from the summit of a rising ground under some trees, to see anything in the shape of an enemy, he then and there decided to return to Lakhnao, and sent the Assistant Adjutant-General to counter-march the force. That officer had delivered his message, and the troops had begun their return journey, when suddenly fresh instructions arrived for the force to advance towards Chinhat. The men then marched, in regular order, covered by cavalry, and with videttes thrown out, along “a newly raised embankment, constructed of loose and sandy soil, in which every now and then gaps occurred, indicating the positions of future bridges.”* Following the cavalry, there came, first, the 8-inch howitzer, then the four guns manned by Europeans, then the four manned by natives. A hundred and fifty men of the 13th Native Infantry came next, followed by two guns manned by natives, then by three hundred men of the 32nd Foot, then by the remaining native troops, eighty in number. Marching in this order for about a mile and a half, the troops descried the enemy drawn up at a distance of about twelve hundred yards, their right covered by a small hamlet, their left by a village and a lake, their centre resting on the road. Simultaneously the enemy saw them and at once opened a heavy round-shot fire.

Sir Henry immediately halted his column and deployed the infantry into line. Then placing his European guns in position, and ordering the infantry to lie down, he returned the enemy's fire. A continuous cannonade from both sides was now kept up. Then, after something of a lull, which induced many officers to believe that the

Marches on
Chinhat.

Describes the
enemy.

Battle of
Chinhat.

British were getting the best of the day, the enemy suddenly divided, and menaced both flanks in considerable force. The movement against the British left was made not only in overwhelming numbers, but from the cover of the village of Ishmáil-ganj—a village which ran parallel to that part of our line occupied by the 32nd. The fire from this village caught that regiment in flank, and in a very few minutes nearly half of its number present, with a large proportion of officers, including the commanding officer, Lient.-Colonel Case, were lying dead or disabled on the ground. Meanwhile every effort had been made to bring the native artillery into action, but with very indifferent success. The fact was that native artillerymen were traitors; they had upset in the ditch two of the guns and cut the traces by which some of the others were attached.

The enemy
gain our left
flank.

Elated with the success achieved against the 32nd, the enemy pressed on with so much vigour that it became evident that, if any of the force were to be saved, the retreat must be sounded. A retreat was then commenced, the 32nd necessarily, from the position they had occupied near the road, leading; the native infantry protecting the rear. The retreat once begun, the enemy galloped their guns on either flank of our force, and continued to pound it with grape all the way to the Kukrail bridge. So heavily was the column pressed, that few of those who were hit were saved, a fact borne out by the extraordinary proportion of killed to wounded*—in the 32nd alone one hundred and fifteen to thirty-nine. As the retiring force approached the bridge over the Kukrail a large body of the rebel cavalry was descried immediately in their line of retreat. They were in considerable force. But on our side there was no hesitation. Captain Radclyffe's trumpet sounded the charge, and instantly our thirty-six horsemen dashed at the enemy. A more gallant charge was never made. It appalled the rebels. They did not wait for it, but turned and fled. The line of retreat was secured.

The British
retreat.

Gallantry
of Captain
Radclyffe
and his com-
panions.

The danger, however, was not over. The enemy's infantry

* Amongst the latter was Lieutenant James of the Commissariat Department, a most gallant officer, severely wounded in the knee. He would not allow the wound, severe and painful as it was, to interfere with the performance of his onerous duties throughout the siege.

was pressing on. All our gun-amunition was exhausted. In this dilemma Sir Henry showed a nerve and decision not to be surpassed. He placed the guns on the bridge and ordered the portfires to be lighted. The feint had all the hoped-for effect. The enemy shrunk back from a bridge apparently defended by loaded guns. They at once relaxed their pursuit, and the little army succeeded in gaining the shelter of the city and in retiring in some sort of order on the Maeheli Bhawan and the Residency. Their losses, however, had been most severe, and they had left the howitzer and two field-pieces behind them.*

The pursuit
is checked
at Kukrail;

Immediately after crossing the Kukrail bridge Sir Henry Lawrence made over the command to Colonel Inglis, and, followed by his staff officer, Captain Wilson, and by his secretary, Mr. Couper,—who, acting throughout the day as his aide-de-camp, had displayed equal coolness and courage—again at the Gúmtí. galloped, unattended by any escort, through the city to the Residency. Arriving there, Sir Henry ordered out fifty men of the 32nd, under an officer, Lieutenant Edmonstone, to the iron bridge over the Gúmtí, with a view to their being posted in the two houses on either side of the bridge, to defend it. Towards this bridge the elated enemy surged in crowds, but they never forced it. The fifty Englishmen, covered by a fire from two 18-pounders in the Redan battery, held it successfully, though not without loss, till noon. The enemy then desisted, and crossed the river by another bridge. Our men were then finally withdrawn. This defence was a very gallant affair.

That the loss of the battle of Chinhat should precipitate the crisis was certain. But the crisis would have equally come had there been no battle. And the battle, unfortunate in its immediate results though it proved to be, had at least this advantage,—it removed from Sir Henry's mind any doubt he might have had as to his ability to hold two positions. Brigadier Inglis states, in his dispatch, that, had both posts been held, both must have

Advantages
derived by
the loss of
the battle.

* These two field-pieces were, however, spiked by Captain Wilson, the Assistant Adjutant-General, before they were left. The heroic efforts made by Lieutenant Bonham of the Artillery to save the howitzer would most assuredly, had Sir Henry Lawrence lived, have gained for that officer the Victoria Cross.

fallen; and he ascribes the concentration of the troops in the better position of the two to Chinhat.

Of the behaviour of Sir Henry Lawrence on that day but one opinion has been recorded. That opinion is ably summarised in the record of a gallant soldier, the Assistant Adjutant-General throughout the siege. Calmness in
combat of
Sir Henry. "Throughout that terrible day, during the conflict," records Captain Wilson, "and when all was lost, and retreat became all but a rout, and men were falling fast, he displayed the utmost calmness and decision; and as, with hat in hand, he sat on his horse on the Kukrail bridge, rallying our men for a last stand, himself a distinct mark for the enemy's skirmishers, he seemed to bear a charmed life."

The first consequence of the defeat was the occupation of the city by the rebels and the uprising of the discontented spirits within it. That very afternoon they began to loop-hole many of the houses in the vicinity of and commanding the Macheli Bhawan and the Residency. They even succeeded in bringing a six-pounder to bear on the outer verandah of the post afterwards known as Anderson's post. Subsequently, about half-past one, they brought another gun into position, and soon demolished the outer defences, including a loop-holed mud parapet but recently erected. The post, however, Anderson's
post is
attacked. was so important, that orders were sent to its garrison to hold it to the last extremity. Shortly afterwards a circumstance happened, the precursor of many deeds of gallantry on the part of the defenders of Lakhnao.

The house which was thus being defended was the residence of Mr. Capper, C.S. Mr. Capper had volunteered to aid in its defence, and was standing for that purpose under the verandah, behind one of the pillars, when the enemy's fire brought down the verandah, and buried him under six feet of wood and masonry. Captain Anderson, 25th Native Infantry, though not the senior officer present, at once called upon the garrison to assist in rescuing the buried gentleman. The work was one of no ordinary danger, for there was no protection against the concentrated fire of the enemy, and one at least of those present expressed the opinion that the act would be useless, as Mr. Capper would probably be dead. Anderson was not discouraged by these doubts. Announcing his intention to rescue Capper at all risks,

Mr. Capper
is buried in
the ruins of
the verandah.

he called on those around to aid him, and set to work with a will. He was speedily joined by Corporal Oxenham, Anderson gallantly sets to work to extricate him, 32nd Foot, Monsieur Geoffroi, a Frenchman, Signor Barsotelli, an Italian, and two Englishmen, Lincoln and Chick, from the Post Office garrison. The enemy's round shot continued to pour over the place where Capper lay, and, to be able to work, the six men I have mentioned were forced to lie on their stomachs, and grub away in that position. At length they succeeded in extricating Capper's body, but his legs still remained buried. The situation for him was now replete with danger, for to stand up was almost certain death. In this dilemma, Oxenham, obeying a signal from Anderson, who was supporting the head, dashed round to the other side, and extricated by a supreme effort the buried legs. This done, Capper was hauled in by the other five men, and was saved.*

The following morning the enemy opened a heavy musketry fire upon the Maehchi Bhawan and the Residency. Sir Henry had foreseen this action and had prepared for it. Resolved to concentrate all his defensive efforts on the Residency, he signalled the following night to the garrison of the Maehchi Bhawan to evacuate and blow up that fortress. These orders were admirably carried out by Captain Francis, 13th Native Infantry, then commanding at that post. A quarter of an hour past midnight the

* For this act Oxenham received the Victoria Cross; but Mr. Capper ever considered that he owed his life mainly to Anderson, who alike suggested the attempt, and, by his example, carried it to be a successful issue. Anderson was recommended for the Cross in 1868, but it was not bestowed upon him. On this occasion Mr. Capper wrote as follows: "My former letters clearly acknowledge that it was to the gallantry of Colonel Anderson that I owe my life: that had he not, by word and example, shamed the others to action, no effort would have been made to save me. . . . It is clear that Colonel Anderson must have voluntarily exposed himself to imminent danger for the long period of three-quarters of an hour—contrary to the advice of his superior officer—with the object of rescuing a comrade from a terrible and lingering death. At the moment when Corporal Oxenham (at the call of Colonel Anderson) went forward to extricate my legs and feet, Colonel Anderson was supporting my head and shoulders; and, whilst all three of us were exposed to the cannonade, the head and upper part of Anderson's body must have been exposed to the same heavy musketry fire as was risked by Oxenham. The risk of life accepted by Anderson was continuous; and if the question is, to whom (under God) I am chiefly indebted for the preservation of my life, the answer is—Colonel Anderson."

garrison of the Machchi Bhawan entered the Residency with their guns and treasure without the loss of a man. Shortly afterwards the explosion of two hundred and forty barrels of gunpowder and of five hundred and ninety-four thousand rounds of ball and gun ammunition announced the complete destruction of that post.

A singularly good fortune attended the time chosen for this operation. The enemy had determined, before they commenced in earnest to besiege the Residency, to devote a preliminary night to the plunder of the shops of the town. They were engaged in this congenial work when the explosion of the Machchi Bhawan signified to them that they had missed a great chance.

The time for the evacuation fortunately chosen.

The garrison, consisting, including civilians, of nine hundred and twenty-seven Europeans * and seven hundred and sixty-five natives, was now concentrated in the Residency. To all appearances the situation was desperate. Not only were the fortifications incomplete, but the enemy had at once occupied and loop-holed the houses which had been left standing outside and close to those fortifications. The west and south faces of the enclosuro were practically undefended, the bastion which had been commenced at the angle of the two faces having been left unfinished. Looking at the weakness of his resources and the immense superiority in numbers of the besiegers, Sir Henry may be held excused if, at the first moment, he scarcely expected to hold out, without relief, for more than ten or fifteen days.†

The garrison desperate.

The weakness of the defences.

And, if the rebels had possessed as leader a real soldier, the advantage of their position was so marked, their superiority in point of numbers so overwhelming, that the earlier forebodings of Sir Henry might possibly have been realised. A general who would have freely sacrificed his men, and whose men would not have flinched from his summons, might well have taken advantage of the disaster of Chihat. The Residency was not, in a mili-

The mode in which they might have been forced.

* These were composed as follows:—32nd Foot, 535; 84th Foot, 50; Artillery, 89; officers not with English regiments or Artillery, 100; Civil and Uncovenanted, 153.

† His letter to General Havelock, dated 30th of June.

tary sense, defensible, and must have succumbed to the determined onslaught of determined men, vastly superior in numbers to the garrison.

But it is a remarkable fact that the mutiny produced amongst the mutineers no real general—not one man who understood the importance of time, of opportunity, of dash, in war. It is, too, worthy to be noted that, whilst no men in the world have a greater contempt of death than the natives of India, they yet always have shrunk from a hand-to-hand encounter with Europeans. Still less have they cared to assault a fortified position defended by Europeans. If carelessness of life be courage, no people in the world are braver than the natives of India. But the courage which is required to make a man a real soldier is something more than mere carelessness of life. Such a man must be anxious to affront death, to court it. He must be indifferent to pain; must be capable of enjoying the delirium of battle; must be animated by a love of glory, and above all by a confidence in his superiority to his enemy. None of these qualities are possessed by the native soldier to the same extent as by our own countrymen; whilst, with respect to the last, it is conspicuous by its absence. Perhaps it is mainly because the native soldier opposed to the British soldier, far from feeling the confidence I have referred to, is imbued with the conviction of the enormous superiority of his enemy, that his moral nature is cowed, and he cannot fight him as he can and does fight a fellow Asiatic.

Certainly in the case of Lakhnao this moral power was a strong factor on the side of the British. There they were, few in numbers, occupying a position, not, in a military sense, defensible; two sides of it, indeed, practically undefended. To attack them came an army enormously superior in numbers, flushed with victory, and occupying positions which commanded a great portion of the defences. To all appearance the victory of the attacking party was assured. It was not gained, simply because the inferior moral nature of the Asiatic, shrinking involuntarily from actual contact with the European behind defences, neutralised the superiority of numbers.

What was the position? Let the reader imagine a number of houses, built for ordinary domestic purposes, originally separated from each other by small plots of ground, but now

Comparison
between
the English
and Asiatic
soldier.

Effect of
the superior
moral of the
English.

Compiled from the Survey made by
Lieuten^t. W Moorsom, H.M. 52 L^t. Inf 71857.


SCALE OF 400 FEET = 1 INCH

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 800 1000 1200 1400

Line of defences shown by a thick line —

Guns ————— x

Mortars ————— o



joined together by mud walls and trenches—the mud walls for defence from outer attack, the trenches for protection against the enemy's shells! Such, in a few words, was the enclosure known to the world, from the principal building within it, as the Residency.

The Residency enclosure. What was it?

It is true that the walls of the houses were thick, that the bricks were of that small class peculiar to India during the last century, and that they were cemented by well-tempered mortar. But even the strongest houses constitute but a poor military position, especially when those houses are, to a great extent, commanded from higher buildings outside. This position, moreover was blockaded and attacked by the enemy before, as I have said, a single part of it had been made really defensible. As the blockade progressed, and whilst the enemy were erecting batteries, mounting guns, throwing up barricades, and loop-holing the empty houses outside of, but close to, the enclosure, the garrison had time, notwithstanding the fierce and continuous fire maintained upon them, to repair, and in some cases even to strengthen, their defences. These defences were naturally rough, run up under enormous difficulties, and never in their most finished state deserving the name of regular fortifications. The houses of the several occupants, and the batteries erected along the line of intrenchments came to be regarded as posts, and each of these posts was commanded by an officer. What these posts and who these officers were will be related in due course. At present, I have to describe the earliest and most regrettable incident of the siege.

Since the retirement of our force within its lines of defence the fire of the enemy upon it had been continuous.

Night and day, from the tops of surrounding houses, from loop-holed buildings, from every point where cover was available, they had poured in a perpetual fire of round shot, of musketry, and of matchlock balls. Many of the garrison who were in places considered before the siege perfectly safe were hit. But no place was so exposed as the Residency itself, and on it a well-directed fire was constantly maintained. Moreover, the enemy had recourse to digging deep approaches to their batteries and guns, and these effectually concealed them from our sharp-shooters.

Proceedings of the enemy after Chinbat.

But, long before the cautious system of attack thus described had attained its full development, the garrison sustained an irreparable loss.

Sir Henry Lawrence occupied in the Residency a room convenient for the purpose of observing the enemy, but much exposed to their fire. There, the day after the defeat at Chinhat, he was seated conversing with his secretary, Mr. Couper. Suddenly an 8-inch shell, fired from the very howitzer we had lost at Chinhat, fell into the room, close to them. It burst, however, without injury to either. The whole of the staff then implored Sir Henry to remove to a less exposed position. But this he declined to do, remarking with a smile that another shell would never be pitched into the same room. Later in the day, when it was evident that the enemy's round-shot were being directed at the Residency and were striking the upper storey, Captain Wilson and Mr. Couper again pressed Sir Henry to go below and to allow his things to be moved. He promised to comply on the morrow. The following morning he went out to post and arrange the force which had come in from the Macheli Bhawan and to place the field-pieces in position. He returned tired and exhausted about 8 o'clock. He lay down on his bed, and transacted business with the Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Wilson. He was engaged in this work when suddenly a howitzer shell entered the room, and, bursting, wounded him mortally. He lingered in extreme agony till the morning of the 4th, when he died. Captain Wilson's account of the event is as follows:—

A shell
penetrates
Sir Henry
Lawrence's
room.

A second
strikes and
kills him.

Captain Wil-
son's account
of the event.

“During the first day the enemy threw an 8-inch shell from the howitzer they had captured from us into the room in which Sir Henry and Mr. Couper were. It burst close to both, but without injury to either, and curiously enough did little damage. We now urged Sir Henry to leave the Residency and go elsewhere, or at least go down below into the lower storey. This, however, he then declined to do, as he laughingly said he did not believe the enemy had an artilleryman good enough to put another shell into that small room. Later in the day some round-shot came into the top storey of the Residency; and in the evening Mr. Couper and I both pressed him to go below, and allow his writing things and papers to be moved; and he promised that he would the next day.” “Towards 8 a.m.” (on the 2nd) “he returned, greatly exhausted (the heat was dreadful), and lay down on the bed with his clothes on, and desired me to

draw up a memorandum as to how the rations were to be distributed. I went into the next room to write it, but, previous to doing so, I reminded him of his promise to go below. He said he was very tired, and would rest a couple of hours, and that then he would have his things moved. In about half-an-hour I went back into the room with what I had written. His nephew, Mr. George Lawrence, was then lying on a small bed parallel to his uncle's, with a very few feet between them. I went between the beds, and stood on the right-hand side of Sir Henry's, with one knee resting on it. A native servant was sitting on the floor pulling the punkah. I read what I had written. It was not quite in accordance with his wishes, and he was in the act of explaining what he desired altered, when the fatal shot came; a sheet of flame, a terrific report and shock, and dense darkness, is all I can describe. I fell on the floor, and, perhaps for a few seconds, was quite stunned. I then got up, but could see nothing for the smoke and dust. Neither Sir Henry nor his nephew made any noise, and, in alarm, I cried out, 'Sir Henry, are you hurt?' Twice I thus called out without any answer. The third time he said, in a low tone, 'I am killed.' The punkah had come down with the ceiling, and a great deal of the plaster, and the dust and smoke were so great that it was some minutes before I could see anything; but as they gradually cleared away I saw the white coverlet of the bed on which Sir Henry was laid was crimson with his blood. Some soldiers of the 32nd now rushed in and placed Sir Henry in a chair. I then found that the back of my shirt was all blown off (I had on only a shirt and trowsers), that I was slightly wounded by a fragment of the shell, that our chief was mortally wounded; and that the servant pulling the punkah had had one of his feet cut off by another fragment of the shell. Mr. George Lawrence was alone of the four in the room unhurt."

Sir Henry Lawrence was one of those rare characters which it is difficult to over-praise. The adjective "noble" expresses most nearly what he was. His thoughts and his deeds were alike noble. In one of the eloquent and effective speeches which he who was then Mr. Disraeli delivered when in the cold shade of opposition "justice" was most felicitously described as being "truth in action." The life of Sir Henry Lawrence was a witness to the soundness of this aphorism. The nobleness of his nature,

Character of
Sir Henry
Lawrence.

the honesty of his mind, his unqualified love of justice, displayed themselves in his every act. He was just to others because he was true to himself. Than his, it is difficult to imagine a purer, a more unselfish, a more blameless, and at the same time a more useful life. He, at least, did not live in vain. Great as were his services to his country, those he rendered to mankind were still greater. The establishment of the Lawrence Asylum—an institution which provides, in the healthy mountainous ranges of India, food, lodging, and instruction for the children of our European soldiers, was not the least important of those services. To it Sir Henry gave his time, his savings, the energies he could spare from his duties. He inoculated his friends and the Government of India with his ardour. For more than forty years that institution has borne testimony to the practical nobility of the spirit which founded it.

It must not be imagined that because he possessed great virtues Sir Henry Lawrence was fashioned after the manner of the monks of the middle ages. There could not be a greater mistake. He was essentially human, with strong human passions. His passions, indeed, had been brought gradually and by long training very much under control.* Yet, even when they burst the bonds, there was something noble about them too. He never concealed the annoyance which had been caused him from having been “cavalierly elbowed out of the Panjáb.” He felt that he had been wronged, that injustice had been done him, that advantage had been taken of his generosity, and he showed that he felt it. This wrong, he admitted, had caused him to fret even to the injury of his health. Yet how hearty was his forgiveness of those who had so wrung him when the stain on his reputation, as he regarded it, was removed by Lord Canning. “I can now,” he writes, “more freely than ever forgive Lord Dalhousie.” In his personal dealings with other men, the nobleness of his nature is reflected by the love, the respect, the affection he drew towards himself. “Few men,” wrote Brigadier Inglis, when commenting on his death, “few men have ever possessed to the

His noble
nature.

His human
passions.

Faculty of
gaining re-
spect and
affection.

* He did not admit this. Writing of Mr. Coverly Jackson, he says: “He is an able and energetic man, but, like us Lawrences, has strong passions not under much control.”

same extent the power which he enjoyed of winning the hearts of all those with whom he came in contact, and thus ensuring the warmest and most zealous devotion for himself and for the Government which he served." The deep affection with which he was regarded when living survives to the present day. Of no man is the recollection more warmly cherished. Nor is this to be wondered at, for no man ever excited so much enthusiasm in others. When he arrived at a decision, those to whom he communicated it felt that the subject had been thoroughly considered in all its bearings, and that the order was final. His elevation excited no envy. His nature and his policy alike incited him to trust. He believed in the honour, the right feeling, the public spirit of those with whom he was brought in contact until they actually showed themselves unworthy of his confidence. He gained, to a greater extent than any Englishman of the present century, the trust of the natives. He gained this trust by his absolute frankness. Far from flattering them, far from simulating a regard which he did not feel, his frankness was carried to the extremest limit. But they believed in him, they knew that he was sincere. They had a saying that "when Sir Henry looked twice up to heaven and once down to earth, and then stroked his beard, he knew what to do." He devoted all his energies to the country he served so well. In a word, he was a striking type of that class, not a rare one, of the public servants of England in India, who give themselves without reserve to their country. That Sir Henry Lawrence felt to the last the inner conviction that he had so given himself wholly and without stint, is evidenced by the expression of his dying wish that, if any epitaph were placed on his tomb, it should be simply this: "Here lies Henry Lawrence, who tried to do his duty."

Trust reposed in him by the natives.

The credit of the successful defence of the Residency at Lakhnao is due, in the first place, to Sir Henry Lawrence. He alone made it possible to successfully defend it. Three weeks before any one else dreamed of the chance even of a siege he began to lay in supplies. He did more. To ensure the prompt provisionment of the place, he paid for the supplies so stored considerably in excess of their market value. It is a fact, not perhaps generally known, that he did this in spite of the written protests of men so highly placed that they might almost be called his colleagues.

Credit due to Sir Henry for the ability to defend the Residency with success.

He caused to be brought into the Residency the treasure from the city, and, whenever feasible, from out-stations. The treasure, so collected, amounted to a very large sum. To obviate the necessity of placing a guard over it, he buried it, and made it the site of a battery in the Residency enclosure. He collected there the guns, the mortars, the shot and shell, the small arms, the ammunition, and the grain. A great portion of the latter he caused to be stored underground. He strengthened the fortifications, formed outworks, cleared away the obstructions close up to the Residency. He did all this before the siege commenced. And it was owing to his care, his energy, his determination in respect of these things, that the gallant men who survived him were able to offer to the foe a successful resistance.

The value of that successful resistance to the general interests of England in India has never publicly been sufficiently appreciated. It appears to me this is the proper place, dealing as I am with the character of the man who made that successful resistance possible, to estimate it. An event which occurred nearer to us in the autumn and winter of 1878 will bring more vividly before the reader than any description the value of the successful defence of Lakhnao. I allude to the defence of Plevna by the Turks. That splendid feat of arms neutralised for four months two Russian armies, and gave time to Turkey to organise whatever means she might have to prolong the contest. Now the Lakhnao Residency was the Plevna of India. (It is not too much to assert that the siege of the Residency kept in Oudh for five months immense masses of the regular army,* troops who but for that defence would have been employed either in overrunning the North-West or in reinforcing the garrison of Dehli. It was the splendid defence of the Residency that kept those troops from harming us, that gave time to England to send out reinforcements. That defence was, in a word, necessary to the maintenance of the hold of England on India. That that hold was preserved sums up, briefly, the amount of one portion of the debt incurred by England to Sir Henry Lawrence.)

* Besides the regular troops were many thousand men belonging to the ex-king's army, and many of whom had been drafted into the local and police force of the country; also the numerous retainers of the talukdars.

Sir Henry died, I have said, on the 4th of July. In consequence of his death-bed instructions Major Banks assumed the chief civil authority, whilst the command of the troops devolved upon Brigadier Inglis.

Major Banks
succeeds him.

The ground on which were built the detached houses now about to be attacked was an elevated plateau, the surface of which was rough and uneven. The defences traced around it had the form of an irregular pentagon. A glance at the accompanying plan will show that regarding the point indicated as "Innes's house" as the northernmost point, its eastern face ran irregularly parallel with the river Gúmí as far as the Baillie Guard. The line from that point to "Anderson's garrison" constituted the south-eastern, and from Anderson's garrison to "Gubbins's battery" the south-western face. The western face comprehended the line between Gubbins's battery and Innes's garrison.

The "posts"
of the Resi-
dency.

Innes's garrison occupied a long, commodious lower-roomed house, containing several rooms, two good verandahs, and having a flat roof. It was commanded by Lieutenant Loughnan of the 13th Native Infantry, a most gallant officer.

Overlooking this post on the eastern face was the Redan battery, at the apex of the projecting point of high level ground. This battery was armed with two 18-pounders and a 9-pounder. It was commanded by Lieutenant Samuel Lawrence of the 32nd Foot.

The line of intrenchments between the Water Gate and the Banqueting hall, transformed into a hospital, was commanded by Lieutenant Langmore of the 71st Native Infantry. It was entirely without shelter.

Passing over the Residency and the Banqueting hall, we come to the Treasury buildings situated below and to the eastward of the latter, known under the name of the Baillie Guard. This was armed with two 9-pounders and an 8-inch howitzer, commanded by Lieutenant Aitken, 13th Native Infantry. Following the outer tracing we come to Fayrer's house with one 9-pounder, commanded by Captain Gould Weston, late Superintendent of the Military Police; to the Financial garrison post commanded by Captain Sanders, 13th Native Infantry; and to Sago's house commanded by Captain T. T. Boileau, 7th Cavalry. The two last-named buildings were commanded by the Post Office armed with two 18-pounders and a 9-pounder, and whose garrison was under the orders of Lieutenant Graydon.

Following the line of outer works we arrive at the Judicial post, an extensive upper-roomed house, commanded by Captain Germon, 13th Native Infantry. Next to that, and forming the south-eastern angle of the position, was Anderson's post,—a two-storied house surrounded by a wall, with two good verandahs, and intrenched and loop-holed. No battery was attached to this post. It was commanded by Captain R. P. Anderson, 25th Native Infantry, the officer whose gallant rescue of Mr. Capper has been recorded in a preceding page.

The Káhnepúr battery, constructed of earth and palisades, was the next post. This was armed with an 8-pounder and two 9-pounders. This was the only post the commandant of which was constantly changed. The reason was that it was so entirely commanded by the enemy's works, that when they concentrated a heavy fire upon it no man could live in it. But neither could the enemy occupy it, for it was entirely commanded by the house behind it. It thus remained to the end a part of our defences. The Thag gaol, occupied by the boys of the Martinière College, and commanded by their principal, Mr. Schilling; the Brigade Mess, a high and convenient building, commanded by Colonel Master, 7th Light Cavalry; and the Sikh squares; led to Gubbins's post, armed with two 9-pounders and an 18-pounder, and commanded by Major Apthorp, 41st Native Infantry. Between this post and the Church garrison were the Bhúsá intrenchments and sheep pens, slenderly manned by the officers and soldiers of the Commissariat Department. The Church garrison consisted of about a dozen Europeans. The church was stored with grain. This leads us back to Innes's house, whence we started.

Of the garrisons within the lines of defence may be mentioned Ommaney's post, connected by a lane with Gubbins's post and supported by the residents of the Begam Kothí, few in number and principally on the staff.

It cannot be too often repeated that on the morrow of Chinhat this plateau was, in a military sense, indefensible. Difficulties in the way of the defence. In many places barricades of earth constituted the only defence against the enemy. Nor was it easy to repair the want. "It is difficult," wrote a staff officer, "to chronicle the confusion of those few days, for everywhere confusion reigned supreme." The same authority gives, a little further on, example of this confusion. After mentioning the severe wound received by the commissariat officer,

Lieutenant James, at Chinhat, and the consequent disorder in that department, he paints in graphic terms how the bullocks, deserted by their attendants and wandering about in search of water, fell into wells; how fatigue parties of civilians and officers, after having been engaged many hours in repelling the enemy's attacks, had to spend six or seven more in burying the dead cattle; how the horses of the troopers of the 7th Cavalry who had deserted, maddened for want of water, broke loose and fought with each other, unheeded by the over-worked garrison.

The rebels were not ignorant of the confusion that reigned behind those weak ramparts. Why did they not take advantage of it? They had guns, they had position, they had overwhelming numbers. One determined rush, or an unceasing succession of determined rushes, and, though their losses would have been enormous, the position must have been carried. The reader will have already answered the question. They did not attempt those rushes because they were entirely Asiatics and the defenders were mainly Europeans!

Why the enemy took no advantage of those difficulties.

The course which they pursued, and the means adopted by the garrison to baffle that course, have been described in immortal language by the Brigadier who commanded the defence.* It would be difficult to add to the grandeur of that simple and expressive story. Regarded from a literary point of view, it is a model of despatch-writing. But it is far more than that. Its greater merit lies in the fact that it records with unsurpassed modesty, untinged by a shadow of self-laudation, a long deed of heroism, unsurpassed and unsurpassable, to be spoken of with reverence so long as the pulse of the English heart beats high in appreciation of what is brave, of what is manly, of what is noble.

The defence—as described by Brigadier Inglis.

Far from taking of their victory at Chinhat that prompt advantage at which a capable English general would have clutched, the rebel-leaders, for nearly three weeks, did everything but assault those slight defences. They occupied in force the houses which commanded them; they erected batteries; they placed guns in position; they dug trenches to protect their men from our shells; and for the entire period I have mentioned, that is from

Tactics of the mutineers.

* *Despatch of Brigadier Inglis to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, given at full length in Appendix B.*

the 1st to the 20th of July, they kept up a terrific and incessant fire day and night, not less than eight thousand men, and probably a larger number, firing at one time into the defenders' position. Their fire was very effective. The mosques, the houses which from want of time to destroy them had been allowed to stand, the not very remote palaces, afforded them commanding positions. Their shells penetrated into places before considered absolutely secure. Many of the garrison

Casualties
in the early
part of the
siege.

succumbed to this incessant rain of projectiles. Mrs. Dorin was killed in an inner room of Mr. Gubbins's house; Mr. Ommaney, of the Civil Service, was mortally wounded on the 4th of July; Major Francis,

of the 13th Native Infantry, a very gallant officer, on the 7th; Mr. Polehampton, the chaplain, the same day, severely. Before the 20th of July dawned, the list of casualties had been increased by Mr. Bryson, at one time Sergeant-Major, 16th Lancers, shot through his head on the 9th; by Lieutenant Dashwood, 48th Native Infantry, who succumbed the same day to cholera; by Lieutenant Charlton, 32nd Foot, shot through the head on the 13th; by Lieutenant Lester, mortally wounded on the 14th; by Lieutenants Bryce and O'Brien, wounded on the 16th; by Lieutenant Harmer wounded, and Lieutenant Arthur killed, on the 19th. That day also, Mr. Polehampton, wounded on the 7th, died of cholera. In addition to these officers, many privates, Europeans and natives, succumbed. A few of the latter deserted to the enemy.

Upon the improvised defences the effect of the enemy's fire was even greater. Thus on the 15th Anderson's

Further
effect of the
enemy's fire.

house was entirely destroyed by round-shot, though the post was still nobly held by the garrison; on the 18th, many round-shots were fired into the Post

Office, Fayrer's house, Gubbins's, and the Brigade Mess-house. At one time the rebels succeeded in setting the Residency on fire by firing carcasses into it. At another they threatened an assault on Gubbins's post. In fact they had recourse to every possible expedient excepting one, and when they did attempt that one it was met gloriously and successfully.

The garrison during these three weeks had their work cut out for them. The order, so conspicuous by its absence in the first hours of the siege, was gradually restored. By the 10th arrangements had been made for securing and feeding the bullocks, whilst the surviving horses, after scores had been shot down, had been

Proceedings
of the gar-
rison.

got rid of by turning them loose over the intrenchment in the dark of the night. A strong element of disorder was thus removed. A large number of these animals, however, had previously perished, and the interring of them was no slight addition to other labours.*

The heat during this time was excessive. Cholera was busy. The stench from putrid animals was most offensive. Few officers had a servant. Whilst the days were consumed in fighting, the nights were passed in developing means for the continuance of the struggle.

Difficulties
they had to
contend with.

Then, stores had to be dug out and carried, guns to be shifted, trenches to be dug, shafts for mines sunk, the dead buried, and the thousand-and-one necessities devolving upon men so situated attended to. Still the garrison showed no signs of faltering. The necessity for having the mind constantly on the stretch, however, whilst, perhaps, it added to the bodily capacity to bear fatigue, told in the long run upon many.

On the 7th of July a sortie was made. The party consisted of fifty men of the 32nd and twenty Sikhs. The object was to examine Johannes' house, a building outside, and close to the line of defence, near the Brigade mess, as it was believed that the enemy were mining. The sortie was successful. The rebels were driven out of the house, and fifteen or twenty of their number were killed. On our side three men were wounded.

The first
sortie.

I cannot quit the account of this sortie without making special reference to the gallantry of the officer who led it, Lieutenant Sam. Lawrence, of the 32nd Foot. The cool daring he displayed obtained for Lieutenant Lawrence the Victoria Cross.†

Daring of
Lieutenant
Sam. Lawrence.

* Numbers of horses and bullocks died, and their burial at night by working parties, in addition to nightly fatigue parties for the purpose of burying the dead, carrying up supplies from exposed positions, repairing intrenchments, draining, and altering the position of guns, in addition to attending on the wounded, caused excessive fatigue to the thin garrison, who had but little rest, night or day. In all duties the officers equally shared the labours with the men, carrying loads, and digging pits for putrid animals, at night, in heavy rain. All exerted themselves to the utmost, alternately exposed to a burning sun and heavy rain."—*Journal of a Staff Officer.*

† It may be interesting to the reader to peruse the words in which the bestowal of this honour was notified. In the *London Gazette* of the 22nd of November, 1859, the following announcement appeared:—"Lieutenant, now Brevet-Major, S. Lawrence, 32nd Foot.—Date of act of bravery, 7th July,

For some time subsequently the garrison confined themselves strictly to defence. But on the 20th the rebels changed their tactics. They determined then to try the rush which they should in the first instance have attempted.

At midnight, on the 20th of July, the enemy's fire almost ceased, nor was heavy firing resumed in the early morning. About half-past 8 o'clock, however, a considerable movement on their part was noticed. The observation of this movement and surmises as to its immediate aim kept the garrison well on the alert. A little after 10 o'clock the rebels sprang a mine inside the water-gate, about twenty-five yards from the inner defences, and close to the Redan. Immediately after the explosion they opened a very heavy fire on the defences near which the mine had been sprung. Under cover of this fire, as soon as the smoke and dust had cleared away, they advanced in heavy masses against the Redan. The garrison, however, received them with so heavy a fire that they recoiled back sorely smitten; nor, although they made a second attempt, and penetrated to within a very few yards of the English battery, were they able to effect a lodgment. Again they fell back, baffled.

Simultaneously a heavy column advanced against Innes's house. The garrison here consisted only of twelve men of the 32nd Foot; twelve of the 13th Native Infantry; and a few non-military servants of Government;—the whole commanded by Ensign Loughnan, 13th Native Infantry. Against this handful of men the rebels pressed in large numbers, and made their way to within ten yards of the palisades. A rolling fire sent them back. They came, however, again,—and again; —and again;—but always with the same result. Loughnan, who commanded the post, young in years, but cool, wary, and resolute, covered himself with glory. By the qualities indicated by these adjectives, he

Gallantry
of young
Loughnan.

1857.—For distinguished bravery in a sortie on the 7th of July, 1857, made, as reported by Major Wilson, late Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General of the Lakhnao garrison, 'for the purpose of examining a house strongly held by the enemy, in order to discover whether or not a mine had been driven from it.' Major Wilson states that he saw the attack, and was an eye-witness to the great personal gallantry of Major Lawrence on the occasion, he being the first person to mount the ladder and enter the window of the house, in effecting which he had his pistol knocked out of his hand by one of the enemy."

forced the rebels to desist from their attempts to storm the post, and to content themselves with a heavy musketry fire from a safer distance.

But the enemy's attack was by no means confined to the two points I have noted. They made, likewise, a desperate and very determined attempt on the Kánhpúr battery, their standard-bearer, who led them on, jumping into the battery-ditch. But a well-directed bullet having stopped his further progress they became disheartened and fell back. Very soon afterwards another detachment advanced with scaling ladders against Anderson's and Germon's posts. But their reception at both was so warm that they retreated, not to renew the attack.

The attack
repulsed at
all points.

It was now 2 o'clock. For two hours longer the rebels still continued to pour in a heavy fire. They even attempted to effect a lodgment in one of the brick-built cook houses close to the outer defenses. But the real attack was over. Made in great force and with considerable resolution, it had been defeated by the British with the loss of but four killed and twelve wounded. By sharp experience the garrison had learned the wisdom of keeping themselves as much as possible under cover.

This attack and this repulse deserve to be considered under two aspects—the material and the moral. As a deed of gallantry it is scarcely to be surpassed by any feat in history. It was the triumph of British coolness and pluck over Asiatic numbers and swagger; of the mind over matter. But in a moral point of view it was more important still. It showed the mutineers that they had miscalculated their chances; that, if it had ever been possible for them to storm the intrenchment, that time had gone by; that, unless famine should come to aid them, they and their countrymen would never triumph over that handful of Europeans.

Moral
aspect
of the
repulse;

on the
Asiatics,

Nor did they, the Europeans who formed that garrison, feel less the moral exaltation of that victory. After three weeks of incessant pounding with shot and shell the rebels had tried to overwhelm them by an assault. In making that assault they had been singularly favoured. Their mine had been sprung in accordance with their calculations; they had covered the advance of their infantry by a fierce artillery fire; their infantry had

on the Euro-
peans.

penetrated to within a few yards of the defences! And yet the garrison had repulsed them—and repulsed them with a loss so small that it did not visibly affect their numbers. The defenders were immensely elated at the results of the day, and, when their posts were visited in the evening, they could talk of nothing but of the heavy losses they had inflicted on the enemy as shown by the numerous corpses in front of their posts. Well might they, from that day, look forward with hope to the future!

But the day following this inspiring victory the garrison sustained a loss which it could ill afford. Major Banks, who had succeeded Sir Henry Lawrence as Chief Commissioner, was shot through the head whilst reconnoitring from the top of an out-house. It is true that the functions devolving upon Major Banks were purely civil functions. But his great knowledge of the natives, his noble and cheery nature, his accurate perception of the situation, had rendered him invaluable as a colleague to Brigadier Inglis. His fearlessness, his courage, and his sympathy with suffering had endeared him greatly to the garrison. His place was not filled up.

This arrangement did not take place, however, without a protest. Mr. Gubbins at once intimated his intention of assuming the position of Chief Commissioner. But Brigadier Inglis and his advisers felt that the time for divided authority had passed; that under the circumstances it was necessary that there should be but one chief, and that that chief should be a soldier. The Brigadier then issued an order intimating that the office of Chief Commissioner would be held in abeyance until such time as the Government of India could be communicated with.*

From the 20th of July to the 10th of August the rebels contented themselves mainly with keeping up an unrelenting fire upon the garrison, loop-holing more houses and bringing the attack closer and closer. They made no general assault. On their side the defenders were so fully occupied in repairing damages, in countermining, often successfully, and in replying to the enemy's fire, that they could

* This arrangement subsequently received the entire approval of the Governor-General.

not find sufficient time to remove the carcasses of horses and bullocks. The stench from these carcasses and from others only partially buried became almost unbearable, and possibly aided in fomenting the pest of flies, as well as the spread of fever, of cholera, of dysentery, of scurvy, and of small-pox. The badness and insufficiency of the food, the want of cooks, and the indifferent cooking, aided, in a marked manner, the working of these diseases.

But in the midst of these troubles and trials a spark of hope of aid from outside glimmered in the horizon. Many letters had been despatched by messengers believed to be faithful, but up to the 25th of July no reply had been received to any of them. Early in the morning of the 22nd, the pensioner Angad came in from Kánhpúr, but without a letter. Angad was a very remarkable character. He had been a Sipáhi, but he must have proved a very bad bargain, for he had quitted the military service, when still young, smooth-faced, and wiry. But he was the only messenger sent out from the intrenchment who ever brought back a letter. On this occasion he did not carry one with him for fear of being detained by the enemy; but he stated that the English had been victorious; that he had seen two European regiments at or near Kánhpúr; that one of them had square buttons and the other light blue caps. This description greatly puzzled Brigadier Inglis and his staff, who could not call to mind any regiment in the British army which wore square buttons or whose heads were adorned with light blue caps. But it was perfectly accurate. The square buttons belonged to the 78th Highlanders—the blue cap-covers, to the 1st Madras Fusiliers.*

Letter
from
Colonel
Tytler.

At 11 o'clock on the night of the 25th the same pensioner, who had been sent out again on the night of the 22nd to General Havelock's camp, returned with a reply to that letter from that officer's Quartermaster-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser-Tytler. The letter stated that "Havelock was advancing with a force sufficient to bear down all opposition, and would arrive in five or six days."* Brigadier Inglis at once resolved to smooth the way for the relieving force by transmitting by the same channel to General Havelock a plan of his position and of the roads approaching it. Angad accordingly

* Brigadier Inglis's despatch.

took advantage of the first dark night to leave the intrenchment with the plan, drawn up by Major Anderson, and two memoranda partly written in the Greek character. He delivered these to General Havelock at Mangarwár on the 28th of July. They satisfied him as to "the extreme delicacy and difficulty of any operation to relieve Colonel Inglis."* Meanwhile the occasional sound of heavy firing on the road between Kánhpúr and Lakhnao continued to confirm the hopes raised by the opening of this communication in the minds of the garrison.

Four days later—the ominous 10th of August—the rebels made their second assault. About 10 o'clock that morning a body, numbering perhaps sixteen hundred, was observed by the garrison massed behind their trenches, opposite the southern face of the defences. Very soon after, a large force was noticed approaching the bridge of boats from the Mariáun cantonments. Brigadier Inglis was not slow to mark the significance of these movements. The word was passed that an assault was impending. Instantly all the occupants of the posts were on the alert. Half an hour later the enemy fired a shell into the Begam Kóthí, a building in the centre of the intrenchment. This was apparently a signal, for immediately after they sprang a mine between Johannes' house and the Brigade mess-house. The effect of the explosion was terrible. The greater portion of the Martinière house was blown in, the palisades and defences for the space of thirty feet were destroyed. On the smoke and dust clearing away, a breach was discovered through which a regiment might have marched in unbroken order. The enemy advanced with great resolution, occupied Johannes' house and garden and the buildings close to the Kánhpúr battery, and made a desperate effort to take that post. But, whilst they were met by a withering front fire from its defenders, the garrison of the Brigade mess-house, composed of a large proportion of officers, many of them excellent shots, and armed with their sporting guns and rifles, poured upon their flank from its roof a well-directed and continuous fusillade. This front and flank fire quite paralysed the assailants. Some thirty of their number, however, more daring than their comrades, penetrated into the ditch of the battery within a few

The second
grand assault.

Effect of the
mine sprung
by the
enemy.

* Havelock's *Despatch to the Commander-in-Chief*, 28th of July 1857.

feet of our guns. But hand-grenades freely rolled into the midst of them speedily caused them to run back, under a heavy musketry fire, to their comrades under cover. Their losses were enormous.

The attack
repulsed

This attack then was repulsed. But, whilst it was progressing, another had been attempted on the adjoining face. The explosion of a mine in front of Sago's house was the signal for the assault. But it was repulsed as bravely and as successfully as had been the other.

everywhere.

It was now about noon. The losses of the rebels had been very severe. Repulsed at all the points they had attempted, they kept up, however, for two hours a steady and continuous fire of round-shot and musketry. This then subsided into the ordinary routine fire, which never ceased. But about 5 o'clock they suddenly made an unexpected formidable rush on Captain Sanders's post (the Financial garrison). So determined were those who led the assault, that one of them actually seized the bayonet on the musket of a man of the 84th and tried to wrench it off. He was shot, and the attack was repulsed.

They make
a final
effort; but
in vain.

At 9 o'clock the assault was renewed on this post, on Innos's house, on Anderson's post, and on Gubbins's post. But at each and all these places the rebels met a reception which caused them to repent their audacity. By 10 o'clock the comparative quiet all around the intrenchments was a confession that the second general assault had failed.

On this occasion the losses of the garrison scarcely exceeded those sustained on the 21st of July. They amounted to three Europeans and two Sipáhis killed, and about double that number wounded. It was remarked by many of the garrison that the attack was neither so persistent, nor so energetic, as on the previous occasion,—a proof how the *moral* of the enemy had been lowered by their first repulse.

Effect of
the assault
on both
parties.

Still, to achieve that victory, the garrison had been terribly tried. The reader must never forget how the paucity of their numbers told against them. There were men enough, it is true, to man the posts, to work the guns, to repulse the enemy. But to do all this every man was required. Reliefs were impossible. The same men who had fought all day had to continue under arms, working and watching all night. It was the exposure,

The British
soldier
during the
siege.

the fatigue, the want of rest, the inferior nourishment that combined to constitute an enemy more formidable than hostile bullets; an enemy wearing to the constitution, undermining the health, though never affecting the moral or the animal courage of the soldier. The illustrious French general, Foy, once wrote that "the British soldier is not brave at times merely; he is so whenever he has eaten well, drunk well, and slept well." Sir William Napier rightly denounced this estimate as being a "stupid calumny." At Laklnao the British soldier had to contend against want of sleep, against bad food, and latterly against an entire want of liquor and tobacco. Yet who will deny that, at the defence of that place, "every helmet caught some beams of glory"? True it is that, even there, "no honours awaited his daring, no despatch gave his name to the applauses of his countrymen; his life of danger and hardship was uncheered by hope, his death unnoticed." But cold must be the blood, dull and eluded the spirit of the man, whose heart does not throb as he peruses the lines which follow, as applicable to the defenders of Laklnao as they were when penned by the immortal historian,* to the tried soldiers of Wellington. "Did his heart sink therefore? Did he not endure with surpassing fortitude the sorest of ills, sustain the most terrible assault in battle unmoved, and with incredible energy overthrow every opponent, at all times proving that, while no military qualification was wanting, the fount of honour was still full and fresh within him?" Who will say that this eloquent record of the stamp and character of the unlettered men who beat the choicest soldiers of Napoleon does not literally and accurately portray the moral and physical qualities of their successors in the ranks of the British army, who, at the defence of Laklnao, sustained to the full even the lofty measure of their imperishable renown?

A worthy
successor of
the warrior
of the Penin-
sula.

The next day, and the day following, the enemy continued a heavy cannonade. They appeared to concentrate their fire on the Kánhpúr battery, which had already suffered so severely. The position of the garrison here was really critical. The battery was completely commanded by the enemy. It was quite impossible to hold it against an assault. Yet, with a splendid audacity, the defenders would

The Kánhpúr
battery.

* Sir William Napier.

not withdraw their guns, lest such an act should give the enemy confidence!* In the evening of that day a strong working party did their utmost to repair damages in that battery and to remove from it one disabled gun. Three days later the battery was again rendered untenable, but again that night, and the following, were the damages repaired and the defences strengthened. Brigadier Inglis, always at hand whenever danger was to be encountered, having heard that the officers and men of the post believed that it had been successfully mined, went to it and remained there during the night of the 16th.

In the interval, the 12th of August, the garrison made a sortie in order to find out the intentions of the enemy in digging close to Sago's house. The party consisted only of twelve men of the 32nd Foot, under Lieutenant Clery, accompanied by Captain Hutchinson of the Engineers. The rebels however, were well on the alert, and their covering party, strong in numbers, compelled our troops to retire without effecting their object.

August 12.
A sortie
made and
repulsed.

On the 18th, the enemy delivered their third general assault. This time the usual preliminary mine had been dug under one of the Sikh squares. Exploded at daylight, its effect was electric. Two officers and two sentries on the top of the house were blown into the air and fell among the *débris*. The guard below, consisting of six drummers and a Sipáhi, were buried in the ruins and lost their lives. Of those on the roof, the officers and one of the sentries escaped with a few bruises. The other sentry was killed.

The third
grand assault.

In other respects the explosion was most successful. A clear breach, some twenty feet in breadth, had been made in the defences. The enemy, stimulated and excited, were not slow to take advantage of this opening. One of their officers, a very gallant fellow, sprang at once to the top of the breach, and, waving his sword, called on his men to follow. Before, however, his summons was responded to, a bullet had laid him low. His place was instantly occupied by another, but he was as instantly killed. Simultaneously the head of the column was sorely smitten by the flank fire from the top of the Brigade Mess. The *moral* of

Success of
the explo-
sion of the
enemy's
mine.

* This post (the Kánhpúr battery) was so dangerous that the commanding officer had to be changed every day.

the Sipáhis was greatly affected by these casualties, and the attacking force seemed suddenly to melt away. By means of some barricaded lanes, however, they managed shortly after to take possession of the right flank wall of the Sikh square.

But the garrison, admirably commanded, not only drove them from this, but succeeded in capturing one of the houses previously held by them, between the Sikh square and Gubbins's house. It was from this house that the enemy had most annoyed that face of the defences. Consequently it and others contiguous to it were blown up that evening.

The third assault was thus not only less formidable than its two predecessors; it resulted in a positive advantage to the besieged. And yet never had the latter been taken more completely by surprise, the presence of a mine in that spot never having been suspected.

Notwithstanding the vigilance exercised by the garrison of the Sikh square, they had not heard the slightest sound of the working of the mine which exploded.* No precautions had, therefore, been taken. The rebels then had the opportunity most coveted by an assailing army—an open breach, an unprepared garrison, their own troops massed, their leaders bold and resolute. And yet they were foiled. Who will assert that the result would have been the same if the defenders had been the assailants, and the assailants the defenders?

In a history of the great Indian mutiny, and especially in the history of a prolonged siege, it is impossible to record every act of heroism, to describe every isolated attack, and every individual defence, however noble, and however gallant. I have selected, therefore, for more particular description the four general assaults made upon the defences of the Residency as affording the most striking examples of the conduct of the hostile parties. In this third assault I have shown how, with every advantage before them, the assailants were not only beaten back, but actually lost ground. The inquiry

The assault
repulsed,

with advantage to the
garrison.

Reason for
specially
dwelling on
the four
great assaults,

* The officers at this post were Lieutenant Meehan and Soppett, and Captain Orr (unattached). One of them thus wrote, the day after the occurrence: "The new mine, which occasioned the calamity of yesterday, must have been worked by the enemy with sharp and noiseless tools, as . . . not the slightest sound . . . ever reached us."

naturally arises—to what particular action on the part of our troops were they indebted for their victory? It is due to those gallant men to answer this question somewhat in detail.

A glance at the sketch* will show that the outer Sikh square was commanded by the Brigade Mess-house. The explosion of the mine found the officers on the roof of that house ever watchful and ready, and with a large reserve of loaded muskets. It was their fire which struck down the two daring leaders who in succession mounted the breach. It was their fire, taking an advancing enemy in the flank, which made the enemy's formed masses shrink from the assault. But that was not all. At the first sound of the explosion every man of the garrison was on the alert at his allotted post. The Brigadier ordered down the reserve, consisting of only eighteen men, to the threatened point, and placed them in a position which commanded the breach from the right. At the same time boxes, doors, planks, etc. were rapidly carried down to make as much cover as possible to protect the more exposed men against musketry; a house, also, was pulled down and a road made for a gun; and, after incredible exertions, a 9-pounder was got into a position which commanded all the breach, and was loaded with a double charge of grape. I may leave this simple description without comment. It is typical of the garrison and its commander. Threatened with a great calamity, they brought at once into play every possible resource to meet it. The history of war does not show a brighter example of coolness and courage. The conduct of the assailants and the assailed on that 18th of August marks emphatically the fathomless distinction between the European and Asiatic in the qualities of a real soldier!

Detailed
action of the
garrison in
the repulse
of the 18th
of August.

It may not be out of place to point out here some of the peculiarities which distinguished this garrison from ordinary garrisons of besieged places—peculiarities which, strange though the assertion may at first sight appear—account to a certain extent for the success achieved. One of these was the paucity of its numbers. One effect of this was that the garrison of a post at the beginning of the siege remained the garrison of that post to the end. The men were never relieved, because

Peculiarities
which dis-
tinguished
this garrison
from ordinary
garrisons.

* Facing page 290.

there were no troops to relieve them. So great was the necessity to be for ever on the alert that the member of one garrison was unable to visit the member of another garrison. The only man who quitted his post was the man who went every morning to fetch the day's rations. Even when the post was knocked down by the enemy's fire the garrison of that post built up fresh defences from the *débris*. It was thoroughly understood by all that there was no retreat; that every man must die at his post; that whatever casualties might occur vacant places could not be filled. One consequence of this was that the defenders of a post on the western face knew nothing during the day of what was going on on the eastern face. It is true that, every evening, the Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Wilson, visited every post, generally accompanied by Mr. Couper, and whilst examining its state, noting its wants, and receiving the reports of the commander, he encouraged the soldiers with accounts of success achieved in other parts. It is true also that there was a reserve—but its numbers from casualties had diminished very considerably. This reserve, and the

The reserve.

Brigadier and his Staff, were the only members of the garrison who had no fixed post to defend. The men of the reserve were posted in the centre of the position, with the strictest orders that they were not to move thence except under the personal orders of the Brigadier or his Staff. Summonses from other persons were on no account to be attended to. It was their business to rush wherever the Brigadier might consider their presence to be most needed. Nobly did they perform this dangerous duty. The others lived or died where they had been originally posted.

One consequence of this permanency of location, of this knowledge that they could neither be reinforced nor relieved, was to sharpen the wits of the defenders, to make them take precautions which otherwise they might have overlooked. Thus

Precautions
taken by the
garrison.

they had always a considerable reserve of loaded muskets; they were careful never to expose themselves unnecessarily; when boring loop-holes they made sure that the background should be dark. The subject of loop-holes was, indeed, so thoroughly mastered that it deserves a paragraph to itself.

It must never be forgotten that the assailants and assailed were quite close to each other. The distance that separated them was, in many points, not greater, in some much less, than

the average width of a street such as the Strand. No man on either side dared, therefore, expose himself in the open to discharge his musket. Except at the time Loop-holing. of a general assault the muskets were fired through loop-holes. Now, when two hostile parties are so close to each other, it is very easy to discover the bearings of particular loop-holes—and to avoid them. Having found a point out of their line of fire, the besieging party would be naturally encouraged to post men at that point to fire on any defender who might expose his person. The garrison came gradually to encourage the assailants to occupy such a point and to have confidence in occupying it. But they marked well the direction; and during the night they bored holes in that direction. In the morning the enemy would come up by twos and threes to occupy their chosen post; or the garrison would do something to attract them there. Then the muskets would be discharged from the new loop-holes. The result was almost always successful. This method of out-witting the enemy was tried again and again, and generally with success.

A marked effect of the extremely narrow distance which separated the besiegers from the besieged was the constant, the unintermitting strain it caused to the defenders. They never knew when or where to expect an assault, and yet they always had to be ready to meet one. In a fortress, with its bastions and its glacis, the movements of an enemy are always discernible. At Lakhnao there were myriads on one side of a narrow lane, hundreds on the other side. These hundreds had no time to prepare for a sudden rush of the myriads, for the latter had but to traverse a few feet. The defenders were bound always to be ready; day or night; in sunshine or in storm. This necessity caused a strain on the system which can hardly be imagined, for, had the garrison not been ever ready, Lakhnao must have fallen.

At the commencement of the siege officers and men were prodigal of their fire. Even on the darkest night they discharged their pieces at an enemy they could not see. But, at the end of about ten days, this evil Correction
of prodigality
of fire. corrected itself. The fatigue was too great, the constant recoil of the piece too painful, to permit it to continue. After that the men husbanded their resources and never fired but when they could cover a foe. The garrison learned after the siege that nothing had tended more to daunt the enemy

than the perfect stillness which used to prevail in the intrenchment during the night.

Another most important matter in the defence was the mode adopted to obtain information of the enemy's movements. To procure this information, an organised system of "look-out" was established at a very early date. It was carried out in this way. At daybreak an officer, accompanied by a Sipáhi, was detailed to take post in the highest tower on the roof of the Residency. From holes made in this tower the officer watched all the movements of the foe. He had slips of paper with him, and one of these he sent down by the Sipáhi whenever necessary. They were relieved every two hours. A precisely similar watch was maintained from the roof of the Post Office. In this manner the Brigadier was kept acquainted with the movements which came within observation. These duties were by no means devoid of danger. During the defence two officers were severely wounded while so employed.

As I am writing of the roof of the Residency this may be a fitting place to record that on the highest point of that roof the British flag waved gloriously throughout the long siege. Whilst the members of the garrison felt a noble pride in thus displaying to their assailants their resolute confidence, the sight of that symbol of British predominance filled the hearts of those assailants with fury. The flag was a constant aim of their sharpshooters. Again and again were the halyards severed; the flag was riddled; the staff cut through, by bullets. But, as soon as darkness permitted, a new staff, new halyards were supplied. Patched up though it might be, the flag continued to the last to float defiance to the enemies of England.

Perhaps no mode of foiling the enemy was more practised by a portion of the garrison than mining and counter-mining. To enable the general reader to understand how this was effected, I will briefly relate the process carried on in the defences as described to me by one of those who was present. A shaft some four feet in diameter was sunk in the interior of the defences, as near as possible to the point to be assailed, to a depth of from twelve to twenty feet, according to circumstances. From this the gallery was run out in the direction and to the distance required. Now the real toil began. One man—an officer or soldier as the case might be—worked with a short

The look-out system.

The British flag.

Mining.

The method adopted.

pick-axe, or crowbar, to loosen the earth in front of him—to make a burrow just sufficiently high to clear his head when seated, and wide enough to allow of his working. Close behind this first worker sat another with an empty wine ease. This he filled with loose earth. When filled, he jerked a cord as a signal, and the box was drawn to the shaft, where another individual again gave notice to two at the top holding a rope attached to either side of the ease. These pulled it to the surface, emptied it and returned it. Thus five men worked at once. Two in the mine, one at the bottom of the shaft, two above it.

There were usually ten men thus employed on one mine, relieving each other at intervals agreed upon by themselves. The usual spell was half an hour, but was not unfrequently less. As the gallery progressed, it was visited by an officer of Engineers, who gave all necessary instructions.

These mines were not always made for offensive purposes. Frequently they were used to cut off the subterraneous advance of the enemy. In such cases they were run out a short distance, and then carried on laterally.

The fatigue and labour of constructing such works with indifferent tools and scant and impromptu appliances in a hot night in India, after fighting and working all day on an insufficiency of indifferent food, and without stimulants of any kind, cannot easily be imagined.

It deserves to be remarked that throughout the siege officers and men equally stood sentry. There were no exemptions. No place within the defences was absolutely safe. Even the building used as a hospital was constantly under artillery fire. In August a shell exploded there, killing one Sipáhi and wounding two others. On the 5th of September an 18-pounder shot traversed the building, wounding again Lieutenant Charlton and a soldier of the 32nd. In fact, both attendants and patients were always under fire.

The officers
and men
share alike.

The hospital
no place of
safety.

To return to the siege. The defeat of the 18th of August had a depressing effect on the mutineers. They kept up, it is true, during the next day, a heavy fire, but they made no serious attempt to prevent the further demolition of houses and buildings outside the defences, which had, up to that time, afforded them excellent cover. This demolition was effected by a small party

Houses out-
side the in-
trenchment
demolished.

under Captains Fulton, Hntehinson, and Anderson, supported from within the defences by a covering fire.

The day following, however, the rebels had recovered their spirits, and, covered by the heaviest cannonade the garrison had till then sustained, made an attempt to burn down the gates at the Baillie Guard, but without result. They soon had to learn that mining was an art which could be practised by defenders as well as by assailants. Johannes' house, held by the enemy, was a dominant position, and, as the siege wore on, the fire from it had become intolerable. It could no longer be taken by a sortie, for the enemy, warned by the previous successful sally, held it in such force as to render impossible any further attempt of the

The garrison successfully mined Johannes' house.

kind. There was only one resource, and that was to mine under it. Many nights of terrible toil, sustained almost exclusively by the officers, were spent in the work. At last the Engineer officer reported that the mine was, he believed, well advanced under the building. It was then heavily charged. To entice as many of the enemy as possible within the building, the garrison, on the 21st, opened upon it a heavy musketry fire. The enemy, regarding this fire as the prelude to another sortie, crowded into the house to assist in its defence. No sooner did the defenders note this than they fired the mine. The result was most successful. Johannes' house played no further part in the siege of Lakhnao.

In the interval between this date and the fourth and last assault on the 5th of September the losses of the garrison, alike from the fire of the enemy and from sickness, were very heavy. I find Captain Wilson, the Assistant Adjutant-General, thus writing in his journal on the 23rd of August:—"A heavy cannonade from the enemy from daylight till about 10 p.m., when it slackened. Their principal efforts were against the Brigade Mess-house and Kánhpúr battery: the former they seriously damaged, and succeeded in entirely levelling the guard-houses on the top, both of which had fallen in and there was no longer any cover for our musketry to fire from. Our ranks were rapidly thinning." The following extract from the same diary on the same day will show the enormous difficulties which beset the garrison even in the matter of labour absolutely necessary, and in the repair of damages from the enemy's shot. "We had work nightly," writes Captain Wilson, "for at least three

Occurrences between the third and fourth assault.

hundred men ; we had the defences to repair daily, supplies to remove from godowns which were fallen in from the effect of the enemy's shot, mines to countermine, guns to remove, barricades to erect, corpses to bury, and rations to serve out ; but with our weak, harassed, and daily diminishing garrison, we could seldom produce as working parties more than three fatigue parties of eight or ten men each relief." Other difficulties too were overtaking them. It was the rainy season. And the grass and jungle outside the defences had grown in the prolific manner natural to grass and jungle during the rainy season in India. This extreme growth rendered it possible for the mutineers to steal up, unobserved, close to the intrenchment. The heavy rain had likewise greatly injured many of the defences. Many of the supplies had been expended ; the supply of tobacco was ex-
The supplies diminished.
 hausted ; flour had become scarce.

In place of flour, wheat was now issued to all who could find time to grind it. The stench from decaying and decayed offal had become, in many places, scarcely endurable. Mortality from sickness had too become very prevalent especially, amongst the children.

There was, however, during this period one great counterpoise to the mental and bodily wear and tear. The garrison were still buoyed up by hope from outside. Hopes of relief. On the 22nd and 23rd reports of distant firing were heard. These had been often noticed before, and now caused but little excitement. But, on the 28th, the messenger Angad returned within the intrenchment, conveying a letter from General Havelock, dated the 24th, with the information that he had no hope of being able to relieve them for twenty-five days. They had a certainty then of three weeks' continuance of this life, probably of more. One result of this letter was a further reduction in the amount of rations !

On the 5th of September the enemy tried their fourth grand assault. The morning was fine, with a late moon giving a clear light before day had broken. The The fourth grand assault. rebels, however, waited for the dawn to commence a cannonade severer, if possible, than the last referred to. As the sun rose, about eight thousand rebel infantry were despatched preparing for an assault. It is needless to add that the garrison were ready—waiting for it. About 10 o'clock the enemy exploded two mines, one—the larger—close to the 18-pounder

battery; the other at the Brigade Mess-house. Fortunately they had miscalculated their distances and in both cases the explosion did little harm. But as soon as the smoke cleared away they were seen advancing with great resolution—their attack specially directed against Gubbins's post. Planting an enormous ladder against the bastion, they essayed to mount it. Several reached the top, but they encountered so heavy a fire of musketry and hand-grenades from the defenders that not a man could gain a footing there. They came on again and again, however, with extraordinary courage,—not only against this point, but against the Sikh square and the Brigade Mess house; nor was it until they had lost an enormous number of men that they fell back, beaten, baffled, and dispirited. The British loss amounted to but three killed and one wounded.

It deserves to be recorded that in this attack eight Sipáhis of the 13th Native Infantry, assisted by three artillerymen, loaded and worked the 18-pounder in the 13th battery, and after three or four rounds succeeded in silencing the 18-pounder opposed to them. This battery was entirely under charge of those Sipáhis. It had been constructed solely by them under the superintendence of the Engineers, and they were very proud of it.

Similar attacks, though in less force, were made the same day at other points, but they were all repulsed. The 5th of September was, in fact, the worst day the assailants had experienced. They had lost more men than on any previous occasion, and they appeared to those of the garrison who occupied positions commanding a view of their retreat to be more thoroughly beaten than on any previous occasion. Certainly they were more thoroughly dispirited, for they never tried a general assault again.

Still for twenty days the garrison remained cut off from the outer world, exposed day and night to a heavy fire of musketry and guns, to mines, to surprises, to attacks on isolated parts. The most unhealthy month of the year, the month in which the stagnant water caused by the abundant rainfall of July and August dries up, emitting miasmatic smells bearing with them fever, dysentery, and cholera, had now come to find a congenial field

Repulsed.

The "eight"
of the 13th
Native In-
fantry.

The assail-
ants are
dispirited
by their re-
pulse.

Sickness
increases
within the
defences.

for its ravages within the intrenchment. The live stock, too, was sensibly diminishing, the small stock of rum and porter,* reserved only for the sick and wounded, was running low. As the numbers of the garrison diminished, the labours of the survivors naturally augmented. Added to this, scarcely a day passed but some portion of one or other of the posts crumbled under the weight of the enemy's fire. Now it was two sides of Innes's house, steadily cannonaded daily with 18-pounder shot, that fell in;† now the verandah of the Residency that succumbed to incessant battering; now the wall of the building occupied by the boys of the Martinière. Some idea of the incessant nature of the hostile fire may be gleaned from the fact that, on the 8th of September, two hundred and eighty round-shot, which had lodged there during the siege, varying in size from a 24 to a 3-pounder, were gathered from the roof of the Brigade Mess-house alone!

At 10 P.M. on the 16th the pensioner Angad was again sent out with a letter rolled up in a quill for General Havelock. He evinced no reluctance. The risk was great,—certain death if discovered,—but the reward promised him was enormous—not less than five hundred pounds a trip. He was absent just six days. He returned at 11 P.M. on the 22nd, bringing with him a letter containing the gratifying intelligence that the relieving force had crossed the Ganges and would arrive in three or four days! To guard against that depression among his men apt to be engendered by disappointed hope, the Brigadier put on ten days to the time, and announced to the garrison that help from outside would arrive certainly within the fortnight. The effect was electric. The garrison were greatly elated by the news, and on many of the sick and wounded the speedy prospect of a possible change of air and security exercised a most beneficial effect. As to Angad—whatever may have been his adventures—he was a made man for life.

Sept. 16

Angad again sent out.

Angad brings glad tidings.

* Some idea of the scarcity may be conceived from the prices realised at auction and at private sales. On the 10th a bottle of brandy realised at auction £1 11s.; on the 12th, £2 were given for a small chicken; £1 12s. for a bottle of Curaçoa, whilst the same price was offered for two pounds of sugar. A new flannel shirt fetched £1, whilst five old ones realised £11 4s. On the 19th the price of a bottle of brandy had risen to £2.

† The post was, however, still nobly held, and preparations made for some kind of defence out of the *débris*.—*Diary of a Staff Officer.*

"Live or die," he exclaimed, "I have made the trip three times in safety; I'll go no more, but come life or death I'll remain with you."†

On the 23rd—the day following Angad's return—a smart cannonade was heard in the direction of Kánhpúr: some even fancied they heard musketry fire. A considerable movement of troops was also observed in the city, but the object was not apparent. A similar sound of distant firing and a similar movement of troops in the city was noticed likewise on the 24th. The night that followed was very unquiet, two alarms keeping the whole garrison under arms. The sounds that reached them indicated the prevalence of great disturbance within the city. It subsequently transpired that the rebels, aware of the near approach of the relieving force, were determined to use all possible means to prevent communication between that force and the garrison. Early the following morning distant firing was heard. At 10 o'clock a messenger arrived bringing an old letter from General Outram dated the 16th. The messenger could only add of his own knowledge that the relieving force had reached the outskirts of the city. The anxiety of the garrison was now intense. It was not lessened by the gradual cessation of the fire about an hour later (11 A.M.). The sounds of disturbance in the city still, however, continued. At noon the sound of musketry and of cannon close at hand gladdened their ears, whilst the smoke from the discharge of the latter showed that their friends were within the limits of

Lakhnao. The excitement now almost passed the power of endurance. But it had to be borne. For an hour and a half it was evident that a fierce struggle was going on. But then it became evident that the European had asserted his superiority. At 1 30 P.M. many of the people of the city commenced leaving with bundles of clothes on their heads and took the direction of the cantonments across the different bridges. At 2 P.M. armed men and Sipáhis began to follow them, accompanied by large bodies of Irregular Cavalry. Whilst the disturbances within the city had been progressing, a blockading party of the enemy's troops had continued to keep a heavy fire on our defences.

* Angad had made four trips; but the three last of these only had been undertaken by order of Brigadier Inglis.

They continued it, now that their comrades were retreating, more vigorously than ever. But the garrison, leaving them to do their worst, brought every gun and mortar to bear on the foe whom they beheld fleeing towards the cantonment. They were able to do this with the more effect as the bridge of boats had been carried away, and many of the enemy's cavalry had to swim the Gúmtí. The cannonade on these men lasted an hour and a half, a proof that their numbers must have been considerable.

Signs of the
enemy's
defeat.

The scene that followed cannot be better told than in the words of one to whose diary* I am so largely indebted. "At 4 P.M." writes Captain Wilson in his journal, "report was made that some officers dressed in shooting coats and solah hats, a regiment of Europeans in blue pantaloons and shirts and a bullock battery were seen near Mr. Martin's house and the Motí Mahall. At 5 P.M. volleys of musketry, rapidly growing louder, were heard in the city. But soon the firing of a Minié ball over our heads gave notice of the still nearer approach of our friends, of whom as yet little or nothing had been seen, though the enemy had been seen firing heavily on them from many of the roofs of the houses. Five minutes later, and our troops were seen fighting their way through one of the principal streets; and, though men fell at almost every step, yet nothing could withstand the headlong gallantry of our reinforcements. Once fairly *seen*, all our doubts and fears regarding them were ended: and then the garrison's long pent-up feelings of anxiety and suspense burst forth in a succession of deafening cheers. From every pit, trench, and battery—from behind the sandbags piled on shattered houses—from every post still held by a few gallant spirits, rose cheer on cheer. Even from the hospital many of the wounded crawled forth to join in that glad shout of welcome to those who had so bravely come to our assistance. It was a moment never to be forgotten.

The relief.

"Soon," continues the journal, "soon all the rear-guard and heavy guns were inside our position; and then ensued a scene which baffles description. For eighty-seven days the Lakmao garrison had lived in utter ignorance of all that had taken place outside. Wives who had long mourned their husbands as dead were again restored to them.

The meeting.

* *The Defence of Lucknow,—a Diary by a Staff Officer.*

Others, fondly looking forward to glad meetings with those near and dear to them, now for the first time learned that they were alone. On all sides eager inquiries for relations and friends were made. Alas! in too many instances the answer was a painful one."

But relief had come. Communication with the outer world had been opened. By whom had this gallant dash through the beleaguering force been accomplished? Was it relief or reinforcement? This is a question which I shall answer fully in the next chapter. In this place I will only add that, when the delirium of joy at the sight of old friends, and of receiving intelligence from outside had given place to sober considerations, it was recognised that the garrison had not been relieved, but reinforced; that the losses sustained by the incoming force had been so great that, combined with the garrison, they still could not thoroughly master the enemy. In some respects, even, the position of the garrison had been rendered worse. There were more mouths to feed, and there was no increase of food to supply them; more accommodation to be provided, only to be obtained by extending the position; and withal the uncertainty as to the period when it would be possible for the Government to equip another force sufficiently large to attempt a real relief.

But with the arrival of that force concludes the episode of the first siege of the Lakhnao Residency. If in the Summary. course of my narrative of that unsurpassed trial of courage and endurance I have not more markedly referred to individuals by name, it is because, where all fought so nobly, where all showed such a devotion without stint and a valour that was dauntless, I have thought it becoming to accept the judgment—the keen and decisive judgment—of the man who was in all respects the best qualified to form an opinion. In his admirable report to the Government of India* Brigadier Inglis has specially mentioned those to whom he considered himself most indebted. In that report the members of the staff; the commandants of outposts; the officers of the artillery, of the 32nd, of the 84th, and of the native regiments; the gentlemen of the Civil Service, covenanted and uncovenanted; of the medical service, and those unconnected with the Government, are

Honour to whom honour is due.

* *Vide* Appendix B.

specially mentioned. Omitting necessarily the names of the class regarding which Sir William Napier wrote: “no honours awaited his daring, no despatch gave his name to the applauses of his countrymen”—the private soldier—all, who in the opinion of Brigadier Inglis deserved special mention, have been mentioned. But there is one exception—an important though necessary exception. Brigadier Inglis could say nothing regarding the conduct of Brigadier Inglis. I may be allowed to supply the omission.

To command a small party defending a weak intrenchment against an overwhelming force, certain sterling qualities are necessary. A man need not be a Brigadier
Inglis. strategist or a tactician. But, whilst confident in bearing, unyielding in temper, he must be bold, determined, and resolute in action. He must likewise possess the valuable quality the existence of which displays itself in the capacity to weigh correctly the professional opinions of the officers about him. Now, by the testimony of all with whom I have conversed on the subject, Brigadier Inglis fulfilled all these conditions. His daring obstinacy in resisting, his confident mien, his cool courage, gained him the respect and affection of officers and men. What he might have accomplished in the field I cannot say. But it may with confidence be affirmed that for the actual duties devolving upon him—for the defence of a weak post with a small force—few men were better qualified than Brigadier Inglis, and certainly no one more merited than he the honours and promotion by the bestowal of which a grateful country showed its sense of the eminent service he had rendered.

But it is impossible to allude to the qualities of Brigadier Inglis without paying a special tribute to the man who was his right hand—a man to whose untiring Captain
Wilson. watchfulness, great decision, and unceasing exertions, the prolonged and successful defence of the Residency was in no small measure attributable. This is not my opinion only. It was the opinion of Brigadier Inglis: it is the opinion of every man of the garrison with whom I have spoken. I allude to Captain Thomas Fourness Wilson, of the Bengal Staff Corps.

Captain Wilson had been nineteen years in the army when the mutiny broke out. He had no interest, and was still but a regimental captain when Sir Henry Lawrence came to

Lakhnao. On being nominated brigadier-general, Sir Henry was naturally anxious to have as his assistant adjutant-general a perfectly competent officer. He selected Captain Wilson, unknown to him before, but whom he had specially marked from the time of his first conversation with him. Brought at once into confidential relationship with Sir Henry, Wilson speedily gained his admiration and esteem. His activity, his prudence, his cool daring, his stern and inflexible nature, the determination with which he carried out orders, marked him as the man for the occasion. And when, after Sir Henry's death, Wilson served under Inglis in the same capacity, he won his confidence by the display of the same qualities which had gained for him the esteem of his predecessor.

It is impossible, indeed, to over-estimate the "splendid conduct" of this officer during the long siege. Brigadier Inglis, from whom I have taken this expression, wrote of him at the time that he "was ever to be found where shot were flying thickest"; and he bore emphatic testimony alike to "his untiring physical endurance and bravery," and to "his ever ready and pertinent counsel and advice in moments of difficulty and danger." Every night throughout the siege he visited the several posts, ready with advice, with assistance, with encouragement. His determined nature, his prompt decision, were invaluable to all, from the Brigadier to the meanest private. Nor will it be possible to speak of the gallant defence of the beleaguered Residency without associating it in the mind with the name of Thomas Fourness Wilson.*

Brigadier Inglis was fortunate in his Engineers. Captain Fulton, who, to the grief and dismay of every one in the garrison, was killed on the 14th of September, was a man unsurpassed in his profession, supremely daring, and ever courting danger. No one than he more fertile in resource, more ready, more eager. He was peculiarly

Captain
Fulton.

* It is with the deepest regret that I have to add that this gallant officer no longer lives to serve his country. Appointed a Companion of the Bath, and, later, Aide-de-camp to the Queen, he filled, after the siege of Lakhnao many important staff offices in India; and in 1880 he was selected by Lord Hartington for the high post of Military Member of the Governor-General's Council in India. In the duties of that office his strong common sense, his resolute will, his appreciation of what was right, enabled him to render invaluable service to the Government. He had laid down the office after a five years' tenure, when, engaged in a shooting party in the Tarai, he was attacked by fever and died.

happy in the devices he adopted to foil the cunning of the enemy. A short experience had convinced him that when he had detected the enemy mining, the wisest plan was to meet him with a countermine. Often would he, pistol in hand, descend into the burrow which formed his countermine, and wait listening to the progress of the hostile pickaxe on the same level. The enemy hearing no sound would continue to work confidently. Suddenly the ground would give way to the pick. A lantern would be shown behind the leading man. Instantly Fulton's pistol would lay that man low. The others, unable to pass him, would turn and run. Before they could come back the mine would be filled and exploded. His death, occurring but eleven days before the relief, was most acutely felt and lamented by all. It even caused a feeling akin to dismay.

Amongst others who are gone a tribute must be paid here to Lieutenant James, the Commissariat officer. It would be difficult, indeed, to add a word to the glowing eulogium of Brigadier Inglis. "It is not too much to say that the garrison owe their lives to the exertions and firmness of this officer." Wounded as he was at Chinhat by a ball in the knee, causing him intense suffering, he refused to be placed on the sick list, and never ceased to pay the strictest attention to his onerous duties. His determination and his courage were alike conspicuous. His peculiar temperament fitted him exactly for the position he held. Lieutenant James lived to justify to the full the high opinion entertained of him by all his comrades. He met his death in the prime of life when pigsticking in Bengal. As a tribute—though a feeble tribute—to his daring nature and manly qualities, he was buried in the scarlet hunting coat which he wore when he met his fatal accident.

Lieutenant
James.

I have spoken of Mr. Couper. This gentleman deserves more than a passing mention. A civilian, he was ever ready to descend into the mine, to visit the posts, to assist in interring the dead animals, to dig trenches, to carry stores, and to fight. He was over cheery and buoyant. His subsequent career has not belied the early promise. At a later period he was nominated, as Sir George Couper, Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces.

Mr. Couper,
C.S.

These men were types of their class in devotion to duty and to their country. There were many others. Prominent amongst those who fell during the siege, nobly fighting,

or who died of wounds, or from other causes, were Radeliffe of the 9th Cavalry, daring, ready-witted, full of energy; Francis of the 13th Native Infantry, "a brave, good officer, respected by all, and in whom Sir H. Lawrence had much confidence;" Anderson, the Chief Engineer, to whose able counsel Brigadier Inglis felt deeply indebted; Simons, of the Artillery, distinguished at Chinhat; Case, of the 32nd, who fell when gallantly leading on his men at that battle; Shepherd and Arthur, of the 7th Cavalry, killed at their posts; Hughes of the 57th Native Infantry; Mansfield and McCabe, of the 32nd—all three foremost in danger: Lucas, a gentleman volunteer, and Boyson of the uncovenanted service, both conspicuous for their coolness and courage. These were among the honoured dead. To mention with them the survivors who rivalled them, men of whom R. P. Anderson, whose splendid daring has been told in a preceding page, Master, Langmore, and Aitken were the types, it would be necessary to recount the story of the siege in every minute detail.

It is difficult to praise too highly the fidelity and gallantry of the remnants of the 13th, the 48th, and the 71st Native Infantry, and the daring and bravery of their officers. Of those regiments the 13th counted the greatest number of loyal men. They were chiefly posted at the Baillie Guard. This position was described by Brigadier Inglis as "perhaps the most important in the whole line of defenses." Here, led by the most gallant of men, Lieutenant Aitken, they rendered the most splendid service. "They were exposed," reported Brigadier Inglis, "to a most galling fire of round-shot and musketry, which materially decreased their numbers. They were so near the enemy that conversation could be carried on between them; and every effort, persuasion, promise, and threat, was alternately resorted to, in vain, to seduce them from their allegiance to the handful of Europeans, who, in all probability, would have been sacrificed by their desertion." They vied with their European comrades in the work of the trenches, in the ardour of their courage, in their resolution to defend to the last the spot of ground assigned to them. True it is that they were led by their own officers, and it would be impossible to overpraise men such as Germon, Aitken, and Loughman, of that regiment. But the Sipáhis did more than fight. They risked even their casto for the English. On one occasion, when it had become necessary to dig new in-

The honoured
dead.

The native
troops.

trenchments, and to erect a new battery on the spot where Sipáhis had been previously buried, the highest Bráhmans of the 13th responding to the call of the gallant Aitken, themselves handled the putrid corpses to throw them into the outer ditch.

A few words must here be devoted to the native pensioners who replied to the call of Sir Henry Lawrence. I have stated in a previous page that about a hundred and eighty of these men were enrolled. It is difficult to write in too high terms of the conduct of these men. Most of them were old, the vision of some was impaired. Yet they bore themselves most bravely. Unable to work much, they yet manned the loopholes, and the least capable amongst them were ever ready to load and pass to their countrymen the spare muskets always at hand. Notwithstanding the facts that throughout the siege these men received no tidings from their family or their relations; that they were on reduced rations and entirely deprived of the condiments so highly prized by a native of India in his advanced years; not a single incident of desertion occurred amongst these men. Some died, many were killed, yet no one heard a grumble from the survivors. They continued to the last to abuse the rebels, and to declare that, as they had for so many years eaten the salt of the State, the State had a right to their lives.

The pensioners.

Imperfect as is this story of this first siege, it would be still more so were it to contain no reference to those who, despite their own sufferings and their own privations, used every effort to assuage the sufferings and the privations of others. "Many," wrote Brigadier Inglis, referring to the ladies, "among whom may be mentioned the honoured names of Birch, of Polehampton, of Barber, and of Gall, have, after the example of Miss Nightingale, constituted themselves the tender and solicitous nurses of the wounded and dying soldiers in the hospital." The word "many" might be held to include all whose attention was not absorbed by their own children, or who were not held down by sickness and ill-health. They were exposed to a danger of no ordinary kind, to privations almost unparalleled. When the siege began the number of ladies amounted to sixty-eight, and of children sixty-six. Of the former seven, of the latter twenty-three succumbed to the want of suitable food, to the fire of the enemy, or to privations. It has rarely happened that ladies have been placed in

The ladies.

a position so trying—never that they have displayed qualities more worthy of respectful homage.

One word regarding the losses sustained by the defenders. I have already stated that at the beginning of the siege the strength of the garrison amounted to nine hundred and twenty-seven Europeans, and seven hundred and sixty-five natives. Of the Europeans, one hundred and forty were killed or died of their wounds; one hundred and ninety were wounded; this does not include sixteen non-military men killed and fourteen wounded. Of the natives, seventy-two were killed and one hundred and thirty-one were wounded. There were deaths from other causes, and a few of the natives deserted. This is certain, that on the 25th of September the number of the European defenders, including sick and wounded, had been reduced to five hundred and seventy-seven; that of the natives to four hundred and two. In eighty-seven days the garrison had thus been reduced, in various ways, by three-eighths.

But they are now in the first delirium of the long-expected relief. They are welcoming with enthusiastie delight Outram, Havelock, and their gallant following. It remains for me now to relate how it was that Outram and Havelock accomplished the great feat of arms with which their names will for ever be associated.

CHAPTER III.

NEILL, HAVELOCK, AND OUTRAM.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL NEILL, pressed by the Commander of the Forces, Sir Patrick Grant, to hasten to Kánhpúr to join General Havelock as soon as possible, in order that he might be on the spot to take command of the force should Havelock from any cause become unfit for the duty, left Alláhábád on the 16th of July, and, proceeding with all possible expedition, reached Kánhpúr on the 20th. On his way he had received a note from General Havelock telling him that he was anxiously awaiting his arrival, as, immediately on that occurring, he intended "to strike a blow that will rebound through India." Neill, as I have said, arrived on the 20th. He dined that evening with Havelock, and was informed that he intended to begin the passage of the Ganges on the morrow, leaving Neill in command at Kánhpúr with about two hundred men, the majority of whom were sick and wounded. In this arrangement, Neill, anxious that Havelock should take with him every available man, entirely concurred.

July 16.

Brigadier-General
Neill arrives at
Kánhpúr.

Neill, as I

July 20.

Havelock announces
his intention to
march to relieve
Lakhnao.

Before deciding on making a desperate effort to relieve Lakhnao, General Havelock had traced out a position resting on the river, which it would be easy for a small force to hold against very superior numbers. The work was being intrenched and some guns were being mounted there at the time of Neill's arrival. He was to complete and to hold it.

He traces out a
position on the
Kánhpúr side.

The morning of the 21st set in rainy—the heavy rain of the Indian monsoon—but the preparations had been made the evening before, and, in the presence of Havelock's determination to push on, nothing would have stayed them. That day the artillery and a por-

July 21.

Havelock crosses
into Oudh.

tion of the 78th Highlanders passed over to the opposite bank. To cross the Ganges in the height of the rainy season is no easy matter. The breadth of the swollen river, the rapidity of the current, alone present formidable obstacles. Fortunately, the General had at his disposal a small steamer. To this steamer he caused to be attached five or six of the boats peculiar to the country, and these she towed across—with difficulty; for it was all she could do to hold her own against the current.

It will easily be understood that, under the circumstances stated, and although the force destined for the expedition numbered little more than fifteen hundred men, and although they took with them no tents of any kind, the operation should be tedious. It occupied just four days. On the afternoon of the 24th, General Havelock crossed likewise, and marched the force about five miles on the Lakhnao road, halting for the night at the little village of Mangalwár.

The force which was now starting on an expedition, which, however desperate it was, seemed at the time to present, under so daring a leader as Havelock, some chance of success, consisted of artillery—ten guns, imperfectly equipped and imperfectly manned; of infantry—the remnants of the 64th, the 84th, the 78th, the Madras Fusiliers, and of Brasyer's Sikhs: and, of cavalry, some sixty volunteer horse. Small as were their numbers, they were animated by the best spirit, and had unbounded confidence in their General.

On the night of the 24th of July this force bivouacked at Mangalwár. It remained halted at that village four days, to enable the General to complete his dispositions for carriage and supplies. On the 28th these had been completed so far as, in the disorganized state of the country, it was possible to complete them. At 5 o'clock on the morning of the 29th the force began its onward movement. After marching three miles the advanced pickets of the enemy were discerned. These fell back as our men still pressed on, and disclosed the enemy occupying a very strong position. Their main force rested on the town of Unáo, a straggling place, extending about three-quarters of a mile, and which the heavy rains and the nature of the soil

Takes no impedimenta with him.

Con-stitution of his force.

His first bivouac at Mangalwár.

July 29.

Makes a decided advance.

rendered it impossible to turn. In advance of this town, and between it and the British force, was a succession of walled enclosures, filled with skirmishers. These enclosures joined themselves on to a village united with Unáo by a narrow passage, and all the houses in which were loop-holed and occupied. The narrow passage referred to was also commanded by loop-holed houses on either side of it, whilst the enemy had placed their batteries so as to pour a concentrated fire on troops advancing against the town.

Finds the rebels occupying Unáo.

Strength of the position.

It was impossible to turn such a position; it was murderous work to attack it in front. But if he was to get on at all Havelock had no option. The simple motto of "move straight forward," embodying a principle which has never failed when tried by British troops against Asiatics, must be adopted. After a steady reconnaissance, then, Havelock gave his orders. Covering his main body with skirmishers, armed with the Enfield rifle, he opened a heavy fire from them and from his guns on the more advanced positions of the enemy. This fire drove them from those positions and forced them to take refuge in the loop-holed houses. At these Havelock then sent the 78th Highlanders and the Madras Fusiliers. Gallantly did they advance. But to dislodge an enemy from loop-holed houses, singly, one after another, is deadly work. So our men found it. Havelock, therefore, ordered up the 64th. Their advance decided the day. The enemy were either bayoneted in the houses or sought refuge in flight.

Havelock is forced to attack it in front.

His first success.

But the town of Unáo was still in the enemy's possession, and, what was of more consequence, fresh troops were observed hastening down the Lucknow road in its direction. Havelock at once made preparations to meet them. Drawing off his force on to a spot of dry ground between the village and the town, he placed his guns in a position to command the high road, by which alone he could be attacked, and waited for the movement of the enemy further to develop itself. In a short time it was manifest he would be attacked. The rebels were marching in dense masses upon him. Havelock's joy was great. He felt that he had them. Restraining his impatience till they were well within distance, he suddenly opened upon them from both arms a withering fire. It stopped them. They attempted to deploy.

He manoeuvres to be attacked.

But on either side of them were swamps and marshes. Consequently, their horses and their guns stuck fast, their infantry floundered. All this time they were exposed to a continuous fire. Being what they were, they did not then make the one movement, a straight rush, which might have saved them. Meanwhile, some of our men, wading in the marshes, made their presence perceptible on either flank. That was the final blow. The rebels gave way, and fled precipitately, leaving in our possession fifteen guns.

In one of his letters written during his advance on Kánhpúr, I think it was just after the battle which gave him that place, Havelock remarked that, viewing his position, he suddenly recollected "old Frederiek at Leuthen," and acted accordingly. Probably no man had more completely studied the campaigns of that great master in the art of war, as well as those of his immediate successor in the roll of Fame. If he had learned from Frederiek the mode in which to turn to his own advantage a false position occupied by himself, he ever adhered strictly to the Napoleonic maxim of promptly following up a victory. He could not at Unáo put into execution this maxim in the manner which would have gladdened his heart—for to carry it out efficiently a general has need of cavalry, and Havelock had but sixty sabres. But he could and he did work it in the only way open to him. Notwithstanding that he and his men were under the terrible July sun of India, he determined to push on after the enemy as soon as his men should have satisfied the cravings of exhausted nature. He ordered, then, a halt; and while the cooks prepared the food, and the doctors attended the wounded, he caused to be disabled the fifteen guns he had captured, for want of cattle to take them with him!

At the end of three hours the men again fell in, and pushed forwards—always towards Lakhnao. They had marched six miles, when suddenly they came in sight of a walled town, situated in the open, and intersected by the road which they must traverse. This was the town of Bashíratganj. It looked very formidable. In front of it was a large pond or tank, swollen by the surrounding inundation to the form of a river. On the Lakhnao side of it was another pond or lake, traversed by a narrow causeway. It possessed besides a wet ditch,

Success of his
manœuvre.

He determines to
follow up the
blow.

Gives his men
their food;

and pushes
forwards.

Finds the enemy
in force at
Bashíratganj.

and its main gate was defended by an earthwork and four guns, and flanked on both sides by loop-holed turrets. Havelock halted his men, while he rode to reconnoitre. The scheme that his brain then conceived was very daring. It had, too, this great merit that, if successful in every detail, the enemy would be destroyed. He conceived in a word the idea of amusing the rebels with a cannonade, whilst he should send the 64th to cut them off from the causeway. When he should consider that movement sufficiently pronounced, he would storm the town with the 78th and the Madras Fusiliers, and catch the enemy between two fires. He succeeded in all, except in the most decisive, of his combinations. He poured a tremendous fire on the town, whilst the 64th made a flank movement to his right; then, when he deemed the moment to have arrived, he sent on his remaining infantry at the main gate. But—one of the chains in his scheme had snapped. The 64th had not reached the causeway—and the main body of the enemy escaped across it.

Endeavours, while attacking in front, to cut them off.

Forces the position, but fails to cut them off.

Still the loss of the rebels that day had been severe. It was computed that not less than four hundred of them had been killed or wounded. On the British side eighty-eight had been placed *hors de combat*—but two battles had been gained!

Result of the day's fighting.

But the thoughts of the General that night were not consoling. It was not alone, or even mainly, that his losses in the fight had been heavy. Sickness also had done its work. On the morrow of the two battles he could not, deducting the necessary guards, place in line more than eight hundred and fifty infantry. He knew that in front of him were places to be traversed or stormed, the means of defence of which exceeded those of the places he had already conquered. Then, too, he had no means of carrying his sick. He could not leave them. He could not spare a sufficient force to guard them. But perhaps his strongest difficulty lay in the fact that every step forwards would take him further from his base, and he had information that that base was threatened. Náná Sáhib, in fact, had no sooner heard of the onward move of the British, than he sent a considerable body of cavalry across the river to cut off their communications with Kánhpúr.

Considerations which forced themselves upon his notice.

July 30.

Such arguments as these were sufficient to make even Havelock

lock hesitate. But with them came the other consideration,—the possibility, notwithstanding all these obstacles, of success. But he could not help putting to himself this pertinent question:—What sort of success would it be? If, on the morrow of his first march he could bring only eight hundred and fifty infantry into line, how many would he be able to muster on the morrow of the fourth? This question was answered by the General's own Quartermaster-General in a telegram sent to the Commander-in-Chief. "We could not hope to reach Lakhnao," telegraphed Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser Tytler, on the 31st, "with six hundred effective Europeans; we had then to pass the canal, and force one and a half mile of streets"—and this in face of some thousands of trained and disciplined soldiers, and an armed and countless rabble!

I do not think the soldier lives who would fail to justify the resolution at which Havelock arrived the following morning, to fall back on Mangalwár, and to ask for reinforcements. From Mangalwár it would be possible to send the sick and wounded to Kánhpúr without permanently weakening his force. He effected this movement the following day without haste, and in the most perfect order. He did not march before 2 P.M., and then retired only to Unáo. The following morning (31st) he fell back on Mangalwár. Thence he despatched his sick and wounded into Kánhpúr, and a letter to General Neill, stating that he had been forced to fall back, and that to enable him to reach Lakhnao it was necessary that he should receive a reinforcement of a thousand men and another battery of guns.

Neill received this letter the same day. He had assumed command at Kánhpúr on the 24th, and in a few hours the troops there had felt the effect of his vigorous and decided character. Neill was a very remarkable man. By the "law of desert" he stands in the very front rank of those to whom the Indian mutiny gave an opportunity of distinction. It would be difficult to put any one above him. Not only did he succeed in everything he undertook, but he succeeded when the cases were all but desperate. He succeeded because he dared; because he threw into all he attempted the energy of one of the most determined characters ever bestowed on man. Such a man could not fail, and live. His whole soul was in

Dominating force
of those
considerations.

Havelock falls
back on
Unáo.

Neill at Kánhpúr.

July 24.

Character of Briga-
dier-General Neill.

his profession. He had made his regiment, the Madras Fusiliers, equal to any regiment in the world. At Calcutta, he had inaugurated, by his dealings with the railway officials, the principle of prompt obedience to military requirements. At Banáras he had, by his vigour and decision, crushed an outbreak, which, had it been successful, would have raised all the country to the north-west and to within a hundred miles of the capital. The same qualities displayed at Alláhábád had saved that important fortress. In the moment of success, when men had begun to stake all their hopes on his advance to Kánhpúr, he was suddenly superseded by Havelock. And now, second to that general, he was at Kánhpúr commanding there a few invalids, with the commission to finish the fortified work on the river, to erect *têtes de pont*—so that on the subsiding of the waters a bridge of boats might be established—and to send on to his senior officer all the reinforcements in men and material he might receive.

Neill, I have said, assumed command on the 24th of July. He had been but ill-satisfied with the state of affairs, as he found them, at Kánhpúr. The location of the troops appeared to him faulty; the camp pitched without method or arrangement; no effectual steps taken to put a stop to the plundering in the city—a plundering carried on by our European and Sikh soldiers.* But on the 24th he was master, and could remedy these evils. His first act on the 25th was to appoint a superintendent of police; to re-establish authority and order in the city and bazaars; to put a stop to plundering. He announced his assumption of command, and notified the carrying out of the measures above stated in a telegram the same day to the Commander of the Forces, Sir Patrick Grant. The spirit of the man showed itself in the last sentence of this telegram:—"All well here. I will hold my own against any odds."

It displays itself
in vigorous action.

July 25.

He was a bold man who would thus write under existing circumstances. Not only was Neill aware that Náná Sáhib, distant from him but twenty-four miles, was threatening to cross the river and to attack him, but he had received information that the mutinous 42nd Native Infantry were within eight miles of the station,

Boldness of his
resolves.

* *Private Journal of Brigadier-General Neill, unpublished.*

and that other native regiments were gradually collecting on the right bank of the Jamnah with the avowed intention of making a dash on Kánhpúr. But Neill was not disturbed. "If the 42nd are within reach," he recorded in his journal on the 30th, "I will deal them a blow that will astound them."

With the levies of Náná Sáhib he did deal. On the 31st he despatched a party of fifty Fusiliers and twenty-five Sikhs, with two 6-pounders and a 5½-inch mortar, manned by six gunners, under the command of his aide-de-camp, Captain John Gordon, of the 6th Regiment N.I., in the steamer to Jajamáo,* to seize the boats in which it was reported Náná Sáhib intended to cross the river. The party destroyed several boats, carried off six or eight, and returned to Kánhpúr the next day.

Neill meanwhile had been receiving small reinforcements. He was daily expecting half a battery (Olpherts's), with which to reinforce Havelock; but unfortunately there was a deficiency of gunpowder—and no gunpowder could be expected for a week. Under these circumstances, and in view of the one fact, that on the 30th he received from General Wilson, commanding before Dehlí, a letter intimating that it might be necessary for him to retire on Karnál, and of the other, that his own position was threatened from the west, it became more than ever necessary to show a bold front, and even, whenever feasible, to strike a blow. The one thing necessary for the success of Neill's views in this respect was that Havelock should continue to move successfully on to Lakhnao.

This being the case, and the character of the man being considered, some idea may be conceived of the fury which seized him when he received, on the night of the 31st, a letter from General Havelock, informing him of his retrograde movement, and that he could not advance until he should receive a reinforcement of a thousand European infantry and another battery of guns. A second letter merely asked for all the infantry that could be spared and half a battery. With the demand for guns came, too, the information that of the fifteen pieces taken from the enemy every one had been destroyed.

* Jajamáo is on the Oudh side of the Ganges, twenty-two miles north-west of Unáo.

"Our *prestige* here is gone," records Neill in his journal. The letter from General Wilson was bad enough,—but that was only a possibility—it might not happen. But this retirement, the death-blow to all his hopes, had actually occurred. Who, he asked himself, was to blame for it? He did not take long to answer. He had no love for Havelock. He had felt deeply the slight, as he considered it, that he, the second in command, had not been invited to assist at the councils of war which had been held; that, although asked to communicate unreservedly with Havelock, he had been told to address his Adjutant-General. These things had chafed him. And now this retreat had come to upset all his calculations. He could not restrain himself. He had been asked to communicate "unreservedly" with Havelock through his staff. He determined to write "unreservedly" direct. He did so.* Havelock replied in the indignant tone

* The following is the text of the most salient part of Neill's letter:—"I late last night received yours of 6 P.M. yesterday. I deeply regret you have fallen back one foot. The effect on our prestige is very bad indeed. Your camp was not pitched yesterday before all manner of reports were rife in the city—that you had returned to get more guns, having lost all you took away with you. In fact, the belief amongst all is that you have been defeated and forced back. It has been most unfortunate your not bringing any guns captured from the enemy. The natives will not believe that you have captured one. The effect of your retrograde movement will be very injurious to our cause everywhere, and bring down upon us many who would otherwise have held off, or even sided with us. The troops at Gwáliar have marched, whether to this or Ágra is not yet known. The troops collected at Fathgarh will very soon follow. They are now joined by the 42nd N.I., which have passed on. I could not move out and intercept them. . . . You talk of advancing as soon as reinforcements reach you. You require a battery and a thousand European infantry. As regards the battery, half of Olpherts's will be in this morning; the other half started yesterday or to-day from Alláhábád. This will detain you five or six days more. As for the infantry you require they are not to be had, and if you are to wait for them Lakhnao will follow the fate of Kánpúr. Ágra will be invested: this place also: the city will be occupied by the enemy. I have no troops to keep them out, and we will be starved out. You ought not to remain a day where you are. When the iron guns are sent to you, also the half-battery, and the company of the 84th escorting it, you ought to advance again, and not halt until you have rescued, if possible, the garrison of Lakhnao. Return here sharp, for there is much to be done between this and Ágra and Delhi." In his reply, Havelock described this letter as "the most extraordinary letter he had ever perused." "There must be an end," he went on to say, "to these proceedings at once. I wrote to you confidentially on the state of affairs. You send me back a letter of censure of my measures, reproof and advice for the future. I do not want and will not receive any of them from an officer under my command, be his experience what it may. Understand this distinctly, and that a

which might have been expected. By this time the first burst of Neill's anger was over, and the rejoinder he sent to Havelock's reply was pronounced by the high authority to which it was referred—the acting Commander-in-Chief, to be “perfectly unexceptionable.” The matter was then allowed to drop, but the correspondence had produced between the two generals a coolness which, whilst it did not interfere with co-operation for the good of the State, could yet never be forgotten.

Communicates his
opinions to
Havelock, and is
rebuked, and
makes an *amende*.

1857.
August 2.

On the 3rd of August Havelock was reinforced by Olpherts's half-battery and a company of the 84th. Hopes had been held out to him that the 5th Fusiliers and the 90th Light Infantry would reach Kánhpúr early in August. Had the Government of India only taken the precaution to disarm the native regiments at Dánápúr early in June, this might have been possible. But the fatal trust in men known to be untrustworthy had kept the 5th Fusiliers in Bihár and had stopped the onward progress of the 90th.* This culpable weakness made itself felt in Lakhnáo as well as in Bihár. But the disappointment only

and renews his
advance into Oudh.

August 4.

roused Havelock to renewed exertion. On the 4th of August, having then about fourteen hundred effective men under his command, two heavy guns (24-pounders), two 24-pounder howitzers, and a battery and a half of guns, he started a second time in the direction of the besieged Residency. Having heard that the town of Bashíratganj had been re-occupied in force, he bivouacked that night at Unáo. Leaving that place early the following morning, he found the enemy occupying a position very similar to that from which he had dislodged them on the 29th of July. This time he determined there should be no mistake; that, if the enemy would only wait the completion of his turning

He finds the
enemy strongly
posted at
Bashíratganj.

consideration of the obstruction that would arise to the public service at this moment alone prevents me from taking the stronger step of placing you under arrest. You now stand warned. Attempt no further dictation. I have my own reasons, which I will not communicate to any one, and I alone am responsible for the course which I have pursued.”

* “So great is the alarm,” wrote a journalist at the time, “that H M.’s 90th and 5th Fusiliers have been retained, though grievously required to reinforce Kánhpúr.”

movement, they should not escape. Havelock then ordered the advance by the road of the heavy guns, supported by the 1st Madras Fusiliers and the 84th Foot; whilst the 78th Highlanders, the Sikhs, and Maude's battery should turn the village on its left. The heavy guns, Again attempts to annihilate them. commanded by Lieutenant Crump of the Madras Artillery, a very able and gallant officer, speedily dislodged the enemy from the outer defences. As they retreated our infantry advanced. Meanwhile the turning movement greatly disquieted them. They saw that if carried out it would entrap them. Bewildered by the progress They flee in a panic, it was making, and much embarrassed by the firing in front of them, they were stricken by panic and fled across the causeway. This flight saved them from certain and entire destruction. The turning movement had not been completed. Still it had progressed so far that in their flight across the causeway the rebels came under the fire of the guns of Maude's battery and were mown down in numbers. The heavy guns continued all this time their destructive fire, silencing the guns of the enemy and forcing them back. The rebels did indeed for some time longer hold villages to the right and left of the town, but in the end they were forced out of these.

August 5, 1857.

and their position is gained.

Still, though the enemy was beaten, "the whole transaction," to use the language employed by Lieutenant-Colonel Tytler to Sir Patrick Grant, "was most unsatisfactory, only two small iron guns, formerly captured by us, and destroyed, in our ideas,* being taken."

The loss of our force had not been large. Two had been killed and twenty-three wounded. The loss of the rebels was estimated at three hundred. But there were weighty considerations to stay further advance. (Cholera had broken out in the camp.)

Considerations which weighed at this conjuncture with Havelock.

This disease and fever had placed seventy-five men on the sick list. In the action at Bashiratganj one-fourth of the gun ammunition had been expended. Between that town and Lucknao, was a deep river, the Sái, and three strong places, guarded, it was believed, by 30,000 men. The zamindárs, too, had risen on every side in bodies of five hundred or six hundred, independently

* These were the guns captured on the 29th of July. General Havelock reported regarding them that they had been "dismantled by the Commandant of Artillery; so imperfectly, however, that the enemy again fired out of them."

of the regular troops. "All the men killed yesterday," wrote Colonel Tytler, "were zamindárs." But even Had he continued to advance his numbers would have been greatly reduced. were the force able to reach Lakhnao what could it effect, enfeebled and worn out, against the myriads who would oppose it in the streets? On the morrow of the fight at Bashíratganj it was impossible to parade nine hundred infantry. To what extent would this number be reduced in fighting its way to the Residency?

These were potent reasons against an advance, but there were others still stronger. Intelligence reached Havelock on the 5th that the men of the Gwáliár contingent had successfully mutinied against their own Mahárájah, and were threatening to move on Kalpí. Kalpí was a position which would threaten Kánhpúr, and menace the communication with Alláhábád. It is true that, had it been possible to strike a decisive blow at Lakhnao, the striking of it would have been the best reply to any demonstration on Kalpí. Not less true that a defeat involving a heavy loss to the force in an attempt on Lakhnao would precipitate any such demonstration. The intelligence regarding the Gwáliár force then brought home to Havelock for immediate decision the question of advance or retreat. The advance could scarcely be successful, and yet failure in it involved, in Havelock's opinion,* the destruction of his force, and with it, possibly a disaster at Kánhpúr. Retreat only risked Lakhnao. But did not an unsuccessful advance subject Lakhnao to a risk even greater?

No sensible man will deny that, under the circumstances of the case, Havelock exercised a wise judgment in deciding to retire and wait for reinforcements. He fell back on Mangalwár. He lay there for four days recruiting his men. On the 11th he purposed to recross into Kánhpúr. But, learning that the rebels had established themselves in considerable force at Bashíratganj, with advanced parties at Unáo, prepared to disturb him while crossing, he resolved to anticipate them. For the third time, then, he advanced along the Lakhnao road, pushed the advanced

The action of Havelock justified.

He falls back on Mangalwár, but again advances in order to cover his passage of the river.

* "The only three staff officers of my force whom I ever consult confidentially, but in whom I entirely confide, are unanimously of opinion that an advance to the walls of Lakhnao involves the loss of this force. In this I concur."—*Brigadier-General Havelock to the Commander-in-Chief, August, 1857.*

parties of the enemy out of Unáo, and bivouacked near that town for the night. At dawn the following day, the 12th, he set out and found the enemy strongly intrenched behind earthworks in a village in advance of

August 12.

Bashíratganj. Covered by his artillery and skirmishers, Havelock advanced in échelon of battalions from his right. The swampy nature of the ground delayed the advance of the heavy guns, and the British troops suffered somewhat meanwhile from the enemy's fire. When the British guns were in position, they opened on the earthworks; but, as might have been expected, the fire made little impressien. Havelock, therefore, determined to try the effect of an infantry charge. Under his orders the 78th Highlanders precipitated themselves, without firing a shot, on the earthworks in front, while the Madras Fusiliers, to whom the turning movement had been intrusted, took them in flank. The result was decisive. Two of the enemy's guns were captured and turned on them. They fled in disorder, leaving about two hundred killed and wounded. Our loss amounted to thirty-five.

Beats the enemy at Bashíratganj, and re-crosses.

Having thus scared away the enemy, Havelock leisurely fell back on the 13th, and by 2 o'clock of that day had recrossed into Káñhpúr without a casualty. His troops were taken over in the steamer and in country boats towed by the steamer, the current being still too strong to permit the putting together of the bridge of boats, materials for which had been prepared.

In his absence Neill had not been idle. The night of the 5th of August intelligence had reached him that a party of the mutineous 42nd Native Infantry, aided by some disaffected villagers, had plundered part of Bithúr, and had sacked the house, and carried off the two daughters of Subahdar Nárain Ráo, a relative of Náná Sáhib, but who, throughout the mutiny, had been staunch in his allegiance to the British, and had suffered much persecution in consequence. Neill at once ordered a party, commanded by Captain J. Gordon, and accompanied by the Subahdar referred to, to set out at day-break the following morning in the steamer for Bithúr. Gordon started at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 6th, having under him forty men of the Madras Fusiliers, twenty-five Sikhs, and six gunners, in charge of two six-pounders and a 5½-inch mortar. Passing Bithúr, Gordon noticed that the roof of one of Náná Sáhib's houses was crowded with

Action of Neill at Káñhpúr.

Again despatches Captain J. Gordon to clear the river.

August 6.

men. He promptly opened fire upon and dispersed these. He then sent a party on shore to endeavour to recover the daughters and property of the Subahdar—the latter accompanying it. In both attempts success attended its efforts. The steamer, whose guns had meanwhile effected considerable damage on the houses and shipping of the rebels—sixteen boats having been sunk—picked up the Subahdar,* his daughters, and property, and reached Kánhpúr at six o'clock that same evening.

A third steamer expedition under the same officer, Captain

And again.

August 8.

Gordon, was organised for the 8th. The object this time was to intercept the troops of Náná Sáhib, who had begun the previous evening to cross the Ganges three miles above Bithúr. The steamer, having on board the same number of troops as on the 6th, set out again at 4 A.M. As she steamed by Bithúr a shot was directed at her from the shore. This was followed by a heavy musketry fire, and it soon became evident that the place was occupied by a strong body of the mutinous 42nd. The steamer returned the fire from guns and Enfields as she slowly steamed on, the Sipáhis following her, taking advantage of every scrap of cover for three miles. At this point the current was so strong that the steamer could proceed no further. The Sipáhis then took possession of a house on the bank and opened a heavy fire; but they were speedily shelled out of it. Captain Gordon, unable to make further way against the current, ascertained by other means that no troops were crossing, and then turned the head of the steamer down stream. But, after passing Bithúr, she struck heavily on a sand-bank. Fortunately this sand-bank was beyond musketry range. There the steamer remained all night. The following morning the enemy brought some guns to bear upon her, but the great strength of the current had enabled her to cut her way through the sand-bank during the night, and at daybreak she dropped down to Kánhpúr.

Captain Gordon had ascertained that the number of mutineers, regular troops, at Bithúr, amounted to about two

* "We then took on board the Subahdar and the Sikhs. The Subahdar was looking quite happy, having recovered his two little daughters. One of them (the eldest) is really a beautiful little creature, about eight years old. Some of the Subahdar's plundered property was also recovered, so he was in high glee altogether."—*Manuscript Journal of an Officer present.*

thousand. He made his report accordingly to Brigadier Neill. With a soldier's true instinct, Neill, the next morning, marched about two hundred men and four guns about three miles on the Bithúr road, passing the city on the way. This movement had the best effect. It gave confidence to our well-wishers, and discouraged the rebels and their friends. The movement was repeated the following day and the day after.

Neill parades his troops.

I have already stated that General Havelock re-crossed on the 13th. He at once assumed command. The meeting between the two generals was outwardly friendly; but it was impossible, after the correspondence I have alluded to, that there should be any real cordiality between them. At an interview on the following day Neill expressed to Havelock his opinion that his men were not then in a fit state to march on Lakhnao; that they required rest, and should not be unnecessarily exposed; that it was indispensable that the rebels at Bithúr should be dealt with first. The private journal of Neill shows that he still held to his previous opinion, that in retiring after his first victory, on the 29th of July, Havelock had committed an error which could not be redeemed until he had received large reinforcements. I cannot concur in this view. Subsequent events prove, I think, that it was not well founded. Indeed, considering the immense temptation to Havelock to advance, the pain which the issue of the order to retreat caused him, I cannot but regard his resistance to that temptation as the most heroic act even of his heroic career.

Havelock re-assumes command at Kashiপুর. August 13.

Havelock's resistance to the temptation to advance on Lakhnao justified by subsequent events.

Havelock allowed his troops to rest on the 14th and 15th. At 4 o'clock on the morning of the 16th, leaving only a hundred men under Neill in the intrenched camp, he marched against Bithúr. The rebels at that place, now augmented to nearly four thousand, were composed of Sipáhis from the 17th, 28th, 31st, 34th, and 42nd Native Infantry; of the 2nd Regular and 3rd Irregular Cavalry; of Náná Sáhib's retainers and two guns. Havelock found them drawn up in advance of the castellated palace of Bithúr. Their position was strong, being defended by intrenched mud quadrangles filled with Sipáhis, and sheltered by plantations of sugar-cane rising high above the head. Two villages, one on either flank, and connected by earth-works, formed the sup-

August 16.

ports of this position. The villages were strongly occupied. The enemy looked so formidable that Havelock resolved to avail himself of his great superiority in guns. He made his men lie down, whilst for twenty minutes he poured on the enemy a heavy fire from the artillery and Enfield rifles. The guns made, however, little impression on the quadrangles, and Havelock saw he must effect his purpose with the bayonet. Covering his infantry with the Madras Fusiliers, he gave the order for an advance. The quadrangles were rapidly approached, but when our men were within twenty yards of them, the men of the 42nd Native Infantry, dressed in their red coats, started up, and met them. Bayonets were actually crossed, and it was not till sixty of the 42nd had fallen that they retired on their supports between the two villages. Havelock cannonaded this position for a time, but the enemy's guns were so well served that he again sent on the infantry. Another desperate contest ensued. The enemy defended their guns with great spirit, and were only driven from their position by hard fighting. Meanwhile a body of their cavalry, some two hundred strong, had made a raid on our rear, killed twenty or thirty camp followers, and carried off the mess property of the volunteers. This raid did not, however, affect the action. That was decided in front of Bithúr by the defeat of the enemy, the capture of his position, and the loss of his two guns.

Still, victory as it was, it was in every sense of the word a victory most exhausting to the victors. In the 84th Regiment seven men died from sunstroke alone. The Madras Fusiliers lost five from the same cause. In killed and wounded the British lost between fifty and sixty. The men were much knocked up from fatigue. They could not pursue the enemy, but bivouacked where they had fought. The next morning they returned to Kánhpúr.

This was on the 17th. General Havelock found waiting him on his return a copy of the *Calcutta Gazette*, dated the 5th of August, containing the nomination of Major-General Sir James Outram to the military command of the country in which he was operating. He learned, in fact, that he was superseded. He received this information from the *Gazette* alone.

Havelock marches
against the rebels
at Bithúr.

The 42nd Native
Infantry cross
bayonets with
our men,

and fight
with great
gal-antry,
but are beaten.

The victory
dearly bought.

August 17.
Havelock, on
return from his
victory,
finds himself
superseded.

It was accompanied by no communication to break the news. He had the harsh and bald announcement only.

This, then, was the result of his splendid daring, of his victories against Náná Sáhib, of his strenuous efforts to reach Lakhuao! Supersession! A hard word to a victorious soldier! For though Have-

Reflections on
the policy of
judging only by
results.

lock had failed to reach Lakhuao he had ever been victorious. Supersession! The first thought of a feeble Government when their hopes have not been entirely fulfilled! With what confidence could any man serve a Government which acted in this manner towards one who had shown, by his daring, his self-negation, his devotion, by his success wherever success was possible, that he had never despaired of the safety of his country. It was not in this way that Rome treated her generals. Terentius Varro carried rashness to its extreme when he fought Hannibal; yet, recognising the patriotism of his motives, Rome received Varro with applause. She thanked him for not having despaired of the fortunes of the republic. Havelock was opposed to no Hannibal, but he had fought against an enemy exceeding him in numbers, occupying chosen and well-fortified positions, and animated by the energy of despair. Circumstances had forced him to emulate even Varro in rashness. He had been compelled to risk much, to put aside the prudent part of the regulations of the military science, to dare and to dare greatly. He had won all his battles. And, if in the ultimate aim he had not entirely succeeded, it was to a great extent because the fatuous action of the Government of India with respect to the Sipáhis at Dánápúr had hindered the onward progress of the reinforcements by whose aid alone complete success would have been possible!

The policy of
judging
by results.

And he was superseded—without a word—by a simple announcement in the *Gazette*. Again was it apparent that success was the sole standard by which, in those troublous times, the Government judged their servants. Mark their action in this respect. At Dánápúr they threw on Major-General Lloyd the responsibility of disarming or of not disarming the Sipáhis. That officer took thereupon certain measures which were not successful. In consequence, the Government supersede him, and announce their intention to bring him to a court-martial. At Ágra, Brigadier Polwhele

Examples of the
effect of that policy
as pursued,
without discrimi-
nation, by the
Government
of India.

fought a battle with the enemy, and, though one result of that battle was the retirement of the enemy from Ágra, yet in the actual conflict he was beaten. The Government of India promptly remove him from his command. Mr. William Tayler saved the province of Bihár. Then, in the dire extremity to which that province is again brought by the action of the Government, he issues an order which in its operation might, under certain circumstances, expose the Government to the chance of losing a few thousand pounds. Fortune brings on the spot a heaven-born soldier to avert that chance. Yet, because it had been incurred, Mr. Tayler is removed from his post, and professionally ruined. Neill starts from Calcutta, achieves great things at Banáras and at Alláhábád. The Government of India are impatient for him to march on Kánhpúr. But the mutiny has caused confusion in every department. Supplies have to be stored; carts to be collected; elephants, camels, and bullocks to be brought in—and this when the whole civil organisation of the country is out of gear. Neill, aided nobly by the civil authorities, completes all his arrangements. At last he is on the point of moving. But there has been some delay—necessary delay—yet delay. The very day he telegraphs he is about to move on he learns that he has been superseded by Havelock. He, labouring, perspiring, taking no rest night or day, displaying an energy that acts as inspiration to all around him, has not yet been sufficiently expeditious for the occupiers of the gilded saloons of Calcutta. Again, the test of results is applied. Neill makes way for Havelock. And now, under the influence of the same test, Havelock gives way to Outram.

It is one of the glories of our countrymen that, however acutely they may feel a disappointment of this nature, it never affects their public conduct. It is this recognition of, and this devotion to, duty, that stamp the Englishman. He subordinates to it all private feelings. He may be keenly sensible of the injustice perpetrated towards himself, but above himself is always his country.

He may have his own views as to how that country may best be served; but, when the Government which represents it has other and different views, he feels bound to devote all his energies to make possible of success the orders of the Government. Thus acted Neill. And, now, thus also acted Havelock. Superseded, as he

The distinguishing
characteristic of
Englishmen,

is eminently
conspicuous in
Havelock.

regarded himself to be, he was as active, as daring, as devoted, as when he ruled, the unfettered commander of an independent force. Never indeed was the exercise of the great qualities of resolution and energy more necessary than after his return from the expedition against Bithûr. Out of seventeen hundred English troops whom he had had altogether under his order from the time of his quitting Allâhâbâd, but six hundred and eighty-five remained effective. Not only was he now compelled to abandon for the moment all idea of re-crossing into Oudh, but the action of the Gwâlîâr contingent threatening Kalpî rendered it doubtful whether he could even hold Kânhpûr. Were Kalpî to be occupied by this force, consisting of five thousand disciplined men, with thirty guns, his communications with Allâhâbâd might at any moment be cut off. To the north, the Nawâb of Farrukhâbâd was ready with thirty thousand men — some Sipâhis, some raw levies—to take advantage of any difficulty which might threaten Kânhpûr. It was, too, in the power of the rebels in Oudh to cross the Ganges at any point below Kânhpûr, and acting singly, or co-operating possibly with the Gwâlîâr troops, to endanger his communications. Of all these dangers Havelock had the fullest cognizance. Yet his judgment was never clouded. To remain at Kânhpûr was undoubtedly a risk, but to fall back on Allâhâbâd would have been a calamity. Not only would he have lost by such a movement the *prestige* and the material advantages his victories had gained, but such a movement would have had the effect of uniting against him the now divided enemies, and of placing them, with more means at their disposal, in a position stronger than that from which he had dislodged Nâná Sâhib. His central position, faulty as it was in a military sense, gave him an immense moral power. He resolved, then, to hold it as long as possible. He announced, accordingly, to the newly-arrived Commander-in-Chief, Sir Colin Campbell, that, if hopes of reinforcements were held out to him, he would, in spite of the very threatening aspect of affairs, continue to hold Kânhpûr; that otherwise he should be forced to retire on Allâhâbâd. The reply of Sir Colin on this head was re-assuring. Reinforcements were on their way. Havelock resolved to await them at Kânhpûr.

Difficulties and dangers of his position.

He faces them with calmness and resolution.

August 17-20.

He resolves to hold Kânhpûr.

The month that intervened between the battle of Bithûr and

the arrival of Sir James Outram was rich in events, which, if not showy, were important. On the 20th of August the indefatigable Captain Gordon had again been sent on an expedition in the steamer. This time he was to proceed down the river and destroy some sixty-two boats belonging to the Oudh rebels, said to have been collected opposite Rájghát, in the Fathpúr district. The operation was one most necessary to be carried out, for it was by these boats that the Oudh rebels might hope to cross the river and operate on our communications with Alláhábád. Gordon, taking with him one hundred men of the Madras Fusiliers, twelve artillerymen, twelve Sikhs, and three pieces, started on the 19th. On the way down the river, hundreds of horse and foot were noticed collected on the Oudh side, opposite the intrenched camp of the British. The steamer was fired at from more than one fort on the way down. The expedition, notwithstanding, was to a great degree successful, for the party on board the steamer managed in four days to destroy thirty-five boats of various sizes.

Captain Gordon
again sweeps
the Ganges.

Arrangements meanwhile were made and carried out for sending all the sick and wounded who could bear the journey to Alláhábád. Reinforcements gradually arrived in small parties; the troops were allowed to rest after their fatigues; the regulations for the maintenance of public order were rigorously enforced; the works at the intrenchment were pushed on. In all these works the co-operation of the civil authorities, at the head of whom was Mr. Sherer, was of inestimable value. Our countrymen had the gratification also of welcoming fugitives from various parts of the country. On the 1st of September, Mr. and Mrs. Probyn and family, Mr. Edwards, and Mr. Jones, came in from Oudh. "They looked so joyous and happy after their sufferings."* On the 4th eleven more (Eurasians) came in from Kalpi, their release having been negotiated some time before by General Neill with the Rájah of that place. To keep the men in spirits, games and races were instituted every evening; there were occasional theatrical performances, and a band constantly played.

Preparations at
Kánhpúr.

The feeling entertained by Neill towards Havelock had, I

* Brigadier Neill's Journal.

have said, never been very cordial. The two men were not formed to act together. Neill had chafed much under the inaction to which, since Havelock's arrival, he had been subjected, and he had greatly feared that, in the advance which was to take place, he would again be left behind. His gratification, then, may be imagined when, on the eve of Outram's arrival, Havelock informed him that the command of the right wing of the relieving force had been conferred upon him.

Neill is appointed to command the right wing of the relieving force.

Sir James Outram arrived at Kánhpúr on the 15th of September. If there were anything in the world which could reconcile a successful soldier to supersession, it would be to be superseded by such a man as Outram. Sir James Outram bore the highest character. He was a paladin of the days of chivalry and romance. To a fearlessness which never recognised danger, to a nerve that never trembled, to a coolness that never varied, he added a generosity without stint, a forgetfulness of self rarely paralleled, a love of the soul's nobility for its own sake alone. Not idly had he been called the Bayard of the Indian army. He was without fear and without reproach. Engaged in many contests, he never fought for himself—he fought always the cause of those whom he believed to have been wronged. When a man so acts—when he gives himself, as it were, to others—the thought of self always flies. So it was with Sir James Outram. He gave all his energies to his clients. On their behalf he staked his prospects, his position, his future. He was appalled neither by the power, the talent, the interest, of the side to which he was opposed. He had emphatically the courage of his opinions, and, convinced of their soundness, he fought for them to the end.

Sir James Outram.

In an earlier part of this volume* I have stated that Sir James Outram had arrived in Calcutta on the 1st of August. Four days later he was reappointed Chief Commissioner of Oudh, and nominated to the joint command of the Dánápúr and Kánhpúr divisions—a command including practically the entire country between Calcutta and Ágra. General Outram left Calcutta at once by river steamer, and, after a tedious voyage up the Ganges, reached Alláhábád on the 2nd of September. He devoted three days to the necessary preparations. These made, he sent

Sept. 2.
He arrives at
Alláhábád,

off, on the morning of the 5th, the 5th Fusiliers, some detachments of the 64th and the 1st Madras Fusiliers, and Major Eyre's battery of artillery—the same which, with a detachment of the 5th, had relieved Aralı—following himself the same evening with the 90th

and sets out for
Kánhpúr.

Light Infantry.

For the first three days the progress of the troops was uneventful. But on the fourth day, on arriving at the camping-ground of Kaligáon, definite information reached Outram that a party of insurgents from Oudh, in number from three to four hundred, with four guns, had crossed the Ganges, near the village of Kúndapatí, on the trunk road between Fathpúr and Alláhábád. The object of this party was evident. It was to sever the communications between Outram and Alláhábád.

Outram at once sent orders to the advanced guard of his force to halt where it was. On joining it, he directed Major Eyre to march against the enemy.

Dispatches Vincent
Eyre against
them.

For this purpose, he placed at that officer's disposal one hundred men of the 5th Fusiliers, sixty of the 64th, all mounted on elephants, and two guns. Forty men of the 12th Irregulars were directed to join this detachment on its march.

Eyre set out on the 10th. On reaching, that same evening, the village of Hatgáon, he was joined by Captain Johnson and his forty horsemen (the 12th Irregulars). As these men had made a forced march of twenty-four miles to join him, Eyre prudently resolved to halt for a few hours. By so doing he would refresh his men, and still be able to reach his destination by daybreak. He set out again at half-past one in the morning, and came in sight of Kúndapatí at early dawn. The villagers whom he met reported the rebels to be close at hand, if not actually within the walls of the village, and that their boats were moored about a mile off. Eyre at once ordered his cavalry to gallop at once to the gates of the town,—to guard them should the rebels still be there,—to pursue and hold them in check should they have evacuated it. Meanwhile he pressed on the infantry.

Sept. 10.
Eyre marches on
the enemy,

The prudence of these dispositions was quickly justified. The rebels, learning almost at the same time of Eyre's approach, had already commenced a hasty retreat towards the river, and had just entered their boats when

and crushes them.

the cavalry came upon them. The latter, just in time to prevent the unmooring of the boats, kept the rebels fully occupied till the other arms should arrive. Then, when these came up, Eyre gave orders to board. The enemy, crowded though they were, made for some time an obstinate resistance. At last, seeing that the day was going against them, they made a desperate attempt to blow up the boats and all therein. In one boat only was the attempt partially successful. Recognising the general failure of their scheme, and resolved not to ask for quarter, they then threw their guns overboard, and precipitated themselves into the river. Eyre at once drew back his men, and opened upon the rebels a grape and musketry fire, the effect of which was decisive. Not a man surrendered:—but only three escaped.

Sept. 11.

The effect of this decisive movement completely paralysed the plans of the mutineers. It was felt all over the Duáb. Another, and it was estimated, a larger party, had landed some four miles higher up with the intention of co-operating with the men against whom Eyre had marched. But so great was the terror caused by his victory that they re-embarked and recrossed into Oudh before the cavalry could intercept them. The movement, so skilfully planned and so vigorously carried out, had, in fact, relieved Sir James Outram from the danger, no light one, of having his communications cut off during the contemplated operations in Oudh.*

Eyre's decisive
action defeats the
plans of the rebels.

Thus secure regarding his communications, Outram continued his march, and reached Kánhpúr on the 16th of September. His very first act was of a nature so noble, so generous, so disinterested, that had it been the solitary glorious act of his glorious life, it would have sufficed to surround his name for ever with a halo of veneration and respect—an act so rare, so striking in

Sept. 16.

Outram arrives at
Kánhpúr.

* That this was the view taken by the General himself is clear from the despatch to the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 11th of September: "The importance of this success will, I am sure, be appreciated by your Excellency and the Governor-General. I now consider my communications secure, which otherwise must have been entirely cut off during our operations in Oudh. A general insurrection, I am assured, would have followed throughout the Duáb had the enemy not been destroyed, they being but the advanced guard of more formidable invaders."

its self-abnegation, that lesser and ignoble natures, unable to comprehend it, endeavour to seek for it a motive congenial to the temper of their own minds,—but yet an act essentially genuine—pertaining to the nature of the man—consistent with every previous act of his life.

He generously
leaves to Havelock
the glory of
relieving Lakhnao.

Sir James Outram had been sent to Kánhpúr to command the force which was to relieve Lakhnao. In accepting that command he superseded the man whose daring efforts with an inferior force to effect that relief had won for him the applause and admiration of his countrymen. To the generous nature of Outram it seemed revolting that he should reap where another had sown; that he should obtain the glory where another had endured the trials and the dangers. He could not do it. He was determined that it should not be done. Availing himself

The order which
he issued on
the occasion.

then, of the circumstance that whilst, in a military point of view, he was commander of the forces about to march into Oudh, he would also enter that country in a civil capacity, as its Chief Commissioner, he published, the day of his arrival at Kánhpúr, the following order:—

“The important duty of relieving the garrison of Lakhnao had been first entrusted to Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B., and Major-General Outram feels that it is due to that distinguished officer, and to the strenuous and noble exertions which he has already made to effect that object, that to him should accrue the honour of the achievement.

“Major-General Outram is confident that this great end for which Brigadier-General Havelock and his brave troops have so long and gloriously fought will now, under the blessing of Providence, be accomplished.

“The Major-General, therefore, in gratitude for, and admiration of, the brilliant deed of arms achieved by Brigadier-General Havelock, and his gallant troops, will cheerfully waive his rank in favour of that officer on this occasion, and will accompany the force to Lakhnao in his civil capacity, as Chief Commissioner of Oudh, tendering his military services to Brigadier-General Havelock as a volunteer.

“On the relief of Lakhnao, the Major-General will resume his position at the head of the forces.”

Rare and noble act of generosity! Only a soldier can appreciate the full extent of abnegation of self which it involved.

Well might the illustrious warrior who then commanded in chief in India—well might Sir Colin Campbell, when announcing to the army this deed of real glory, write these glowing words: “Seldom, perhaps never, has it occurred to a Commander-in-Chief to publish and confirm such an order as the following one, proceeding from Major-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B.

Sir Colin Campbell appreciates Outram's noble self-abnegation.

“With such a reputation as Major-General Sir James Outram has won for himself, he can well afford to share glory and honour with others. But that does not lessen the value of the sacrifice he has made with such disinterested generosity in favour of Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B., commanding the field force in Oudh.

Sir Colin Campbell's order to the army.

“Concurring, as the Commander-in-Chief does, in everything stated in the just eulogy of the latter by Sir James Outram, His Excellency takes this opportunity of publicly testifying to the army his admiration for an act of self-sacrifice and generosity, on a point which, of all others, is dear to a real soldier.”

I cannot believe that there will be one amongst my readers who will grudge the time and the space I have devoted to the complete elucidation of this “act of self-sacrifice and generosity.” The incidents of war often harrow the imagination. They bring to the surface many of the darker and the baser emotions of human nature. They show men to the world with their passions excited often beyond control, their worst feelings rampant and raging. This was especially the case during the war with the mutinous Sipáhis, and with the rebellious population generally. It is a relief to turn from the contemplation of such incidents to a noble deed—a noble deed of a noble man—unsurpassed and unsurpassable of its kind—and which will have its record eternal as the language in which it has been chronicled.

Reflections on the act.

General Havelock then remained commander of the force that was to relieve Lakhnao. He issued the same day an order acknowledging “the kind and generous determination of Major-General Sir James Outram, G.C.B., to leave to him the task of relieving Lakhnao, and rescuing its gallant and enduring garrison,” and expressing “his hope that the troops will strive, by their exemplary and gallant conduct in the field, to justify the confidence thus reposed in them.”

The force now at Havelock's disposal consisted of three

thousand one hundred and seventy-nine men of all arms.*

Numerical strength of the relieving force. He divided it into three brigades:—two of infantry, the third of artillery. The first brigade consisted of the 5th Fusiliers; the 84th Regiment, and, attached to it, two companies of the 64th; and the Madras Fusiliers. It was commanded by the gallant Neill.

The 2nd Brigade, composed of the 78th Highlanders; the 90th Light Infantry; and the Sikh regiment of Firúzpur, was commanded by Brigadier Hamilton, 78th Highlanders.

The 3rd Brigade comprehended Captain Mande's battery, Captain Olpherts' battery, Major Eyre's battery of heavy 18-pounders, the whole commanded by Major Cooper.

Besides those, there were a hundred and nine volunteers, and some fifty-nine of the 12th Irregulars, believed to be faithful, under the command of Captain L. Barrow. (Major-General Outram was one of these volunteers.) (To defend Kánhpúr during the advance on Lakhnau, there remained the Headquarters of the 64th Regiment, under the command of Colonel Wilson.)

The whole of the reinforcements had reached Kánhpúr by the morning of the 16th of September. It was decided, however, not to attempt the passage of the river till the bridge of boats should be completed.

The rebels, meanwhile, were on the alert. On the afternoon of the 17th, a party of their cavalry and infantry, with three guns, came down to the opposite bank to reconnoitre. Their appearance was the signal for the withdrawal to the right bank of a party of Sikhs who had been sent across to cover the formation of the bridge. Emboldened by this retreat, a detachment of the rebel infantry crossed to an island, and, under cover of the long grass found there, opened a fire on the men working at the bridge. But a few round and shrapnell shot from our heavy pieces soon drove them away.

Measures taken to enter the passage of the Ganges.

* The numerical strength of the component portions of the force was as follows:—

European Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	2,388
Ditto Volunteer Cavalry	-	-	-	-	-	109
Ditto Artillery	-	-	-	-	-	282
Sikh Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	341
Native Irregular Cavalry	-	-	-	-	-	59
Total	-	-	-	-	-	3,179

The bridge-head on the opposite side was covered by a detachment from the British force during the night, and on the 18th the bridge had so nearly Sept. 18. approached completion, that it was resolved to make arrangements at once to effect a successful passage. On the 18th no enemy was to be seen on the opposite bank. That morning four guns of Maude's battery were crossed over to the island above referred to, and the 78th Highlanders and the 90th Light Infantry were marched to a position on the river-bank, to be ready to take immediate advantage of the completion of the bridge. Subsequently, part of the 90th and three guns of Maude's battery crossed the river. At eleven o'clock the enemy brought down their heavy guns, and opened fire on the British. The British guns answered. The cannonade lasted three hours, when the rebels ceased it almost as suddenly as they had begun it.

On the 19th the bridge was ready. The English force crossed in the following order. The 78th Highlanders The passage. led. They were followed by the Sikhs of the regiment of Firúzpur, by the remainder of the 90th Light Infantry, by Olpherts' battery, by the Madras Fusiliers, then Her Majesty's 84th and two companies of the 64th, the Volunteer Cavalry and Irregulars, then half of Maude's battery—in the order named.

As soon as they had crossed the troops were formed into contiguous columns at quarter distance, and the 84th were ordered to lie down, as they were in First movements after the passage of the main body had been effected. the line of the enemy's fire. Skirmishers from the 78th Highlanders were sent out at once to cover the line. General Neill's brigade was then ordered to take up a position on the right of the line, and to drive the enemy from some sand-hills occupied by them about six hundred yards in advance. Neill immediately moved forward his brigade and attacked the enemy. They made a firm resistance, but were driven from their position. Whilst the infantry fight was going on William Olpherts* brought up a half-battery in splendid style, and silenced the enemy's guns. The enemy

* Regarding this officer, Lord Napier of Magdala once said to me: "I have often seen Olpherts in action, but never without his deserving the Victoria Cross."

slowly retired, and, the cavalry having followed them up to observe, the force piled arms and laid themselves out for breakfast, pending the arrival of the camp equipage. This did not reach the ground till past three o'clock.

The next day was devoted to the crossing of Eyre's heavy guns. They were brought into camp by noon. The arrangements for the advance were then complete.

Sept. 20.

Passage of the heavy guns.

At half-past five o'clock on the morning of the 21st the force started on its arduous task. The second brigade, having Olpherts's battery attached to it, and with the volunteer cavalry on its reverse flank, led; the first brigade, with Maude's battery, followed; then came Eyre's heavy battery, escorted by the 5th Fusiliers, one wing leading, the other covering the rear; last of all, the 12th Irregulars under Captain Johnson. The pickets of the previous night formed the baggage and rear guards.

Sept. 21.

The advance on Lakhnao.

On approaching the village of Mangalwár it became evident that the enemy were massed there in great strength. Havelock upon this took ground to the left, and deployed into line, having the volunteer cavalry on the extreme left. This manœuvre had scarcely been accomplished before the enemy's guns, five in number, opened fire. They had playing on the road one heavy gun defended by a breastwork. The three English batteries at once replied, whilst the infantry marched through the swamp to the hard ground from which they could act on the rear of the rebels. Just at this moment the rain came down in torrents. This did not affect the assailants, but before they could reach the road behind the village the enemy had evacuated it. A rapid pursuit ensued. It was most successful. The volunteer cavalry captured two guns, a set of colours, and an elephant, and killed about a hundred and twenty men. It was said in camp that five men had fallen to the sword of the General's son and aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Havelock. Olpherts's battery, though newly horsed with but half-trained horses, pushed on splendidly, doing great execution. As the infantry advanced they found the road strewn with shoes which the rebels had cast off to facilitate their flight. But, fast as they ran, the English followed to within musket-shot. This close pursuit drove the enemy helter-skelter through the village of Unáo, without their making even an effort to defend it.

The enemy driven from Mangalwár.

Our men halted for breath and a mouthful of food at Unáo. They stayed there but half an hour. Then, pushing on, they reached Bashíratganj—likewise abandoned by the enemy in their flight—and put up for the night in the *sarai*, or travellers' resting-place—a very large building, capable of accommodating nearly the whole of the force. There was not a man not wet to the skin, for the rain had been of the pelting nature peculiar to the breaking up of the rainy season. The baggage was some distance behind, but it came up two hours later, and afforded then to the tired combatants the luxury of dry clothes and a dinner.

Our troops make a momentary halt at Unáo,

and bivouac for the night at Bashíratganj.

The force had thus reached with but a skirmish the furthest point of Havelock's three brilliant inroads into Oudh. This time there was no talk of retreat. Yet, excited with victory, proud of their day's work as they were, the men were not unconscious that their greatest difficulties lay before them. But, had those difficulties been ten times greater, they were in the mood to overcome them. The end to be attained was the relief of their beleaguered countrymen—of those countrymen who for more than eighty days had held out against the hosts of the enemy. It was that enemy who now barred their onward progress. The pent-up determination of every heart found vent that night in the expressions of firm resolve that, be the resistance of the enemy what it might, it should bar the way no longer.

Temper of the men.

The rain fell heavily next morning as Havelock's force left its night quarters, at half-past seven, the first brigade leading. Every one was in the highest spirits, and, in spite of the pelting downpour, wetting to the skin, all stepped out gaily. No enemy was seen in front—a few cavalry only, at a safe distance, on the flanks. After a march of sixteen miles they reached the village of Banní. Banní was a strong and defensible position. To reach it a force coming from Kánpúr had to cross the river Saí, here spanned by a long bridge built of masonry. After passing the bridge the road takes a turn to the right. The river was not fordable. Strong as was the position, the enemy neither used the advantages it offered to them, nor opposed to our troops the smallest opposition. They even neglected to break down the bridge. Nor, although they had constructed

Sept. 22.

They re-commence the onward movement.

The rebels, panic-stricken, abandon defensible position

two half-moon batteries on the Lakhnao side of it, had they the spirit to use them. In a word, panic-stricken by Havelock's rapid advance, they abandoned the best chance they had of stopping him, and evacuated their strongest position before even it had been attacked. Banní was but sixteen miles from Lakhnao. Havelock, then, in the hope of giving information of his approach to the garrison of the Residency, fired that evening a Royal salute. His men lay there for the night, their indignation aroused and their slumbers troubled by the constant sound of the booming of the cannon fired against their beleaguered countrymen.

The troops bivouac
for the night at
Banní.

The events of the following day, the 23rd, were certain to be crucial. Breakfast, then, was served out to the men before they started. But by half-past eight o'clock they were on their way, marching in column of subdivisions right in front. The rain had cleared off, but it was very close and steamy, without a breath of wind.

They start again
the following
morning,

Since six o'clock that morning the booming of the cannon discharged against the Residency had ceased. This silence seemed to indicate that the enemy were massing their big guns to oppose the relieving force. The men of the relieving force, however, unawed by the silence, pressed on with determined step. For some time no enemy was visible. But as they approached the Álabágh infantry began to show themselves on their flanks, and it soon became apparent that the enemy were prepared to receive them at that walled garden. A party of cavalry was sent on to reconnoitre. They returned to report the enemy had six guns in position; that their left rested on the Álabágh, and their centre and right were drawn up behind a chain of hillocks.

but meet no enemy
till they approach
the Álabágh,

Havelock then halted his force, changed the order of the column from right to left in front, and brought up the 78th Highlanders and Eyre's heavy guns. These changes having been effected, the British force moved on. No sooner, however, were they within range than the enemy's guns opened with round and grape shot. They must have studied the distance very carefully, for their first shot knocked over three officers of the 90th, all of whom subsequently died. The casualties amongst the men and camp followers were likewise considerable. But these losses did not check the advance. Whilst the 78th,

Sept. 23.

Havelock's dis-
positions for
attack.

the 90th, and the remainder of the 2nd Brigade pushed quickly on to gain the open ground on which it could deploy, Neill, with the 1st Brigade, took ground to the left, passing through deep ditches, through swamps, and over heavy ground. On reaching the open he deployed his men in a position causing them to overlap the enemy's right. Meanwhile Eyre's battery on the road, and Olpherts's on the right, had opened out on the enemy. Maude's quickly followed. This fire had the effect of dispersing the rebel cavalry, and cleared the way for the advance of our men. By this time the two brigades had reached open ground, had deployed, and were advancing, the 2nd on the front, the 1st enveloping the enemy's right. Neill led his men over very heavy ground, and drove the enemy from several villages in succession. The key of the enemy's position, however, was the Álambágh, and the upper-storied buildings adjacent to it. These the rebels defended with great resolution; but they could not withstand the assault made by the 5th Fusiliers. Advancing with the bayonet, the men of this splendid regiment cleared the houses and stormed the position. The rebels then fell back to resume the contest on the morrow. Of the guns they had brought into action five were captured by the Volunteer Cavalry. One of these, however, in the darkness and confusion of the night, they recovered.

He drives the
enemy from the
Álambágh,

Having driven the enemy from the Álambágh, the force advanced to within sight of the domes, the minarets, and the gardens of Lakhnao. But the day's work had been hard—much still remained to be effected, and the General prudently determined to halt for the night. Accordingly he took up a position, placing the 1st brigade on the right, the 2nd on the left, of the road, Eyre's heavy battery on the road itself. Our men, however, had scarcely taken up the ground assigned to them and had halted, when the rebels, who, up to that time, had been fleeing in desperate haste, suddenly stopped, brought up fresh guns, and opened a heavy fire on the regiments as they stood or lay in line. They occupied also in considerable strength a two-storied house, subsequently known as the Yellow House, and from it began a fusillade on our line. Just at this time the rain came down in torrents, and our men were soon wetted to the skin. Havelock met his action of the enemy by drawing back his line out of fire, throwing

advances, then
halts for the
night.

The enemy turn
upon him.

his right on the Álabágh, and refusing his left. The movement was a difficult one, as darkness had set in, and the road was jammed with horses, elephants, bullocks, guns, and men. However, it was carried out. The 5th Fusiliers occupied the

He contents himself with occupying a strong position for the night.

Álabágh. The other regiments were more or less provided for, some occupying hamlets, some lying in the open. The Madras Fusiliers bivouacked in mud ankle deep; but they and the rest

of the force "were as merry and jolly as possible." * The rain had ceased. The men had been greatly cheered by the news that reached them that day that Dehlí had been captured, and were in a humour to bear up against evils far greater than those they were encountering. They had shown

Fine temper of the men.

their enthusiasm by loudly cheering Olpherts's battery as, led by that most daring officer, it had

passed in front of the infantry line at a gallop to charge the enemy.

The force halted throughout the day of the 24th to prepare for the desperate deed of the morrow. During the

The force halts during the 24th.

day the position was further changed so as to remove the men entirely from the range of the

enemy's guns, which nevertheless continued their cannonade. The enemy's cavalry, likewise, creeping round to the rear, made an attempt on the baggage, but, though they surprised and killed some ten or twelve of its defenders, they were eventually driven off. That night all the baggage of our men was stored in the Álabágh, and a guard of two hundred and fifty men was placed there.

At last the day of trial dawned. General Havelock, in consultation with Sir James Outram, had resolved to

The advance on the 25th.

Sept. 25.

advance, not by the direct route to the Residency, but by another and more circuitous road skirting the Chárbágh canal. At half-past eight o'clock on

the morning of the 25th, the 1st brigade, headed by Maude's battery, with two companies of the 5th Fusiliers leading, moved off in column of sections, right in front. They had advanced but a short distance when a tremendous fire opened upon them. From the Álabágh to the Yellow House before alluded to the advancing troops had to encounter a perfect storm of round and grape shot and a sharp fire of musketry. Vigorously pushing

* MSS Journal, kept at the time.

on, they approached the enclosure called the Chárbágh, and a village, both filled with the enemy. From these the musketry fire was very galling. Our men, however, dashed at the enemy, and expelled them.

The next point to be reached was the Chárbágh bridge, the only opening left into Lakhnao. This bridge was barred by an earthen parapet about seven feet high, stretching completely across it, and having in the centre an opening, overlapped on both sides by the walls of the parapet, through which it was possible for only one man to pass on foot. On this parapet were mounted six guns, two of them 24-pounders. To the right of the bridge, on the side by which the British were advancing, were some enclosures occupied by the enemy. On approaching the position the force halted; Maude brought two guns to the front and opened fire, whilst Outram, taking with him the 5th Fusiliers and the Sikhs, proceeded to drive the enemy from the enclosures on the right, with the view of bringing a reverse fire on the guns defending the bridge.

The Chárbágh bridge.

The enemy, on their side, had not been slow to reply to the challenge given them by Maude, and for some time the artillery duel raged with great fury. In this the enemy had the advantage of numbers and position. They had heavy guns, and those guns were under cover. Maude had but two light guns, and they were in the open.

An artillery duel ensues there.

When the duel had lasted half an hour, it became evident that Maude could make no impression on the enemy. He had lost twenty-one men at the Yellow House, and others had fallen in front of the bridge.

Maude appeals to young Havelock.

In his despair he appealed to young Henry Havelock, then standing by his side, to "do something." Havelock rode at once to Neill, who was standing on the opposite side of the road, and suggested to him that he should charge the bridge. But, in the absence of Outram, Neill conceived that he would not be justified in giving such an order until that general's turning movement should have made itself felt. Fraser-Tytler made a similar attempt, and with the same result.

Something, however, had to be done. Under these circumstances, young Henry Havelock, always bold, daring, and adventurous, imperilled his commission to carry out an idea which had flashed through his brain. Turning his horse's head, he galloped off in the

Havelock's darling rose.

direction of the post occupied by his father. After making the turn of the road, he halted, waited for three or four minutes, then, galloping back to Neill, saluted him and said—as if bringing an order from the general, whom he had not seen—“You are to charge the bridge, Sir.” Neill at once issued the order. Tytler and Havelock carried it across the road, formed up the men, and gave the order to advance.

Arnold of the Madras Fusiliers dashed on to the bridge with the advance of twenty-five men, Tytler and Havelock accompanying them mounted. Tytler's horse was shot dead, and he was pierced through the groin. Every other man of the twenty-five, the mounted Havelock and a private named Jakes excepted, was shot down by a discharge from the enemy's six guns loaded with grape. Havelock, unable to pass the overlapping barrier of which I have spoken, sat in his saddle, his sword in his hand, calling on the men to come on. Jakes stood by his side loading and firing as fast as he could. The interval between their first touching the bridge and the arrival on it of the storming column was, probably, not more than two minutes, but it seemed an hour. Standing alone on the bridge, the two Englishmen—the daring officer and the gallant private—were exposed to a fire from all the neighbouring houses, every wall loop-holed, every window fortified by sand-bags, and every roof occupied. In the language of Outram, “they were the target for many muskets.” Just at this moment, when the storming party was coming on, a rebel Sipáhi jumped on the parapet, within ten yards of Havelock, and took at him a deliberate aim. The direction was true, but the musket threw high, for the bullet passed through the centre of the top of his hat. Havelock paid him back in truer coin. Returning his sword to the scabbard, he drew his revolver and shot him, as he was reloading, through the body.

A few seconds later the Madras Fusiliers came up with a rush, swarmed over the parapet and through the gap, and carried all before them. The 78th Highlanders belonging to the 2nd brigade followed; and the captured guns were spiked.* The entry into Lakhnao was won!

* For his gallant conduct on this occasion, Havelock was recommended by Sir James Outram for the Victoria Cross. He had previously received it for

On the regiments of the 2nd brigade closing up, the whole force advanced, but, in pursuance of the resolution already referred to, instead of moving straight on through the city, it took a turn to the right at the bridge, and pushed on by a very bad and narrow road along the outskirts. The troops pressed along this road, subjected here to but little opposition.

Havelock determines not to force the main streets, but to turn them.

The rebels, however, having made a demonstration on the rear of the relieving force, two regiments were detached to cover the advance of the remaining brigades, as well as to protect the heavy guns, the dragging of which over the heavy road was found both tedious and difficult.

Two regiments detached to cover the rear.

This road gradually led into the outskirts of the city, and the men were forced to penetrate through narrow streets and lanes, every one of which seemed alive with the enemy's fire. Still the one way to win the day was to press on, and the men continued to dash forward, overcoming or disregarding every obstacle. Suddenly, however, they found their progress impeded by a most formidable obstacle. Before them lay a narrow bridge over a nullah, with high banks on the opposite side. This bridge lay under the lee of the Kaisarbágh, partially commanded by the two guns posted there, and by the muskets of the numerous enemy occupying it. The infantry and the guns were forced to cross that bridge, and to cross it almost singly. The fire opened from the Kaisarbágh was tremendous. It happened, however, that a sheltered position was attainable on the other side, from which the enemy might be fired at with advantage. The troops, then, as they crossed the bridge, took up this position, and, opening a fire, to some extent covered their comrades. But the ordeal was a terrible one, and many men fell at this point. Having passed this obstacle, the force re-united, and halted under cover of some deserted buildings near the Chatr Manzil and Farhatbaksh palaces.

Progress of our men through the city.

Terrible obstacles in their way.

They gallantly surmount them.

It was before this—before, indeed, the Chárbágh bridge had

his conduct at Kánhpúr. Maude also received the Cross for the persistent gallantry he displayed this day. "But for his nerve and coolness," wrote Outram, "The army could not have advanced." Private Jukes was killed later in the day.

been carried – that William Olpherts performed the gallant deed which gained for him the Victoria Cross. The 90th Light Infantry, led by Colonel Campbell, had been ordered to charge and carry a battery of two guns, strongly posted at the end of a street. They charged and carried it. Whilst they held the guns, Olpherts, who had charged with them, galloped back, under a severe fire of musketry, and brought up limbers and horses to carry off the captured ordnance. This was, in round numbers, the thirtieth time that this gallant officer had deserved the Cross he so nobly wears!

Olpherts gains
the Cross.

To return. Darkness was now coming on. The rear-guard, with the heavy guns, the wounded, and the baggage, was behind, exposed to the fury of the enemy. In a consultation with General Havelock, Sir James Outram proposed that the force should occupy the Chatr Manzil Palace for a few hours, to permit the junction with the rear-guard. The proposition showed judgment and prudence, for the Chatr

Outram proposes
to halt at the
Chatr Manzil till
the rear-guard
should rejoin;

Manzil was a strong position, easy to hold, and virtually communicated, by means of intervening palaces, with the Residency. Had the suggestion been adopted, the safety of the rear-guard would have been assured, and the entrance into the Residency

enclosure could have been effected with comparatively little loss. But General Havelock considered that the importance of letting the beleaguered garrison know that succour was at hand outweighed every other consideration. The troops, re-formed, accordingly pushed on. The houses in Khás Bazaar were thronged with the enemy. As the men approached the archway a tremendous fire opened upon them. Neill, who was leading them, passed through the archway, then, suddenly pulling up his horse, he directed his

The troops again
push on.

aide-de-camp, Gordon, to gallop back and recall a half-battery which had taken a wrong road. He remained there sitting on his horse, his head turned in the direction from which he expected the half-battery to emerge, when a Sipáhi, who had taken post on the arch, discharged his musket at him over the parapet on its top. The bullet entered his head behind the left ear, and killed him.

The death of
Neill.

Thus fell one of the bravest and most determined men in the British army. Neill had only required opportunity to become

great. Hating pedantry, cant, and circumlocution, he was essentially a man of action. In the early days of the mutiny, when every one from highest to lowest seemed utterly abroad, Neill suddenly appeared on the scene, and by his prompt decision and quick energy had in a moment stayed the plague. He was a born warrior, very cool, very keen-sighted, and very determined. His military capacity must not be judged by his condemnation of Havelock's retreat from his first advance. He, I believe, under similar circumstances, would have acted similarly. But his judgment was clouded on this occasion by his personal feelings. He had felt deeply his supersession by Havelock, and he disliked him. Every one of his own acts was marked by judgment, by a keen appreciation of the end to be attained. In a word, he was a noble type of the northern land that owned him. Though thirty-one years have elapsed since he fell, the memory of him still lives, fresh and green, in the hearts of those who knew him—and who, knowing, loved and respected him—alike in India and in England.

James Neill

Undeterred by the loss they had sustained, the British troops pressed on through the Khás Bazaar, fiercely assailed by a musketry fire. Emerging from this, the sounds of cheering from the Residency enclosure suddenly gladdened the ears of the Highlanders and their comrades. Others of the advancing force, who had forced their way through other streets, appeared on the scene almost immediately afterwards, and took up the cheers most vociferously. Well, indeed, might their hearts swell within them! Those cheers were but the natural outburst of the sweetest feelings of which the nature of man is capable—the pleasure of aiding those in dire distress.

Our men, still
pushing on, over-
come every
obstacle,

But they are not yet within the enclosure. The night was dark, and, before our troops could enter it, was necessary to make a way for them and for the guns. The displacement of the impediments at the gate of the Baillie Guard which had so long resisted the enemy's assaults caused some delay. But at last they were removed, and many of the victorious troops entered. Then ensued the scene which I have endeavoured faintly to describe in the last chapter.

and reach the gate
of the Baillie
Guard.

I have said that many of the victorious troops entered. The bulk of them, however, lay all that night on the ground

between the Baillie Guard gateway and the Farhatbaksh Palace, and rejoined their comrades early the next morning. There still remained the rear-guard. Of that guard, even in the morning, there were no tidings. At noon, consequently, a party was ordered out to support or to disengage them. This detachment, consisting originally of two hundred and fifty men of the 5th Fusiliers, and Sikhs of the Firúzpur regiment, and subsequently reinforced by a hundred men of the 78th Highlanders, under Captain Haliburton, and a hundred of the 32nd, under Captain Lowe, the whole commanded by Colonel Napier, R.E.,* proceeded to the walled passage in front of the Moti Mahall Palace, and found the rear-guard holding that passage. The junction having been effected, the surviving sick and wounded were transported, on the morning of the 27th, along the river bank into the intrenchment.

They enter, some that night, some the following morning.

Sept. 26.

consisting originally of two hundred and fifty men of the 5th

Sept. 26-27.

The rear-guard.

The losses of the rear guard.

A 24-pounder gun is recovered.

It then became a great object to extricate, from the exposed position in which it had been left on the 26th, a 24-pounder gun, used the previous day against the enemy. It was scarcely possible to approach this gun, so heavy was the fire maintained on it. The attempt, however, was made by three daring men, Olpherts of the Bengal, Crump of the Madras, Artillery, and Private Duffy of the Madras Fusiliers. Crump, an officer of the most brilliant promise, was killed; but Duffy, by a display of combined daring and ingenuity, managed to fasten a rope to the gun in such a manner as to ensure its withdrawal.†

The gun having been recaptured, earnest endeavours were made to open out a road for the whole of the ordnance through the palaces to the Residency. At three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, the whole force proceeded undiscovered through the enemy's posts, and succeeded in packing the heavy guns and waggons in the garden of the Moti Mahall. The garden adjoining, and which was held in force by the enemy, was then attacked and carried by detachments of the 90th, 32nd and 5th Fusiliers, led by Colonel Parnell and Captain McCabe. From this point measures were taken to open a road for the guns

* Now Lord Napier of Magdala.

† For this act, Duffy, on the recommendation of Olpherts, received the Victoria Cross.

through the palace, and by the 1st of October every gun and waggon was safely lodged in the intrenchment.

Such an operation as the relief of Lakhnao by so small a force could not indeed be effected, save at a heavy sacrifice of life. The actual loss, up to the 26th of September inclusive, in killed and wounded, amounted to five hundred and sixty-four officers and men. This does not include the casualties sustained by the rear-guard up to the morning of the 27th, amounting to sixty-one killed and seventy-seven missing. As the missing were sick or wounded men, who had been intercepted or slain, the number of killed of the rear-guard may be counted as the total of the two numbers, or one hundred and thirty-eight. This would raise the entire losses of the relief operation to seven hundred and two, officers and men. Amongst the former was Major Cooper, commanding the artillery brigade. By his death the command of that brigade devolved upon Major Eyre.

The force which had thus with such daring and persistent bravery reached the beleaguered Residency discovered in a few hours that they had reached that spot only to increase the number of the garrison. Means of transport for the combined force were absolutely wanting. Even had they the transport, was that force strong enough to escort the ladies and children in safety to Káñhpúr? These were considerations which pressed themselves on Sir James Outram, who had, on the 26th, resumed command. For the moment, the result of the successful advance on Lakhnao was that more mouths were required to be fed—more lodgment had become necessary for the garrison. These were difficulties. But to meet and overcome difficulties is one of the natural tasks of a real man. How Sir James Outram met and conquered them I shall describe in the next volume.

There remained meanwhile to him, to Havelock, and to their gallant comrades the inspiring conviction, that by greatly daring they had accomplished a feat unsurpassed in the annals of war. The English traveller who shall visit Lakhnao may well pause, struck with wonder and admiration, as contemplating the narrow streets and lofty houses of the city, the size of the palaces, the extent of the walled enclosures surrounding them, he calls to mind that they were a handful of his countrymen who forced their way through those narrow streets, the houses filled with armed enemies; who beat down the opposition

The garrison are reinforced—not relieved—by Havelock's success.

Reflections on the defence and on the successful advance.

offered them by the foe in those walled enclosures ; —to rush to the succour of other men, also countrymen, who, beleaguered in a weak position—a position in a military sense not defensible—had repulsed, during eighty-seven days, the incessant attacks of countless foes. Contemplating in turn the city and the enclosure, he will be unable to resist the conviction, that the relievers and the relieved were in very deed worthy each of the other. If he wonder at the possibility of a small force maintaining itself in the battered enclosure of the Residency, he will equally doubt the power of repeating a feat such as that which Havelock and his soldiers accomplished. Both the one and the other were impossible had they not been done. That both were achieved was due to a combination of qualities which, on another field and on a different occasion, exposed our countrymen to the taunt that they never knew when they were beaten. The spirit that had animated Raleigh, that had inspired Drake, that had given invincible force to the soldiers of Cromwell, that had dealt the first deadly blow to the conqueror of Europe, lived in these men—their descendants. It was that spirit, born of freedom, which filled their hearts with the conviction that, being Englishmen, they were bound to persevere, bound to dare every danger, every discomfort,—to conquer. It was not simply the joy of battle—the *certaminis gaudia* which incited Attila* to conquest—that animated their hearts. Rather was

* At the battle of Châlons Attila, observing the repulse of the attack of his troops on a hill which the enemy had succeeded in occupying before him, sent for the commanders of his divisions and thus addressed them : “After having conquered under my orders a great part of the world, you ought to know what sort of a man I am, and I cannot forget what you are. Let us leave to generals accustomed to slumber on the bosom of peace encouragements of an ordinary character. War is your natural condition ; vengeance your sweetest passion. For you a battle is a holiday ; let us celebrate this one with joy. Behold your victims ; sacrifice them to your glory ; to the manes of your companions whom they surprised and killed. Here, courage has nought to fear from wile and artifice. These open plains can give cover to no ambush. All is open ; all is assured to valour. And what is this army that you are about to fight ? It is a confused mass of weak and effeminate nations, afraid of each other, hating each other, and who were tearing each other to pieces when the fear of your arms united them. Already, before the battle, they tremble. It is terror which has lent them wings to fly to that height. They repent already of having offered battle in the plains. They seek elevated ground to be out of reach of your missiles ; they would like to hide themselves in the clouds. As for the Romans we know them already. I only fear the promptitude of their flight. Without awaiting even the first

it the conviction that they were struggling for the right, that they were combating treacherous foes, that England looked to them for the vindication of her honour and for the safety of the trust she had confided to them, that inspired the defenders with dogged resolution:—the soldiers who followed Havelock with an *élan* that was irresistible. The men whose great achievements, reflecting an eternal glory on their country, I have but faintly portrayed, all lived but thirty-one years ago. Some of them are with us still. Outram and Havelock, and Inglis and Neill, and Eyre and Wilson have passed away, but there are those who remain who emulated their example. There are, too, their successors in the ranks of the British army, and recent history has proved that on these the inspiration of great deeds has not been cast away. The men whose deeds I have recorded were tried in the fire. They represented the gallant soldiers from whose minds neither the assaults of an overwhelming enemy, the privations of scanty food, incessant watching, nor the terrible trials of climate, could obliterate the fact that they were Englishmen, and as such were bound to conquer—and who did conquer. Their names and their example survive them. Carthage could boast of her Hannibal; Rome of her Scipios and her Cæsar; Gaul of her Vercingetorix; France, too, can speak with pride of her Jean d'Are, of her Henri IV., of her Villars, and of the great commanders trained in the school of Napoleon. Spain can show her Saragossa; but no other nation in the world can show a defence equal in its resoluteness and in its result to that of Lakhnao, in which every

blow they are accustomed to fly before the dust raised by our horses' feet. Give them, then, no time to arrange themselves in battle array. Cast yourselves on their squadrons; then, without stopping to pursue your victory over them, charge the Alans, the Franks, and the Visigoths. They are those alone whom we have need to conquer; they are the nerves of the army; all the rest will fall with them. Think not that your individual fate depends on the enemy. No dart can reach him who is reserved by Mars to sing the song of victory. No dart can touch him who has to conquer, whilst he who has to die would meet his fate even in inglorious ease. Why should Fortune have given the Huns victory over so many nations unless it were to prepare them for the joys of this battle? Why should she have opened to our ancestors the Magotic Marsh closed and unknown for so many ages? . . . If circumstances do not deceive me—here—here before us—is the field of which so many exploits have been the promise and the forerunners. For myself, I will be the first to launch my javelin against the enemy—let him die who shall refuse to follow Attila! (*Si quis poterit Attila pugnante otium ferro sepultus est*).”—Jornandes, *de Rebus Geticis*, c. 12.

man was a hero and every woman a heroine. To find a parallel we must search the records of England herself, and go back to Clive at Arkát and to Flint at Wandiwash.

I leave Lakhnao now, and with regret. But I leave it for a field not less noble. For I have to narrate now how it was that the imperial city of Dehlí succumbed to the army which had so patiently and so persistently assailed it.

APPENDIX A.

(VIDE PAGE 174.)

IN May, 1831, General Lionel Showers published a pamphlet containing some correspondence he had had with me on the subject of the insufficient notice I had given of his exploits in the earlier editions of my history of the Indian Mutiny. The first and second letters of that correspondence speak for themselves. The first contained the complaint of General Showers; the second, my answer to that complaint. The third letter reiterated his shallow claims, and ended, characteristically, with a sneer at myself. Utterly indifferent to the sarcasms which were the natural consequence of my refusal to endorse his shadowy claims, I declined to bandy personalities with General Showers, and left his second letter unnoticed.

In the pamphlet of 1831 no attack was made upon the late Sir George Lawrence. Sir George Lawrence was alive, and the Lawrences were still a power; but General Showers had not forgotten that, at an unexampled crisis in the history of British India, he had served under Sir George Lawrence, and that Sir George Lawrence had recorded his opinion that, in that crisis, he had found him, "when every other officer hurried to his post," loitering at *Ábn* and *en route*, neglectful of his orders, and guilty of repeated acts of disobedience and defiance of his authority. He waited, then, till that illustrious man should no longer be alive to reply to him; then, conveniently "clearing out a long-disused cabinet," he proceeded to concoct "a missing chapter of the Indian Mutiny," characterised by praise of himself and depreciation of his former chief. I say nothing of his remarks regarding myself; I plead guilty to the charge of declining to distort the truth in order to fabricate a hero out of inferior clay.

With respect to the conduct of General Showers during the Mutiny, I may repeat here what I have written in a footnote in the text, that the question was fully disposed of by the Governor-General of India in Council (Lord Canning), in letter No. 727, dated February 24, 1860. That letter thus concludes:

"On a full review of all the proceedings set forth in the correspondence, and especially of the particular instances above adverted to, his Excellency cannot avoid the conclusion that Captain Showers, notwithstanding his good abilities and his zeal for the public service, does not possess either the judgment or the temper required in an officer entrusted with political duties. His conduct has been marked by unjustifiable opposition to the orders of his superior, needless disputes with other officers, and a desire to

meddle with the duties which do not belong to him. He has failed to profit by the warning formerly addressed to him on this head. His Excellency therefore dismisses Captain Showers from the Rajpootana Agency, and directs that his services be placed at the disposal of the Military Department. You will accordingly take measures to relieve Captain Showers at once."

General Showers has the audacity to argue that that decision, which was final, and was never altered, was virtually cancelled by a letter addressed to him by the Secretary of State the 14th April, 1862. But what are the facts? Major Showers, as he then was, had represented to the Secretary of State that, in consequence of the non-confirmation by the Government of India of his appointment as Political Agent in Mewâr, he had been subjected to a considerable pecuniary loss. The reply of the Secretary of State ran, with reference to that point, as follows :

"Adverting to the exceptional circumstances of the times, to the claims necessarily made on the hospitality of officers in the position you then held, and to the particular facts which you have stated, Sir Charles Wood is willing to take this part of your case into his favourable consideration. He will, therefore, call the attention of the Government of India to the subject, and to request that, if, as he believes, the full salary of the Mewâr Agency has not been disbursed to any other officer, the difference between the allowances of the officiating and the confirmed appointment, during the period of your employment as Political Agent at Mewâr, be disbursed to you."

The sense of this decision is too plain, one would think, to be capable of being distorted. The Secretary of State says, in so many words, to Major Showers : "We will not punish you by fine as well as by dismissal. You probably incurred expenses which your full salary was intended to meet ; therefore you shall have that full salary." To those acquainted with the financial rules of the Government of India, even this explanation is superfluous. By those rules an officer who may not be confirmed in an acting appointment is entitled only to the half-staff salary. To disburse to him the full-staff pay the sanction of the Secretary of State is necessary ; and when, as in the case of General Showers, exceptional circumstances occur, such sanction is rarely withheld.

The claim, then, made by General Showers, that the grant of his full-staff pay, accompanied as it was by an allusion to his "admitted zeal and ability," cleansed him from the condemnation of his conduct during the Mutiny by the Government of India, is, then, simply impudent. Nor would it be necessary to notice it further but that the impudence, set forth with all the hectoring of a Captain Bobadil, is liable to be accepted as truth by the untravelled Englishman, to whom the antecedents of General Showers, and the measure of him taken in India, may not be known.

It is by the character a man has borne in the country where he has spent the best years of his life that his worth or worthlessness must be

judged; not by the veneer he may assume after he has retired from the scene of his life-labours. Now, General Showers spent all the best years of his life in India. His character was well known in that country, alike by those in the service as by those out of it. Let us see how he was regarded there.

Perhaps the best mode of ascertaining this fact is to record the impression of him which his recent book, published in 1888, has called forth. The leading paper of the North-western Provinces is 'The Pioneer.' The following are the terms in which that able and honest journal reviews General Showers's latest work, 'A Missing Chapter of the Indian Mutiny.'*

"This *brochure* is, in the main, an attempt on the part of General Showers to vindicate himself, his action, and his policy as Political Resident in Mewâr (Udaipur) from the blame, tacit and expressed, cast upon them at the time by the late General Sir George St. Patrick Lawrence. The vindication comes rather late in the day, and certainly loses all value and force from having been delayed until long after the death of the officer against whom it is mainly directed. Colonel Malleon, who, in his history of the Mutiny, took Sir George Lawrence's view of the matter, comes in for some harsh and bitter remarks, backed by a manipulated quotation from Shakespeare. He, however, is to the fore, and, should he think it worth while, which is hardly likely, can ably protect himself. Against Sir George Lawrence, General Showers will hardly be allowed to score an *ex-parte* decree. General Showers, moreover, states (p. 191) that, having been removed by the Local Government for acting without orders, presumably upon report by General Lawrence, he was restored to office by the Secretary of State on appeal. He gives no copies, either of the original report or of either of these orders, though he prints copies of several other papers far less to the point than these would have been. If General Showers 'left the Court without a stain upon his character, surrounded by his friends,' where the necessity for this long-delayed whitewash? General Showers' appeal was apparently made in February, 1862, and presumably his restoration took place in that year. (Somewhat characteristically, he gives, as the grounds of his restoration by the Secretary of State, an extract from his memorandum of appeal.) It is not clear, therefore, why—sixteen years thereafter, when his opponent and many of the other actors in those scenes have passed away—he has now seen fit to open up this matter in so polemical a fashion. The necessity for the present work is the less apparent as General Showers claims to have 'conclusively disposed of the matter' by the publication of a counterblast to Colonel Malleon in 1881.

"Captain Showers placed on record, at the Board of Control, India Office (*sic*), in the spring of 1856, a memorandum in which, while criticising the annexation policy of Lord Dalhousie, he foretold the Mutiny as a result

* 'A Missing Chapter of the Indian Mutiny:' by Lieutenant-General Charles Lionel Showers. Longmans, Green and Co., London and New York

thereof. A copy of this memorandum he brought out to India in the same year and laid before Lord Canning. It is unfortunate that so weighty a document as this must have been, and one so useful to future historians, has been lost to the world. The original is lost, the copy given to Lord Canning is not forthcoming, and the author of so important a State paper seems to have kept no copy of it. General Showers states, in words given as Lord Canning's own, that that statesman, while convinced, or nearly so, by the views set forth in this paper, refrained from acting upon them because 'what he (Captain Showers) advocates would involve a reversal of the policy which *I am sent to carry out*, viz., the consolidation of the Empire (?) *through the absorption of the Native States.*' The Italics and query are our own. We take liberty very gravely to doubt if Lord Canning ever permitted himself to say anything of the sort. Not only in this sentence, but in several other places, General Showers antedates the 'Empire' of India. He more than once styles the Queen of 1857-58 by her recently assumed Imperial title, as when he speaks of 'assumption by the Queen-Empress of direct rule over India at the latter end of 1858.'

"We learn from this work (p. 8) that it was to Captain Showers that we owed the first inception of the design of the diversion of the troops of the China Expedition to the aid of India. We had been under the impression that that idea had first emanated, whence so many heroic ideas sprang, from Sir Henry Lawrence, who advised Lord Canning somewhat to that effect immediately after hearing of the events of the 11th May at Mirath.

"Into the controversial matter, which is clearly the main *motif* of the work, we need not enter further. As a contribution to the history of the Mutiny and Rebellion of 1857-58 there is little that is new. The title is a misnomer. There is no 'missing chapter' of that time which is now told for the first time. The only things 'missing'—and as to those we have to take General Showers' authority—are Captain Showers' despatches of the time, or some of them, which he roundly charges General Lawrence with having burked or misrepresented. The historical part of the work is an account of the occurrences of the Mutiny in Mewâr, principally at Udaipûr and Nimach and the neighbourhood, which has all been told and recorded, officially and otherwise, far more ably and clearly than it is recounted in this book; for General Showers' is not the pen of a ready writer. Some local touches and episodes, both before and behind the scenes, such as could only be given by a leading local actor in the drama, there undoubtedly are. In particular, the staunch and universally recognised loyalty of the House of Mewâr, in the person of the Mahârâj Rânâ Sarup Singh, is set forth more precisely, and with greater insistence and detail, than we remember to have seen elsewhere. Indeed, one of the chief *raisons d'être* of the book is the establishment of the position, that the active loyalty of the Mahârâj Rânâ in those troublous and trying times, and the powerful material aid given by the Durbar to the British arms, were mainly due to the policy of Captain C. L. Showers, which set aside and was, *ab initio* and throughout, antagonistic to that previously

punished and subsequently advocated by his predecessor and thereafter chief, Brigadier-General George St. Patrick Lawrence."

But this is not all. General Showers had apparently forgotten that, although the Old Lion was dead, there were young lions ready and resolute to vindicate their father's fame. One of these, Mr. A. J. Lawrence, as soon as he read the review I have just quoted from the 'Pioneer,' hurled at the presumptuous libeller of his sire's name the sharp-pointed javelin I have extracted from that paper. Addressing the editor of the 'Pioneer,' Mr. Lawrence wrote :

"Your notice of General Showers' attack on my late father requires some notice. I gather from the little mention made of this book in my letters from home that neither my brother nor any of Sir George's old assistants think Showers worth powder and shot. He was re-employed in Gwáliár in 1864, and after six months was dropped. The Gwáliár officials have probably a warm remembrance of him. Most native states where he served found him expensive, and, if my recollection is right, the attack on Nimbhára and the Tonk intrigue were the cause of his leaving Rájputána, and of his (long-delayed) abuse of Sir George Lawrence. Showers had a certain cleverness and facility with his pen, which, however, by your account, seems to have left him; but he was vain, unscrupulous, and self-laudatory. Refused employment by the Foreign Office, not wanted by the Army, he did general duty at Pesháwar for some time. I have the best authority for knowing the opinion there held of him. He offered himself, in Lord Mayo's time, as a member of the Legislative Council, on the supposed strength of his acquaintance with the criminal tribes of India. Great was Lord Mayo's surprise and indignation on hearing of this suggestion. Showers subsequently lived, and tried to raise cotton, at Dehrá Dun; and his last appearance in India was an unsuccessful application for exemption of stamp duty. And this is the man who presumes, five years after my father's death, and thirty years after the time of which he professes to be the only true historian, to attack a man with whom, when Lord Lawrence came out as Viceroy, and my father was with him in Calcutta, he was willing and anxious to renew his acquaintance.

"Allahabad, 20th July.

(Signed) A. J. LAWRENCE."

In this letter Mr. Lawrence describes his father's assailant as "vain, unscrupulous, and self-laudatory." The description will be accepted by all who knew General Showers in India. In that country the qualities denoted by those adjectives were constantly leading him into hot water. In a word, they did much to ruin his career. I much fear that in this, the last of his many warfares—all of his own seeking—they have not contributed to his reputation with posterity. It can scarcely be a consolation to General Showers to know that, whilst his two self-laudatory books are but little known now, and will be absolutely unknown to the generation that will come after, this self-sought *exposé* of himself will be read wherever the English language is spoken.

APPENDIX B.

Official Report of the Defence of Lakhnao (vide Chapter II. Book IX.).

“FROM BRIGADIER INGLIS, *Commanding Garrison of Lakhnao*, TO THE
SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT MILITARY DEPARTMENT, *Calcutta*.

Dated, “Lakhnao, 26th September, 1857.

“SIR,—In consequence of the very deeply-to-be-lamented death of Brigadier-General Sir H. M. Lawrence, K.C.B., late in command of the Oudh Field Force, the duty of narrating the military events which have occurred at Lakhnao since 29th June last, has devolved upon myself.

“On the evening of that day several reports reached Sir Henry Lawrence that the rebel army, in no very considerable force, would march from Chinhat (a small village about eight miles distant on the road to Faizábád) on Lakhnao on the following morning; and the late Brigadier-General therefore determined to make a strong reconnoissance in that direction, with the view, if possible, of meeting the force at a disadvantage, either at its entrance into the suburbs of the city, or at the bridge across the Gokral, which is a small stream intersecting the Faizábád road, about half-way between Lakhnao and Chinhat.

“The force destined for this service, and which was composed as follows, moved out at 6 A.M. on the morning of the 30th June:—

Artillery.—Four guns of No. — Horse Light Field Battery.

Four ditto of No. 2 Oudh Field Battery.

Two ditto of No. 3 ditto ditto ditto.

An eight-inch Howitzer.

Cavalry.—Troop of Volunteer Cavalry.

120 Troopers of Detachments belonging to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
Regiments of Oudh Irregular Cavalry.

Infantry.—300 Her Majesty's 32nd.

150 13th Native Infantry.

60 48th Native Infantry.

20 71st Native Infantry (Sikhs).

“The troops, misled by the reports of wayfarers—who stated that there were few or no men between Lakhnao and Chinhat—proceeded somewhat further than had been originally intended, and suddenly fell in with the enemy, who had up to that time eluded the vigilance of the advance guard by concealing themselves behind a long line of trees in overwhelming numbers. The European force and the howitzer, with the native infantry, held the foe in check for some time, and had the six guns of the Oudh

Artillery been faithful, and the Sikh Cavalry shown a better front, the day would have been won in spite of an immense disparity in numbers. But the Oude artillerymen and drivers were traitors. They overturned the guns into ditches, cut the traces of their horses, and abandoned them, regardless of the remonstrances and exertions of their own officers, and of those of Sir Henry Lawrence's staff, headed by the Brigadier-General in person, who himself drew his sword upon these rebels. Every effort to induce them to stand having proved ineffectual, the force, exposed to a vastly superior fire of artillery, and completely outflanked on both sides by an overpowering body of infantry and cavalry, which actually got into our rear, was compelled to retire with the loss of three pieces of artillery, which fell into the hands of the enemy, in consequence of the rank treachery of the Oudh gunners, and with a very grievous list of killed and wounded. The heat was dreadful, the gun ammunition was expended, and the almost total want of cavalry to protect our rear made our retreat most disastrous.

"All the officers behaved well, and the exertions of the small body of Volunteer Cavalry—only forty in number—under Captain Radcliffe, 7th Light Cavalry, were most praiseworthy. Sir Henry Lawrence subsequently conveyed his thanks to myself, who had, at his request, accompanied him upon this occasion, Colonel Case being in command of H.M.'s 32nd. He also expressed his approbation of the way in which his staff—Captain Wilson, Officiating Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General; Lieutenant James, Sub-Assistant Commissary-General; Captain Edgell, Officiating Military Secretary; and Mr. Couper, C.S.,—the last of whom had acted as Sir Henry Lawrence's A.D.C. from the commencement of the disturbances,—had conducted themselves throughout this arduous day. Sir Henry further particularly mentioned that he would bring the gallant conduct of Captain Radcliffe and of Lieutenant Bonham, of the Artillery, (who worked the howitzer successfully until incapacitated by a wound), to the prominent notice of the Government of India. The manner in which Lieutenant Birch, 71st N.I., cleared a village with a party of Sikh skirmishers, also elicited the admiration of the Brigadier-General. The conduct of Lieutenant Hardinge, who, with his handful of horse, covered the retreat of the rear-guard, was extolled by Sir Henry, who expressed his intention of mentioning the services of this gallant officer to His Lordship in Council. Lieutenant-Colonel Case, who commanded H.M.'s 32nd Regiment, was mortally wounded whilst gallantly leading on his men. The service had not a more deserving officer. The command devolved on Captain Steevens, who also received a death-wound shortly afterwards. The command then fell to Captain Mansfield, who has since died of cholera. A list of the casualties on this occasion accompanies the Despatch.

"It remains to report the siege operations.

"It will be in the recollection of His Lordship in Council that it was the original intention of Sir Henry Lawrence to occupy not only the Residency, but also the fort called Macheli Bhawan—an old dilapidated edifice, which had been hastily repaired for the occasion, though the

defences were even at the last moment very far from complete, and were, moreover, commanded by many houses in the city. The situation of the Machchí Bhawan with regard to the Residency has already been described to the Government of India.

"The untoward event of the 30th June so far diminished the whole available force, that we had not a sufficient number of men remaining to occupy both positions. The Brigadier-General, therefore, on the evening of the 1st July, signalled to the garrison of the Machchi Bhawan to evacuate and blow up that fortress in the course of the night. The orders were ably carried out, and at 12 p.m. the force marched into the Residency with their guns and treasure without the loss of a man; and shortly afterwards the explosion of 240 barrels of gunpowder and 6,000,000 ball cartridges, which were lying in the magazine, announced to Sir Henry Lawrence and his officers—who were anxiously awaiting the report—the complete destruction of that post and all that it contained. If it had not been for this wise and strategic measure, no member of the Lucknow garrison, in all probability, would have survived to tell the tale; for, as has already been stated, the Machchí Bhawan was commanded from other parts of the town, and was, moreover, indifferently provided with heavy artillery ammunition, while the difficulty, suffering, and loss which the Residency garrison, even with the reinforcement thus obtained from the Machchí Bhawan, has undergone in holding the position, is sufficient to show that, if the original intention of holding both posts had been adhered to, both would have inevitably fallen.

"It is now my very painful duty to relate the calamity which befell us at the commencement of the siege. On the 1st July an 8-inch shell burst in the room in the Residency in which Sir H. Lawrence was sitting. The missile burst between him and Mr. Couper, close to both; but without injury to either. The whole of his staff implored Sir Henry to take up other quarters, as the Residency had then become the special target for the round-shot and shell of the enemy. This, however, he jestingly declined to do, observing that another shell would certainly never be pitched into that small room. But Providence had ordained otherwise, for on the very next day he was mortally wounded by the fragment of another shell which burst in the same room, exactly at the same spot. Captain Wilson, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, received a contusion at the same time.

"The late lamented Sir Henry Lawrence, knowing that his last hour was rapidly approaching, directed me to assume command of the troops, and appointed Major Bauks to succeed him in the office of Chief Commissioner. He lingered in great agony till the morning of the 4th July, when he expired, and the Government was thereby deprived, if I may venture to say so, of the services of a distinguished statesman and a most gallant soldier. Few men have ever possessed to the same extent the power which he enjoyed of winning the hearts of all those with whom he came in contact, and thus ensuring the warmest and most zealous devotion for himself and for the Government which he served. The successful

defence of the position has been, under Providence, solely attributable to the foresight which he evinced in the timely commencement of the necessary operations, and the great skill and untiring personal activity which he exhibited in carrying them into effect. All ranks possessed such confidence in his judgment and his fertility of resource, that the news of his fall was received throughout the garrison with feelings of consternation only second to the grief which was inspired in the hearts of all by the loss of a public benefactor and a warm personal friend. Feeling as keenly and as gratefully as I do the obligations that the whole of us are under to this great and good man, I trust the Government of India will pardon me for having attempted, however imperfectly, to portray them. In him every good and deserving soldier lost a friend and a chief capable of discriminating, and ever on the alert to reward merit, no matter how humble the sphere in which it was exhibited.

"The garrison had scarcely recovered the shock which it had sustained in the loss of its revered and beloved General, when it had to mourn the death of that able and respected officer, Major Banks, the Officiating Chief Commissioner, who received a bullet through his head while examining a critical outpost on the 21st July, and died without a groan.

"The description of our position, and the state of our defences when the siege began, are so fully set forth in the accompanying Memorandum, furnished by the Garrison Engineer, that I shall content myself with bringing to the notice of His Lordship in Council the fact that, when the blockade was commenced, only two of our batteries were completed, part of the defences were yet in an unfinished condition, and the buildings in the immediate vicinity, which gave cover to the enemy, were only very partially cleared away. Indeed, our heaviest losses have been caused by the fire from the enemy's sharp-shooters stationed in the adjoining mosques and houses of the native nobility, the necessity of destroying which had been repeatedly drawn to the attention of Sir Henry by the staff of Engineers; but his invariable reply was, 'Spare the holy places, and private property, too, as far as possible;' and we have consequently suffered severely from our very tenderness to the religious prejudices and respect to the rights of our rebellious citizens and soldiery. As soon as the enemy had thoroughly completed the investment of the Residency, they occupied these houses, some of which were within easy pistol-shot of our barricades, in immense force, and rapidly made loop-holes on those sides which bore on our post, from which they kept up a terrific and incessant fire day and night, which caused many daily casualties, as there could not have been less than 8,000 men firing at one time into our position. Moreover, there was no place in the whole of our works that could be considered safe, for several of the sick and wounded who were lying in the Banqueting Hall, which had been turned into an hospital, were killed in the very centre of the building, and the widow of Lieutenant Dorin and other women and children were shot dead in rooms into which it had not been previously deemed possible that a bullet could penetrate. Neither were the enemy idle in erecting batteries. They soon had from

twenty to twenty-five guns in position, some of them of very large calibre. These were planted all round our post at small distances, some being actually within fifty yards of our defences, but in places where our own heavy guns could not reply to them, while the perseverance and ingenuity of the enemy in erecting barricades in front of and around their guns, in a very short time rendered all attempts to silence them by musketry entirely unavailing. Neither could they be effectually silenced by shells, by reason of their extreme proximity to our position, and because, moreover, the enemy had recourse to digging very narrow trenches about eight feet in depth in rear of each gun, in which the men lay while our shells were flying, and which so effectually concealed them, even while working the gun, that our baffled sharp-shooters could only see their hands while in the act of loading.

“The enemy contented themselves with keeping up this incessant fire of cannon and musketry until the 20th July, on which day, at 10 A.M., they assembled in very great force all around our position, and exploded a heavy mine inside our outer line of defences at the water gate. The mine, however, which was close to the Redan, and apparently sprung with the intention of destroying that battery, did no harm. But, as soon as the smoke had cleared away, the enemy boldly advanced under cover of a tremendous fire of cannon and musketry, with the object of storming the Redan. But they were received with such a heavy fire, that, after a short struggle, they fell back with much loss. A strong column advanced at the same time to attack Innes’s post, and came on to within ten yards of the palisades, affording to Lieutenant Loughnan, 13th N.I., who commanded the position, and his brave garrison, composed of gentlemen of the Uncovenanted Service, a few of Her Majesty’s 32nd Foot, and of the 13th N.I., an opportunity of distinguishing themselves, which they were not slow to avail themselves of, and the enemy were driven back with great slaughter. The insurgents made minor attacks at almost every outpost, but were invariably defeated, and at 2 P.M. they ceased their attempts to storm the place, although their musketry fire and cannonading continued to harass us unceasingly as usual. Matters proceeded in this manner until the 10th August, when the enemy made another assault, having previously sprung a mine close to the Brigade Mess, which entirely destroyed our defences for the space of twenty feet, and blew in a great portion of the outside wall of the house occupied by Mr. Schilling’s garrison. On the dust clearing away, a breach appeared, through which a regiment could have advanced in perfect order, and a few of the enemy came on with the utmost determination, but were met with such a withering flank fire of musketry from the officers and men holding the top of the Brigade Mess, that they beat a speedy retreat, leaving the more adventurous of their numbers lying on the crest of the breach. While this operation was going on, another large body advanced on the Cawnpore battery, and succeeded in locating themselves for a few minutes in the ditch. They were, however, dislodged by hand grenades. At Captain Anderson’s post they also came boldly forward with scaling ladders, which

they planted against the wall ; but here, as elsewhere, they were met with the most indomitable resolution, and, the leaders being slain, the rest fled, leaving the ladders, and retreated to their batteries and loop-holed defences, from whence they kept up for the rest of the day an unusually heavy cannonade and musketry fire. On the 18th August the enemy sprung another mine in front of the Sikh lines with very fatal effect. Captain Orr (unattached), Lieutenants Meham and Soppitt, who commanded the small body of drummers composing the garrison, were blown into the air, but providentially returned to earth with no further injury than a severe shaking. The garrison, however, were not so fortunate. No less than eleven men were buried alive under the ruins, from whence it was impossible to extricate them, owing to the tremendous fire kept up by the enemy from houses situated not ten yards in front of the breach. The explosion was followed by a general assault of a less determined nature than the two former efforts, and the enemy were consequently repulsed without much difficulty. But they succeeded, under cover of the breach, in establishing themselves in one of the houses in our position, from which they were driven in the evening by the bayonets of H.M.'s 32nd and 84th Foot. On the 5th September the enemy made their last serious assault. Having exploded a large mine, a few feet short of the bastion of the 18-pounder gun, in Major Apthorp's post, they advanced with large heavy scaling ladders, which they planted against the wall, and mounted, thereby gaining for an instant the embrasure of a gun. They were, however, speedily driven back with loss by hand grenades and musketry. A few minutes subsequently they sprung another mine close to the Brigade Mess, and advanced boldly ; but soon the corpses strewed in the garden in front of the post bore testimony to the fatal accuracy of the rifle and musketry fire of the gallant members of that garrison, and the enemy fled ignominiously, leaving their leader—a fine-looking old native officer—among the slain. At other posts they made similar attacks, but with less resolution, and everywhere with the same want of success. Their loss upon this day must have been very heavy, as they came on with much determination, and at night they were seen bearing large numbers of their killed and wounded over the bridges in the direction of the cantonments. The above is a faint attempt at a description of the four great struggles which have occurred during this protracted season of exertion, exposure, and suffering. His Lordship in Council will perceive that the enemy invariably commenced his attacks by the explosion of a mine, a species of offensive warfare for the exercise of which our position was unfortunately peculiarly situated ; and, had it not been for the most untiring vigilance on our part in watching and blowing up their mines before they were completed, the assaults would probably have been much more numerous, and might, perhaps, have ended in the capture of the place. But, by counter-mining in all directions, we succeeded in detecting and destroying no less than four of the enemy's subterraneous advances towards important positions, two of which operations were eminently successful, as on one occasion not less than eight of them were blown into the air, and twenty

suffered a similar fate on the second explosion. The labour, however, which devolved upon us in making these countermines, in the absence of a body of skilled miners, was very heavy. The Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council will feel that it would be impossible to crowd within the limits of a dispatch even the principal events, much more the individual acts of gallantry, which have marked this protracted struggle. But I can conscientiously declare my conviction that few troops have ever undergone greater hardships, exposed as they have been to a never-ceasing musketry fire and cannonade. They have also experienced the alternate vicissitudes of extreme wet and of intense heat, and that, too, with very insufficient shelter from either, and in many places without any shelter at all. In addition to having had to repel real attacks, they have been exposed night and day to the hardly less harassing false alarms which the enemy have been constantly raising. The insurgents have frequently fired very heavily, sounded the advance and shouted for several hours together, though not a man could be seen, with the view, of course, of harassing our small and exhausted force, in which object they succeeded, for no part has been strong enough to allow of a portion only of the garrison being prepared in the event of a false attack being turned into a real one. All, therefore, had to stand to their arms, and to remain at their posts until the demonstration had ceased; and such attacks were of almost nightly occurrence. The whole of the officers and men have been on duty night and day during the eighty-seven days which the siege has lasted, up to the arrival of Sir J. Outram, G.C.B. In addition to this incessant military duty, the force has been nightly employed in repairing defences, in moving guns, in burying dead animals, in conveying ammunition and commissariat stores from one place to another, and in other fatigue duties too numerous and too trivial to enumerate here. I feel, however, that any words of mine will fail to convey any adequate idea of what our fatigue and labours have been—labours in which all ranks and all classes, civilians, officers, and soldiers, have all borne an equally noble part. All have together descended into the mines, all have together handled the shovel for the interment of the putrid bullock, and all, accoutred with musket and bayonet, have relieved each other on sentry without regard to the distinctions of rank, civil or military. Notwithstanding all these hardships, the garrison has made no less than five sorties, in which they spiked two of the enemy's heaviest guns, and blew up several of the houses from which they had kept up their most harassing fire. Owing to the extreme paucity of our numbers, each man was taught to feel that on his own individual efforts alone depended in no small measure the safety of the entire position. This consciousness incited every officer, soldier, and man to defend the post assigned to him with such desperate tenacity, and to fight for the lives which Providence had entrusted to his care with such dauntless determination, that the enemy, despite their constant attacks, their heavy mines, their overwhelming numbers, and their incessant fire, could never succeed in gaining one single inch of ground within the bounds of this straggling position,

which was so feebly fortified that, had they once obtained a footing in any of the outposts, the whole place must inevitably have fallen.

"If further proof be wanting of the desperate nature of the struggle which we have, under God's blessing, so long and so successfully waged, I would point to the roofless and ruined house, to the crumbled walls, to the exploded mines, to the open breaches, to the shattered and disabled guns and defences, and, lastly, to the long and melancholy list of the brave and devoted officers and men who have fallen. These silent witnesses bear sad and solemn testimony to the way in which this feeble position has been defended. During the early part of these vicissitudes, we were left without any information whatever regarding the posture of affairs outside. An occasional spy did, indeed, come in with the object of inducing our sipâhis and servants to desert; but the intelligence derived from such sources was, of course, entirely untrustworthy. We sent our messengers daily, calling for aid and asking for information, none of whom ever returned until the 26th day of the siege, when a pensioner named Angad came back with a letter from General Havelock's camp, informing us that they were advancing with a force sufficient to bear down all opposition, and would be with us in five or six days. A messenger was immediately despatched requesting that on the evening of their arrival on the outskirts of the city two rockets might be sent up, in order that we might take the necessary measures for assisting them while forcing their way in. The sixth day, however, expired, and they came not; but for many evenings after officers and men watched for the ascension of the expected rockets, with hopes such as make the heart sick. We knew not then, nor did we learn until the 29th August—or thirty-five days later—that the relieving force, after having fought most nobly to effect our deliverance, had been obliged to fall back for reinforcements; and this was the last communication we received until two days before the arrival of Sir James Outram, on the 25th September.

"Besides heavy visitations of cholera and small-pox, we have also had to contend against a sickness which has almost universally pervaded the garrison. Commencing with a very painful eruption, it has merged into a low fever, combined with diarrhœa; and, although few or no men have actually died from its effects, it leaves behind a weakness and lassitude which in the absence of all material sustenance save coarse beef and still coarser flour, none have been able entirely to get over. The mortality among the women and children, and especially among the latter, from these diseases and from other causes, has been perhaps, the most painful characteristic of the siege. The want of native servants has also been a source of much privation. Owing to the suddenness with which we were besieged, many of these people who might, perhaps, have otherwise proved faithful to their employers, but who were outside the defences at the time, were altogether excluded. Very many more deserted, and several families were consequently left without the services of a single domestic. Several ladies have had to tend their children, and even to wash their own clothes, as well as to cook their scanty meals entirely unaided. Combined with

the absence of servants, the want of proper accommodation has probably been the cause of much of the disease with which we have been afflicted. I cannot refrain from bringing to the prominent notice of His Lordship in Council the patient endurance and the Christian resignation which have been evinced by the women of this garrison. They have animated us by their example. Many, alas! have been made widows, and their children fatherless, in this cruel struggle. But all such seem resigned to the will of Providence, and many, among whom may be mentioned the honoured names of Birch, of Polchampton, of Barbor, and of Gall, have, after the example of Miss Nightingale, constituted themselves the tender and solicitous nurses of the wounded and dying soldiers in the hospital.

"It only remains for me to bring to the favourable notice of His Lordship in Council the names of those officers who have most distinguished themselves, and afforded me the most valuable assistance in these operations. Many of the best and bravest of these now rest from their labours. Among them are Lieutenant-Colonel Case and Captain Radeliffe, whose services have already been narrated; Captain Francis, 13th N.I.,—who was killed by a round-shot—had particularly attracted the attention of Sir H. Lawrence for his conduct while in command of the Machchi Bhawan; Captain Fulton, of the Engineers, who also was struck by a round-shot, had, up to the time of his early and lamented death, afforded me the most invaluable aid; he was, indeed, indefatigable. Major Anderson, the Chief Engineer, though, from the commencement of the siege, incapable of physical exertion from the effects of the disease under which he eventually sank, merited my warm acknowledgments for his able counsel; Captain Simons, Commandant of Artillery, distinguished himself at Chinhut, where he received two wounds, which ended in his death; Lieutenants Shepherd and Arthur, 7th Light Cavalry, who were killed at their posts; Captain Hughes, 57th N.I., who was mortally wounded at the capture of a house which formed one of the enemy's outposts; Captain McCabe, of the 32nd Foot, who was killed at the head of his men while leading his fourth sortie; as well as Captain Mansfield, of the same corps, who died of cholera—were all officers who had distinguished themselves highly. Mr. Lucas, too, a gentleman volunteer, and Mr. Boyson, of the Uncovenanted Service—who fell when on the look-out at one of the most perilous outposts—had earned themselves reputations for coolness and gallantry.

"The officers who commanded outposts—Lieutenant-Colonel Master, 7th Light Cavalry; Major Apthorp, 41st N.I.; Captain Gould Weston, 65th N.I.*; Captain Sanders, 41st N.I.; Captain Boileau, 7th Light

* G. G. O., No. 1516, dated, *Fort William, 15th November 1858*: "Major-General Sir J. E. Inglis, K.C.B., formerly commanding Lucknow Garrison, having brought to notice that the name of Captain G. Weston, 65th Regiment Native Infantry, was inadvertently omitted in his despatch of the 26th September, 1857, the Hon. the President of the Council of the Right Hon. the Governor-General of India in Council, with the concurrence of his Lordship,

Cavalry; Captain Gernon, 13th N.I.; Lieutenant Aitken, and Lieutenant Loughnan, of the same corps; Captain Anderson, 25th N.I.; Lieutenant Graydon, 44th N.I.; Lieutenant Langmore, 71st N.I.; and Mr. Schilling, Principal of the Martinière College—have all conducted ably the duties of their onerous position. No further proof of this is necessary than the fact which I have before mentioned, that throughout the whole duration of the siege the enemy were not only unable to take, but they could not even succeed in gaining one inch of the posts commanded by these gallant gentlemen. Colonel Master commanded the critical and important post of the Brigade Mess, on either side of which was an open breach, only flanked by his handful of riflemen and musketeers. Lieutenant Aitken, with the whole of the 13th N.I. which remained to us with the exception of their Sikhs, commanded the Bailey Guard—perhaps the most important position in the whole of the defences; and Lieutenant Langmore, with the remnant of his regiment (the 71st), held a very exposed position between the hospital and the water gate. This gallant and deserving young soldier and his men were entirely without shelter from the weather, both by night and by day.

“My thanks are also due to Lieutenants Anderson, Hutchinson and Innes, of the Engineers, as well as to Lieutenant Tulloch, 58th N.I., and Lieutenant Hay, 48th N.I., who were placed under them to aid in the arduous duties devolving upon that department. Lieutenant Thomas, Madras Artillery, who commanded that arm of the service for some weeks, and Lieutenants Macfarlane and Bonham rendered me the most effectual assistance. I was, however, deprived of the services of the two latter, who were wounded, Lieutenant Bonham no less than three times, early in the siege. Captain Evans, 17th B.N.I., who, owing to the scarcity of Artillery officers, was put in charge of some guns, and was ever to be found at his post.

“Major Lowe, commanding H.M.’s 32nd Regiment; Captain Bassano, Lieutenants Lawrence, Edmonstone, Foster, Harmar, Cook, Clery, Browne, and Charlton, of that corps, have all nobly performed their duty. Every one of these officers, with the exception of Lieutenants Lawrence and Clery, have received one or more wounds of more or less severity. Quartermaster Stribbling, of the same corps, also conducted himself to my satisfaction.

“Captain O’Brien, H.M.’s 84th Foot; Captain Kemble, 41st N.I.; Captain Edgell, 53rd N.I.; Captain Dinning, Lieutenant Sewell, and Lieutenant Worsely, of the 71st N.I.; Lieutenant Warner, 7th L.C.; Ensign Ward, 48th N.I. (who, when most of our Artillery officers were killed or disabled, worked the mortars with excellent effect); Lieutenant Graham, 11th N.I.; Lieutenant Meehan, 4th Oude Locals; and Lie-

desires to rectify that omission, and is pleased to direct that that officer’s name be added to the paragraph commencing with the words ‘the officers who commanded the outposts,’ and inserted after the name of Major Apthorp, 41st Native Infantry. Order Books to be corrected accordingly.”

tenant Keir, 41st N.I., have all done good and willing service throughout the siege, and I trust that they will receive the favourable notice of his Lordship in Council.

"I beg particularly to call the attention of the Government of India to the untiring industry, the extreme devotion and the great skill which have been evinced by Surgeon Scott (superintending surgeon) and Assistant-Surgeon Boyd, of H.M.'s 32nd Foot; Assistant-Surgeon Bird, of the Artillery; Surgeon Campbell, 7th Light Cavalry; Surgeon Brydon, 71st N.I.; Surgeon Ogilvie, Sanitary Commissioner; Assistant-Surgeon Fayrer, Civil Surgeon; Assistant-Surgeon Partridge, 2nd Oude Irregular Cavalry; Assistant-Surgeon Greenhow; Assistant-Surgeon Darby, and by Mr. Apothecary Thompson, in the discharge of their onerous and most important duties.

"Messrs. Thornhill and Capper, of the Civil Service, have been both wounded, and the way in which they, as well as Mr. Martin, the Deputy Commissioner of Lakhnao, conducted themselves, entitles them to a place in this despatch. Captain Carnegie, the Special Assistant Commissioner, whose invaluable services previous to the commencement of the siege, I have frequently heard warmly dilated upon, both by Sir H. Lawrence and by Major Banks, and whose exertions will probably be more amply brought to notice by the Civil authorities on some future occasion, has conducted the office of Provost Marshal to my satisfaction. The Reverend Mr. Harris and the Reverend Mr. Polehampton, Assistant Chaplains, vied with each other in their untiring care and attention to the suffering men. The latter gentleman was wounded in the hospital, and subsequently unhappily died of cholera. Mr. McCrae, of the Civil Engineers, did excellent service at the guns, until he was severely wounded. Mr. Cameron, also, a gentleman who had come to Oudh to enquire into the resources of the country, acquired the whole mystery of mortar practice, and was of the most signal service until incapacitated by sickness. Mr. Marshall, of the Road Department, and other members of the Uncovenanted Service, whose names will, on a subsequent occasion, be laid before the Government of India, conducted themselves bravely and steadily. Indeed, the entire body of these gentlemen have borne themselves well, and have evinced great coolness under fire.

"I have now only to bring to the notice of the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General in Council the conduct of several officers who composed my Staff;—Lieutenant James, Sub-Assistant Commissary-General, was severely wounded by a shot through the knee at Chinhat, notwithstanding which he refused to go upon the sick list, and carried on his most trying duties throughout the entire siege. It is not too much to say that the garrison owe their lives to the exertions and firmness of this officer. Before the struggle commenced, he was ever in the saddle, getting in supplies, and his untiring vigilance in their distribution, after our difficulties had begun, prevented a waste which otherwise, long before the expiration of the eighty-seven days, might have annihilated the force by the slow process of starvation.

“Captain Wilson, 13th N.I., Officiating Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, was ever to be found where shot was flying thickest, and I am at a loss to decide whether his services were most invaluable, owing to the untiring physical endurance and bravery which he displayed, or to his ever-ready and pertinent counsel and advice in moments of difficulty and danger.

“Lieutenant Hardinge—an officer whose achievements and antecedents are well known to the Government of India—has earned fresh laurels by his conduct throughout the siege. He was officiating as Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General and also commanded the Sikh portion of the cavalry of the garrison. In both capacities his services have been invaluable, especially in the latter, for it was owing alone to his tact, vigilance, and bravery, that the Sikh horsemen were induced to persevere in holding a very unprotected post under a heavy fire.

“Lieutenant Barwell, 71st N.I., the Fort Adjutant and officiating Major of Brigade, has proved himself to be an efficient officer.

“Lieutenant Birch, of the 71st N.I., has been my A.D.C. throughout the siege. I firmly believe there never was a better A.D.C. He has been indefatigable, and ever ready to lead a sortie, or to convey an order to a threatened outpost under the heaviest fire. On one of these occasions he received a slight wound on the head. I beg to bring the services of this most promising and intelligent young officer to the favourable consideration of His Lordship in Council.

“I am also much indebted to Mr. Couper, C.S., for the assistance he has, on many occasions, afforded me by his judicious advice. I have, moreover, ever found him most ready and willing in the performance of the military duties assigned to him, however exposed the post or arduous the undertaking. He commenced his career in Her Majesty's Service, and consequently had had some previous experience of military matters. If the road to Káuhpúr had been made clear by the advent of our troops, it was my intention to have deputed this officer to Calcutta, to detail in person the occurrences which have taken place, for the information of the Government of India. I still hope that, when our communications shall be once more unopposed, he may be summoned to Calcutta for this purpose.

“Lastly, I have the pleasure of bringing the splendid behaviour of the soldiers, viz., the men of H.M.'s 32nd Foot, the small detachment of H.M.'s 84th Foot, the European and Native Artillery, the 13th, 48th, and 71st Regiments N.I., and the Sikhs of the respective corps, to the notice of the Government of India. The losses sustained by H.M.'s 32nd, which is now barely three hundred strong; by H.M.'s 84th and by the European Artillery, shew at least that they knew how to die in the cause of their countrymen. Their conduct under the fire, the exposure, and the privations which they have had to undergo, has been throughout most admirable and praiseworthy.

“As another instance of the desperate character of our defence, and the difficulties we have had to contend with, I may mention that the number

of our artillerymen was so reduced that, on the occasion of an attack, the gunners—aided as they were by men of H.M.'s 32nd Foot, and by Volunteers of all classes—had to run from one battery to another wherever the fire of the enemy was hottest, there not being nearly enough men to serve half the number of guns at the same time. In short, at last the number of European gunners was only twenty-four, while we had, including mortars, no less than thirty guns in position.

“With respect to the native troops I am of opinion that their loyalty has never been surpassed. They were indifferently fed and worse housed. They were exposed—especially the 13th Regiment—under the gallant Lieutenant Aitken, to a most galling fire of round-shot and musketry, which materially decreased their numbers. They were so near the enemy that conversation could be carried on between them; every effort, persuasion, promise, and threat was alternately resorted to, in vain, to seduce them from their allegiance to the handful of Europeans, who, in all probability, would have been sacrificed by their desertion. All the troops behaved nobly, and the names of those men of the native force who have particularly distinguished themselves have been laid before Major-General Sir James Outram, G.C.B., who has promised to promote them. Those of the European force will be transmitted in due course for the orders of his Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief.

“In conclusion, I beg leave to express, on the part of myself and the members of this garrison, our deep and grateful sense of the conduct of Major-General Sir J. Outram, G.C.B., of Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B., and of the troops under those officers who so devotedly came to our relief at so heavy a sacrifice of life. We are also repaid for much suffering and privation by the sympathy which our brave deliverers say our perilous and unfortunate position has excited for us in the hearts of our countrymen throughout the length and breadth of Her Majesty's dominions.

“I have, &c.,

(Signed) “J. INGLIS, Colonel,

“H.M.'s 32nd, Brigadier.”

NOTE.—To preserve uniformity I have applied to the spelling of the names of places in the Appendices the system which has been used throughout the work.—G. B. M.





